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This chapter looks at why it would be proper to base the evaluation of WTO’s legitimacy 
mainly on its democratic credentials and the impact of its rules, processes and policies on the 
potential for economic development of its poorer Members.  
There are several perceptions about what legitimacy entails. Buchanan finds that the question 
of legitimacy of global actors exercising public authority is to a large extent, a moral one.1 
Weiler describes that the concept of legitimacy as an evaluative criterion for a polity or an 
institution can be defined both narrowly and broadly; a narrow definition mainly concerns 
formal procedures, such as ratification, while a broad one concerns ‘societal acceptability’ of 
the polity or institution.2 In the words of Suchman, legitimacy is a ‘perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.’3 Aristotle based legitimacy on 
constitutionalism, on justness, the public interest and distributive justice.4 In general terms 
one could thus say that governance is legitimate if it is fair, if it serves the ‘common good’ of 
its respective constituency, is based on its shared norms, and if it protects it against both the 
self-interest of governors and the strategies of special societal interests or the potential 
tyranny of the majority.5 Studies of transnational governance regimes increasingly focus on 
its legitimacy in terms of justice and principled reasoning.6 Nanz claims that an adequate 
constitutionalisation of transnational governance must guarantee that several functional, legal 
and democratic sources of legitimacy merge.7 Researchers have often been criticized for 
using the term legitimacy loosely without defining it and it has been called a blind man’s 
                                                            
1 A. Buchanan, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas, (eds.), The Philosophy of 
International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 80. 
2 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale Law Journal, (1991), pp. 2468-2469. 
3 M. C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, 20 Academy of Management 
Journal, (1995), p. 574. 
4 M. Zeldritch Jr, J. Jost, B. Major, (eds.), The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, 
Justice and Intergoup Relations, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 4. 
5 P. Nanz, ‘Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory’, in C. 
Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann, Constitutionalism, Multilevel Governance and International Economic Law, 
(Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 61.  




hammer.8 Perhaps this is not surprising given the fact that evaluating legitimacy is at its core 
a subjective undertaking, which gives precedence to the researcher’s own value system. It is 
an abstract concept, given reality by multiple actors in the social environment.9  
Apart from the more general question of justness, morality and fairness, three main strands 
appear most relevant to the present study based on the below analysis. Firstly, whether the 
organisation upholds the values of its most important stakeholders, secondly, whether its 
rules and policies fit within the norms and purported goals of the general international legal 
system and thirdly, do its agenda setting and rulemaking processes uphold democratic 
principles. These are in turn intrinsically linked since a gap in the democratic legitimacy of 
the organisation inevitably leads to a gap in the legitimacy of its substantive rules and any 
enforcement thereof. Other strands of legitimacy theory fail to provide a perfect lens for the 
present analysis yet their underlying concepts nevertheless offer valuable tools for the 
subsequent analysis of particular aspects of WTO rules and policy as discussed below. 
 
1. External/Internal Legitimacy and Legitimacy of Origin/Exercise 
Governmental legitimacy consists of its internal and external aspects. The internal, which 
depends on the perception of its subjects, is usually related to the achievement of social and 
distributive justice – a so-called government for the people – which in turn creates stability 
and obedience.10 The external aspect, on the other hand, is a matter of how it is perceived by 
other international authorities.11 In theory, internal legitimacy influences external 
legitimacy.12 In practice, one can observe rather that when geopolitical interests dictate states 
to forge alliances or create enemies, the myth of internal (il)legitimacy is pushed regardless 
of the population’s actual perception of their governments to achieve external illegitimacy 
and enable interference into the affairs of sovereign states. 
                                                            
8 R. C. Hybels ‘On Legitimacy, Legitimation, and Organizations: A Critical Review and Integrative Theoretical 
Model,’ Academy of Management Journal Special Issue, (1995), p. 214. 
9 M.V. Tilling, ‘Refinements to Legitimacy Theory in Social and Environmental Accounting’, 4 Commerce 
Research Paper Series No 04-6, (2004), p. 4. 
10 I. Shapiro, Democratic Justice, (Yale University Press, 1999); This is also known as ‘output legitimacy’ as 
opposed to ‘input legitimacy’ (government by the people), see W. Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy and the Multi-Actor 
Polity’, in M. Egeberg & P. Lægreid (eds.), Organizing Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen 268, 
(Scandinavian University Press, 1999). I. Shapiro, Democratic Justice, (Yale University Press, 1999). 
11 S. Talmon, ‘Who Is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria for Governmental 
Legitimacy in International Law’, in G. S. Goodwin-Gill & S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality of International Law: 
Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie, (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 509-17. 
12 M. Weber, Economy and Society, (Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 31; J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined (University of London, 1832), pp. 200-201; T. M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance’, 86 American Journal of International Law, (1992), pp. 46, 48; R. Grafstein, ‘The Legitimacy of 
Political Institutions’, 14 Polity, (1981) p. 51. 
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A distinction has further been drawn between a government’s legitimacy of origin and its 
legitimacy of exercise. In the age of democracy, legitimacy of origin has been understood as 
living up to some democratic standards. While the legitimacy of origin has been the classical 
measure for evaluating the legitimacy of governments, recent practice has seemingly shifted 
towards a concern about the legitimacy of exercise.13 While this seems commendable in 
theory, in practice it has led to a regime-change frenzy where the ultimate factor rendering 
states vulnerable to foreign intervention is neither their lack of democratic credentials, nor 
their lack of internal legitimacy, but rather their refusal to play along with the economic and 
geopolitical interests of the powerful. On the other hand, states that do play along do not get 
their legitimacy challenged despite their vast and profound human rights abuses and an 
absolute lack of democracy and freedom of thought, expression and political activism. 
Furthermore in no perceivable future can one expect a serious international condemnation of 
the lack of legitimacy of origin of the US ruling system itself in light of their undemocratic 
practices, such as the weighed voting system of superdelegates, rigged primaries that 
seemingly cannot be challenged in court, legalised bribery of mainstream media and 
politicians14 all the way to the electoral colleague system, which has granted victory to the 
loser of the popular vote several times.  
The first connection between this discussion and the WTO is that theoretically, if Member 
governments are legitimate then the WTO should also be legitimate.15 However, if they are 
not, this already creates a legitimacy gap for the organisation. As Pogge claims, Nigeria’s 
accession to the WTO was affected by its military dictator Sani Abacha, Myanmar’s 
accession by the SLORC junta, Indonesia’s accession by Suharto, Zimbabwe’s accession by 
Mugabe and the Congo’s succession by Mobutu Sese Seko. These rulers’ success in 
subjecting people to their rule does not give them the moral authority to consent on their 
behalf – nor does such success entitle us to treat the populations of these countries as if they 
had consented through their rulers’ signatures.16 If governments entering unfavourable WTO 
deals violated the right to self-determination of their peoples, such deals would legitimately 
be put up for scrutiny and re-evaluation based on this fact. One could go further and observe 
that only 19 countries are now considered to be full democracies. As of 2016, the US is no 
longer considered a full democracy as popular confidence in the functioning of public 
                                                            
13 J. d’Aspremont and E. De Brabandere, ‘The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy In International Law: The 
Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise,’ 34 Fordham International Law Journal, (2011), p. 191. 
14 US Supreme Court, Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. (January 21, 2010). 
15 S. Cho, ‘A Quest for WTO’s Legitimacy’, 4 World Trade Review, (2005), p. 392. 
16 T.W. Pogge, Politics as Usual, (Polity Press, 2010), p. 41. 
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institutions has declined.17 With a clearer perception of reality this popular confidence should 
have faded long ago. It is further clear, that the general public is increasingly aware of the 
illusion of democracy and the fact that especially in the area of trade, deals are being agreed 
to mainly at the dictate and for the benefit of large corporations and are neither by the people 
nor for the people.  
Secondly, the tests for governmental democratic legitimacy should have equivalents 
applicable to the governance and decision-making of international institutions themselves. 
Some find that when it comes to legitimacy of governance ‘beyond the national state’ it is 
hard to determine the relevant constituency (is it the state members or the citizens of these 
members), the proper location of its legitimacy, the appropriate criteria to determine it and 
most importantly, the very meaning of the concept – issues which have come to the fore as a 
master question in international relations.18 The internal/external distinction of legitimacy is 
not readily applicable to international organisations, because strictly speaking there is no 
subject-sovereign relationship between individuals and international organisations. Yet 
individuals are the final recipients and users of the adopted rules and regulations and should 
thus be given a sense of ownership in the process.19  
Contrary to the trend with national governments, in terms of international organisations, the 
shift has been in the direction from a concern about the legitimacy of exercise towards a 
concern about the legitimacy of origin.20 In the absence of direct legitimacy of origin and the 
absence of a periodical legitimacy or accountability test through direct elections or any other 
mechanism, the legitimacy of international organisations has been addressed through the way 
in which the functions are exercised: i.e. the procedures followed and whether the decisions 
are in line with the legal obligations of the organisation stemming from the application of 
international law and the organisation’s constitution.21 Furthermore, in this context not only 
the question of how power is bestowed upon such institutions, but also participation in both 
decision-making and dispute settlement processes forms an important part of the debate.22  
                                                            
17 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2016, available at: 
https://infographics.economist.com/2017/DemocracyIndex/, (last accessed: 8.7.2017). 
18 Nanz, supra note 5, pp. 61- 62. 
19 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Loming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?,’ 93 American Journal of International Law, (1999), p.617  
20 d’Aspremont, supra note 13, p. 220. 
21 Ibid. 
22 N. Matz, ‘Financial Institutions between Effectiveness and Legitimacy – A Legal Analysis of the World 
Bank, Global Environment Facility and Prototype Carbon Fund’, 5 International Environmental Agreements, 
(2005), pp. 271-272. 
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Contemporary international law has expanded its scope, loosened its link to state consent and 
strengthened compulsory adjudication and enforcement mechanisms.23 The Westphalian 
model according to which law used to be divided strictly between (internal) state law whose 
legitimacy rested on the institutionalization of democratic procedures and (external) inter-
nation law that relied on sovereign consent for legitimate law-making, has partially collapsed 
in the recent history.24 Such a two-track model can thus not answer today’s questions of the 
legitimacy and authority of increasingly intrusive global law norms.25 According to 
Wheatley, the new model can only be legitimate under the condition that the scope and 
content of international law norms is subject to the democratic will of all states and more 
importantly not only considered at the moment of adoption.26 Wheatley develops his theory 
based on Habermas’ model of deliberative democracy, which presumes an absence of 
objective truth that could determine the ‘right policy’ and therefore only political truths can 
be established; this should happen through rational discourses grounded in reasoned 
arguments around what is equally good for all, and where positions are accepted as legitimate 
only when agreed through un-coerced discussions by those affected by the outcomes and not 
when they are merely the preference of the majority.27 With the precondition that all 
participants have an equal opportunity to exercise influence in the process and have an equal 
chance of prevailing, the first aim is to convince the others with arguments, however if 
consensus cannot be reached, the relationship shifts from discourse to bargaining, where 
compromises are acceptable in principle to all participants.28 Applying this to the system of 
governance beyond the state, the laws of the international community of states enjoy 
democratic legitimacy where agreed through a rational process of diplomatic deliberations in 
which outcomes are agreed to by all states affected by the relevant international law norms. 
States may interact through the use of bargaining where each tries to maximise its 
preferences; rhetoric, where each attempts to persuade others that they should change their 
positions; and arguing with the aim of achieving a reasoned consensus.29 The preconditions 
here are that the participants must have the ability to empathize; share a common 
                                                            
23 M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis,’ 15 European 
Journal of International Law, (2004), p. 911. 
24 S. Wheatley ‘A Democratic Rule of International Law’, 22 European Journal of International Law, (2011), p. 
527. 
25 Ibid, p. 527. 
26 Ibid. 
27 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. 
William Rehg, (1996), p.104 in ibid, p. 535. 
28 Ibid. 




understanding of the world; a common system of norms and rules perceived as legitimate; 
must recognize each other as equals and have equal access to the discourse which must also 
be open to other participants and be public in nature.30 However the reality is that the 
differences in power between the actors on the international scene make it impossible to 
apply this model. Truth-seeking or the formation of rules according to communicative reason 
is affected by restricting access to the deliberations and by limiting what counts as a good 
argument.31 Ideas are presented as automatically carrying more weight if brought forward by 
more powerful actors which furthermore adjust their arguments based on their interests and 
thus fail to display the necessary argumentative consistency.32 As chapters IV and V of this 
thesis show, the WTO is far from a forum which would provide for utopic bargaining 
conditions. It is clear that Members of the WTO are not equally powerful in the discussions 
and do not have an equal chance of prevailing. Essentially even the nature of bargaining is 
not presented for what it is, as the agendas are advanced mostly under the guise of being 
‘beneficial for all’ to enhance perceived legitimacy. Even though the WTO is a Member-
driven organization, Members themselves often blame the WTO system itself, not merely 
other Members for various alleged failures and poor performance, concerning either the 
negotiations or the DSM.33 
 
2. Expanding the Legitimacy of Origin 
The expanding reach of international law also means that the general public is directly 
impacted by it, more so than it has ever been which demands an increased participation of the 
public itself. The strengthened impact of WTO and its DSM on the policy space of states and 
their far-reaching influence on the daily lives of citizens of these states, their human rights 
and the right to development, has brought about an increased attention to the legitimacy of 
this institution and a call for a meaningful participation of the public to complement the 
legitimacy of origin currently primarily based on the consent of states.34 This has shifted the 
question of WTO’s legitimacy to one which corresponds with the acceptability of the 
organisation by the extended society.35 In his recent report on the WTO, the UN Independent 
                                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 Wheatley, supra note, 24, p. 538. 
32 Ibid. 
33 S. Cho, supra note 15, p. 392. 
34 d’Aspremont, supra note 13, p. 224. 
35 S. Charnovitz, ‘Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 American Journal of International Law, 
(2002), pp. 28-29; S. Ostry, ‘The WTO and International Governance’, in K. G. Deutsch and B. Speyer (eds), 
‘The World Trade Organization Millennium Round: Freer Trade in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2001), 
pp. 285, 290, 293. 
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Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, Mr Alfred de 
Zayas, called for national human rights institutions and civil society organisations to assist in 
conducting human rights, health and environmental impact assessments of all commercial 
treaties and disseminate this information amongst the public based on which referendums 
should then be held.36 Despite this seemingly good idea, one cannot but question its 
practicality. How many questions would be put forward to the electorate? Could the 
electorate ever be truly informed enough to decide on intricate deals or would they instead be 
presented with an oversimplified in/out decision, bringing potentially more harm than good? 
Yet, the values of the general public have to be taken into account for the WTO to enjoy 
organisational legitimacy, one way or another. 
 
3. Strategic Legitimacy Theory and Relevant Stakeholders  
At an organisational level, legitimacy refers to a process by which an organisation seeks 
approval or avoidance of sanctions from groups in society.37 Organisational legitimacy is 
considered to exist when the activities of the organisation correspond to the norms of 
acceptable behaviour in the larger societal system of which they are a part: when an actual or 
even just potential disparity exists between the two there will exist a threat to organisational 
legitimacy.38 Legitimacy is an operational resource without which there can be dire 
consequences for an organisation.39  
Part of legitimacy theory is examining the relevant stakeholders of an organisation and the 
resources they control. In a domestic framework the stakeholders of an organisation would be 
the state, the public, the financial community and the media.40 There is no equivalent to a 
government or state providing a general legal framework in the international sphere, so in 
terms of WTO’s stakeholders one can only speak of Member states and perhaps the UN, as a 
parallel. Apart from that, other stakeholders can be categorised as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the media and the general public. Thus the WTO has to maintain 
legitimacy in the eyes of all these stakeholders. The UN as a stakeholder continues to issue 
development goals for the international community, including the WTO. Unsurprisingly the 
WTO thus presents itself as working in line with said goals and claims its legitimacy in this 
                                                            
36 UN, Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, 
Alfred Maurice de Zayas, Human Rights Council, Thirty-third session, A/HRC/33/40, 2016, p. 22, para. 102. 
37 S.E. Kaplan and R.G. Ruland ‘Positive Theory, Rationality and Accounting Regulation’, 2 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, (1991), p. 370. 
38 M. R. Matthews, Sociallly Responsible Accounting, (Chapham & Hall, 1993). 
39 Suchman, supra note 3 pp. 575-576. 
40 Hybels, supra note 8, p. 244. 
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regard to avoid any perceived conflict.41 However one can perceive the UN as an external 
entity only to a limited extent in the first place, since the Member states of both organisations 
are essentially the same and the same power structures exist in both. In other words, while 
WTO’s claim to legitimacy is seemingly there to satisfy the UN, a more accurate observation 
would be that the goals set out by the UN are already formulated in a way not to pose a 
substantive challenge to WTO’s claim to legitimacy in the first place. This is analysed further 
in the next chapter. 
The real challenge rather comes from elsewhere, most notably developing Member states, 
NGOs, the academia and the general public. It is important to note from the organisational 
legitimacy theory that legitimacy is a dynamic construct and an organisation can lose its 
legitimacy if it does not adapt to changing community expectations. The legitimacy of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was based on its initial Membership and on 
being in line with the needs of that Membership. With the expansion of the Membership and 
the transformation into the WTO, the needs of the Membership were not as uniform as before 
and the affected communities had new expectations and concerns. While from the 23 original 
contracting parties of the GATT, only 10 were developing countries, the ratio has changed 
through the years to the point where at the moment more than 70% of the Membership 
consists of developing countries. Development can fairly be described as the most important 
and legitimate interest of these countries, thus making it the most important issue for the 
majority of the WTO Membership.  
The organisation has tried to keep up the appearance of its legitimacy with symbolic 
assurances that all is well and in accordance with everybody’s needs, while maintaining the 
same philosophy as before and merely expanding its reach.  There have been only cosmetic 
changes but no serious rethinking of the system in light of the new Membership and the needs 
of their economies and communities.  
There exists an acknowledgement of a legitimacy gap at the WTO.42 Legitimacy has been 
seen as one of the main challenges for the WTO since its creation, generating a great deal of 
debates and reactions among scholars and politicians alike.43 Different factors have 
contributed to this. While representatives of developing Member states claim they have been 
excluded from vital stages in the decision making processes, representatives of civil society 
                                                            
41 See WTO, ‘DG Azevêdo presents Ban Ki-Moon with WTO Agreement contributing to UN Development 
Goals’, (10 November 2016), available at:https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dgra_10nov16_e.htm, 
(last accessed: 8.7.2017). 
42 d’Aspremont, supra note 13, p. 225. 
43 Cho, supra note, 15, p. 391. 
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criticise the organization's lack of consideration of non-state and non-corporate interests in 
decision making and dispute settlement procedures, thus lacking a genuine legitimacy of 
origin.44 Esty describes WTO's lack of legitimacy as linked to the difficult societal 
acceptance of the institution and its policies.45 In this sense, the WTO lacks not only the 
above described legitimacy of origin but the legitimacy of exercise as well. In 2005 the WTO 
issued a Consultative Report (also known as the Sutherland Report) in an attempt to identify 
the WTO’s institutional challenges inextricably linked to the fundamental question of the 
legitimacy of WTO as a system, not necessarily as a mere gathering of – at the time – 148 
Members. Although the report addressed NGO concerns regarding transparency, it did not 
pay due attention to the general public, i.e. the actual and potential ‘users’ of the WTO 
system.46 Since then however, there has been a notable effort by the organisation to win over 
the general public with its elaborate website, public forums and other PR. 
 
4. Justice, Common Good and the Core Values of Humanity 
Similarly to Wheatley, Rousseau linked legitimacy to the will of the people, which is based 
on a democratic conception, and it is merely a question of what the stakeholders have decided 
together in their sovereign assembly. On the other hand the ‘general will’ is an incarceration 
of the citizens’ common interest that exists in abstraction of what any of them actually want.47 
According to him, under the right conditions and subject to the right procedures, the 
legislators will then be led to converge on laws that correspond to the common interest. As 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed in the context of the WTO, ‘instead of global 
rules, negotiated by all, in the interest of all, and adhered to by all, there is too much closed-
door decision-making, too much protection of special interests, and too many broken 
promises.’48 Yet to an extent creating the ‘right conditions and procedures’ is always utopic. 
Therefore a shift to a focus on the substance of the rules themselves, and whether they are 
indeed in the common interest, is necessary for an evaluation of their legitimacy. In this vein, 
Pogge dismisses propositions that free and competent consent of states to common rules is 
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the ultimate legitimizing factor.49 Even though circumstances such as weaker states 
negotiating under duress, lacking the expertise to work out whether it would be better for 
them to accept the asymmetrical rules, or to stay outside the agreements, or their bargaining 
power being negatively affected by historical crimes such as colonialism, are mostly also 
present – these are not the decisive questions, but rather the fairness or unfairness of the rules 
themselves when it comes to evaluating them.50 Regardless of the process according to which 
they were agreed upon the only morally relevant question about the rules is whether they do 
wrong to any state which has signed up to them.51 Posing substantial obstacles to 
development and exacerbating inequality would present such a ‘wrong’. In this sense Joseph 
calls for an adjustment of the mechanisms for free trade, which in her opinion have sustained 
if not created a system of astonishing global inequity,52 while de Zayas would like to see a 
WTO, which places people before profits and development before the expansion of 
monopolies.53 There is widespread concern and considerable anxiety about potential harmful 
effects of globalisation on several issues from jobs and wages in the developed world to the 
global and local ecosystems and the impact on world poverty and hunger, the livelihood of 
hundreds of millions of small farmers and the economic development of developing 
countries.54 In the 90s and 2000s many people expressed their dissatisfaction with and the 
rejection of economic globalisation and international trade through large and often violent 
street demonstrations in Seattle, Prague, Montreal, Cancun, Washington, Hong Kong, 
Geneva, Genoa, Zurich and other cities around the world. Even though one cannot see such 
protests very often anymore, the debate on the benefits and dangers of economic 
liberalisation and international trade is more relevant than ever in light of reoccurring 
economic crises and growing inequality.55 Rodrik claims that it was the anti-globalisation 
protesters who may have had only limited success in blocking world trade negotiations or 
disrupting the meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that have nevertheless 
irrevocably altered the terms of the debate: ‘Poverty is now the defining issue for both sides. 
The captains of the world economy have conceded that progress in international trade and 
finance has to be measured against the yardsticks of poverty alleviation and sustainable 
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development.’56 As Lester et al. describe, it is safe to say that most people would like to see 
throughout the developing world countries to develop, ‘that is, go from being poor to rich 
(generally speaking, through industrialisation).’57 In other words, development throughout the 
globe and not just in affluent countries can be identified as a common interest and one of the 
core values of the general public.  
 
5. Adherence to a Normative Hierarchy and Community  
Professor Hart has been one of the main critics of the international system and what he saw as 
its lack of a ‘unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and providing general 
criteria for the identification of its rules.’58 He wished to see something equivalent to a 
constitution which would be the ultimate set of rules against which the validity of all other 
rules would be tested. In his book Politics, Aristotle gave one of the first descriptions of 
legitimacy. 59  One of the main elements he elaborated on was constitutionalism, whereby the 
authority of government derives from and is limited by a body of higher/fundamental law for 
the protection of interests of citizens, including minorities. What Franck rightly points out, 
however, is that the UN Charter does present one of the most obvious such ‘rules of 
recognition’ and that states perceive themselves to be participants in a structured process of 
continual interaction that is governed by such ‘secondary rules’: 
If the international community were merely a playing field of which states engaged in various random, 
or opportunistic, exchanges or interactions, it would be easy to conclude that this was a truly primitive 
aggregation, a rabble, lacking the organizing structure of secondary rules of process and, of course, an 
ultimate secondary rule… The international community, however, is demonstrably not like that.60 
 
If the UN Charter is indeed such a rule of recognition comparable to constitutions in the 
domestic system, then it does not merely determine procedural rules but should also impact 
them substantively. All international organisations, including the WTO need to conform to 
the UN Charter which includes setting out an agenda which does not hinder the achievement 
of human rights and development.61 The Charter contains the pledge of all UN Members to 
take joined and separate action in cooperation with the UN to promote ‘higher standards of 
living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development’ 
‘[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
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for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples.’62 
Economic development further presents one of the main components of the international 
environmental agenda. The notion of sustainable development started to emerge in the 
consciousness of the international community after the costs to the environment from 
industrialisation and over-use of natural resources became ever increasingly apparent. From 
the very beginning however, the concern for the environment included the concern for the 
needs of poorer countries.63 In this sense the landmark document in defining sustainable 
development, i.e. The Report of the Commission on Environment and Development, entitled 
Our Common Future,64 calls for policies to take into account the problems related to social 
and economic development alongside the problems related to environmental degradation in a 
manner that would enable humanity to meet the needs of the present without compromising 
the fulfilment of the needs of future generations. It describes the concept of sustainable 
development in the following way: 
The concept of sustainable development [implies] limitations imposed by the present state of technology 
and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the 
effects of human activities. But technology and social organization can be both managed and improved to 
make way for a new era of economic growth… widespread poverty is no longer inevitable. Poverty is not 
only an evil in itself, but sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to 
all the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a better life. A world in which poverty is endemic will 
always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes…65 
 
The need for poverty alleviation is thus not only seen as morally necessary but as an 
inevitable part of preventing ecological catastrophes. The idea here is that growth and efforts 
at improving technology should be geared towards a model that does not necessitate the 
destruction of the environment. More recently, the concern over climate change has stepped 
into the forefront of international efforts for environmental protection. Several documents, 
dealing with this issue also recognize the connection between tackling climate change and 
economic development and call for the responses to the danger of global warming to be 
conducted in a manner that is economically beneficial to the developing country in question. 
In this sense, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) 
'specifically recognizes that the problem of climate change cannot be looked at in isolation 
and that there are close inter-linkages between social economic development and measures to 
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address climate change'.66 The document further envisions the responses to climate change to 
be such that they avoid harming social and economic development and are rather integrated 
with national development programmes taking into account both the legitimate priority of the 
needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the fact 
that economic development is in turn essential for adopting measures to address climate 
change.67 The application of new technologies should furthermore be done in a manner that is 
economically and socially beneficial to the developing country.68 Similarly the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution adopted in 2012 in connection with the Rio+20 
Outcome Document The Future We Want, in paragraph 3 calls for the mainstreaming of 
sustainable development at all levels, integrating economic, environmental and social aspects 
and recognising their interlinkages, so as to achieve sustainable development in all its 
dimensions.69 In paragraph 4 it furthermore states that: 'We recognize poverty eradication, 
changing unsustainable and promoting sustainable patterns of consumption and production 
and protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development 
are the overarching objectives of and essential requirements for sustainable development. We 
also reaffirm the need to achieve sustainable development by promoting sustained, inclusive 
and equitable economic growth, creating greater opportunities for all, reducing inequalities, 
raising basic standards of living, fostering equitable social development and inclusion, and 
promoting the integrated and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems 
that supports, inter alia, economic, social and human development while facilitating 
ecosystem conservation, regeneration and restoration and resilience in the face of new and 
emerging challenges.' Therefore the concept of sustainable development and environmental 
agreements such as the above mentioned, clearly recognise the link between the protection of 
the environment and poverty eradication.  
 
6. Development as the Enabler of a Progressive Realisation of all Human Rights 
The additional importance of the international system, including the WTO to work towards 
the respect of the opportunity to develop is the nature of development as the enabler of the 
progressive realisation of all human rights. The relationship between human rights, especially 
economic and social rights, and development is not hard to grasp. The first cannot sustainably 
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grow in meaning or sometimes even exist without the latter. Eleanor Roosevelt recognised 
this and wrote in one of her columns about the talks in the Human Rights Commission 
preparing the first draft of an international bill of human rights on the inevitable relationship 
between a progressive conception of a freedom from want and the opportunity for 
development: 
In the various proposed bills which have been sent in to us, we have listed the right to food, to shelter, 
to medical care, to health, to education, and a number of other similar rights, which all really are 
covered by the general term "freedom from want." … The representative from the United Kingdom is 
very much troubled by the fact that, while you can write a bill of human rights, it will mean nothing to 
various parts of the world where people are still in a state which will not allow them to enjoy many of 
these rights. It is quite obvious that the people of Borneo do not have exactly the same conception of 
rights and freedoms as do the people of New York City or London. 
Therefore, we will have to bear in mind that we are writing a bill of rights for the world, and that one 
of the most important rights is the opportunity for development. As people grasp that opportunity, they 
can also demand new rights if these are broadly defined.70 
 
Most Member states of the WTO are parties to universal and regional human rights treaties, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights. The principle of pacta sunt servanda 
requires these States to fulfil their human rights treaty obligations in good faith and prohibits 
them from entering into agreements that would delay, circumvent, undermine or make 
impossible the fulfilment of their human rights treaty obligations, which includes the right to 
self-determination, to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. The regional human rights systems, the convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Arts. 5, 6, 8 to 11, 13 and 14) the 
European Social Charter, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights establish binding obligations that require proactive 
measures of implementation and affirmative action to counteract engrained inequalities and 
the sequels of colonialism and discrimination. In this vein three UN experts have called for 
human rights obligations to be reaffirmed in the context of global trade rules to ensure that 
‘WTO negotiations and rules support development efforts to eliminate the root causes of 
hunger, ill-health, and poverty.’71 In this sense, to this day, proponents of the right to 
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development assert not merely its relevance but also its primacy.72 Fukuda-Parr contends that 
the RTD remains ‘highly relevant to the real and concrete challenges to human rights in an 
increasingly integrated and unequal world of the twenty-first century’ and its claim to a 
socially just economic system is even more important now then ever, as globalization 
proceeds at a rapid pace.73 In terms of ensuring a progressive realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights, States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) bear the responsibility of providing for it. If they lack national 
resources for such a progressive realisation they ‘have an obligation to seek international 
cooperation and assistance.’74 This was indicated by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in reference to the right to just and favourable conditions of work75 in 
addition to the many references to international cooperation and/or assistance incorporated in 
nearly all of its General Comments.76 Since development is a prerequisite for such a 
progressive realisation of rights, this would inevitably imply a duty on the part of developing 
countries to demand a more pro-developmental international economic order as well as a duty 
of those developed countries that have signed up to the ICESCR to sincerely cooperate in this 
regard. In other words, human rights obligations give additional weight to a demand for an 
international economic system which is constructive to developmental needs of poorer 
countries.   
 
7. Right to Development as Part of the WTO  
Based on the analysis of this thesis, the present author advocates for the incorporation of the 
right to development into the WTO system as a constitutional norm and as part of the 
legitimate interests which can be protected using exceptions to general rules to contribute to 
the legitimacy of the organisation and to further address the current deficiencies surrounding 
the recognition and enforcement of the RTD in international law. 
There is cause and space to revitalize the RTD in international law beyond existing 
international law instruments. Developed countries have refused to recognise development as 
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a right, mainly to avoid any obligations on their part or changes in the mechanism of global 
trade and finance that are, in fact, central to the ability of developing states to enforce 
it.77 When the Declaration on the Right to Development (DRTD) was voted on, it quite 
unsurprisingly received a negative vote from the US. This was the only negative vote, 
however eight other developed countries abstained, namely the UK, Western Germany, 
Iceland, Israel, Finland, Sweden and Japan. The US, and several other Western countries 
objected to the notion of a RTD on the grounds that it failed to give due attention to economic 
liberties and entrepreneurship, that it was related to questionable economic and social rights, 
and that it was conceptually confusing and conflicted jurisdictionally with trade and other 
international issues.78 In other words, while developed countries continuously speak of their 
commitment to development they were reluctant to formally accept it as a legally binding 
right since that would shift the power from developed to developing countries in setting the 
international agenda for development. In December of 2016, the Declaration celebrated 30 
years of existence. Since being adopted, it has further been reaffirmed in several international 
documents and fora, including at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, which 
resulted in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action containing more than ten 
references to the RTD and/or the DRTD.79 In the same year, the UN General Assembly 
established the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights, tasked among other things 
with promoting and protecting ‘the realization of the right to development’, and the Preamble 
to the Resolution reaffirmed ‘that the right to development is a universal and inalienable right 
which is a fundamental part of the rights of the human person.’80 The Office of the High 
Commissioner has since created and serviced many bodies, such as various 
Intergovernmental Working Groups on the Right to Development,81 a UN Independent 
Expert on the Right to Development82 and a High-level Task Force on the Implementation of 
the Right to Development (2004-2010).83 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
adopted at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit further pledged the realization of the RTD in a 
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commitment ‘to make the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire 
human race from want’.84 Following this, the Monterrey Consensus, resulting from the 
International Conference on Finance and Development, emphasised the commitment on the 
part of the international community to support the development efforts of developing 
countries through international cooperation.85 In 2015, at the Addis Ababa Third International 
Conference on Finance for Development, a ‘strong political commitment’ was confirmed to 
create an enabling environment for sustainable development at all levels in the spirit of global 
partnership and solidarity.86 Most recently the so-called Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) have been endorsed in a UN General Assembly Resolution, which judging by its 
predecessor the MDGs have the potential to generate enormous momentum. Despite the 
evolution and continued relevance of the concept of the RTD its implementation and 
operationalization has been hindered a great deal by political controversy and considerations, 
especially in the context of international trade arrangements. This thesis thus finds the 
necessity of creating additional normative frameworks to improve the operationalization of 
the RTD, especially in its dimension of ensuring a just international economic system in the 
sphere of trade.  
The next section looks at the historical evolution, nature and substance of the RTD and 
highlights where the current legal framework is insufficient and why incorporating the RTD 
into the WTO system would have the potential of drastically improving its enforceability.87 In 
chapter III special consideration is given to the Sustainable Development Goals, the 
fulfilment of which according to Khor, ‘would go a long way to realizing the right to 
development’ yet acknowledging at the same time that ‘there are limitations to the set of 
SDGs and to the SDG approach.’88 The African example of an enforceable RTD is 
highlighted as a model which needs to spread from its regional basis to the international 
system. In the context of trade, the WTO is the natural candidate for the RTD to be 
incorporated in its legal system and thus ensure its enforceability. In fact the Human Rights 
Council recently appointed a Special Rapporteur on the RTD, mandated with engaging and 
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supporting efforts to mainstream the right to development in trade institutions, among other 
bodies and agencies.89  
The WTO does not deny its responsibility in ensuring the RTD. In fact not only in its 
Preamble, but throughout its publications and press releases, the WTO intensively nurtures 
the image of pursuing an agenda which is essentially aligned with the development of its 
poorest Members. In the lead up to the final formulation of the SDGs, the Director General 
issued a statement expressing his own conviction as well as that of the WTO and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that trade was one of the key 
enablers of inclusive and sustainable development and concluded that it therefore had to play 
a central role in the context of the Post-2015 Development Agenda.90 The Director General 
further pledged to the UN Secretary-General, the WTO’s ‘full engagement and support in this 
effort’.91 Similarly in the context of climate change which is intrinsically linked to 
development,92 the Deputy Director-General stated that the two weeks of negotiations leading 
up to the Paris Agreement (COP21) were only the start of a common endeavour in which all 
stakeholders have to contribute, including the international trade community. He further 
expressed the need to create a virtuous circle of trade and environmental policies which 
promote sustainable production and consumption while being pro-growth and 
development.’93 After the last WTO Ministerial, the Director-General solemnly presented the 
Agreement reached to the Secretary-General of the UN as ‘a collective and historic 
contribution to delivering on a key target of the Sustainable Development Goals’ and further 
pointed out a number of other important areas of the SDGs where trade can make a difference 
that Members have already begun discussing.94 On the link between UN Development Goals 
and the WTO he stated: 
Trade was vital in meeting the Millennium Development Goal to cut extreme poverty by half. I have no 
doubt that trade will be just as important in delivering the new Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
Thus it is undisputed that the regulation of trade should contribute to and not hinder the 
potential for sustainable development and poverty alleviation. That being said, there is plenty 
                                                            
89 UN, Human Rights Council, ‘Resolution on the Right to Development’, UN Doc. A/HRC/33/L.29, (Sept. 27, 
2016), para. 14 (c). 
90 WTO, ‘Trade Must Play a Central Role in post-2015 International Work on Development, Azevêdo tells 
UNCTAD meeting’ (4 April 2014), available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra13_e.htm, (last 
accessed: 8.7.2017).  
91 Ibid. 
92 This is despite a notable lack of mention of this fact in the UNDRTD. 
93 WTO, ‘Deputy Directors-General DDG Brauner urges trade community to build on COP21 momentum and 
support climate action,’ (9 December 2015), available 
at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/ddgra_09dec15_e.htm), (last accessed: 8.7.2017). 
94 WTO, supra note 41. 
41 
 
of dispute regarding the way trade should or should not be regulated in order to provide 
potential for development as discussed in chapter III. Furthermore the exact nature of the 
obligations involved and of the modes of implementation of the RTD as envisioned in the 
DRTD have been the subject of intense debate for at least the last thirty years.95 This has 
enabled the discourse to sway away from a large part of the RTDs originally intended 
meaning and there is need to bring it back to its roots. 
 
8. Right to Development as a Tool to Transform International Economic Relations 
The concept of a RTD is unsurprisingly of developing country (particularly African) origin. 
A look at the conceptual roots of the RTD gives us an insight into what its intended nature 
was before its meaning became diluted in the international discourse. One of the first 
instances of its mention was at the Conference of the Group of 77 by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Senegal: 
[t]he old colonial past, of which the present is merely an extension, should be denounced. In favour of a 
new right. Just as, in the developed nations, the right to education, health, employment has been 
proclaimed for individuals, we must proclaim, loud and clear, the right to development for the nations of 
the Third World.96  
 
The call here was clear: the only way for real self-determination is to resist colonialism, neo-
colonialism and their negative effects, by demanding the right to move away from them in a 
meaningful manner. Not long after, in 1969, Cardinal Duval, Archbishop of Algiers also 
declared that:  
the right to development should be proclaimed for the Third World… as a right of peoples of a social, 
subjective kind, entailing the recognition and implementation of objective rules in the domain of public 
international law97  
 
The Cardinal rightly pointed out the gist of the matter: to move away from politics into an 
objective determination of international law rules which would take into account the needs 
of development. The inclusion of the RTD into the WTO legal system as proposed in this 
thesis would seek to bring such objectivity into the currently highly politicised international 
trade law. In the 1960s and 1970s the discourse among the RTD proponents, perhaps the 
most significant of whom was Senegalese Jurist Kéba M’Baye, linked the right mainly with 
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the longstanding demands of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), where the 
emphasis was on the obligations of the international community rather than those of states.98 
The debate revolved around ‘the lack of democracy at the international level and the 
resulting concentration of economic and political power of the North; the rigged rules of the 
system which worked against developing countries; the precarious condition of self-
determination in developing countries; the lack of effective sovereignty over natural 
resources due to the aggressive interventionist policies of powerful countries; ant the 
prevalence of structural conditions that prevented the state in the developing world from 
performing a more robust function in economic policy formulation, coordination, and 
implementation.’99 In this sense the RTD presents a right of peoples/states against the 
international order and it envisions a rebalancing of the latter into a more democratic and 
development friendly system addressing structural injustices and correcting what is wrong in 
the global economic order and the effects of the asymmetrical relationship between the 
developed and developing countries.100 In the same vein, the Charter of Algiers, adopted by 
the first ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 ‘developing’ countries in 1967 thus stated 
that the international community has an obligation to rectify unfavourable trends in the 
economic relationship between developed and developing countries and create conditions 
under which all nations can enjoy economic and social well-being and have the means to 
develop their respective resources to enable their peoples to lead a life free from want and 
fear.101  They further expressed the fact that the development of developing countries will 
benefit the developed countries as well,102 something which gets too often forgotten in the 
short term profit maximisation considerations, running most of the world economy. When 
Kéba M’Baye formulated the RTD in terms of a human right as a ‘right of all’103 and wrote 
that its subjects were ‘at once individuals, peoples and States’ and when Michel Virally 
stated that the right to development was an individual right and a right of the peoples, the 
ambiguity that persists until this day, began.104 General Assembly Resolutions have even 
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favoured the individual aspect.105 For example the Declaration on the Right to Development 
declares: 
Article 1 
     1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and 
all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
  
     2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on 




     1. The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and 
beneficiary of the right to development. 
 
The Declaration places the individual as the central subject of development and beneficiary 
of the RTD. In its Preamble the Declaration further states: development is a comprehensive, 
economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of 
the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free 
and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom.106 The benefits of this approach have been rightly put into question and it has been 
claimed that proclaiming the RTD as an individual right does not actually add anything to the 
concept of human rights.107 The individual dimension here seems to turn the RTD into 
nothing more than a synthesis of all human rights as already laid down in their respective 
declarations and instruments, potentially ‘revitalizing’ or ‘enhancing’ them.108 Indeed, a 
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question can be posed whether the RTD is at all a ‘human’ right in the classical meaning of 
the term. As Bedjaoui stresses: ‘the right to development can not be a human, that is an 
individual right, unless it is first a collective right, whether of the people or the State’.109 This 
is not to diminish the ultimate goal of development, which is to enhance the welfare of 
individuals, but to recognize that as an individual right it cannot create the necessary 
mechanism for enforcement against the international community. 
 
On the other hand, it is understandable why the potential collapse of the meaning of 
‘community’ into the state and the state into the (current) regime has been seen as 
problematic.110 Although it is easy to point to individual human rights abuses and 
undemocratic practices especially when it comes to the treatment of opposition groups or 
minorities to argue for a more individualistic approach to the RTD, it is equally important to 
note that a less than perfect human rights record does not automatically imply bad economic 
policy or a long-term plan against the common good of the population. China is nowadays 
subject to a lot of criticism for its one party rule, however that party has been implementing 
an economic plan for the benefit of its population over decades to great success. As Moyn 
rightly notes:  
successes in the socioeconomic domain have hardly been due to the application of a normative 
framework of human rights, the birth of a formal regime of human rights law, or the mobilizational 
activism of any human rights movement. In fact, the lion’s share of poverty reduction in the last few 
decades (indeed, given the population numbers involved, in world history by far) is due to a single 
factor: the policies of the Chinese state.111  
 
Still the focus on the individual in the context of the RTD has received most attention. In this 
sense Arthur Lewis described development as the enlargement of peoples’ choices. Similarly 
Amartya Sen and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Reports built on the theory of capabilities and look at development as a ‘human 
centred’ process; a comprehensive process, including economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political dimensions; a process involving participation of people; and a process involving 
equal opportunities and social justice.112 These definitions are perhaps helpful in reminding 
us that the final objective of development is to provide all human beings with the opportunity 
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for a full life and intended to prevent us from getting lost in the intricacies of the means of 
achieving this objective.113 However it is exactly through this approach that three essential 
aspects of the RTD are being neglected, i.e. who should have the power to exercise the RTD 
in the international economic systems; what are the needs of states to be able to pursue 
effective economic development; and what economic development even means. Professor 
Chang points out the danger of the current definitions in diminishing the importance of the 
traditional view of development as economic transformation, which was the mainstream view 
on development until about 30 years ago. He describes the notions of development in today’s 
discourse as ‘Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark’ in other words leaving out 
‘development’ itself. He stresses that historically speaking development in Britain, the US, 
Germany, Sweden, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Finland etc. meant upgrading the country’s 
productive capabilities and moving into more difficult industries by using protection, export 
subsidies and many other means of government intervention, much of which is constrained 
today. The key here was the possession and application of superior knowledge, embodied in 
technologies and institutions rather than a command over resources or a ‘comparative 
advantage’ in low-technology activities.114 It is therefore important to adopt this 
understanding of what is economic development when arguing for the inclusion of the RTD 
in the WTO. Unsurprisingly, most Western countries have been arguing for a basic needs 
approach (i.e. the prioritization of the achievement of certain economic and social rights) 
based on the propaganda that capitalism moderated by the distribution of income within the 
state is central to facilitating development in the South.115 In other words, human 
development has served as a ‘solution’ for the fact that capital and trade flows favour 
industrially developed countries and do not bring actual development to poorer countries.116 
Furthermore, although the DRTD speaks clearly of a responsibility of states for the creation 
of international conditions favourable to the realization of the RTD,117 here again the focus in 
practice has shifted mainly on states and providing internal national conditions for the 
realisation of this right. Thus, the rights-based approach has been putting focus almost 
entirely on state accountability in terms of issues related to corruption and good governance 
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rather than any international obligations, while international processes and agencies play 
crucial roles in weakening state capacity, undermining democracy and diminishing state 
authority.118 Ouguergouz explains succinctly the question of the nature of the RTD in the 
following words:  
Like the right of peoples to self-determination, the right to development inevitably has an individual 
dimension; yet this stems rather from the purpose of the right than from the way it is exercised.119  
 
It is thus imperative when speaking of the integration of the RTD into the WTO, to stress its 
‘other’ side, i.e. the responsibility of states for the creation of international conditions 
favourable to the realization of the RTD as clearly articulated in the DRTD, as well as the 
Declaration’s recognition that this right does not pertain only to individuals but also 
communities, nations and regions. The individual can benefit more from this right in the area 
of legal policy if it is regarded as a collective right.120 Indeed, to make the right to 
development a true human right which may be claimed by every individual would be both 
misleading and illusory.121 As Manzo has noted, the rights based approach does little to 
empower either the people or the state.122  
It is further important not to equate mere GDP growth with genuine economic development. 
Many African countries have strong GDP growth, however this is unevenly distributed and 
increases income inequality.123 This is hardly surprising, since the growth is based mainly on 
the export of raw materials and not on industrialisation or the transformation of the 
productive structure. It is thus important to understand that between a mere focus on GDP or 
a mere focus on human rights lies true economic development, i.e. the transformation of the 
productive structure into higher technology production with the potential of engaging and 
lifting larger parts of society out of poverty.124 One could argue that economic development 
is the growth of GNP accompanied by the growth of technical and institutional resources with 
equity and the progressive realisation of human rights as the ultimate goals. At the end of the 
day it has to be acknowledged that ‘any improvement in those resources improves the 
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prospects of realising all the rights and increases the value of their indicators.’125 Thus the 
confusion is merely between what is the necessary and what is the sufficient condition in the 
relationship. It would be sensible to expect the WTO to work towards enabling its Members 
to achieve the so-called necessary condition by providing for the enforcement of a right to 
economic development. It would then be a matter of international human rights mechanisms 
to push for the sufficient condition when necessary. 
 
9. Lessons from the African Charter  
Contrary to the controversy at the international level, RTD is fully recognized as a legally 
binding right in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter), which 
states in Art. 22 that 
All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to 
their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. (2) States 
shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development. 
 
Importantly, the RTD as postulated in the African Charter might just as well be read as a 
simple clarification of the right of peoples to self-determination,126 which is a core principle 
of international law, arising from customary international law. As Bedjaoui has stated ‘[t]he 
‘right to development’ flows from [the] right to self-determination and has the same 
nature.’127 Thus its legitimacy should be of the same nature as well. What is more, the charter 
clearly envisages that the holders of the right are people, not individuals. Needless to say, 
however, the power of a right recognized only in a regional human rights instrument is 
limited to the states parties to that covenant. This is why the recognition of the RTD by the 
African Charter nevertheless has obvious constraints in that it can have no direct influence on 
the international economic order, i.e. the essence of the general claim to an RTD. A look at 
the jurisprudence of the African Commission on the RTD shows this focus, limited to local 
responsibilities between parties to the Charter and claims made by individual groups against 
their own state. For example in Gumne128 a group of individuals brought a communication 
against Cameroon on behalf of the people of Southern Cameroon, claiming that their RTD 
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had been violated due to their economic marginalisation through a denial of basic 
infrastructure.129  
The Respondent state contested the allegation of economic marginalisation with documents 
and statistics in support of its provision of basic infrastructure in Southern Cameroon, which 
showed that for the period 1998 up to 2003/4, the North West and South West provinces, 
(Southern Cameroon,) were allocated substantially higher budgetary resources, than the 
Francophone provinces, for the construction, and maintenance of roads, and running of 
education training institutions. The documents showed that the situation in the Anglophone 
regions was not that different from other parts of the country and the problem concerning 
inadequate infrastructural development was not peculiar to Southern Cameroon.130 The 
Commission found this convincing and further recognized  
the fact that the realisation of the right to development is a big challenge to the 
Respondent State, as it is for State Parties to the Charter, which are developing 
countries with scarce resources… The Respondent State is under obligation to invest its 
resources in the best way possible to attain the progressive realization of the right to 
development, and other economic, social and cultural rights. This may not reach all 
parts of its territory to the satisfaction of all individuals and peoples, hence generating 
grievances. This alone cannot be a basis for the finding of a violation. The Commission 
does not find a violation of Article 22.131 
 
The above mentioned limitations of an RTD provided for only in a regional human rights 
instrument can be clearly seen from this case as the state itself is limited in its abilities to 
provide for its citizens. It is thus the proposition of this thesis that this regional right should 
be adopted in the international system by being incorporated into the WTO in order to bring 
enforceability to its external dimension. 
 
10. Certainty, Symbolic Validation, Coherence and Compliance Pull 
Before concluding, it is worth revisiting several aspects of Franck’s legitimacy theory which 
are also important for our analysis. Apart from it fitting into the normative hierarchy of the 
international community, Franck based the legitimacy of an international rule in its clear and 
determinant meaning, its symbolic validation or authority that it carries; its coherence within 
a wider pattern of rules by treating like cases alike; and adherence of states to it.132  
In order to be legitimate a rule has to possess certainty. In that sense, a rule that prohibits the 
doing of ‘bad things’ lacks legitimacy because it fails to communicate what exactly is 
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expected.133 Franck observes that ‘[i]f a norm is full of loopholes, there is little incentive to 
impose on oneself obligations that others can evade easily’ and furthermore that ‘some rules 
are [intentionally] written with low determinacy so that noncompliance will be easy.’134 This 
claim to a lack of legitimacy can be easily applied to the bulk of special and differential 
treatment (SDT) provisions included within the WTO agreements which are full of hortatory 
language and uncertain obligations, rendering them inoperative in large part. This is 
important to recognise, when witnessing the lack of effectiveness of SDT provisions (see 
analysis in chapter IV). 
Another aspect of importance in Franck’s analysis of legitimacy generally is symbolic 
validation, which does not relate so much to content but to the authority of a rule or the 
originator of a rule.135 These are questions of ritual and pedigree (i.e. flags, anthems, 
supernatural or successive legitimacy, etc.)136 In Franck’s opinion the international society is 
underendowed with such symbolic validation, however he sees as an example the creation of 
supranational agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
World Bank, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) and the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund which are purportedly created 
to distribute benefits to the deserving and needy, either in tandem or in competition with the 
unilateral donations still given by one country to another.137 He sees these agencies as 
symbolically multilateralized as they could function with only the 12 to 16 chief industrial 
nations as members since they contribute almost all of the working capital.138 This symbolic 
multilateralization is there to ‘direct gratitude to the agency, instead of bitterness’ as it is a 
symbolic representation of confluence between sovereignty and interdependence that holds 
together the ‘community’ of states.139 A critical look at this ‘symbolic multilateralization’ 
could however reveal that it can serve to mask the fact that these organisations are run by the 
powerful to fit the agenda of the powerful and thus again only provide a ‘perceived 
legitimacy’. Especially in the case of the World Bank, its intentions have been proven time 
and again as less than noble when it comes to conditionalities put on the receiving countries. 
The standards of symbolic validation and pedigreeing have to be applied coherently, thus the 
symbolic equality of states is expressed through the same amount of ritual acts when 
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validating a government or state. This purports to restrict what powerful states legitimately 
may do with their advantage over the weak. Franck explains this as ‘[a] cue that prompts the 
Soviets, however reluctantly, to do a lot of explaining when they invade Afghanistan’. One 
could add that it also prompts the US to routinely fabricate evidence against adversary 
governments before invading their countries either directly or through its mercenaries and 
forcing regime change. Still the superficial nature or indeed the mere symbolic nature of the 
equality of states requires little more than basic propaganda to convince the domestic public 
and proceed to rule as the hegemon pleases. This author strongly disagrees with Franck’s 
observation that ‘[s]ymbolic equality… both affirms and reinforces real equality.’140 It does 
no such thing but merely creates an illusion to distract the public from the reality. While 
observing substantial amounts of symbolic legitimacy in the WTO – mainly through the 
illusion that all Members contribute equally to rulemaking or have an equal chance at the 
dispute settlement as well as the purported strive for the development of poorer Members – 
this author does not accept that this in itself can bring legitimacy. Furthermore once the real 
power structure and its effects on the processes and rules are exposed to the general public, 
the symbolic legitimacy evaporates and a call for substantive legitimacy replaces it. 
Coherence as an essential part of Franck’s legitimacy test does not simply mean the same 
rules for everyone but ‘mandates a connectedness between various component parts of a rule 
or code; between several applications of a rule in various instances; and between the general 
principles underlying a rule’s application and those implicated in other rules.’141 To illustrate 
his point, he gives the example of a SDT within the world trading regime. He notes that the 
most favored nation (MFN) provision is the most basic provision of the GATT (now WTO) 
and it would therefore seem that applying it consistently in practice would constitute 
coherence and therefore legitimacy. Yet as he explains it has become evident that the MFN 
provision, if applied consistently to all nations, would undermine rather than advance 
GATT’s underlying purpose’ by diminishing the trade prospects of the less-developed 
Member countries.142 Thus the introduction of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
which allows developed states temporarily to permit preferential access to products of only 
some states, particularly the least developed, does not present a loss of coherence nor 
legitimacy.143  
 
On the contrary, while GSP is inconsistent with MFN, it coheres with the underlying purpose of GATT, 
which is to increase trade for all nations. It thus advances the real objectives of GATT. Also, it 
establishes a standard for distinction between the members to whom MFN is applicable and those 
temporarily benefited by GSP. That standard connects coherently with boundaries commonly used in 
other sets of regulations to demarcate coverage. Redistributive principles such as those which underline 
GSP are commonplace in the international rule system and justify distinctions that, although creating 
superficial inconsistencies within rules and the application checkerboarding, in other words, is redeemed 
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by being seen as based on a principle that both is consistent with the real intent of the specific rule and 
connects with that skein of principles integrating various other rules of the international system.144  
 
In this sense Franck’s theory is superior to that of Rousseau who advocated for the rules 
based on the ‘general will’ to be applied without discrimination and thus failed to take into 
account the diversity of stakeholders and the fact that the impact of the laws will be different 
for everyone based on a diversity of lifestyles and the degree of economic inequality between 
them.145 Coherence, and thus legitimacy must be understood in part as defined by factors 
derived from a notion of community. They preclude caprice when they are applied 
consistently or, if inconsistently applied, when they make distinctions based on underlying 
general principles that connect with an ascertainable purpose of the rules and with similar 
distinctions made throughout the rule system.146 
This part of Franck’s analysis is very important for the present thesis as it not only invites an 
examination of whether the GSP and other SDT treatment provisions are really bringing more 
trade to the less developed countries and generally taking into account their specific needs, 
but also an examination of other rules within the system to the extent that they go against the 
underlying purposes of the GATT/WTO, which are not only the increase of trade for all 
nations, but also sustainable development and the raising of living standards around the 
world. If the provisions do not work towards said underlying purposes, a readjustment of the 
system based on these principles is merited to give it more legitimacy. This is what the thesis 
ultimately proposes.  
 
Conclusion 
Several aspects of legitimacy theory have been examined to form the basis of the subsequent 
analysis of WTO’s legitimacy. Apart from the more general question of justness, morality 
and fairness, most relevant aspects to consider are whether the organisation upholds the 
values of its most important stakeholders, whether its rules and policies fit within the norms 
and purported goals of the general international order and whether its agenda setting and 
rulemaking processes uphold democratic principles. The subsequent analysis conducted in 
this study thus looks at historical and current processes which are essential in the rule and 
policy making of the institution to expose its democracy gap. This in turn leads to an analysis 
of the rules themselves evaluated against what has been identified in this analysis as the main 
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benchmark for legitimacy of the WTO, i.e. the impact on economic development of its poorer 
Members. Apart from development being a core value of humanity and the main demand by 
the general public in terms of the WTO, it is also a purported core value of the international 
system, being spelled out as a goal for the international community in the UN Charter and 
several international documents since. Furthermore, the legitimacy of pursuing economic 
development is based on the same moral premises as the pursuit of human rights protection, 
self-determination and the right to resist economic oppression. Yet the right to development 
as it currently stands in national and international law suffers from enforceability issues, 
especially in its external aspects. Despite it emerging mainly from a call for a more equitable 
international economic system it is at present powerless at the relevant institutions, including 
the WTO. This study thus seeks to incorporate said right into the WTO to address its 
legitimacy gap. The analysis furthermore exposeses what can be rightly called WTO’s merely 
perceived legitimacy created through propaganda and designed to distract from the real 








Trade is the oldest and most important economic nexus among nations and alongside war has 
been central to the evolution of international relations.1 It has also been the reason for 
countless wars. In the words of Woodrow Wilson for example, World War I was ‘a 
commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war’.2 And it was a war in which 
‘Britain had destroyed a trade rival’.3 It is also true that '[b]attles can be won with bayonets, 
but the result of war is decided by economics'.4 One should never underestimate the power of 
economic interests and how they shape the world which we live in. Although the language 
changes, the essence of the underlying policies aimed to serve these interests has remained 
the same for hundreds of years.  
The neoliberal agenda of free trade today, has been advanced under the guise of promoting 
peace and benefits for all, however from the very beginning the old mercantilist desire to 
open foreign markets to exports of surpluses and assure cheap imports of raw materials from 
them, has never been far from the surface.5 Furthermore the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have served 
to provide perceived legitimacy to what is essentially a selfish and systematic pursuit of rich 
countries’ interests, largely with disregard, or at the expense of poorer countries and their 
ability to develop. Rules created in this setting are shaped by power and wrapped in deceitful 
propaganda. They are then enforced through ‘voluntary’ observance or through the dispute 
settlement mechanism, sometimes to the benefit of developing countries, but many times 
against them and against their efforts at achieving economic development.  This study will 
show why the organisation, being merely a forum for bargaining and the enforcement of the 
results of such bargaining, in essence lacks a mechanism for providing equal protection of its 
Members’ interests, especially the right to development. Furthermore to borrow Grimsci’s 
expression ‘cultural hegemony’ or Nye’s description of so-called ‘soft power’, the agenda of 
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the powerful is not pursued merely through political and economic coercion, but also 
ideologically.6 Economic theories, such as that of free trade and comparative advantage or the 
theories purporting developmental benefits of strong intellectual property protection are used 
for this purpose. Through such propaganda certain norms which may well work against 
development, are eventually accepted as the ‘common values’ of all, ab initio limiting the 
discourse at the negotiations and the frontiers of possible reform. Despite development being 
a purported goal of the system, there is at the moment no mechanism which can provide 
meaningful protection of developmental interests of Member states beyond what developing 
countries can manage to secure in this highly unequal game of bargaining and ideological 
persuasion. Nevertheless, the WTO claims that ‘development is a core aim – and a main 
accomplishment – of much of what the WTO does.’7 This thesis aims to reveal the fallacy of 
this statement through an analysis of several aspects of this organisation. Considering the 
right to economic development as an essential right and a prerequisite for the long term 
attainment of all other human rights, this author further links the lack of its protection at the 
WTO with a claim of the illegitimacy of the organisation, especially in light of the latter’s 
purported pursuit of sustainable development. 
* 
Generally speaking, norms of international law are legitimised through the procedural 
requirements of the consent of states laid down in treaties or customary law. There are 162 
Members of the WTO and it represents more than 97% of world trade. This provides the 
advocates of the current system with the argument, that all Member states joined the system 
voluntarily, which is proof that they agree with its aims and goals, rendering the latter 
legitimate. However, as Stiglitz points out, there is a difference between individual and group 
actions:  
Given that other developing countries had agreed to sign, it might pay any country that is holding out 
to sign on; but it is still quite possible that developing countries as a whole (or a subgroup of these 
countries) would be better off if they, as a group, had not signed. (The prisoners’ dilemma arises not 
only in the case of prisoners, but also in the case of poor countries engaged in bargaining with the 
rich.)8  
 
Yet the question of whether developing countries as a whole would have been better off 
outside the system is not the only or the ultimate question when evaluating the current model. 
Rather it can be recognised that it is quite possible that in several of its aspects the 
                                                            
6 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and transl. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, (ElecBook, 
1999), pp. 765-767; J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (Public Affairs, 2004). 
7 World Trade Organization, The WTO at Twenty: Challenges and Achievements, (WTO, 2015), p. 9. 
8 J. E. Stiglitz, A. Charlton, Fair trade for All, How Trade Can Promote Development, (Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 75. 
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GATT/WTO system has presented a better option to developing countries than bilateral 
bargaining and relations when dealing with stronger countries, yet at the same time, the 
GATT/WTO is not much more than a lesser evil in this respect and is thus just as worthy of 
severe critique and reform into a more development friendly model, if it is to attain greater 
legitimacy.  
It is further important to recognise the persistent criticisms by developing countries to the 
way the system and its rules had been set out. Out of the 23 original countries of the GATT, 
11 were developing countries, namely Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), China, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
Chile, Cuba, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Syria. It 
appeared that these signatories believed in the underlying philosophy of the GATT and that 
all countries could gain from the multilateral trading system if they only identified the sectors 
in which they had comparative advantage.9 However already in the 1950s a number of newly 
independent developing countries who acceded to the GATT challenged the status quo and 
argued that it was not realistic to expect newly independent countries with fragile economies 
to compete on a level playing field with established industrial countries at that time.10 
Developing countries now make up the vast majority of the WTO Membership and despite 
raising many objections throughout the several rounds of negotiations and forming alliances 
between themselves, they nevertheless time and again end up agreeing to more and more 
rules curtailing available tools necessary for their economic development, while being denied 
meaningful market access in developed countries. An analysis of processes involved in the 
rulemaking, however, does not indicate any hope of change in the future. This author 
suggests that a certain degree of de-politicisation is needed, if the organisation is to 
meaningfully protect and promote economic development for poorer countries.  
First, however, it needs to be acknowledged that what is driving the institution is not a set of 
economic truths but rather pseudo-science which serves the political ends of the powerful. 
While political scientists have the occasional fascination with how the law influences 
relations among states, lawyers seldom give enough attention to the influence of politics on 
law or even prefer not to acknowledge it at all.11 It should be obvious that politics sways the 
                                                            
9 B. Onguglo, ‘Developing Countries and Unilateral Trade Preferences in the New International Trading 
Ststem,’ in M.R  Mendoza., P. Low, and B. Kotschwar (eds.), Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in 
Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 119. 
10 Ibid. 
11 T. Broude, M. L. Busch, and A. Porges (eds.), The Politics of International Economic Law, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), preface. 
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development of international economic law, however this still sounds controversial in a field 
which has traditionally taken pride in its de-politicization.12 In the words of one observer:  
In contrast to [many]13 international governmental organizations, the World Trade Organization, as 
well as its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, seems to have managed to keep 
relatively free from the plague of politicization. It is a business-minded organization fully devoted to 
its mandate of multilateral trade liberalization and of developing an "integrated, more viable and 
durable multilateral trading system.14 
 
However politicization here refers to a situation where a state or groups of states take actions 
for purposes which are not related to the goals and functions of that organization, but rather 
to geopolitical goals and strategies, i.e. ‘higher’ politics.15 This does not imply that the GATT 
and the WTO have been free from politics altogether and the author happily recognizes its 
role in the GATT and WTO  
in the sense of diverging socio-economic policies and ideologies and the use of political tactics in order 
to further what is perceived as the national interests of the various member states...16 
  
When the higher politics were focusing, on matters of international security and the East-
West conflict during the Cold War, the trade system was entrusted to a group of ‘experts’, 
who tended to see the trade system as grounded in the insights of economics and thus to be 
above the ‘madhouse’ of politics and it was they that recast the post World War II global 
economic system as economics, and economics became ideology, the ideology of free trade.17 
One could say that like most other ideologies it began to live a life of its own, however this 
does not mean that it was born out of some objective truth or even a democratic international 
process, instead of a pursuit of national economic interests with the most powerful architect 
imposing their vision on the rest of the world through ‘trade politics’. Furthermore the full 
force of not just trade politics, but plain old ‘geo-politics’ is still entering the trade arena as 
has recently clearly been manifested through the sanctions imposed on Russia, despite its 
accession to the WTO in 2012 and the many commitments it had to undertake in the process. 
                                                            
12 T. Broude, M. L. Busch, and A. Porges, ‘Some Observations on the Politics of Int’l Economic Law’, in ibid, 
p. 4. 
13 Specifically referring to the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
14 A. Reich, ‘The Threat of Politicization of the WTO’, 26 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law (2005), p. 780 (abbreviations omitted); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, (1994), 
Preamble. 
15 Ibid, p. 784. 
16 Ibid, p. 781. 
17 R. Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy, (Cameron May, 2007), pp. 16-17; see also: J. 
Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy 
of Dispute Settlement’, in R. B. Parter et al. (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, And Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading 
System at the Millenium, (pp. 334, 336-337); D. Driesen ‘What is Free Trade? The Real Issue Lurking Behind 
the Trade and Environment Debate’, 41 Virginia Journal of International Law (2001), p. 279. 
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Proponents of the world trading regime like to emphasise that although majority voting is 
allowed, decisions in the WTO are normally reached by consensus.18 Art. IX, paragraph 1 of 
the WTO Agreement states that  
[t]he WTO shall continue the practice of decisionmaking by consensus followed under GATT 
1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the 
matter at issue shall be decided by voting. At meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council, each Member of the WTO shall have one vote.... Decisions of the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless 
otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement. 
 
This supposedly makes the decisions more acceptable to all Members and gives them more 
legitimacy. The WTO claims that consensus legitimizes the outcomes of negotiations, 
because it ‘prevents the most powerful from dominating the agenda [and] keeps everyone 
negotiating until compromises are reached.’19 However it is also recognized that lengthy 
behind-the-scenes negotiations are sometimes necessary to reach said consensus, and it is 
hard to imagine how this adds to legitimacy, especially since they many times involve divide 
et impera tactics and the blackmailing of weaker states. Pascal Lamy, the then Director 
General put it bluntly that ‘[t]here is no way to structure and steer discussions among 146 
members in a manner conductive to consensus.’20 A true consensus then might just be 
nothing more than an impossible ideal. Furthermore, it is often times too late for a 
meaningful influence on the outcomes of the negotiations by the time of the voting on a 
particular draft. It is not unimportant who prepares the draft and when and how it reaches the 
rest of the Membership. In other words, the consent theory at the WTO is based on the same 
principles as the rules of contract. However in the words of one observer:  
Contract's principles of good faith and bargaining fail when developing nations have no ability to 
bargain with the First World. Contract legitimizes this kind of oppression by positing that all 
parties - in this case First and Third World nations - are autonomous, competent, and able to reach 
agreement that merit enforcement. Autonomy in terms of these countries and their bargaining 
power is clearly fictional. It is obvious through the use of such legal fictions, however, that law is 
able to allow domination couched in the appearance of autonomy.21  
 
The WTO is plagued by power inequalities and is in that sense not distinct from other 
international organizations.22 As shown in chapter IV, the powerful states use their strength 
inside and outside of the WTO to push for their agenda and furthermore dominate the WTO 
                                                            
18 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Whose WTO is it anyway? available 
at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm (last accessed 22.8.2016). 
19 World Trade Organization, supra note 7, p. 13. 
20 P. Lamy, Press Conference closing the World Trade Organization Fifth Ministerial Conference, Cancun, 
Mexico, 14 September 2003. 
21 M. H. Davis and E. D. Neacsu, ‘Legitimacy Globally: the Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, Global 
Economics and their Governing Principles of Political Economy’, 69 University of Missouri – Kansas City Law 
Review, (2001), p. 744/745. 
22 J. Walters, ‘Power in WTO Dispute Settlement’, 28 Journal of Third World Studies, (2011), p. 169. 
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administration, steering the negotiating process according to their wishes. Whose interests 
and ideas are shaping the rules can also clearly be seen through such examples as the 
negotiations regarding the 'standard of review' at the Uruguay round.23 The issue which was 
only understood by a few people and went ‘virtually unnoticed by almost all the public or 
private policy-makers concerned with the negotiation’ was turned into a ‘deal breaker’ - a 
problem which could have caused the entire negotiation to fail - by the interests of the US 
companies.24 The said standard determines to what degree panels should respect national 
governments’ determinations on whether an action is consistent with WTO law or not and 
certain economic interests in the US and elsewhere were deeply concerned about restraints on 
the capacity of the organization to overrule national government determinations, especially 
on antidumping duties.25 Unlike others, these countries were ‘perceptive and economically 
endowed enough to carry their views deeply into the negotiating process.’26 Quite unlike the 
proposition of it being a non-politicized institution, it is therefore fair to say that the WTO 
‘has been, and continues to be, shaped in its agreements and institutional foci in significant 
part by political pressures emanating from its members, particularly those able to wield the 
most influence.’27  
It has been argued that positions should be accepted as legitimate only where agreed through 
un-coerced discussions by those affected by the outcomes and not when they are merely the 
preference of the majority.28 This is to happen through rational discourses grounded in 
reasoned arguments around what is equally good for all to determine the ‘right policy’ or a 
political truth as it is not possible to determine an objective truth. 29 One could easily prove 
the coercive nature of the discussions at the WTO, however it is harder to determine what are 
actual ‘rational discourses’ and a search for ‘what is good for all’ and what is mere 
propaganda used to convince all parties into accepting what is actually only good for some.  
                                                            
23 Art. 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding now stipulates, that a panel has to ‘make an objective 
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability 
of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the Dispute 
Settlement body in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements.’ 
24 Based on interviews by Professor J. H. Jackson, in J. H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO, 
Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 135. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 M. K. Lewis, The Politics and Indirect Effects of Asymmetrical Bargaining Power in Free Trade Agreements, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 19. 
28 J. Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy’, 
transl. W. Rehg, (MIT Press, 1996), p. 104. 
29 Ibid.  
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In this sense procedural legitimacy should not be overestimated at the expense of substantive 
legitimacy.30 It is important to bear in mind how the use of legitimizing theories such as the 
comparative advantage theory, according to which ‘everyone benefits’ can limit the political 
imagination and lead to ‘false consciousness’ whereby even the dominated do not understand 
that they are oppressed.31 In other words, it is ‘a limit upon consciousness in which all, rulers 
and ruled share’.32 In such a situation, a continuing search for an objective truth, justice or 
substantively legitimate rules outside the actual negotiations becomes the only option to 
improve the system.  
This thesis thus proposes the integration of the right to development into the WTO and its 
dispute settlement mechanism. The ultimate goal would be to correct the current rules, 
heavily tilted towards the interests of already industrialised countries, and give meaning and a 
degree of legal power to the right to development which currently lacks it in the international 
setting.  
      * 
Trade liberalization and WTO rules provide better market access to contracting parties, they 
improve the relative incentive for exports as against sale in the domestic market and they 
provide a number of privileges to exporters.33 They further provide them with security in 
market access as trade is subject to agreed rules and the existing trade barriers will be known 
to the investors and exporters; if any dispute arises, it can be settled through the dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM); furthermore in cases of imports competing with domestic 
products in an unfair manner, the affected industry can request their government to take 
necessary measures through safeguard actions and the imposition of antidumping and 
countervailing duties.34 However firms that do not have production capabilities competitive at 
an international level, may not be able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by 
global trade liberalization and even when they do, they may incur higher marketing cost due 
to their lack of experience, smaller scale and the lack of marketing and distribution 
channels.35 Not only would such firms not be able to take advantage of the opportunities at 
the moment of liberalization, but they would also be stripped of the chance of ever building 
                                                            
30 P. Nanz, ‘Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory’, in C. 
Joerges and E. U. Petersmann, Constitutionalism, Multilevel Governance and International Economic Law, 
(Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 63. 
31 Davis, supra note 21, p. 739.  
32 Davis, supra note 21, p 740.  
33 M. Shafaeddin, Competitiveness and Development, Myth and Realities, (Anthem Press, 2012) p. 38 
34 Ibid, p. 38, 39. 
35 Ibid, p. 39. 
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up sufficient capabilities to do so. In other words, if trade barriers from countries which are 
still developing are torn down too rapidly, they will never have the opportunity to build up 
domestic industries and to engage in respective learning processes, because their infant 
industries would be killed off by competition before this could happen.36 Furthermore many 
available remedy tools have mostly been used against developing countries while they 
themselves have been reluctant to utilise them for political or technical reasons, such as their 
lack of resources.  
Implementing the underlying free trade theory in its pure form, would be problematic enough 
as it would allow for a static comparative advantage situation, where developing countries are 
forever at a disadvantage locked into the production of primary commodities. However, it is 
no secret that the WTO furthermore only pursues free trade in areas where the rich countries 
are strong while it allows for Keynesianism where they are weak. Although this has been put 
forward as the biggest problem preventing development, developmental economists disagree, 
and argue that the most important question is that of policy space left under the WTO and 
other international agreements to the developing countries, to be able to pursue 
industrialisation as all successful countries have done in the past. Moreover, because the 
situation in the world has changed and due to the increase in competitiveness and the role of 
multinational companies in trade and the power they have on the market and production 
system, the need for more policy space has actually increased, yet at the same time this policy 
space is constantly shrinking.37 
Renowned developmental economists such as Rodrik, Stiglitz and Chang have shaken the 
unconditional belief in free trade, igniting a new interest in industrial policy. Several non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, War on Want and Action Aid have been 
persuading developed country governments to protect developing countries’ policy space at 
the WTO and a heterodox perspective on development has even entered the World Bank, 
with the ideas of its chief economist at that time, Justin Yifu Lin, the first non G9 chief 
economist, advocating for the use of industrial policy.38 However as Professor Robert Wade 
describes it from his own experience doing research at the institution during that time, other 
World Bank economists, including from the vice presidency were receiving the ideas of Lin 
                                                            
36 P. Hilpold, WTO Law and Human Rights: Bringing Together Two Autopoietic Orders, (University of 
Innsbruck, 2010), p. 19 
37 M. Shafaeddin, interview on Challenges Facing LDCs after the Global Economic Crisis, at the Global 
Development And Environment Institute, (Tufts University, 29.9. 2010) available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVl-wiPS1jM (last accessed 22.8.2016) 
38 J. Y. Lin, New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development, World Bank Policy 
Research, Working Paper No. 5197, (World Bank, 2010)  
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with great scepticism, summed up by one of them in the following statement which closed 
down the whole discussion about industrial policy: ‘For every Korea there are a hundred 
failures, who would you put your money on?’ 39 With Lin’s departure from the World Bank 
in 2012, the ideas sadly left the institution as well.40  
It is the aim of this thesis to highlight some of the aspects of the GATT/WTO system which 
have been most detrimental to the development of poorer countries; to expose the politics and 
propaganda behind the WTO law in this regard; to present and explain alternative thinking to 
the economic theory adopted by the organization and finally to advocate for resistance 
against an unfair international economic order through a demand for the recognition and 
enforcement of the right to development. 
 
1. Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the core research question of whether the WTO suffers from a 
legitimacy gap due to its rules being overly tilted in favour of developed countries to the 
extent that they encroach upon the ability of poorer states to pursue true economic 
development. The study further discusses the sub-questions of how ideological, historical and 
procedural factors perpetuate this gap and how it is concealed through maintaining perceived 
legitimacy. 
To answer the main question, the analysis tackles several aspects of the GATT/WTO: 
Firstly it examines the mandate and the main source of the WTO’s claim to legitimacy, i.e. its 
underlying economic theory which is behind the idea that the WTO is apolitical in its goals, 
serving an almost scientific truth for the benefit of all. It asks whether this so-called theory of 
comparative advantage is in fact as sound as portrayed and whether it can be universally 
applied with positive results, regardless of specific circumstances of particular countries and 
their developmental level, or can it in fact retard development. It also examines how this 
theory serves to limit any demands by developing countries for special and differential 
treatment by making them appear unreasonable.  
Secondly, the thesis looks at GATT/WTO procedural legitimacy. It examines the forum 
nature of the system and what that relates to in practice in terms of providing all Members 
with equal opportunity in bringing forward proposals and to determine outcomes and the 
                                                            
39 R. Wade, D. Quah and H.-J. Chang, ‘Does Market-led Development have a Future?’, discussion (London 
School of Economics, 15 May 2013), available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R84XoIinBL8, (last 




(in)ability of poorer countries to defend their policy tools necessary for development while at 
the same time assuring opportunities in accessing the markets of more affluent countries;  
Thirdly it looks at legitimacy in terms of the outcomes of the negotiations, i.e. the rules 
themselves and whether they present a fair and balanced protection of Members’ interests, 
especially development. It devotes special attention to one of the agreements within the 
system, i.e. the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and its particular purported and actual impacts on the ability of less technologically advanced 
countries to upgrade their technologies to superior levels, which is essential for development; 
Fourthly it considers whether the dispute settlement mechanism at the WTO can bring a 
rebalance of the system and the unequal protection of Member’s interests or are there 
limitations inherent in the mechanism and the law it applies that prevent it from playing such 
a role to a satisfactory extent;  
Finally, the study looks at the possibility of meaningfully addressing the status quo by 
incorporating the right to development into the system.  
   
2. Literature Review  
Vast literature exists on the WTO, its particular agreements and their implications for 
individual economies or sectors of these economies. This is not surprising considering the 
scope, importance and complexity of the law of this organisation. Most mainstream writings, 
including those from the organisation itself, present the WTO as a pro-development 
organisation and furthermore even if some criticism is considered to be valid, the conclusion 
is that the organisation is based in sound economic theory and therefore follows the right 
path.41 If nothing else, the merits of the WTO for development is highlighted through the fact 
that it is better to be inside a predictable system than outside, if you are a weaker party.42 
                                                            
41 See for example: P. Van den Bossche, V. Zdouc, 3rd edn., The Law and Policy of the World Trading System, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013); S. Lester et al., World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary, 2nd 
ed., (Hart Publishers, 2012); M. Friedman and R. D. Friedman, ‘The Case for Free Trade’, Hoover Digest 4 
(1979); J. H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic 
Relations, (Cambridge University Press, 2007);C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘Economics and the Law: Too Much One-
Way Traffic?’ 60 Modern Law Review, (1997); P. Samuelson, Economics, 10th edn., (McGraw – Hill, 1976); B. 
Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System, The WTO and Beyond, 2nd 
edn. (Oxford University Press, 2001); P. Krugman, ‘Is Free Trade Passé?’, 1 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
(1987); J. Bhagwati, ‘Is Free Trade Passé After All?’, 125 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, (1989); M. Corden, 
Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, (Oxford: Clarendon: 1974) 
42 See for example: D. C. North, ‘Institutions’, 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives, (1991); R. Coase, The Firm, 
the Market and the Law, (University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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However, extensive studies and critiques have also been done on the WTO vis-à-vis its 
developing Members in general43 and on particular questions in this relationship, such as the 
weakness of developing countries in the lawmaking of the organisation,44 the particular 
challenges they are facing in the dispute settlement,45 the special treatment accorded to 
them,46 impacts on particular sectors of their economies,47 etc. More recently, studies and 
                                                            
43 See for example: Y.-S. Lee et al., (eds.), Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Sonia E. Rolland, Development at the World Trade Organization, 
(Oxford University Press: 2012); T. Chantal and J. Trachtman (eds.), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal 
System (Oxford University Press, 2009); R. E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010); H. Katrak and R. Strange, (ed.), The WTO and Developing Countries, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); B. Hoekman and W. Martin (eds.) Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-
Active Agenda, (Blackwell, 2001); S. Laird, The WTO Agenda and the Developing Countries, (Centre for 
Research in Economic Development and International Trade, 2000); G. P. Sampson and W. B. Chambers, 
(eds.), Developing Countries and the WTO: Policy Approaches, (United Nations University Press, 2008); W. 
Martin and A. Winters, (eds.), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, Paper No. 307 (World Bank, 
1995). 
44 See for example, F. Jawara and A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International 
Trade Negotiations: The Lesson of Cancun, (Zed Books, 2004); B. L. Das, The Current Negotiations in the 
WTO: Options, Opportunities, and Risks for Developing Countries, (Third World Network, 2005); T. Broude, 
M. L. Busch, and A. Porges (eds.), The Politics of International Economic Law, (Cambridge University Press, 
2011); B. Guha-Khasnobis, (ed.), The WTO, Developing Countries, and the Doha Development Agenda: 
Prospects and Challenges for Trade-Led Growth, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); R. Wilkinson and J. Scott, 
‘Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment’, 7 World Trade Review, (2008). 
45 See for example, M. L. Busch, and E. Reinhardt, ‘Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement’, 37 Journal of World Trade, (2003); C. P. Bown and J. Pauwelyn, (eds.), The Law, Economics and 
Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, (Cambridge University Press, 2010); M. M. Ching, 
‘Evaluating the Effectiveness of the GATT Dispute Settlement System for Developing Countries’ 16 World 
Competition (1992-93); K. Won Lee, ‘Suspending TRIPS Obligations as a Viable Option for Developing 
Countries to Enforce WTO Rulings’, 9 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy, (2014); 
A. Subramanian & J. Watal, ‘Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the 
WTO’, 3 Journal of International Economic Law, (2000); M. Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law and Society Review, (1999) 
46 See for example, A. A. Yusuf, “Differential and More Favourable Treatment’: The GATT Enabling Clause’, 
14 Journal of World Trade Law (1980); A. A. Yusuf, Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States: 
A Study in the Influence of Development Needs on the Evolution of International Law, (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1982); D. Coppens, ‘How Special is the Special and Differential Treatment under the SCM 
Agreement? A Legal and Normative Analysis of WTO Subsidy Disciplines on Developing Countries’, 12 World 
Trade Review, (2013);  A. Ansong, Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the 
GATT/WTO: Past, Present, Future, (Law Research Associates, 2012); B. Hoekman, ‘Operationalizing the 
Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment’, Paper presented at the Third 
Annual Conference on Preparing the Doha Development Round – WTO Negotiators Meet the Academics. 
European University Institute, 2-3 July 2004 
47 See for example, T. T. Nguyãẽn, Competition Law, Technology Transfer and the TRIPS Agreement: 
Implications for Developing Countries, (Edward Elgar, 2010); C. M. Correa, ‘Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster 
Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?’, manuscript, Duke University (2003); FAO, ‘Experience with 
the Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: Developing Country Experiences’, 
Symposium on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security, Paper No. 3,: (FAO, 1999); DFID, Industrial Tariffs, 
Developing Countries and the WTO, (Department for International Development, 2003); K. Anderson, 
Agriculture, Developing Countries and the WTO, (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2000); 
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critiques of the WTO have also been framed as questions of human rights violations.48 Last 
but not least, extensive commentaries and critiques have been written by several 
developmental economists of not just particular rules or agreements, but even of the 
underlying theory of the organisation itself.49 These studies have been conducted by 
academics with backgrounds in political sciences, economics, history, theory and law and 
some of their studies have explicitly recognised the interdisciplinary nature of the questions 
at hand.50  
In recognizing and highlighting the issues faced by developing countries at the WTO, the 
present study is not unique. In, the edited collection, Law and Development Perspective on 
International Trade Law,51 for example, one can explore a breadth of coverage of 
developmental topics at the WTO by renowned scholars both from developed as well as 
developing countries, such as could not have even been attempted by the present author. In 
parts of its observations, the present study has furthermore reached some of the same 
conclusions as have already been noted before. For example, Rolland, calls for the 
reconsideration of the trade and development relationship at the WTO in her book, 
Development at the World Trade Organization.52 Her finding that the institutional processes 
for creating and implementing trade rules at the WTO and the actual regulatory outcomes are 
inseparable and that the consideration of the development dimension at the WTO must 
examine them both jointly has also been one of the major observations and approaches of the 
present study. The above mentioned are just some of the many studies which have 
highlighted the persistent problems in terms of development at the WTO and offered 
solutions to the status quo. Yet the situation remains much the same in terms of a chronic 
                                                            
48 See for example, S. Joseph, Blame it on the WTO: A Human Rights Critique, (Oxford University Press, 2011), 
p. 162; O. de Schutter and K. Y. Cordes, eds., Accounting for Hunger: The Right to Food in the Era of 
Globalisation, (Hart Publishing, 2011); C. G. Gonzalez, ‘Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries’, 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, (2002); 
M. F. Jorge, ‘TRIPS-Plus Provisions in Trade Agreement and Their Potential Adverse Effects on Public 
Health’, 1 Journal of Generic Medicines, 2004. 
49 See for example, G. Dunkley, The Free Trade Adventure: the WTO, the Uruguay Round and Globalism - a 
Critique, (Zed Books, 2000); J. E. Stiglitz, A. Charlton, Fair trade for All, How Trade Can Promote 
Development, (Oxford University Press, 2005); H.-J. Chang, Kicking, Away the Ladder: Development Strategy 
in Historical Perspective, (Anthem Press, 2002); D. Rodrik, ‘The Global Governance of Trade: as if 
Development Really Mattered’, Paper prepared for the UNDP (2001); R. Peet, ‘Ten Pages that Changed the 
World: Deconstructing Ricardo’, 2 Human Geography, (2009); S. R. Khan ‘WTO, IMF and the Closing of 
Development Policy Space for Low-Income Countries: A Call for Neo-Developmentalism’, 28 Third World 
Quarterly, (2007). 
50 S. Joseph, D. Kinley and J. Waincymer (eds.), The World Trade Organisation and Human Rights: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Edward Elgar, 2009). 
51 Lee, supra note 41. 
52 Rolland, supra note 41. 
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inequality in the protection of Members’ interests and the obstacles to the pursuit of 
development. Therefore it warrants an ongoing discussion and a search for new solutions, 
especially in light of the importance of the issue. 
  
3. Significance of the Present Study 
Gupta once expressed his frustration at observing the progressive development of 
international law that supported the status quo.53 The author of the present thesis shares his 
experience of finding legal tools to deal with the discussion of North-South issues to be 
increasingly limited which leads one to embrace an eclectic set of ideas and tools from 
different disciplines to make their arguments clear.54 Thus the kind of scholarship which is 
needed is one which looks beyond the law and uses methods and tools from politics, policy 
studies, international relations, development studies, anthropology and other disciplines to 
create a multidisciplinary academic movement fit to address the challenge of opportunistic 
incrementalism pushed by scholars from the established journals in the developed world.55 
This study thus assesses some of the most difficult themes in the practice of WTO policy by 
looking beyond the legal and political dimensions of the relevant issues. In addition, it 
incorporates multidisciplinary dimensions including the unpacking of economic theory and 
the history of international trade policy from the International Trade Organisation to the 
WTO. It thus presents a comprehensive account of the multifaceted mechanism which 
operates behind the legitimacy gap of the WTO. The economic, political, historical, 
philosophical and legal analyses unmask different aspects of the same vicious circle leading 
to ideologies, rules and practices that are keeping poorer countries from sufficiently being 
able to pursue policies for economic development. Based on the analysis it calls for a drastic 
rethinking and reform of the system beyond compromises sought within what the UN or 
human rights frameworks offer. The contribution of this study in this respect differs 
substantially from related work which mostly seeks a merger between human rights and the 
WTO in a simple incorporation of one system into another. It also differs from calls to ‘solve’ 
WTO problems by implementing developmental goals set out by the UN.  
This study further presents a tool for the general public to thoroughly understand and identify 
the multifaceted nature of the problem areas thus lifting the smokescreen created by the 
propaganda of the WTO and other players pushing for the neoliberal agenda through every 
                                                            
53 J. Gupta, ‘Broadening Third World Legal Scholarship to Include Introspection and Interdisciplinarity’, 8 
International Community Law Review, (2006), p. 65. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, p. 69. 
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pore of the international system. The general public cannot analyse intricate panel reports or 
legislature, nor does it necessarily understand the economics of development.56 It is 
furthermore easy to manipulate facts in this sphere due to the complicated - and often times 
hard to be clearly established - links between trade as well as intellectual property rules and 
the successes and failures of particular economies in their quest for development. 
Disinformation is key in creating perceived legitimacy and manufacturing consent thereby de 
facto diminishing democracy. The first step in addressing the issue of a legitimacy gap at the 
WTO is thus addressing the misinformation in a manner which is academic yet 
understandable to the general public and this study does just that.  
4. Methodology 
The analysis of this thesis considers to the question of WTO’s legitimacy gap. It thus 
concerns both the organisations’ norms and its institutional basis (i.e. dispute settlement 
mechanism and decision-making procedure). The main theoretical approaches have been to 
develop an analysis through legitimacy theory, to conduct a law and development critique 
and consider the propaganda model in relation to the WTO. 
a) Legitimacy theories 
Several theoretical approaches found in various legitimacy theories are used in this thesis to 
conduct an analysis of the organisation and its law. Three main strands provide the main tools 
for the analysis: the democratic credentials of the organisation (i.e. legitimacy of origin), 
whether it upholds the values of its stakeholders (i.e. legitimacy of exercise and 
organisational legitimacy) and whether it fits within the normative hierarchy of the 
international system. All three are essentially intertwined and connected to the broader 
legitimacy theory which rests on the principle of justice and morality. This thesis does not 
adopt the legitimacy theories which uphold perceived legitimacy as the sufficient benchmark 
for the evaluation of organisations or rules but seeks a substantive evaluation of their 
legitimacy. Even theories that do not present a perfect lens for the analysis however, offer 
underlying principles which provide valuable theoretical approaches for its particular aspects. 
This is discussed in detail in chapter I.  
b) Law and development critique  
Based on the legitimacy theories analysed, the advancement of the economic development of 
poorer countries is identified as the main criterion for the evaluation of the legitimacy of the 
WTO. A law and development critique is thus conducted, which forms the primary approach 
                                                            
56 S. Cho, ‘A Quest for WTO’s Legitimacy’, 4 World Trade Review, (2005), pp. 396-397. 
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of the study. The thesis outlines the undisputed claims of benefits for development in terms of 
Membership in the WTO and proceeds to investigate other, more controversial, claims. In 
order to identify aspects of the organisation which nevertheless hinder the potential of 
developing countries to catch up with more developed economies, it follows a rigorous 
methodology based on evidence from original and secondary sources and critically assesses 
some of the most difficult themes in the practice of WTO policy by looking beyond the legal 
and political dimensions of the relevant issues. In this sense the research conducted is 
primarily interdisciplinary in that it is about the law and the implications of the law and its 
ideological surrounding for the subjects it effects rather than a doctrinal study based on 
research in the law. It thus includes the unpacking of economic theory and the history of 
international trade policy from the International Trade Organisation to the WTO and 
throughout various negotiating rounds in order to bring an understanding of the way rules are 
created and which interests they serve. The main economic theories behind the liberalisation 
mandate of the WTO are critically examined through historical evidence and the theories of 
Hamilton, List, Keynes and several modern developmental economists in chapter III to 
provide a clear account of how the developmental rhetoric fails to be reflected in the 
underlying approach set out to achieve it. Similarly economic claims as to the benefits of the 
WTO’s international intellectual property protection are analysed through an account of the 
most successful models used historically for the technological advancement of countries and 
through an account of the various critiques of (inter)national intellectual property protection 
from a developmental perspective in chapter V.   
The economic and historical analysis is then directly referenced in the legal analysis of 
primary and secondary GATT/WTO sources to try and identify which current and former 
rules of the system have been most obstructive to economic development and whether the 
special and differential treatment provided to developing countries makes any substantial 
difference in this regard. This method required a textual analysis of the relevant legal texts as 
well as an analysis of dispute settlement body and Appellate Body reports. The methodology 
of selecting the relevant case law rested mainly on identifying situations in which developing 
countries sought to carve out policy space for economic development based on their 
developing condition and the purported developmental goals of the agreements in order to 
achieve broader interpretations of special and differential treatment provisions and general 
exceptions. This served to identify a gap in the law in terms of economic development not 




The study also drew on the examples of certain developing as well as developed countries, 
when these were conducive as illustrations of the main arguments. The countries were not 
chosen based on the level of their development, but rather on the basis of their experiences 
either with certain aspects of GATT/WTO law or based on their previous or current 
experiences implementing WTO-consistent as well as inconsistent policies and the impact of 
said law and policies on their economic development. A legal and theoretical analysis was 
further conducted of primary and secondary sources on the right to development as well as 
the potential human rights theory in solving questions of development, poverty and inequality 
to identify deficiencies and gaps in said doctrine. The methodology then consisted of political 
analysis of the way interests have been pursued at the GATT/WTO and why developing 
countries have been relatively unsuccessful in defending development friendly outcomes. 
This required an analysis of previous and current negotiating rounds and a look at reports 
from ‘behind-the-scenes’ for a better understanding of the politics at play. It also required an 
analysis of practical and financial considerations when it comes to the question of equal 
participation in the law-making as well as access to the dispute settlement by developing 
countries.   
c) Propaganda model 
Parallel to all above methods and as a result of the used methodologies runs the consistent 
and thorough unveiling of the actual agenda hidden behind extensive propaganda conducted 
through the glorification of certain economic theories, the purported goals of the organisation, 
its purported lack of bias and the illusion created that the negotiations continuously bring 
improvement on developmental and environmental needs of the Member States and its 
peoples. Such disinformation is key in creating perceived legitimacy of the organisation and 
manufacturing consent thereby de facto diminishing democracy.    
d) Ideological approach  
The work on this study was inspired by the concern about the lack of enforceability of 
economic human rights in developing countries. The recognition was soon made of the fact 
that the capability of states to provide for the enjoyment of these rights is conditioned upon 
the ‘enabling’ right, i.e. the right to development and its external dimension of ensuring a just 
international economic order conducive to economic development. Identifying a gap both 
within the international economic institutions as well as the international human rights system 
in terms of the protection of the later right this analysis serves to provide the basis for a 
fundamental rethinking of world trade law and the inclusion of the right to development into 
the system to give its external aspect meaningful enforcement. In other words my ideology 
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reflects a concern for a sustainable progressive realisation of human rights, of solidarity and 
the betterment of the human condition as well as the condition of the ecosystem. This 
ideology best fits the global South approach yet it can be said to form the basis of the values 
of the whole of humanity when removing the smokescreen of propaganda and political 
manipulation which is placed in front of us.  
e) Challenges 
Conducting interdisciplinary research is an intrinsically challenging endeavour when the 
expertise of the author is limited to only one discipline. For someone with a purely legal 
background it was thus unsurprisingly a daunting task to take on economic theory, especially 
theories which are promoted as dogma and science. Yet a thorough understanding is 
absolutely necessary for studies such as this one. In a way, the lack of previous knowledge on 
economics proved to be a blessing in disguise as my mind was not already primed to follow 
the orthodoxy and furthermore it made me understand better the format to be followed in 
presenting the analysis to others who may also lack training in economics. As noted, tackling 
the propaganda manufacturing consent is essential for addressing the democratic deficit and it 
is only though academic work which can be read and understood by the general public that 
we can be successful at this endeavour.  
My methodologies could have taken into considerations other areas, agreements and case law 
as well as examples from other negotiations. This being said, the GATT/WTO is an 
immensely vast subject and the examples chosen in this thesis suffice for sustaining the main 
arguments. The more one analyses GATT/WTO themes and policies, the more one observes 
a repetition of the same pattern and the deficiencies and imbalances highlighted in this thesis 
apply mutatis mutandis to all other areas. They even apply to international law in general, and 
in this sense an analysis was also briefly included on the philosophies and practices of the 
international legal system and its politics to place the WTO in its broader framework and for 
a better understanding of power and agenda in this context.  
There is a danger of overgeneralising when tackling issues concerning large groups with 
different interests and characteristics such as ‘developing countries’. The discrepancies in 
their interests are obvious and they clearly play a detrimental role, when these countries fail 
to stand together at negotiations to block bad deals. This being said, the analysis and 
conclusions of this thesis concerns themes relevant to all of them as well as a broader 
evaluation of the justness of the system which is not a partisan issue. As Chimni rightly 
points out, in the struggle for a more just international economic order struggle it is important 
to keep a focus on structures and processes of global capitalism that continue to bind and 
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unite developing countries, despite the differences in the patterns of their particular 
economies. It is the former structures and processes that produced colonialism and have now 
spawned neo-colonialism: 'In other words, once the common history of subjection to 
colonialism, and/or the continuing underdevelopment and marginalization of countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America is attached sufficient significance, the category 'third word' 
assumes life.'57 International law prescribes rules that deliberately ignore the phenomena of 
uneven development in favour of prescribing uniform global standards, casting to flames the 
principal of special and differential treatment in everything but rhetoric.58 To speak of 
developing countries as a particular category is crucial to organising and offering collective 
resistance to hegemonic policies. The alternative of merely multiplying sub-categories may 
be nothing but a tactic of divide et impera to prevent a global coalition of third world peoples 
and subvert collective modes of reflection on common problems and solutions. 59  
With this exact sentiment in mind, the methodology of the present research has been to focus 
on systemic problems of the WTO in their impacts on developing countries, regardless of 
their specific levels of development or structures of their economies. In this sense the critique 
is not limited to particular cases, but looks for general problems and solutions in the 
relationship of domination between developed and developing countries at the WTO. It 
furthermore suggests reform that is flexible enough to offer a useful tool to any developing 
country, regardless of their particular needs and structures of their economies. 
 
5. Outline of Chapters  
This thesis analyses several aspects of the GATT/WTO underlying theories, genesis and 
evolution, procedures and laws in order to answer the three main research questions, i.e. 
whether the organisation suffers from a legitimacy gap, which mechanisms are perpetuating 
this gap and how the organisation should be reformed in order to address it.  
a) Chapter II – Measuring WTO’s Legitimacy against the Right to Development 
Chapter II thus analyses legitimacy theory from several different perspectives to devise a 
framework for the evaluation of the GATT/WTO system. It looks at classical standards for 
legitimacy of government and considers their application at the international level. It then 
takes into account the evolution in perspective on legitimacy of international law and WTO 
law in particular in light of its ever increasing scope and reach and identifies the general 
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public as its main stakeholder in the modern times. It also reflects on the fact that the WTO is 
part of the wider international legal framework and on what that entails for measuring its 
legitimacy. Three main themes are identified from the study of the theories as the relevant 
benchmarks for evaluating the organisation’s legitimacy. Firstly, its procedural/democratic 
credentials, which imply that its lawmaking and dispute settlement procedures need to uphold 
certain necessary standards; secondly, its adherence to the values of the general public as its 
main stakeholder; and thirdly, its adherence to the values of the broader international system 
and the UN Charter as a rule of recognition comparable to a constitution in the national 
system. Both latter criteria imply that the pursuit of the economic development of poorer 
countries should be the organisation’s priority. The different layers of legitimacy are 
furthermore intrinsically linked as a lack in democratic legitimacy leads to rules which do not 
reflect the values of humanity and their application at the dispute settlement in turn renders 
the latter equally unjust on top of any legitimacy gaps it may have on its own due to unequal 
participation and enforcement. This chapter further identifies the constraints imposed on 
enforcing the right to development in the current international legal framework, including in 
the trade context, despite its essential relevance for ensuring a progressive realisation of all 
human rights and considers the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights as an 
inspiration for the international model in this regard.  
b) Chapter III – Development through Liberalisation 
Chapter III then looks at the mandate of the WTO to consider whether it sufficiently reflects 
developmental concerns and how its underlying theory contributes to soft power exerted at 
the negotiations and beyond. It firstly considers aspects of Membership in the organisation 
which are undoubtedly beneficial for economic development and proceeds to look at the 
more contentious aspects of its mandate, namely the achievement of welfare enhancement 
and sustainable development through mutual liberalisation.  The chapter looks into the 
historical background of how the mandate for the institution was set and why it failed to 
reflect other ideas apart from neo-liberalism. It then examines how comparative advantage 
theory, which underlines this mandate, has become the dogma it is today and why this is 
harmful for policy space needed for development. It examines some of the main original 
problems of the theory with regards to development, especially the myth of a static 
comparative advantage, and it examines on the other hand how some of its main 
preconditions have been later disregarded. It then looks at the historic evidence that speaks 
against premature liberalisation and furthermore examines the voices of developmental 
economists which offer a radically different view from the orthodoxy. Finally it unveils the 
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rhetoric and propaganda which has secured the prominent position of the neoliberal theory 
today at the expense of any other view. 
The main argument is that the free trade theory is inadequate as a recipe for development, 
therefore less orthodox theories need to be given a chance to influence the international trade 
system to begin addressing its legitimacy gap. 
c) Chapter IV – The Unequal Protection of Members’ Interests at the WTO and its 
Impact on Policy Space and Market Openings for Development 
This chapter discusses to what extent the majority of the WTO Membership, which are 
developing countries, are able to influence the rulemaking sufficiently to protect their 
developmental needs, namely market openings for products of interest to them and sufficient 
policy space for the protection and development of their industry and technological 
capabilities. It looks at their status in the organisation in terms of an equal voice and equal 
opportunity to impact rule making and rule changing and how this impacts the rules 
themselves thereby clearly demonstrating the link between a democratic legitimacy gap and 
the legitimacy gap of the norms thus created. It illustrates the problems of negotiations and 
accession protocols and how the biased rules that result therefrom are violating the right to 
development by denying market access to goods of most importance to developing countries, 
by permitting extensive protectionism to still exist in developed countries while prohibiting 
essential policy space for developing countries. In this context it also examines several rules 
and the ineptitude of the so-called special and differential treatment granted to developing 
countries. It finally argues that a rebalancing of the rules is necessary, if the organisation 
wants to achieve true legitimacy, however recognising that this is impossible to a truly 
meaningful extent under the current framework. 
The main argument is that the past and present international trading system is heavily tilted 
against developmental needs of the majority of its Membership and the bargaining nature of 
the institution is unable to bring sufficient change to the status quo as it cannot provide for 
the necessary conditions that would render the rulemaking truly democratic.  
d) Chapter V – The Illegitimacy of Intellectual Property Protection under the WTO in 
Light of Implications for Technological Development 
This chapter critically examines whether intellectual property protection under the WTO adds 
to its legitimacy gap considering its potentially disastrous effects on loss of policy space 
necessary for development. It outlines how the TRIPS Agreement has substantially 
strengthened international intellectual property protection and what this means for the 
remaining policy space of developing countries in their pursuit of technological advancement 
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and the upgrade of their productive structure. It analyses the theory behind strong intellectual 
property protection domestically and internationally and evaluates its main claims in terms of 
benefits to innovation and technology transfer. It further looks at the history of intellectual 
property protection in order to highlight the fact that much like free trade, countries have 
introduced stronger protection of intellectual property mostly after a certain level of 
development had already been achieved, whereas the protection of foreigners’ intellectual 
property rights had been delayed for even longer. The chapter considers the different 
channels of potential technology transfers and aims to evaluate how intellectual property 
protection impacts each of them and whether the positive impacts on some channels justify 
the negative impacts on others or whether developing countries should be essentially left 
alone to devise their own intellectual property strategies instead of the WTO imposing a strict 
and non-discriminatory intellectual property protection scheme on them.  
The main argument is that historically, theoretically and empirically speaking intellectual 
property protection can have opposite effects on innovation and technology transfer, 
depending on several factors and it is essential for developing countries to retain maximum 
flexibility in applying a policy which suits their particular situations. Taking away such 
policy space through strong intellectual property protection at the WTO thus adds to its 
illegitimacy gap.  
e) Chapter VI – The Dispute Settlement Mechanism - a Strong Weapon in Rebalancing 
Power Inequalities and Carving out Necessary Policy Space for Development? 
This chapter looks at the legitimacy of origin from the perspective of the dispute settlement 
mechanism by looking both at its democratic/participational legitimacy as well as the 
application of the law and whether the decisions reached are in line with broader international 
law obligations of the WTO. The first part considers capabilities of developing countries in 
terms of sufficient legal strength to bring disputes against more powerful players. It looks at 
challenges posed in terms of the costs involved which they have to surmount as well as the 
built up of necessary institutions. It examines the statistics of the dispute settlement and 
highlights successful strategies of a substantial number of developing countries in 
overcoming their capacity constraints. The chapter also delves into the question of 
enforcement against economically stronger parties and whether it can be successful. The 
second part of this chapter then looks at legal and political hurdles in terms of the Panels and 
Appellate Body taking into account developmental considerations beyond the rules agreed to 
at the negotiations which are many times tilted heavily against the developmental needs of 
poorer countries as explained in previous chapters, both in terms of loss of policy space and 
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in terms of restrictions on market access for goods of importance for developing countries. It 
thus analyses the effectiveness of recourse by developing countries to ‘development’ or 
‘sustainable development’ as found in the WTO Preamble or other international as well as 
domestic laws and policies, the use of arguments based on sovereignty or a right to economic 
diversification, in order to justify developmental policies strictly speaking in breach of WTO. 
Similarly, it looks at the possibility of recourse to the objects and purposes of the TRIPS 
Agreement in this context. On the other hand it considers the (im)possibility of challenging 
market restrictions placed on goods of importance to developing countries. 
The chapter concludes that the dispute settlement mechanism needs to be provided with a 
clear tool which the Panels and Appellate Body could use for more flexible interpretations of 
the binding agreements which could bring their decisions more in line with the core values of 
humanity and the broader international order, including the UN Charter and the commitment 
to sustainable development. 
f) Chapter VII – Conclusion and Recommendations for Reform 
This chapter reflects on the analysis of the previous chapters and posits that the problems of 
the WTO legitimacy gap are a reflection of the broader context of international relations and 
lawmaking and their undemocratic nature and failure to reflect core values of humanity. It 
then proposes reform in the form of the inclusion of the right to development as a 
constitutional norm at the WTO to address its both main legitimacy gaps by meaningfully 
including the voices of developing countries as well as a respect for their developmental 
needs into the system and to provide the dispute settlement mechanism with a legal tool that 
would enable it to deliver decisions in line with a concern for sustainable development 
beyond what is envisioned by the power politics of the negotiations. The chapter considers 
the main issues to be mindful of when including the right to development into the system, 
how it could function and its potential for finally bringing enforceability to the external 
aspect of the right to development thus far neglected in international law and discourse. It 
further backs the proposal for reform by considering a modern application of the right to self-
determination and a right to resist. It concludes with final thoughts on legitimacy and why we 
should include constitutional principles and judicial enforcement of said principles to address 




A half truth is a whole lie.1 
Chapter III 




Reflecting the expectations of the general public and the majority of its Membership, the 
WTO Agreement declares ‘sustainable development’ and the ‘raising of standards of living’ 
as two of the main goals of the institution. In some aspects, such as ensuring predictability 
and providing market access for goods from developing countries, the WTO indeed 
contributes to their development, in many other aspects however, the link between WTO 
rules and the goal of development is rather less straight forward. Furthermore mutual trade 
liberalisation is envisioned as the only means with which the organisation will strive to 
achieve said goals. This chapter thus discusses some of the main benefits of WTO 
Membership as well as liberalisation more generally vis-á-vis the potential for economic 
development of its developing Members. It also considers why the neo-liberal vision of trade 
came to dominate the mandate of the organisation and how it further shapes developmental 
goals in the broader international agenda. The chapter critically analyses the economic theory 
behind this approach and identifies a need for the inclusion of flexibilities beyond the neo-
liberal theory into the institution to address its legitimacy gap. To an extent this need is 
already recognised in the principle of special and differential treatment for developing 
countries, yet it has been understood very narrowly and implemented poorly.  
 
1. Positive Aspects of Membership in the WTO which Contribute to Economic 
Development 
Before delving into the negative aspects of the system vis-à-vis the potential for development, 
it is essential to firstly consider some of the main benefits of Membership in the WTO system 
in this regard. This section thus focuses on the importance of a rules-based system and the 
stability it provides for economic development as well as the main benefits to development 




1 Yiddish proverb. 
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a) The Importance of Stability in a Rules-Oriented System 
A valuable aspect of international institutions, including the WTO, is that they are designed 
based on a ‘rules-oriented’ approach, which compels parties to focus on the rule and what an 
impartial tribunal is likely to conclude about the application of a rule. This leads to greater 
certainty and predictability, essential in international, particularly economic, affairs driven by 
market-oriented principles of decentralized decision-making, with participation by millions of 
entrepreneurs.2 According to Jackson, the vastness of the WTO membership is testimony to 
the apparent need of nation-states for some kind of overall institutional structure to assist in 
resolving many of the problems that are being thrust upon them by the growing globalization 
of economic affairs.3 Rules set by such an institution can have important operational 
functions: 
They may provide the only predictability or stability to a potential investment or trade development 
situation. Without such predictability or stability, trade or investment flows might be even more risky and 
therefore more inhibited than otherwise. If such 'liberal trade' goals contribute to world welfare, then it 
follows that rules which assist such goals should also contribute to world welfare. To put it another way, 
the policies that tend to reduce some risks lower the 'risk premium' required by entrepreneurs to enter 
into international transactions.4  
 
This results in a general increase in the efficiency of various economic activities, contributing 
to economic development and greater welfare for everyone. The benefits of a rules-based 
system are not disputed - markets require the establishment of legal rules governing the rights 
and duties of those carrying out transactions.5 To realize all the gains from trade, there has to 
be a legal system and political order in place.6 
Rule orientation furthermore implies a less rigid adherence to ‘rule’ than concepts such as the 
‘rule of law’ or a ‘rule-based system’ and connotes some fluidity in rule approaches. An 
overly strong emphasis on a strict application of rules sometimes scares policy-makers, even 
though in practice they may amount to the same thing. Ideally a system needs to 
accommodate the inherent ambiguities of rules and the constant changes in the practical 
needs of human society, while promoting as much as possible the stability and predictability.7 
A further flexibility is said to be simply the fact that Member states can withdraw from the 
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system if it no longer works for them. 8 One of the main criticisms of the WTO which this 
thesis upholds is its reduction of Member states’ policy space to a point that it affects 
Members’ potential to devise an effective economic strategy which would bring economic 
development. Governments sometimes feel that the loss of policy space has been too great 
and that they cannot take action sought even by their democratic constituencies. The question 
of sovereignty is essentially a question of remaining policy space once a nation state has 
become Member of the WTO. It impacts everything from who sets safety standards on 
products to how the most favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment principles are 
applied and how disputes are resolved. 
Proponents of the system argue that the legal ability to withdraw within a reasonable period 
of notice reduces the worry of infringement on sovereignty in this regard. The Uruguay 
Round treaty provisions allow withdrawal upon six months' notice. Whether this is a realistic 
option for nations today, in light of the considerable dependence on international trade and 
the trade system of the GATT/WTO is a different question. WTO provisions appear to insert 
their rules quite deeply into national legal systems, yet the counter argument has been that 
global market forces already constrain governments, and sometimes in ways which are not as 
healthy as any WTO negotiated text.9 In this sense being in the organisation represents the 
lesser evil. Furthermore, withdrawing from any system that has been around for a while and 
its membership is vast and acts in accordance with its rules over a significant period of time, 
basing economic decisions and planning on what is prohibited or allowed inside that system, 
presents a significant cost. In this sense, although globalisation is not irreversible, it has a 
firm institutional basis in the multilateral trading system of the WTO and drastic changes to 
the status quo it would present significant disruptions to the economies involved. This has 
perhaps never been more apparent than with the decision taken by the British electorate with 
regards to exiting the EU. Regardless of the faults and merits of the system, the cost of 
withdrawal will undoubtedly be great if not catastrophic for the UK economy, which has 
been for a long period of time basing its economic decisions on the fact that it enjoyed access 
to the single as have its trading partners within and outside of the EU.  
A related question would concern the price to be paid in terms of economic prosperity for 
withdrawing altogether from the global economy which in today’s world is nearly 
                                                            
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, p. 5.  
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unimaginable. One could simply not flourish being cut off in such a manner.10 A multilateral, 
rules-based system that nevertheless retains some flexibility in this sense presents a good 
framework for the inevitable forces of globalisation. The economics of many countries are to 
an ever-increasing degree dependent on trade. This is true for developed as well as 
developing countries. The ratio of global trade in merchandise and commercial services to 
GDP is a good indicator of this. In the two decades between 1990 – 2010 China increased this 
ratio from 31 to 55 percent, India from 15 to 46 percent, Bangladesh from 18 to 43 percent 
and Mexico from 38 to 62 percent.11 Important to note is the fact that the composition of 
trade has changed for some developing countries. While many remain dependent on exports 
of primary commodities, the share of manufactured goods has been growing. Since the early 
1990s, there has been a boom in high technology exports, with countries such as China, India 
and Mexico emerging as major suppliers of cutting edge technologies, as well as labour-
intensive goods.12 Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have also increased notably 
over the past decades.13 
 
b) Protection of the Less-Powerful against Unhindered Dominance  
The WTO as well as international law in general, offers a protective shield, however fragile, 
to the less powerful States in the system. Gupta observes that international law is marked by 
contradictions best understood in the model of international human rights law which ‘even as 
it legitimizes the internationalization of property rights and hegemonic interventions, codifies 
a range of civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights which can be invoked on behalf 
of the poor and the marginal groups. It holds out the hope that the international legal process 
can be used to bring a modicum of welfare to long suffering peoples of the third and first 
worlds.'14 Similarly, despite the WTO pushing a neoliberal agenda it does recognise the 
importance of development and special and differential treatment for its less developed 
Members. Although, as shown in the analysis of this thesis, most of the special and 
differential treatment (SDT) is little more than talk, it nevertheless exists and in some aspects 
offers at least basic protection to developing countries. Furthermore the dispute settlement 
mechanism and the possibility of standing together at negotiations provide developing 
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University Press, 2013), p. 8. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, p. 12. 
14 B. S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: a Manifesto’, 8 International Community Law 
Review, (2006), pp. 26-27. 
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countries with power otherwise unattainable against more powerful states. Thus it is often 
argued that it is by default beneficial for the majority of small- and medium-sized countries to 
be a part of a relatively strong multilateral institution built on the norm of non-discrimination, 
than being in a much weaker position outside such an institution.15 That is, even if the rules 
evidently embody the preferences of the ‘stronger’ much better than those of the ‘weaker’ 
because without such rules the imbalance would be even starker.16 This cannot be stressed 
enough and it is important to understand both in terms of the critique and the praise of the 
system. On the one hand it means that the less powerful are automatically worse-off outside 
the organisation and on the other hand it implies that the organisation itself is merely a 
compromise between bare power relations and a truly just system. It is important thus to 
nevertheless seek a more equitable system and not merely acquiesce to a system which 
disproportionally benefits developed countries and curtails the possibility of pursuing 
development for poorer countries.  
 
2. Designing the World Trading System 
The original blueprint for the modern international trading system was the Charter of the 
International Trading Organization (ITO/Havana Charter), which never entered into force. 
The first draft was produced by the UK and USA governments, however substantial 
amendments were made during subsequent multilateral negotiations, which brought together 
over fifty nations and negotiators influenced by different traditions of thinking.17 The vision 
of the US drew most clearly on the ideas of classical economic liberalism and argued for an 
almost complete removal of non-tariff barriers to trade, while in the UK there was general 
support for a liberal international economic policy, however with a number of important 
qualifications.18 Apart from the US and the UK positions, there was a range of alternative 
views, the most important of which came from a group of less developed countries, including 
India, Brazil and Chile, which argued for the need to use protective trade measures to 
promote industrial development and diversification, to protect their infant industries, and to 
stabilize their balance of payments.19 These and other ideas left their mark on the final 
version of the Charter and the ITO Charter ‘represented a singular moment when ideas, 
                                                            
15 J. S. Odell, ‘How Should the WTO Launch and Negotiate a Future Round?’, 14 World Trade Review, (2015), 
p. 119. 
16 Ibid, p. 120. 
17 A. Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order, (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 24. 
18 Ibid, p. 24. 
19 A. A. Yusuf, Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States: A Study in the Influence of 
Development Needs on the Evolution of International Law, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982), p. 157. 
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institutions and actors shared a common interest’.20 The Charter specified several issues as 
objectives of the ITO, such as the expansion of production, and industrial development 
particularly of those countries which are still in early stages of industrial development, access 
to the markets, products and productive facilities (for example, access to technology) and 
removal of restrictive business practices.21 The text of the Charter included detailed 
discussion of modalities for employment creation, cooperation for reconstruction and 
development, labour standards, commercial policy, commodity agreements for stabilization 
of commodity prices, the operation of ITO and eventually the creation of a ‘Special Fund’ in 
the UN.22 While the majority of the provisions regarding commercial disciplines in the ITO 
Charter were actually identical to those in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 1947, they differed substantially regarding the role of government assistance for 
economic development: the ITO Charter contained a complex and comprehensive mechanism 
for government protection of infant industries and trade restrictive measures to address 
balance of payment issues where countries could derogate from the main disciplines subject 
to consultations with affected Members and the organization (the latter sometimes having a 
power of approval over proposed measures.)23 Unfortunately the Charter’s deviation from the 
classical liberal perspective became unacceptable to the business community in the US and 
the US Congress, which never even took the Charter into consideration for ratification. The 
GATT, which was signed even before the final death of the Havana Charter in 1947 and was 
meant only as a temporary agreement, instead stole the limelight and marked the start of 
modern international trade law. The GATT spoke more pointedly to the economic interests of 
the leading powers at that time and it has, in turn, survived through a slow process of 
consolidation and legislation ‘precisely because it has continued to speak to a narrow set of 
commercial imperatives.’24 The GATT was ‘almost a caricature of the intended ITO’ and it 
did not make ‘allowance for special problems of developing countries’.25 Contrary to the 
detailed provisions in the ITO Charter, the GATT included Art. XIII only in 1955 to allow 
limited exceptions to its obligations for the purpose of supporting new industries and 
                                                            
20 D. Drache, ‘The Short but Significant Life of the International Trade Organization: Lessons for Our Time’, 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper, (University of Warwick, 2000), p. 5. 
21 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1984, (United Nations, 1985), in M. Shafaeddin, ‘The Political 
Economy of WTO with Special Reference to NAMA’, Institute of Economic Research, (University of 
Neuchatel, 2010), p. 179. 
22 Ibid. 
23 S. E. Rolland, Development at the World Trade Organization, (Oxford University Press: 2012), p. 65.   
24 R. Wilkinson, What’s Wrong with the WTO and How to Fix It, (Polity Press: 2014), p. 22.  
25 H. W. Singer, ‘Lessons of Post-war Development Experience: 1945-1988,’ Sussex, Institute of Development 
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addressing balance of payment crises, however the framework was more limited while other 
subject matters, such as the inclusion of employment provisions into the GATT was 
successfully resisted by the US, UK and Canada.26  
Since the above described events, the main mandate of both the GATT and later the WTO 
has been understood relatively narrowly and limited in the sense that its primary goal is to 
work towards trade liberalization by substantially reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade. 
Jackson found the stated purposes of the ITO and GATT ‘essentially the same’ with the ITO 
language being merely ‘a bit more detailed’ and a bit more pointedly aimed at aiding the 
poorest countries.27 The GATT 1947 starts out in the following way:  
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with 
a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and 
expanding the production and exchange of goods,  
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.28 
 
Jackson claimed that these objectives ‘coloured by’ the purposes of the ITO Charter, were to 
promote the economic welfare of the world and this would cover any additional reference to 
aiding the poorest countries found in the Havana Charter.29 While there may be indeed little 
difference in the stated objectives, what the purported objectives or mandate of a treaty are 
and the way the treaty sets out to achieve these goals are two separate matters. With the 
advent of the WTO in 1994, new mandates were added still, while nothing much changed 
regarding the means of achieving them. The Preamble of the Marrakesh agreement 
introduced explicitly the goal of sustainable development. It thus changed the phrase ‘full use 
of the resources of the world’ to ‘optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment 
and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development.’ The Preamble further recognizes ‘that 
there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially 
the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.’ Still in terms of the means of 
achieving this, it remained much the same story as the Members set out to contribute to these 
                                                            
26 T. W. Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World – The Advent of GATT, (University of North Carolina Press, 1999), p. 
269, in Rolland, supra note 23, p. 64. 
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University Press: 2009), p. 85. 
28 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, (hereinafter GATT 
1947), Preamble.  
29 Jackson, supra note 27, p. 85. 
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objectives ‘by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to 
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.’30 In other words, despite clearly 
stating that the ‘ultimate’ purpose of the organization is not free trade in itself but the 
fostering of sustainable long-term economic development and improvement of living 
standards in rich and poor countries alike, there is still an essential lack of appreciation of the 
fact that liberalization does not always promote economic development, and that it may even 
retard it.31 Rather than mainstreaming development, the Uruguay Round engrained a singular 
neoliberal understanding of trade, where allowances for development are considered 
anomalies to be eventually phased out.32 The Uruguay Round also brought hitherto 
unthinkable issues into the arena of multilateral trade politics.33 Issues such as protection of 
intellectual property (including sensitive areas such as health and agriculture), public 
services, public procurement, subsidization of domestic activities, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, to name just a few, have become part and parcel of the WTO's 
mandate,34 bringing additional challenges for development in terms of the loss of essential 
policy space and additional costs in conforming with the agreements.  
The above described philosophy of development through liberalisation, does not allow for 
exceptions to free trade (to the extent that it has been established in the WTO agreements) 
based on a concern for economic development. Rather the weighing of competing interests is 
always done along the lines of free trade, versus the concern for the environment or human 
rights (as envisioned in the provisions on the allowable general exceptions).35 Only in the 
context of retaliation following a dispute settlement can one observe the recognition that the 
ability to impose restraints on trade is beneficial to the party who has been granted the right 
to retaliate. At the same time, the goal of sustainable development through liberalisation 
cannot even be used in legal proceedings to force market openings for developing countries’ 
exports, unless it concerns a question of discrimination in the way market access has been 
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granted to them.36 This is because the Preamble only functions as a tool to interpret 
obligations and permitted exceptions to those obligations that are already established in the 
agreements, and has in practice proved irrelevant beyond that point.37  
 
3. Neoliberal Agenda Mostly Supported by UN Narrative 
Similarly to the WTO Preamble, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) had been 
criticised for their proposed policy solutions, while continued and new concerns have been 
raised regarding the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).38 Both sets of goals contain 
a mixture of economic and political discourses and are not entirely following the neo-liberal 
model.39 Especially the SDGs reflect a stronger inclusion of Keynesian ideas following the 
2008 financial crash reminiscent of the original rise of Keynesianism following the Great 
Depression from 1929-1939. Yet when it comes to questions of trade, both the MDGs and the 
SDGs strictly follow neoliberal ideas. Within this framework, the Keynesian goals and targets 
cannot realistically be achieved and they merely serve as a faҫade for pushing a neoliberal 
agenda, in the form of mixed economic solutions.40 There are great similarities between 
MDGs and SDGs which reflect the fact that both were created by and for wealthy developed 
countries41 and do little to change the structure that produced the present levels of poverty.42  
The foundation of MDG’s Goal 1 of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, is the Rome 
Declaration on World Food Security, which presents the opening up of trade as ‘a key 
element’ in this fight43 with the oversimplified and false equation that lowering food prices 
will benefit the most impoverished. Recognising the insufficiency of yields in low-income 
food-deficit countries and their uncompetitiveness, it proposes as a solution increases in food 
imports and exports (see chapter IV for a discussion on the problems of this assumption). To 
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address the uncompetitiveness, it speaks of improving technologies and technology transfer 
(TT) yet it does not address how this TT will happen. The goal does not speak for example of 
potential conflicts between the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) and TT (see chapter V for a discussion on TT) and does not mention the 
agreement at all. The only time MDGs speak of TRIPS is when they praise it as essential for 
innovation and recognise the need for only minor exceptions to it.  
Another problem is that industrialisation and the transformation of the productive structure, 
as inevitable components of economic development, have seen their value diminished in most 
of the international narrative surrounding development, including the MDGs, which placed 
no weight on industrialisation but rather focused on issues such as health and education and 
in terms of the WTO, again a freer market. In this vision developed countries were to remove 
their subsidies and tariffs on agriculture and textiles, but there was no notion that developing 
countries needed to get out of those activities which are keeping them poor, a process which 
requires the ability of using industrial policies, including protectionism. In a welcome 
change, SDGs finally recognize in their goal 9 that  
[i]nclusive and sustainable industrial development is the primary source of income generation, [which] 
allows for rapid and sustained increases in living standards for all people, and provides the 
technological solutions to environmentally sound industrialization… Without technology and 
innovation, industrialization will not happen, and without industrialization, development will not 
happen. 
 
It is encouraging that the protection of the environment and the industrialisation of 
developing countries are not presented as mutually exclusive in this goal. Yet the SDGs fail 
again to address the lack of policy space still available to achieve these goals including in the 
context of TT.  
In the context of health, the MDGs Road Map44 speaks of TRIPS as essential for supporting 
the innovation necessary to fulfil the goal of combating major diseases in the developing 
world with the caviat that it should not limit access to life-saving medicine. This formulation 
does not recognise the problems posed by TRIPS beyond the already agreed to exceptions 
and suggests that said exceptions would suffice in averting its negative impacts. The MDGs 
thus give no additional basis for a reformed IP system at the WTO or more policy space 
granted to developing countries in this regard. On the contrary, MDGs merely reiterate the 
same old narrative of strong IP protection being essential for innovation without mentioning 
any downside for TT. Goal 6 of the SDGs reaffirms this stance and speaks of the importance 
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of TRIPS while emphasising the need to allow developing countries to provide their citizens 
with affordable medicines and vaccines. 
MDG Goal 8 Target 12 plainly calls for ‘an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory 
trading and financial system’ or in other words for the lifting of restrictions on exports and 
trade to ensure global partnership for development. The narrative is thus that free trade is the 
main ingredient for development. The Road Map further states that World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and debt relief will only be provided to developing 
countries once conditions are met enabling them to service residual debt through export 
earnings, aid and capital inflows. This demonstrates the necessity of abiding by neoliberal 
conditions or risk defaulting on outstanding loans, forfeiting future loan obtainment.45 
Likewise, bilateral debt relief can only be obtained if capitalistic, market-driven policies are 
adopted.46  
Goal 17 on global partnership for sustainable development once again presents an open 
market as the solution to underdevelopment and in Targets 10, 11, 12 calls for the opening of 
markets and the removal of trade restrictions to increase exports from developing countries. 
The goal further calls for the reduction of indebtedness of the least developed countries 
(LDCs) in Target 4 through debt restructuring.  
In the context of the environment, the MDGs speak in Goal 7 Target 9 of integrating the 
principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reversing 
the loss of environmental resources. This does not address the fact that domestic policies 
which do so can be in conflict with WTO rules (see chapters IV and VI for a detailed 
discussion), neither does it address the fact that WTO fails to sanction fossil fuel 
subsidisation. The Road Map merely supports the Kyoto Protocol which envisions emission 
trading – a system which fails to force companies to move towards environmentally friendly 
modes of production, as they find it cheaper to buy the excess credits than to install new 
pollution-abatement equipment.47 One would expect the SDGs to be the most revolutionary 
in terms of the protection of the environment vis-á-vis ensuring economic growth, however in 
its Goal 8 dedicated to ‘sustained and sustainable economic growth’ the SDGs merely repeat 
the neoliberal prescription of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, i.e. the need to increase 
‘Aid for Trade’ where nations are provided with aid in return for lifting trade restrictions.48 
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Once again, therefore, the liberalisation of trade is presented as the ultimate solution. 
Governments are expected to adjust their institutional structures in order to enable more 
systematic considerations of the environment when economic decisions are made, yet there is 
no mention of adjusting the current system of allowable and prohibited subsidies under the 
WTO which in practice allows for fossil fuel subsidisation but not that of green energy 
programmes when these are conditioned upon local content requirements. It is clear from this 
example, how language can be manipulated to appear to the general public as procuring 
actual progress, while leaving root problems unaddressed. The WTO subsidies rules actively 
discourage divestment into green energy production, which in principle goes against Goal 8, 
yet technically speaking it does not conflict with it. Thus the reference to sustainable 
development in the WTO Preamble is not random or insignificant. It is a part of a wider 
narrative with the particular goal of providing perceived legitimacy to the neoliberal agenda 
of the most powerful countries, by presenting it as pro-developmental.  
Despite the above, it is worth noting that many observers, including the UN Independent 
Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, nevertheless find 
in the SDGs a tool for reforming the WTO. Thus for example, de Zayas finds the India Solar 
Mission decisions of the Panel and Appellate Body, which is directly based on the above 
mentioned subsidies rules, to be against the SDG and the Paris Agreement and he 
furthermore finds the outcomes of the Nairobi Ministerial to be in conflict with the said 
SDGs. Azevêdo on the other hand hailed Nairobi as a success in terms of achieving the 
SDGs.49 
Apart from the well-deserved criticism, the SDGs also merit some praise. For example, Goal 
1 no longer speaks merely of eradicating extreme poverty and reducing the proportion of 
people living in poverty, but also of reducing inequality. The basis for this is the 2013 UN 
Document, Report on the World Social Situation: Inequality Matters which exposes the need 
to reduce growing inequalities within and between countries50 for the sake of ensuring equal 
economic and social opportunities, equal access to healthcare and educational opportunities, 
eliminating poverty traps and the wasting of human potential.51 The document highlights the 
fact that failing to do so results in less dynamic, less creative societies52 as well as a global 
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loss of demand which translates into poor and unsustainable economic growth.53 The 
recognition of the effects of growing inequality is highly significant as it moves the 
conversation beyond merely assuring the minimum level of human rights enjoyment as 
envisioned by the neoliberal doctrine (see chapter VII). There is no mention of the fact that 
neoliberal policies exacerbate such inequality, yet it opens the door for criticism in such a 
direction. In this sense the SDGs bring an important improvement and support to the call for 
the right to development (RTD) to become an integral part of international economic law, 
including the law of the WTO. Global trade rules and the theory behind them are all about the 
search for ‘the most efficient producer’ with absolute disregard of the fact that this 
contributes to growing inequalities between and within countries.  
Commendably Goal 10 of the SDG’s sets out to reduce inequality within and among 
countries, with Target 6 focusing on the integration of developing countries’ voices in 
international economic decision-making processes, potentially increasing the inclusion of 
their ideas and opinions. In the context of the same goal, the WTO is furthermore expected to 
‘implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, in 
particular LDCs.’54 Thus this goal and its recognition of the importance of effective SDT give 
a mandate to demand a rebalancing of the current system tilted too heavily towards the voices 
and interests of developed countries. Goal 16, Targets 7 and 8 further focus on increasing the 
inclusion of developing countries in global decision-making processes more generally, to 
promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. Yet such an inclusion 
needs to be meaningful and not restricted only to expressing ideas which inevitably end up 
being ignored, such as has been the practice at the WTO (see chapter IV).  
 
4. Development as the Objective of a Round of Negotiations  
Development was further identified as the main objective of the new round of WTO 
negotiations in 2001, which were to rebalance the system into a more development friendly 
model. The Doha Ministerial Declaration declared:  
International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and the alleviation 
of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and 
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are 
developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme 
adopted in this Declaration.55  
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Despite this declaration and many issues relevant to development actually being raised in the 
so-called Doha development round, nothing much has changed in terms of the outcomes of 
the negotiations (see chapter IV). While the WTO in its recent publication speaks of the 
redundancy of explicitly identifying the round’s objective to be development, as 
‘development is [already] a core aim -and main accomplishment - of much of what the WTO 
does’, the reality is rather the opposite. As India sarcastically expressed at one point during 
the negotiations: ‘We wonder now whether development here refers to only further 
development of the developed countries.’56 Chang on the other hand simply called the Doha 
Development round yet another anti-development project wrapped in development theory.57 
One could say the masks finally fell in 2015 at Nairobi, when the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) was simply cast aside (see chapter IV). In the words of the UN Independent Expert on 
the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, The Ministerial could have 
delivered good results, had it been true to the commitments made under the DDA, but it was 
instead ‘seriously marred by the intransigence of some States that attempted to bury the 
Agenda and prevent progress on food, security and environmental protection.’58 The 
Ministerial ‘failed to implement target 17.10 [SDGs], pursuant to which States would 
‘promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable trading system, 
under the WTO, including through the conclusion of negotiations under the DDA. That 
paradox highlights the need to rethink the global trading system and the skewed ideological 
approach taken by some negotiators. One problem with the WTO beyond Doha and Nairobi, 
is that the prevalent vision that equates ‘progress’ with the growth of trade volumes and 
exports or with a higher gross domestic product. The UN Charter advocates another vision of 
progress as development, solidarity and human rights in a progressively more democratic and 
equitable international order.’59 
To sum up, economic development of poorer countries as an essential element of sustainable 
development is clearly set out as a mandate of the WTO. Arguably this mandate is also 
encompassed in the GATT/WTO goal of ‘raising the standards of living’, since economic 
development is a prerequisite for the long-term ability of states to provide the conditions for 
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the enjoyment of all human rights in a progressive manner. Yet despite development being a 
mandate of the organisation, the means of achieving it are set out inadequately as they rest 
too heavily on the economic theory of comparative advantage and its modern adaptation with 
insufficient regard for the principle of SDT. This theory is thus analysed below.  
 
5. The Underlying Economic Theory of the World Trading Regime 
The comparative advantage theory in economics is used as a legitimizing factor for the 
ultimate goal of the world trade regime, i.e. free trade. It claims its application benefits 
everyone and enhances welfare in all parties that open up. The bargaining at the GATT/WTO 
has thus far not yet achieved complete free trade, but this is what future rounds are called to 
do.60 In terms of tariffs, almost 60% of global trade is now tariff free and the tariffs still 
applied have been substantially reduced since World War II.61 These reductions have been 
especially dramatic in developing countries. For example India’s average tariff has fallen 
from 38.6% to 13.5% in two decades; Morocco’s from 33.5% to 12.5% and Indonesia’s from 
25.6% to 7.1%.62 Leaving other trade barriers aside for a moment, this is a significant 
opening up of developing countries’ markets. 
There is a general consensus on the condemnation of developed countries in the way they 
have sought liberalisation in the GATT/WTO regime in sectors in which they have been 
superior in technology and production, while refusing the opening up of their markets for 
products in which developing countries have had an advantage (namely agriculture and 
textiles, see chapter IV). In this sense the critique is that developed countries have not been 
implementing the very free trade theory which they and the WTO preach when it does not 
serve their interests. True proponents of free trade unsurprisingly condemn the imposition of 
restrictions on the products of developing countries regardless of their existing or non-
existing reciprocity. Friedman thus states that: ‘Instead of making grants to foreign 
governments in the name of economic aid-thereby promoting socialism-while at the same 
time imposing restrictions on the products they produce-thereby hindering free enterprise-we 
could assume a consistent and principled stance.’63  
However, it is important to understand that even if the pure form of the free trade theory had 
been implemented, it would pose serious challenges for the struggle against growing 
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inequality in developed countries and for the ability of developing countries to achieve true 
development. As history shows, protectionism used in conjunction with other policies aimed 
at transforming the productive structure of a country, has been essential in nearly all 
successful instances of development. This has been conveniently forgotten and the free trade 
or comparative advantage theory, invented by Smith and Ricardo has become a sort of a 
religion of the majority of modern economists, where little about it is questioned. On the 
other hand ‘[t]hey have created a straw man, called the ‘protectionist’ with whom they 
associate anyone from List to Hamilton,’64 as a sort of derogatory name for those they 
consider have erred in their approach to economics. The bias is also evident at the WTO, 
which has proclaimed the theory of comparative advantage to be ‘the single most powerful 
insight into economics’.65  
 
6. Benefits of Liberalisation for Development 
There are undoubted benefits to liberalisation in many aspects. Technological advancement 
and the emergence of a more secure and predictable trading environment, have allowed 
producers to fragment production across many countries.66 Recent trade statistics highlight 
the importance of trade in intermediate products and the significance of such trade in 
improving the competitiveness of exports. Today, trade in intermediate products accounts for 
more than half of global merchandise exports; and the average import content of exported 
goods is 40%.67 Cheap imports of intermediate products are the lifeblood of competitive 
exports. In 2012, Karel De Gucht, the European Commissioner for Trade referred to this fact 
when he expressed the need to convince Europeans about the value of free trade. He 
reminded that few businesses make a product from start to finish and sell it to a customer 
themselves. Rather it is as part of international teams that we create wealth.68 Yet this 
realisation does not imply that any trade restriction is anti-developmental. Instead it implies 
that any economic policy needs to be well thought out and not impose restrictions on trade 
across the board. Furthermore the liberalisation of foreign markets expands the markets that 
local producers can access, allowing them to produce at the most efficient scale to keep down 
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costs. As the size of an enterprise increases, its average cost per unit falls, as the fixed costs 
are spread out over more products. This is vital for developing countries because even when 
they have a numerous population, low incomes make their potential local markets small.69 
Increased trade also diffuses new technologies and ideas, increasing local workers’ and 
managers’ productivity. TT through trade and investment are even more valuable for 
developing economies which employ less advanced technologies and typically have less 
capacity to develop new technologies themselves.70  
In the words of one of its main proponents, free trade promotes a mutually profitable division 
of labour, greatly enhances the potential of real national product, and makes possible higher 
standards of living all over the globe.71 A WTO study from 2000 claims that trade 
liberalisation allows people to exploit their productive potential, assists economic growth, 
curtails arbitrary policy interventions and helps to insulate against shocks in the domestic 
economy.72 Yet not everything is as straight forward and developmental economists put 
substantive reservations on such claims. The main developmental argument in favour of 
restrictions on trade is that comparative advantage is not fixed but can be created. For 
example, efficient production techniques can be learned through practice while similarly 
innovation takes place mainly through the production process. If not yet competitive an 
industry which is exposed to outside competition too early, loses its chance to develop. While 
there is a short-term loss to domestic consumers, who have to put up with shoddy, expensive 
products for a while, once these companies get up to speed, workers and consumers are both 
better off.73 While proponents of free trade acknowledge the negative impact on producers 
which are not able to compete with unrestricted imports, they do not perceive this as a 
problem for the development of the affected society but rather as a loss of ‘a few’ for the 
benefit of the majority which gains access to cheaper products and more choice.74 Erecting 
any kind of trade barriers is thus seen as the protection of a few at the expense of the many. 
In this sense Stiglitz lamented the fact that compensation of the losers rarely happens, which 
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in his opinion would have rectified the situation and neutralised opposition to free trade.75 
Furthermore the government is not trusted to be honest enough to pick the appropriate 
industries to protect or that it will remove protection once it is no longer necessary.76 
Krugman makes the same argument in the context of strategic trade policy where a country 
imposes a tariff or quantitative restriction to reserve the domestic market for a domestic 
industry with economies of scale to cut its costs and undercut foreign competitors in other 
markets. While those defending such policies believe that a domestic industry establishing 
itself on the world market would contribute to the national economic welfare, Krugman 
maintains that such interventions typically raise the welfare of small, fortunate groups by 
large amounts, while imposing costs on larger, more diffuse groups.77 A similar sentiment is 
expressed with regards to subsidies. Proponents of free trade do not believe governments are 
capable of picking ‘the right’ industry to subsidise. In this sense Lester et al. find a 
government protecting and investing into ‘the wrong’ green technology worse than simply 
leaving it to the free market to pick its winner, whether it be coal, nuclear or wind power. 
This is because of the purported concern for the taxpayer’s money.78 Friedman claims that 
amid the cacophony of the ‘interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers’ and their 
employees, one voice is drowned out, i.e. the voice of the consumer.79 As he explains, 
‘protection’ really means ‘exploiting the consumer’:  
A ‘favourable balance of trade’ really means exporting more than import, sending abroad goods of 
greater total value than the goods we get from abroad. In your private household, you would surely prefer 
to pay less for more rather than the other way around, yet that would be termed an ‘unfavourable balance 
of payments’ in foreign trade.80  
 
He further dismisses what he calls the ‘extreme horror story’ depicted by the defenders of 
tariffs, i.e. a situation in which country A could produce all products cheaper than country B 
and trade would therefore only flow one way.81 Basing his logic on the mechanism of 
(balance of payments), he claims that the inevitable fall in the value of the currency of 
country B would be followed by its products becoming cheaper for purchase by country A 
and everything would fall back into place as trade would achieve equilibrium.82 According to 
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Friedman even if a protected and supported industry could compete successfully once 
established, that does not of itself justify an initial tariff:  
It is worthwhile for consumers to subsidize the industry initially – which is what they in effect do by 
levying a tariff-only if they will subsequently get back at least that subsidy in some other way, through 
prices lower than the world price or through some other advantages of having the industry. But in that 
case is a subsidy needed? Will it then not pay the original entrants into the industry to suffer initial losses 
in the expectation of being able to recoup them later?83 
 
This proposition must however rest on the assumption that industries have such an amount of 
resources or loans at their disposal to be able to endure significant losses year in year out and 
still persist with investment and production until the situation eventually turns. Many free 
traders argue against protectionism because they claim it damages an industry’s 
competitiveness.84 They further maintain that an industry which holds true comparative 
advantage would be able to stand on its own feet from the outset.85 Considering the nature of 
today’s highly competitive market, it is hard to imagine how an industry can be sophisticated 
and advanced enough from day one of its operations to compete with the most established 
firms of the world without any protection. The more convincing argument against 
interventionist policy-making is the above mentioned fear that it might be susceptible to 
being captured by protectionist interests.86 While this can certainly happen it is not 
unavoidable if protection is properly monitored and industries do not get the sense that they 
can relax and not put any effort into upgrading, since the government is making sure that they 
are not failing. Constructive protectionism requires a responsible government implementing a 
clear plan for industrialisation and being prepared to change the plan when necessary. As List 
observed:  [A] statesman… must know, over and above that, how the productive powers of a 
whole nation can be awakened, increased, and protected, and how on the other hand they are 
weakened, laid to sleep, or utterly destroyed.’87 It has been argued that it was actually List’s 
vision of a broad-based interventionist approach which was implemented by many of the East 
Asian successful economies: ‘Far from confirming the common belief that a move away from 
trade intervention will improve efficiency and spur growth, these countries’ experience 
suggest that a sensible combination of trade, industrial and technology policies, implemented 
through tariff and many non-tariff instruments and with safeguards in place, could bring forth 
rapid development and structural changes in an economy.’88 List, largely being labelled a 
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‘protectionist’ was primarily interested in the economics of development rather than trade and 
understood clearly the multifarious ways of promoting industry, albeit he saw protectionism 
as integral to the support of the other instruments.89 Some free traders have accepted certain 
arguments for divergence from their theory in the form of infant industry protection in the 
context of what they see as ‘market failure’– for example, the capital market allocating 
inadequate resources to high-risk sectors – which in their view can best be rectified by 
domestic reforms or subsidies.90  
Another common argument from the proponents of liberalisation is that export-led growth 
has been the industrial policy that enriched much of Asia and left millions of people better 
off.91 This is true, yet the implication that this was accompanied by a liberalisation of the 
domestic market is not true. The frequently reiterated claim that China has used since 1978 a 
liberalised trade policy to increase growth and reduce poverty92 is simply misleading. The 
benefits that their export-led growth brought to the economy in terms of providing China with 
the ability to buy capital equipment needed for its modernization and the benefits of FDI in 
terms of bringing in managerial and technical expertise are not disputed.93 What is disputed is 
for example the image of China as a poster child for globalisation, since its economic policies 
have violated virtually every rule by which the proselytizers of globalisation would like the 
game to be played.94 It did not liberalise its trade to any significant extent during its economic 
boom and it joined the WTO only in 2001 whilst still keeping its economy amongst the most 
protected in the world.95 Furthermore even since joining the WTO in 2001 China 
continuously disregards rules which go against its aim of development in what can be called 
an ‘effective breach’ of the rules. As a consequence it has suffered many loses at the dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM) to a point where it sought to put a limit on the amount of times 
a Member can be brought to the DSM. As Rodrik puts it: ‘The remarkable thing about China 
is that it has achieved integration with the world economy despite having ignored these rules 
– and indeed because it did so. If China were a basket case today, rather than the stunning 
success that it is, officials of the WTO and the World Bank would have fewer difficulties 
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fitting it within their worldview than they do now.’96 In short, global markets are good for 
poor countries, while the rules according to which they are being asked to play the game are 
often not.97 In the context of meeting the SDGs, WTO Director-General Azevêdo brought up 
the case of China again in the following statement: 
Those countries that have opened their economies and made efforts to join international markets have 
performed well. Recent research has shown that opening up to trade, such as through GATT and WTO 
membership, boosts economic growth… China is a case in point. A period of radical reform — supported 
by the process of WTO accession — saw China's simple average tariff falling from about 40 per cent in 
1985 to under 10 per cent today.  Its trade-weighted average tariff is now just over 4 per cent, the lowest 
among the big emerging economies. The pursuit of an export-led growth model has led China to become 
the world's second largest economy and now the world's biggest trading nation. And the developmental 
impact has been huge. China reduced poverty levels from 60 per cent to 12 per cent between 1990 and 
2010.98 
 
While technically not untrue, this statement purposefully oversimplifies the situation and 
attributes all the successes to China’s (imperfect) liberalisation, despite it being merely a final 
step in a long process of building up competitiveness. Furthermore it is not only China, but 
also India, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam who are among those that have recently 
experienced outstanding rates of growth and participated in significant trade long before 
adopting liberalizing reforms.99 China’s economic rise lifted out of poverty a significant 
number of its population and consequently much of the debate on whether globalisation has 
brought progress in achieving developmental goals comes down to who gets to ‘claim’ 
China’s success. There is however a risk of reversal of this progress which has been 
recognised by the Human Development Report in 2011 due to the failure to reduce grave 
environmental risks and deepening social inequality.100 The question of whether economic 
globalisation makes things better or worse in this sense is controversial. While addressing this 
question, one should avoid falling into the trap of either being ‘pro’ or ‘against’ trade as such, 




96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid., p. 30. 
98 WTO, ‘Trade must play a central role in post-2015 international work on development,  Azevêdo tells 
UNCTAD meeting’, (4 April 2014), available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra13_e.htm, (last accessed: 8.7.2017). 
99 S. Joseph, Blame it on the WTO: A Human Rights Critique, (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 164; D. 
Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade: As if Development Really Mattered (UNDP, 2001), pp. 18, 21, 24, 
26; J. R. Paul ‘Do Institutions contribute to Economic Growth and Development?’, 44 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, (2003) 312-313.  
100 UNDP, Human Development Report 2011, Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All (United 
Nations, 2011). 
101 Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation and the Fight Against Poverty (Oxfam, 
2002), Ch. I. 
74 
 
7. The Anti-Developmental Nature of the Theory of Comparative Advantage  
Considering that the theory of comparative advantage, the core of the case for free trade, 
does not make any claims as to the benefits liberalisation for development, the use of the 
development language seems to be dishonest ab initio. According to the theory, consumers 
would benefit from liberalised international trade because goods become cheaper and 
available in larger amounts, and since we are all consumers, everyone will benefit. Dynamic 
developments like economic growth or the transformation of the productive structure are not 
integrated into the theory. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, neo-liberalism and ‘market fundamentalism’ manifested 
themselves in the following prescriptions to developing countries: trade liberalization, 
liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investments, deregulation and privatization.102 In 
1989 the economist John Williams invented the term ‘Washington Consensus’ to cover these 
policies which formed the standard reform package that the Washington based institutions, 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Word Bank and the US Treasury Department 
prescribed to developing countries. The WTO shares with minor differences a common 
ideology with these institutions, i.e. a very particular kind of capitalism, which gives free rein 
across the world to the profit-maximizing interests of a small number of huge, undemocratic 
and largely unregulated transnational corporations.103 
In 2004, James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank finally observed that ‘the 
Washington Consensus [had] been dead for years. It has been replaced by all sorts of other 
consensuses’.104 Indeed it was not the countries which followed it, but the countries which 
did not who ironically managed the most successful development in history.105 The effects of 
these economic and social theories which leave out key determinants of what creates wealth 
and poverty, have been arguably even more harmful in the so-called Third World in the long 
term than the crimes and injustices committed by whites, Europeans and others.106 As 
demonstrated below, ‘[y]ou can call it historical amnesia or double standard’107 but none of 
the now developed countries followed the prescriptions given today to developing countries, 
when they themselves were still developing. It is important to bear in mind that ‘economic 
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policy analysis is a cultural, political and social endeavour, rather than a study of the 
application of proven, scientific truth.’108 Despite this, economic theory, when effectively 
promoted, can have an unimaginable impact on the convictions of ordinary people as well as 
politicians.109 The free trade theory started capturing hearts and minds when a promotional 
movement began in the 19th century out of self-interest in Manchester, which was the centre 
of British manufacturing exports and relied heavily on markets in Europe, North America and 
the Empire.110 The classical liberal theory experienced a renaissance when it was remade into 
the neoliberal ideology at a number of coordinated centres of influence and persuasion and 
was later spread by mass media and tactically supported by American big business.111 
Thus it is essential not to take any mainstream economic theory at face value. In the context 
of the WTO it is thus absolutely necessary to understand the theory of comparative 
advantage, later reformulated into the marginal analysis framework, the fundament of 
neoclassical economics,112 to form an informed judgement the organisation’s legitimacy. In 
the same way that the Rule of Law is used to legitimise domestic legal systems, it is used to 
legitimise the international legal trading regime.113 Such legitimations make certain claims 
about the nature of a system while concealing and preventing the understanding of its true 
nature - in this sense comparative advantage and its claim that 'everyone will profit' is used to 
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conceal the disastrous disparities in income and welfare created by the system and to ensure 
that developing countries will not demand special treatment.114 The WTO holds two 
principles as being of utmost importance: most favoured nation (MFN) and national 
treatment, which derive directly from the law of comparative advantage. The theory of is one 
of the most successful theories in the history of economic doctrines and has acquired the 
reputation of science, some of its proponents going as far as saying that free trade is 'a 
scientific fact as indisputable as gravity'.115 However many voices are challenging the theory, 
some calling it ‘quaint and unreliable’ or simply ‘irrelevant’.116 The author of the theory, 
David Ricardo, was a London stockbroker, self-made millionaire, and Member of Parliament 
who read Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations on his holiday and declared himself an 
economist.117 The essential components of his theory are quite simple and the implications 
that can be drawn from the model appear to be widely applicable.118 From the idea that 
specialization is efficient, the theory forcefully makes the ‘generalization that free trade must 
be in the best interest of all trading countries.’119 Under the theory, advantages are determined 
by comparing national opportunity costs at the optima production compositions of different 
national economies. The optimum production composition of an economy lies where the 
production possibility frontier meets the highest attainable social indifference curve. 
Resources are scarce. If an economy employs them fully, this is production efficiency. The 
amount and ratio between produced goods or services in this state will depend on the way 
resources are distributed towards producing them. This is illustrated by the production 
possibility frontier. To produce one (more) unit of a particular product, one has to 'give up' a 
certain amount of another product, which is known as opportunity cost. Opportunity costs 
grow - i.e. with each additional unit of a particular product, a larger amount of another 
product needs to be given up. Bringing in the perspective of the consumer, the optimum 
production composition will be in the point where the production possibility frontier meets 
the highest possible social indifference curve. To put it simply, it is the point in which fully 
employed resources of an economy are distributed and managed in such a way that the ratio 
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between the produced goods and services gives the most satisfaction to consumers' demands 
as possible. Let us imagine two different economies, which produce two different goods. In 
nation A's optimum the opportunity cost for one unit of product x is three units of product y. 
On the other hand in nation B's optimum, the opportunity cost is one y for one x. Before 
specialisation A produced 10 units of x and 30 units of y in its optimum. On the other hand B 
produced 30 units of x and 30 units of y. After specialization, A employs all its resources to 
produce y and creates 60 units, while B specializes in producing x and creates 60 units of x. 
This way they have jointly created 20 units more of product y. Ricardo illustrated this 
proposition with an example of two nations, England and Portugal, both producing two 
different products, namely cloth and wine. To manufacture any of the products, England 
needs more labourers than Portugal. To produce the same amount of wine it needs 120 
labourers, while Portugal only needs 90 whereas to produce the same amount of cloth, 
England needs 100 labourers, while Portugal again only needs 90. Focusing on their 
comparative advantages both nations would benefit if England turned all its production into 
cloth making while Portugal specialised in wine making. Production of every product will 
automatically migrate to the nation that can produce it at the lowest opportunity cost, while 
the nation driven out of a particular industry in this process, is still to find its true 
comparative advantage.120 The opportunity cost of producing something is the next most 
valuable thing one could be producing if it had not employed its factors of production for 
producing this particular product.121 Direct cost, however, which is a matter of efficiency, can 
be even higher than in the nation from which the production migrated. 
 
8. Problems of the Comparative Advantage Theory  
Ricardo’s theory is plagued with dubious assumptions, while some of its necessary pre-
conditions have been disregarded in its neoliberal reformulation. The theory and its 
reformulations presuppose that all resources are always fully employed and factors of 
production move easily between industries; that labour and capital do not move between 
nations; that there are no trade imbalances; and that international trade can be described by a 
comparative-static model, where every nation has a fixed ‘comparative advantage’.122 The 
theory takes for granted that factors move easily between industries. In reality this is not the 
case. Especially labour and real estate are not easily movable. If the factors are not easily 
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movable imports will not push a nation’s economy into industries better suited to its 
comparative advantage but will merely kill off or drive out its existing industries and leave 
nothing in their place.123 This will manifest itself as outright unemployment, or as a less 
visible phenomenon, underemployment – a decline in quality rather than quantity, as many 
workers will have to take lower-paying jobs.124 In all fairness to Ricardo, it has been 
suggested that ‘a close reading and comparison of the first and third editions of his Principles 
of Political Economy and Taxation indicates that he had reservations concerning the effects 
of free trade on the interests of labour.’125 However there is an additional, purely economic 
cost for a nation which never again uses these individuals’ skills which took investment to 
acquire.126 Is is also established in the neoclassical theory of production itself, that workers 
working with less capital become less productive.127 The killing off of industries can have 
disastrous consequences for developing countries and it can put them back into more 
primitive models of production, instead of helping with the upgrading of the productive 
structure. This is not to say that trade cannot increase the efficiency of resource allocation and 
thus provide an ‘engine for growth’, however this requires a structural adjustment of an 
economy128 which is not always possible considering the limited resources of some countries 
as well as the limitations put on their policy space by international organisations.  
Ricardo also falsely believed that only finished products were mobile across borders.129 
Similarly Adam Smith used the famous metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ that allegedly makes 
sure of this. Realising that free movement of capital across borders would hurt the British 
economy as capitalists would invest abroad, he nonetheless believed that they would feel 
their capital was more secure if they invested at home.130 Both Smith and Ricardo were clear 
that the immobility of capital was essential for comparative advantages to determine 
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international trade, yet this is now discarded as irrelevant. Two of the most important 
propositions of the modern theory of international trade are extensions of the Heckscher-
Ohlin analysis of comparative advantage and the so-called Stolper-Samuelson theorem which 
suggests that free trade equalizes factor prices and that the removal of protective barriers 
decreases the return of the scarce factor and increases that of the abundant factor.131 Factor 
price equalisation means that labour will receive the same wage, capital the same interest 
rate, etc., in each country. 132 This then leads to the same effect as if capital and labour were 
immobile. Many economists have used the Heckscher-Ohlin framework to argue that trade 
liberalization should raise the incomes of unskilled labour in developing countries. In a 
developed country like the US the abundant factor would be capital whereas unskilled labour 
would be the abundant factor in developing countries. In other words, for unskilled labour in 
the US wages should drop, but in developing countries they should increase. However this 
holds only if all countries produce all goods, if the goods imported from abroad and produced 
domestically are close substitutes, or if a nation’s comparative advantage is the same in 
respect to all trading partners.133 A poor country in a world with many factors and many 
goods may no longer have a comparative advantage in producing unskilled intensive 
goods.134 For example, Mexico might have a comparative advantage in producing low skill 
goods in trade with the US, however its comparative advantage switches vis-à-vis trade with 
China.135 There is no evidence that factor-prices actually do equalise worldwide.136 If 
anything, there is a race to the bottom as countries compete for investment. Labour also 
moves between nations but it is more restricted unless it is skilled labour, then it is 
encouraged. This creates a vicious circle in which the brightest minds usually emigrate from 
poorer to more developed countries creating more wealth for the latter and contributing less 
to the economies of the former.  
Another essential assumption of the theory is that trade cannot be unbalanced for a longer 
period of time, as the adjustment mechanism inherent in the theory transforms comparative 
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production cost advantages into absolute price advantages.137 A perpetual trade surplus or 
deficit is impossible under this theory, because Ricardo drew on the price-specie-flow 
mechanism, developed by David Hume, which maintains that changes in the quantity of the 
means of payment (gold at the time), only have a price effect, not a real one. Applying it to 
the England-Portugal example, since Portugal needs less labourers for the production of any 
of the goods, it is assumed prices in Portugal are lower in the moment when the countries 
start trading. Consumers will consequently buy both goods from Portugal, the quantity of 
gold (money) in Portugal will increase, leading to a rise in prices, while the exact opposite 
process will take place in England, leading eventually to lower prices and competitiveness in 
one good, namely cloth, which England will now be able to sell cheaper. Finally, the prices of 
both goods will adjust in a way that the trade is balanced, the value of imports equals the 
value of exports and an equilibrium state is achieved in which both nations produce the 
commodity they have a comparative advantage in.138 Comparative production cost 
advantages are thus transformed into absolute money price advantages for the consumer. 
In the neoclassical theory the exchange rate adjustment mechanism is responsible for creating 
the equilibrium.139 
When a nation has a deficit, its currency will be depreciated and internationally its goods will 
become cheaper. The opposite process will take place in a nation with a surplus.140 When 
exports become equal to imports in money value, the exchange rate will stop moving and 
equilibrium will exist.141  In the case that exchange rates are fixed trade will be balanced via 
wage rate changes.142 In the quantity theory of money, used by Ricardo, money is seen as 
neutral and the velocity of a currency is neglected, however 'neither is velocity constant in 
practise, nor is money neutral to the real economy. Additionally, if money quantities change, 
interest rates are affected.'143 'Though there is generally a positive correlation between the 
increase of the quantity of money and inflation, this correlation is not a 1:1 correlation.'144 
These assumptions are simply wrong. The fact that exchange rates are influenced by financial 
factors as well as rational and irrational expectations cannot be ignored, neither can it be 
ignored that money can be used for other purposes, such as storing value, which all leads to 
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the fact that the capitalistic world is not characterised by a barter economy.145 In reality trade 
imbalances are a constant occurrence and some countries are regularly forced to adjust their 
domestic policies for balance of payments purposes.146 As Culbertson pointed out, ‘trade 
must be kept in balance by trade policy.’147 
Another problem of the theory is its misrepresentation of mercantilism. When the liberal 
theory was introduced it presented itself as a saviour from the ‘dark ages’ of mercantilism 
when nations were openly pursuing policies for their benefit at the expense of other nations. 
However, free trade is essentially not any different apart from claiming that it benefits 
everyone. As one commentator observed: 
[i]n an international system, that is a system composed of nations, the relations among those 
elements are bound to be pervaded by power both as ends and means. Mercantilism and free trade 
are not basically different, but both are the manifestation of, and the instrument by which, power is 
exercised. Free trade is the mercantilism of the strongest power, and it leads to imperialism almost 
as surely as thought-out commercial policy.148  
 
The mercantile system was in operation for more than 200 years between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries.149 Central to the system was the belief that governments should advance 
the goal of maintaining a positive balance of trade with nations by assuming a protectionist 
role in the economy.150 The taxation of trade was the main source of wealth for political elites 
and imperial powers.151 However, sometimes unintentionally, and at other times intentionally 
this taxation also served as protection for domestic infant industries successfully fostering 
domestic manufacturing at the expense of other countries’ industries.152 Historically, 
countries which replaced duties on exports of raw materials with duties on imports of 
manufactured products, attracted merchants, seamen, and manufacturers of cities and 
countries more industrially advanced to take up residence in countries with such policies 
carrying their skill and capital where they found the greatest encouragements and support.153 
Since Adam Smith, mercantilism has been mostly vilified as merely a delusion of early-
modern monarchs trying to maximize their gold supplies.154 Instead of being dismissed in 
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such a manner it is viewed by others, as a variant of developmentalism.155 In developmental 
economics the basic unit is not the individual or the firm but the polity, which today 
corresponds to a nation-state and the competition or collaboration among them is considered 
to be the central fact of economics.156 Friedrich List deemed ‘mercantile’ to be an improper 
name altogether and called it simply ‘the industrial system’.157 He commended it for firstly, 
assuming the importance of manufactures and their influence on agriculture, commerce, and 
navigation of a country, and frankly acknowledging their importance; secondly, trying to find 
the best mode of establishing manufacturing industry in a nation; and thirdly, for taking the 
idea of a nation as its starting point, treating nations as unities, which keeps the attention 
constantly fixed upon national interests.158 Furthermore he envisioned only temporary 
protection, until all countries had attained comparable industrial development, after which 
there should be global free trade.159 In fact it may be important to shift between protectionism 
and free-trade based on the changes in a country’s relative position in the international 
economic hierarchy.160 In the words of Reinert:  
Cumulative factors and path dependencies cause the winds of the market to blow towards 
progress only when a high level of development has already been reached. The poorer the 
nation, the less the winds of laissez-faire blow in the right direction. For this reason, the issue 
of free trade and other policy decisions is one of context and timing.161 
 
9. Questions of Context and Timing  
Nations which have historically championed free trade, most notably the United States and 
Britain, have not been founded on the free market neither have they picked random moments 
in their histories to introduce it. England waited until reaching its economic zenith, a 
consequence of centuries of protectionism and industrial policy, before embracing the free 
trade theory. Reinert notes that ‘history of economic thought tells us what Adam Smith said 
England ought to have done, but no branch of academia seemed to worry much about what 
England actually did, which proved to be very different from what Smith had advised.’162 
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England was the first country to invent infant industry protection. In its post-feudal age, 
Britain was a relatively backward economy and relied on imports of technology, raw wool 
and low-value-added wool cloth.163 In the 14th century, Edward III was the first of the British 
monarchs to try and develop local wool cloth manufacturing by bringing in Flemish weavers, 
centralizing trade in raw wool and banning the import of woollen cloth.164 To set an example 
he wore only English cloth.165 With the reign of Henry VII and the other Tudor monarchs, 
policies aimed at protecting their infant industry reached a new level. History’s first 
deliberate large-scale policy was born out of Henry VII spending his youth in Burgundy and 
observing how the woollen textile production created general wellbeing in the area, while 
ironically importing both the wool and the material used to clean it from England.166 He 
witnessed that not only were the textile producers well off in Burgundy but also the bakers 
and the other craftsmen.167 ‘England was in the wrong business, the king recognized and 
decided on a policy to make England into a textile-producing nation, not an exporter of raw 
materials.’168 
Henry VII created quite an extensive economic policy toolbox. His first and most important tool was 
export duties, which ensured that foreign textile producers had to process more expensive raw 
materials than their English counterparts. Newly established wool manufacturers were also 
guaranteed tax exemption for a period, and were given monopolies in certain geographical areas for 
certain periods. There was also a policy to attract craftsmen and entrepreneurs from abroad, 
especially from Holland and Italy. As English wool-manufacturing capacity grew, so did the export 
duties, until England had sufficient production capacity to process all the wool they produced. Then, 
about a hundred years later, Elizabeth I could place an embargo on all raw wool exports from 
England… Several English historians point out that the industrial policy plan of the Tudors was the 
real foundation of England’s later greatness.169 
  
It is therefore not hard to understand that Ricardo's choice of England and Portugal for his 
seemingly logical exercise was not random, and neither was Smith's choice of the same two 
nations for a discussion on economic specialisation in Chapter VI of The Treaties of 
Commerce.170 Smith chose as his main case the Methuen Treaty signed by England and 
Portugal in 1703, by which Portugal agreed to take English woollen cloth at the existing low 
tariffs in exchange for England taking Portuguese wine at two-thirds of the tariffs imposed on 
France, its main competitor.171 'Therefore Smith reasoned the treaty seemed to benefit 
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Portugal rather than England. Yet the treaty had, nevertheless, been celebrated as a 
masterpiece of English commercial policy.'172 It was in fact Britain who was benefiting not 
both countries and certainly not Portugal alone. For Portugal the result of the deal was a 
complete devastation of its cloth industry, while the skilled workers did not turn to wine-
making or agriculture, as the theory goes, but rather emigrated from the country.173 Britain’s 
not only comparative, as Ricardo described in his model, but absolute advantage in wool, was 
the result of centuries of protectionism. Britain’s economy got its initial boost also thanks to 
the Navigation Acts, another protectionist measure, according to which exporters were 
obliged to use British ships, which played an essential role in establishing British maritime 
supremacy, something even Adam Smith and J. S. Mill recognised.174 
With Robert Walpole, the first British Prime Minister, British industrial and trade policies 
aimed at promoting manufacturing industries spread to other industries, with measures such 
as lowering or dropping altogether import duties for raw materials used for manufactures; 
increasing duty drawbacks on imported raw materials for exported manufactures; abolishing 
export duties on most manufactures; significantly raising duties on imported foreign 
manufactured goods; extending export subsidies to new items; and regulation was introduced 
to control the quality of manufactured products, for the sake of the reputation of British 
products.175 Through the king’s address to Parliament, Walpole stated, ‘it is evident that 
nothing so much contributes to promote the public well-being as the exportation of 
manufactured goods and the importation of foreign raw material.’176 
As List once put it ‘whoever is not convinced of the infant industry argument should first 
study the history of English industry.177 Even more instructive, however, is the economic 
history of the US; the development there was fast and the periods of free trade and regulated 
trade followed each other in rapid succession.178 Before achieving their independence ‘the 
colonies of North America were held by the mother country, in regard to manufactures, in 
such absolute subjection, that besides the common domestic industry and the ordinary 
mechanical employments, no kind of manufacture was permitted’ or as the great Chatham 
believed: the colonies outh not to be allowed to manufacture so much as a hob-nail.179 As 
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other colonies, the American colonies served to help the British Empire in its rivalry with 
other major powers of Europe and were used to provide markets and raw materials for the 
mother country.180  
This was one of the principal causes of the American Revolution. Once separated from 
England and its manufactured products and on the other hand possessing all the material and 
intellectual conditions needed for manufacturing, all kinds of manufacturers received a 
remarkable impulse during the war of independence which in turn benefited the agriculture, 
ultimately raising the value of the soil and the wages of labour in the whole country.181 
However these infant manufacturers were quickly extinguished when English products made 
their way back into America sold at lower prices ‘than at Liverpool and London’.182  This 
state of affairs lasted until the adoption of the Federal Constitution which gave Congress the 
power to establish a uniform system of commerce within America. The issue of the 
federation and federally imposed tariffs was the apple of contention between the 
manufacturing North and the agricultural South which eventually lead to the civil war and not 
the slavery issue as is commonly believed.183 In essence the United States, disregarded Adam 
Smith’s advice to forsake manufacturing and keep specializing in agriculture.184 It was 
Alexander Hamilton, the first finance minister of the USA, who copied and re-invented the 
protectionist philosophy of Walpole’s England. In his famous ‘Report on Manufactures’ 
submitted to the USA House of Representatives in December 1791 he focused on methods of 
promoting manufacture with the unshakable belief that this was expedient for the United 
States. He refutes in the introductory passages of the Report, the idea that ‘to endeavor by the 
extraordinary patronage of Government, to accelerate the growth of manufactures, is in fact, 
to endeavour, by force and art, to transfer the natural current of industry, from a more, to a 
less beneficial channel.’185 Hamilton, using quotation marks, attributes this thinking to 
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‘respectable patrons of opinion’ believed to be a reference to Adam Smith.186 Hamilton 
realised that the manufacturing establishments render the produce and revenue of the society 
‘greater than they could possibly be, without such establishments’ due to a number of 
circumstances which together add to the industrious effort in a community ‘a degree of 
energy and effect, which are not easily conceived’.187 He divided these circumstances into the 
division of labour (within the country); an extension of the use of machinery; additional 
employment of individuals not ordinarily engaged in business;188 promotion of emigration 
from foreign countries; allowing greater scope for the diversity of talents and dispositions of 
individuals; creating a more ample and various field for enterprise (cherishing and 
stimulating the activity of the human mind by multiplying the objects of enterprise);189 
securing a more certain and steady demand and creating new demand for the surplus of 
agriculture from within the country. To encourage manufacturing he set out a detailed plan, 
which included government aid, protecting tariffs, prohibition of rival articles, or duties 
equivalent to prohibitions, prohibition of the exportation of raw materials, direct subsidies to 
private firms, the exemption of raw materials from tariffs and other industrial policy tools.190 
Luckily for America, these were implemented, mildly at first, but progressively throughout 
the century that followed.191   
 
10. Myth of a Static Comparative Advantage 
This brings us to possibly the most important deficit of the comparative advantage theory – 
its definition of comparative advantage itself. One cannot stress enough the importance of 
what is considered a comparative advantage of a country. In the words of Ricardo: 
our enjoyments should be increased by the better distribution of labour, by each country producing 
those commodities for which by its situation, its climate, and its other natural or artificial advantages, 
it is adapted, and by their exchanging them for the commodities of other countries, as that they should 
be augmented by a rise in the rate of profits.192  
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Ricardo made two main arguments - specialisation based on national comparative advantage 
increases the total production and that benefits all participants in a trading system.193 He did 
not however demonstrate that real income could improve in both places.194 Going back to his 
choice of England and Portugal, as mentioned, wool and wine were not random choices. 
England’s absolute advantage in wool was due to five hundred years of protectionism and not 
a naturally unusual endowment with sheep. Portugal on the other hand was England’s most 
important market, because Portugal’s own cloth manufacture barely had any support from the 
state, which was a result of class structure and mercantilist political alliance more than any 
natural determination and the fact that its rulers were relying on overseas possessions and had 
little interest in Portugal's industrialisation, while the focus on wine production was closely 
associated with England’s rivalry with France.195 To be fair to Ricardo, he does mention 
‘artificial advantages’ but it seems he is referring to those already artificially created 
sometime in the past and not as potentially created in the future. Therefore his theory does not 
explain how underdeveloped states can upgrade their economies or diversify their 
production.196 It is content with such countries staying locked in their low quality static 
comparative advantage.197 Anglo-Portuguese trade treaties of 1641, 1654 and 1661, already 
provided more or less free trade between the countries, which led to Portugal’s reliance on 
English cloth. Marquis de Pombal, who was chief minister under Jose 1 was one of the rare 
politicians who tried to reverse the situation, however after he was dismissed from politics 
because of his anti-Jesuit and secular stance, there was a return to dependency, further 
deepened by Portugal's reliance on Britain against Napoleon's invasion, which it had to pay 
for by further opening up its market to Britain including that of its colony Brazil.198 
Essentially, the imbalance in these trading relations led to deficits in Portugal's balance of 
payments which caused its gold and diamonds to flow to England.  These diamonds and gold, 
which were ironically not Portugal's in the first place, but extracted from its colony Brazil 
with not a little force, then became the bullion basis of the British banking and currency 
systems, which enabled the industrial revolution, while Portugal’s later attempts at 
industrialization failed due to balance of payment problems.199  
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A similar fate was in store for Spain. For both England and France trade with Spain and the 
Indies was of first importance for its own commercial prosperity as a source of bullion.200 'In 
certain British circles the trade was so highly regarded that it was referred to in poetical and 
offensively proprietorial tones as ''England's silver mine, her darling.'' ... The British balance 
of trade was almost always favourable.'201 Attempts made by Charles III, king of Spain in the 
1760s to discontinue the treaties of privilege granted to England (claimed also by the French 
under the most-favoured nation treatment, an emerging notion of free trade doctrine) and 
revive Spain's own economy were bound to fail as Spain had already become dependent on 
Britain for her textiles and other indispensable imports.202 Hudson has shown that for many 
other European countries the beginning of their industrial development began when British 
exports stopped being imported because of the Napoleonic wars.203 However after trade 
resumed, these countries regressed again.204 As Peet describes the advantage of industrial 
specialization (cloth) lay not only in the far higher rate of technology change in 
manufacturing, as compared with agriculture, but also in the fact that cloth was an utter 
necessity and thus imported in large quantities, whereas wine was consumed by the British 
upper classes who, ‘if absolutely necessary, could do without their glass of port after 
dinner.'205 Several economists, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) founder Raoul Prebisch and Sir Arthur Lewis exposed the fact that 
the free trade theory ignores income elasticities (i.e. the responsiveness of demand to a rise in 
consumers’ incomes) and potential trade asymmetries; they argued that the demand for 
manufactured imports in developing countries outgrew developed countries’ demand for 
primary products, which lead to declining terms of trade and a perpetual balance of trade 
deficit for developing countries.206 Not to mention that specialization in raw materials, or less 
processed products means selling something and buying it back ten times the price in a semi 
or fully processed form. States whose comparative advantages are solely in primary 
commodities and low-skilled manufacturing, which is the situation of most developing 
countries today, are extremely vulnerable in the global economy and their prospects for 
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sustained growth are low without potential diversification.207 Furthermore economies based 
on mineral or energy resources, also a common phenomenon amongst developing countries, 
may experience a rise in their GDP however the development is uneven as there is a 
disconnect from other parts of the economy; overinflated currencies harm other exports in the 
country and there is vulnerability to volatile prices.208 Even worse, the desire to capture the 
profits from such resources has led to conflicts and military dictatorships supported by 
foreign powers eager to access raw materials at cheap prices with complete disregard for the 
peoples’ of such resource-rich countries.209 
Therefore one should take Ricardo’s ‘artificially,’ but disregard the static nature of his theory. 
That however destroys the theory itself, as free trade is intrinsically incompatible with the 
concept of artificially creating advantages. It denies the importance of targeted economic 
policies which create dynamic comparative advantages and thus does not recognize the 
means for a state to graduate from the former to the latter.210 If an industry is to diversify 
from first stage to second stage, from let us say production of textiles into the higher value 
and higher skilled arena of textile machinery, it has to enjoy infant industry protection at this 
time.211 The same goes for the next step of diversification into even higher stages of 
industry.212  The way England was giving ‘advice’ to its American colonies, was the same for 
all the other colonies who were instructed to open up, but not compete with the colonizer nor 
upgrade capacities beyond primary production, which lead to de-industrialisation and weak 
economies.213 The retardation of the growth of the manufacturing sector in these colonies due 
to policies imposed on them has been estimated to have been as high as 85%-95%.214 
Ironically, African states are now advised at WTO forums that ‘[i]n order to gain from its 
exports, a country should aim to engage in processing, in order to add value to its exports of 
raw products.’215 As if this is some new piece of information and as if it will just happen by 
itself, when the free trade agenda of the international economic system has prohibited or 
limited the use of a large part of industrial policies a government might use to promote and 
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protect its infant industry. Not surprisingly, African countries’ exports which saw a sharp 
increase from 2000 onwards until the global crisis in 2008 were mostly commodities – fuels 
and minerals only.216 Many countries are exporting mainly one good (e.g. oil in Angola).217 
Countries such as Gambia are nevertheless showing a gradually diversified export base.218 
The most important addition to the free trade theory in the 20th century has been that of 
Heckscher and Ohlin which have argued that a nation’s comparative advantage is shaped by 
its resource base, implying that capital-scarce developing countries should specialise in 
labour-intensive products.219 This again advises such countries against being ‘too ambitious’ 
and to stay in a less than optimal stage of development. The inherent economic disadvantages 
of labour-intensive industries, unfairly low-wages and differences in technological levels 
between rich and poor countries which may be amplified by trade and the ‘backwash effects’ 
of trade on traditional industries all lead to inherently unequalising effects of free trade.220 
Even some orthodox theorists accept that some countries can actually lose.221 A further 
problem with free trade theory is that it does not take into account increasing returns to 
capital, economies of scale in production, cumulative advantage or ‘first mover’ benefits, 
learning-by-doing and unequal access, which may all contribute to locking countries into an 
existing industry pattern, to their long-term disadvantage, making capital and trade flows 
favour industrially developed countries.222 Of today’s advanced industrial economies, 
according to Chang, only three - the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Switzerland223 - refrained 
from erecting trade barriers and subsidizing infant industries during the early stages of their 
development. Stiglitz goes further in claiming that '[t]o date, not one successful developing 
country has pursued a purely free market approach to development.'224 
  
Conclusion  
This chapter identifies one of the core issues in the GATT/WTO legitimacy gap and its 
perpetuation in the overwhelmingly pro-liberalisation mandate of the organisation which 
renders other purported goals such as the sustainable development and the raising of 
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standards of living as well as the principle of special and differential treatment assume a 
secondary role, if taken into account at all. The analysis of the economic theory behind this 
mandate clearly shows that it does not include a developmental element. Despite this names 
such as David Ricardo and Adam Smith alongside their respective theories are revered as 
untouchable authorities to provide perceived legitimacy and soft power in the pursuit of 
liberalisation in many aspects beyond what even they had imagined, while the theory is 
ignored completely in areas such as intellectual property or any sector where developed 
countries are set to gain from protectionism. Even if implemented in their pure forms, 
however, these theories can be considered to have been flawed from the beginning, 
prescribing the wrong kind of policies for the then developing countries as they are for 
today’s developing countries. By denying history, ample evidence and even in some cases 
mainstream economics on issues of development, the WTO, World Bank, IMF and even the 
UN are using development language to achieve anything but the right conditions for it. As 
Carant describes, the UN continuously fails to produce the transformational systemic shifts 
necessary for long-term sustainable and equitable change for all.225 Some improvements can 
be identified in the Sustainable Development Goals which provide at least a good start in the 
push for reform, however they fall short of a sufficient departure from neoliberal theory in the 
sphere of trade.   
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Who controls the past controls the future.  
       Who controls the present controls the past.1  
 
Chapter IV 
THE UNEQUAL PROTECTION OF MEMBERS’ INTERESTS AT THE 
WTO AND ITS IMPACT ON POLICY SPACE AND MARKET 




The fact that accession to any regime is voluntary implies that it enhances the welfare of its 
Members.2 Since countries accede to the WTO by their own will, the assumption is that it is 
to their benefit.  However, ‘[t]hat a regime makes its member states better off does not mean, 
of course, that its gains are distributed uniformly across them.’3 It is beyond dispute that the 
WTO does not serve the interests of its Members equally well. However, worse than that, the 
regime in practice has locked in an imbalanced set of rules and practices that have 
contributed to the vulnerability in the world’s poorest countries.4 Furthermore there are very 
few features of the WTO system that do anything to address this imbalance, which shows 
time and again in the outcomes of the negotiations.5 Most of the bias is a consequence of the 
economic power, possession of superior knowledge, abundance of resources and the 
monopoly on propaganda by developed countries which all play a role in the negotiations, 
however it also does not help that the Secretariat itself is mostly made up of staff from 
developed countries, with employees from developing countries making up only 21% in 1995 
and 37% in 2014.6 Perhaps most problematic, however is that this Secretariat, the body which 
should be facilitating negotiations in a neutral and essentially administrative way, could 
rightly be accused of aiding and abetting the rich countries’ quest for their ‘narrow, short-
term mercantilism rather than the long-term interests of the world economy as a whole.’7 Yet 
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more than all of the above, there is another and ultimately decisive factor that disables the 
consensus rule from giving equal power in the negotiations to all the Members and that is the 
fact that the economically more powerful states can simply destroy the institution and make a 
new one or turn to regional agreements if developing countries push too far for their interests 
within the existing system. In order to avoid this and keep the certainty, stability and 
predictability that the WTO provides, developing countries are reluctant to demand ‘too 
much’ regardless of how legitimate their demands would have been or how necessary for 
their development. Thus Anghie’s observation that whenever international law attempts to 
renew itself, its colonial origins are re-enacted, applies both to GATT and WTO rulemaking.8 
It is important to also note however, that some developing states have withdrawn from the 
GATT in the past due to their interests being too marginalised. The hurdles posed against 
developing countries’ exports in the early GATT years caused China to withdraw from the 
system in 1950, Lebanon and Syria in 1951, and Liberia in 1953.9 Therefore the idea that 
developing states are always eager to be part of this system, no matter what, is misleading. 
In a recent WTO publication, the Director-General, Azevêdo makes the well-known claim 
that through the WTO ‘[i]nternational rules, not power, increasingly govern trade relations, 
and conflicts are settled, not in trade wars, but in the WTO’s dispute settlement system’.10 
Although not technically untrue, the statement is nevertheless misleading, as the international 
rules he speaks of are hugely dictated by power and the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
in turn adjudicates based on these rules.  
This chapter discusses to what extent the majority of the WTO Membership, which are 
developing countries, are able to pursue in the institution their most legitimate interests, i.e. 
those serving developmental needs, namely market openings for products of interest to them 
and policy space for the protection and development of their industry and technological 
capabilities. It looks at their status in the organisation in terms of an equal voice and equal 
opportunity to impact rule making and rule changing and how this impacts the rules 
themselves. It illustrates the problems of negotiations and accession protocols and how the 
biased rules that result therefrom are violating the right to development by denying market 
access to goods of most importance to developing countries, by permitting extensive 
protectionism to still exist in developed countries while prohibiting essential policy space for 
developing countries. In this context it also examines several rules and the ineptitude of the 
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so-called special and differential treatment granted to developing countries. It finally argues 
that a rebalancing of the rules is necessary, if the organisation wants to achieve true 
legitimacy, however recognising that this is impossible to a truly meaningful extent under the 
current framework. 
This chapter thus addresses the core claim of the legitimacy gap at the WTO, i.e. that to a 
substantial extent its rules and practices negatively impact the potential for economic 
development of its poorer Members and it further establishes that this is intrinsically linked to 
the democratic legitimacy gap present in the institution. 
  
1. Negotiations Lead to Anomalies in Rules 
Considering its purported goals, it is unsurprising that the WTO is commonly thought of as 
an institution with the main aim of expanding free trade and thereby enhancing consumer 
welfare everywhere in the world. However,  
[i]n reality, it is an institution enabling countries to bargain about market access. ″Free trade″ is not the 
typical outcome of this process; nor is consumer welfare (much less development) what the negotiators 
have chiefly in mind... instead the agenda of multilateral trade negotiations has been shaped in 
response to a tug-of-war between exporters and multinational corporations in the advanced industrial 
countries (which have had the upper hand), on one side, and import-competing interests (typically, but 
not solely, labour) on the other.11  
 
In this it differs importantly from the International Trade Organisation, which in its Charter 
abolished the logic of country-versus-country competition and looked at economic growth 
through trade and employment as a collective policy.12  
It is no secret that, ‘[m]uch of the development of the international trade order in the 20th 
century has been driven by the initiatives, and caprice of the US’.13 Essentially proposals put 
forward for the negotiations are a result of informal meetings between the US and EU which 
come together and decide on a common position.14 For a long time these bilateral 
consultations then evolved into larger ‘green room’ sessions adding only Japan and Canada to 
the circle, at which point they together formed the ‘Quad’ and later still the circle would be 
enlarged to include only friendly developing countries, such as South Africa, Chile and 
Singapore, who are known as ‘Friends of the Chair’.15 Finally other influential developing 
countries were brought on board, whereas for the majority of the Membership, proposed texts 
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seemed to suddenly ‘appear from nowhere’.16 ‘At moments of intransigence, particularly 
during the final stages of the negotiations these groups would then break back down to very 
small groups, almost always involving the US and EU with a range of other members 
periodically playing a role.’17 The ‘green room’ has been compared to the UN Security 
Council, with quasi-permanent members and other members meant to represent the 
membership at large, with the difference that the non-permanent members of the SC are at 
least elected by the full UN membership based on geographical representation and other 
criteria, whereas participation in the green room is ‘by invitation from the main powers on 
political critieria’ thus being even less democratic.18 Many times the only strategy left to most 
developing countries has essentially been that of defence instead of offence and it is because 
of this that they had been characterized in the past as merely passive or defensive.19 It did not 
help either that about a quarter of WTO Members, as recently as 2007, could not even afford 
a WTO mission.20  
The very nature of negotiating rules at the WTO, has led to a serious imbalance between the 
benefits that the Members of the regime enjoy. The politics of such negotiations are further 
directly influenced by strong lobbying at home. A study from 2006 revealed the statistical 
data on lobbying in the EU and US capitals, where the two trade superpowers develop their 
policies for WTO negotiations; it found that around 15,000 lobbyists are based in Brussels 
and around 17,000 in Washington DC, outnumbering lawmakers in US Congress by about 30 
to one.21 Annual corporate lobbying expenditure in Brussels is estimated to be between €750 
million and €1 billion, while US corporations and lobby groups spent nearly $13 billion 
influencing Congress and federal officials from 1998 to 2004, with the pharmaceutical 
industry spending over $1 billion lobbying in the US in 2004 alone.22 Sometimes the 
lobbying is more direct, for example when companies such as Pfizer negotiate directly with 
the Director-General of WTO and officials from WTO Member states against developing 
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countries’ proposals on the right to import cheaper generic drugs during public health 
emergencies.23  
It is rather ironic, that Adam Smith, already in 1776 warned against what were then known as 
‘joint stock companies’ which  he said had corrupted and captured many European and non-
European governments and undermined their societies’ ability to engage in peaceful 
transnational affairs and equitable self-rule.24 Smith’s lengthy critique of these companies is 
often noted wrongly as an example of his contempt for state intervention in commercial 
affairs.25 Although originally chartered by European monarchs and legislative assemblies, 
some of the most important of these companies had acted in various degrees of independence 
from the state by Smith’s time.26 Therefore according to him by the mid-eighteenth century, a 
state-driven mercantilist system had been largely transformed into a company-driven 
mercantilist system.27 Smith’s account of global commerce is characterized by gross 
imbalances of power, destructive economic inefficiencies, and horrific cruelties and he 
claimed international trading companies were the principle agents of these global injustices.28 
It is still this system which drives the world international economic system today, however 
now it is under Smith’s name. 
Ironically however, the blame for the failure of GATT/WTO to adequately advance the 
interests of its developing Membership has often been placed rather on the developing 
countries themselves. One scholar identifies the major themes in the literature enumerating 
three reasons for this failure: 1) that until the Uruguay Round developing countries did not 
play an active but rather a passive and defensive role, 2) that they were unwilling to make 
concessions 3) and that they placed all their focus on demanding special and differential 
treatment (SDT).29 A more accurate description of their efforts would be that 1) they have 
been putting forward proposals and voicing their interests from the ITO negotiations onward, 
but these rarely made it into law, resulting in even core principles of the institution (such as 
that of reciprocity) failing to reflect their vision; 2) that despite this, they were offering 
concessions and accepting restrictions throughout the various rounds, while 3) the legitimate 
focus on demanding special and differential treatment had to be constant, because SDT was 
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never sufficiently granted, however developing countries did not place any less of a focus 
throughout the negotiations also on asserting their demands for increased market access for 
products of interest to them, which they had been denied.  
Another obstacle to meaningful participation by developing countries has been mentioned, 
i.e. their lack of expertise, especially when in the Tokyo round ‘rules and regulations 
themselves’ became the outcome of negotiations which required a very different type of 
negotiator than before.30 This shift in expertise proved to be a major issue for developing 
countries with limited resources. 31 Nevertheless it is important to note, that from the very 
beginning developing countries played an active role and made known that they did not want 
a system based on the principles of reciprocity and most favored nation (MFN). Being aware 
of their economically unequal position they wanted to be able to protect their infant industries 
and they also called for the recognition of the need for special measures of assistance in their 
development.32 That they actively participated from the beginning is clear from the ITO 
negotiations where alongside the Proposed Charter submitted by the UK and US, there was 
also a Proposed Charter submitted by Brazil. Along with other developing countries Brazil 
thought the ITO should have as a central aim to ‘encourage and promote the industrial and 
economic development of Member countries, particularly of those whose development is less 
advanced.’33 Developing countries also managed to get at least some of their concerns into 
the finally agreed Charter. Unfortunately, however it was partly for this reason that the US 
rejected the Charter altogether (see chapter III).34  
The export interests and demands of developing countries were later clearly articulated in 
documents such as the Haberler Report on trade negotiations in the 1950s and in the proposed 
program of action by a Nigerian-led group of developing countries (G21) in 1963.35 The 
Haberler Report showed that the developed country barriers to imports from developing 
countries contributed significantly to the problems they were facing and the GATT set up 
Committee III to review such barriers.36 Tariffs on tropical products, tariff escalation, quotas 
and certain taxes were identified as problematic, however this did not lead to their 
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reduction.37 Developing countries were further continuously submitting proposals throughout 
the various rounds, however these were many times outright ignored while at other times 
there would be promises and resolutions but no actual change. Still more frustratingly, 
change would sometimes be achieved according to the wishes of developing countries, but 
would be insufficient or exceptions and other measures by the industrialised countries would 
be used to nullify the positive effects of any such change.  
The reason for the failure therefore lies not in the inactivity, nor so much in the inability of 
developing countries to understand the situation but rather mostly in their inability to stand 
their ground. Especially since in the beginnings the framework of the GATT did not allow 
them to organize and promote their interests in a systemic and coherent fashion.38 Developing 
countries became even more active in the Uruguay Round, however at that time it was too 
late. It is now widely accepted that they had ‘lost the round’ and that Uruguay was ‘a bum 
deal’.39 However as Rolland notes, ‘all the issues that surfaced since the inception of the 
GATT later became major roadblocks in WTO negotiations… they did not actually result 
from the Uruguay Round agreement. Rather they were built into the negotiations before the 
Round even began.’40 It is until the present day, that developing countries continue to give up 
more and more of their own policy space in various areas in return for a broken promise that 
initial biases would be rectified yet they never are. However Rolland fails to mention another, 
more important aspect of why developing countries agreed to disciplines they did not want, in 
new areas as a part of the ‘single undertaking’ of the Uruguay round and that is, that the 
alternative was to be locked out of the whole system. The ‘Final Act’ of the round included 
GATT 1994 which superseded GATT 1947. The US and EU both withdrew from GATT 
1947 which meant that their obligations and the MFN access to their markets granted under 
that agreement cessed to exist and the only way to regain them was for developing countries 
to accept GATT 1994 as part of a package with all the other agreements they had been 
rejecting until then, i.e. the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPS), The Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMS), The General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (SCM Agreement), etc.41 In other words the EC and US created a new institution 
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to take away the power of developing countries to block new deals unfavourable to their 
interests given to them by being Members of the old institution.  
Negotiating tactics used to manipulate developing countries into accepting less than perfect 
deals, also play an important role. Jawara and Kwa describe those used during and after the 
Cancun negotiations, but which are largely not confined to this particular period of 
negotiations:  
- Secretariat and the Quad driving the process, with developing countries attending only meetings they are 
invited to and ‘left groping in the dark, guessing each step along the way how the preparatory process would 
unfold’ 42 
- prolonging Ministerials, calling meetings late into the night and ‘negotiating into the early hours, relying on 
last-minute brinkmanship to ram through their agenda’ 
- deliberate neglect of positions expressed by developing countries and elaboration of draft texts which simply 
exclude their views. The chairs of the committees formulating their own negotiating texts after unrecorded and 
non-transparent consultations with Members. As one negotiator observed at Cancun: ‘Members can say 
whatever they want, but ultimately, what is decided is what the Chair says the meeting has decided.’ Most such 
texts drafted by the WTO Secretariat, tended to reflect primarily the positions of the major players, particularly 
the US and EC.43  
- issuing the final draft of the Cancun declaration, which was strictly reflecting the US/EC position, only two 
weeks before the Ministerial to make it as hard as possible to reflect on  and oppose. After comments were made 
to the final draft of the Cancun declaration by outraged developing countries at an informal meeting, they were 
discouraged from ‘repeating’ themselves at the formal meeting.44 
- loans promised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank if developing countries give up 
their resistance to further opening up45 
- offering aid (military or other) or promising market access in bilateral agreements under the same condition 
- threats by the US of abandoning the WTO altogether 
- divide et impera tactics whenever the unity of developing country coalitions is strong. A telling example is that 
of US efforts in trying to break up the G21 when it emerged, which involved: convincing African countries that 
the real threat to their economies was coming from Asian and Latin American countries and not developed 
countries;46 threats of launching investigations against some countries, while offering loans or increased quotas 
to others; convincing Latin American countries not to multilateralize things, when they can come to agreements 
with the US in bilateral contexts and threatening to terminate benefits or ongoing free trade agreement 
negotiations otherwise. Using bilateral deals as their main tool, the US managed to achieve a departure of five 
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countries from the group, one month after Cancun (Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru and Ecuador). On 
the other hand the EC was working on distancing from the G21 the ACP countries, which enjoy preferential 
trade agreements with them. 
 
Since the launch of the Doha Round the Quad has expanded to include Brazil, India, China 
and Australia, now forming together the so-called “new Quad”.47 Bringing India, China and 
Brazil into that early phase of negotiations can clearly be seen as an improvement in assuring 
the participation of developing countries in negotiations, however larger developing countries 
may have drastically different needs and wishes than the rest of the developing Members and 
can thus not really be said to represent all of them. More importantly the general shift in 
power at the WTO where Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICs) now 
collectively possess as much bargaining power as the USA and the European Union, has not 
brought an amelioration of the rules in favour of developing countries but rather first a 
stalemate and now a so-called ‘variable geometry’ at the negotiations (see below).48  
After 1995 many countries improved the way they prepared for negotiations, including the 
weakest Members which began frequently using the option of standing together as 
coalitions.49 In the Doha round the coalitions formed around specific issues, such as the,50 
G90, NAMA 11, G33, or representing least developed countries (LDCs), small and 
vulnerable economies (SVEs) and regional groups such as the African Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP).51 In the words of one scholar, ‘[t]hese groups have tended to be relatively organized 
and articulate in expressing their interests and advancing their negotiating positions. Some of 
the major developing-country groups such as the G20, NAMA11, and G33 are technically 
competent and have been able to match the capacity of the major developed countries in the 
Doha negotiations.’52 The proposals put forward by developing countries vary in scope and 
nature and their ‘quantity and increasing sophistication is unprecedented in the history of the 
GATT and WTO.’53 
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Developing countries have been forming alliances amongst themselves since the Seattle 
Ministerial of the WTO in 1999 to create an effective mechanism of defensive blocks against 
unfair proposals.54 The lack of any real offer on cuts in agricultural subsidies by the EU or 
US created a large alliance of developing world nations standing firm and refusing to make 
new commitments on opening up industrial and services markets and a ‘coming together of 
two developing country groupings, the G20 and the G90 – to form G110 – united not in what 
they wanted to get out of the negotiations but in their resolve not to be used against each 
other by the EU and the US’.55 At the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial, developing 
countries felt that their refusal to accept another bad deal was a victory in itself. In the words 
of Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorin: ‘[W]e think that we have achieved some 
important things. Firstly, the respect for our group’56 and that ‘[t]he voice of the developing 
world was taken into consideration’57 However jubilation at ‘no deal’ outcomes needs to take 
into account that the more time is given to US and EC, the more they can bring DCs round to 
their thinking. Time is on their side – it is never on developing countries’ side.58 It is highly 
problematic that the moment developing countries finally put up an effective mechanism of 
defense, the whole system came to a standstill. 
During the Uruguay Round the former Quad decided the subject matters of negotiations, and 
the round was concluded, whereas after the shift in power and a significant increase in the 
WTO Membership, consensus became nearly impossible to achieve other than in less 
significant matters.59 In light of this failure, many Members turned to concluding bilateral 
and regional trade agreements creating the belief that the WTO was losing its relevance for 
rulemaking in competition with such agreements.60 The return to bilateral relations of course 
brings nothing but an even stronger divide-and-rule approach, where every developing 
country is left to fend on its own and is thus inevitably in a weaker position.61 In a bid to 
make WTO relevant again, the last two Ministerials thus desperately pushed for agreement to 
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end the stalemate with an eventual sacrifice of the single undertaking and the DDA at Nairobi 
along with ‘a 14-year effort to agree to a wide-ranging multilateral deal on trade measures for 
development that has been a key demand of developing countries.’62 The two Ministerials are 
considered below and an observation is made about what recent developments in negotiations 
indicate for the future of developing countries’ struggle for a rebalancing of the current rules.  
a) Bali Ministerial Conference, December 2013 
In December 2013 in what one could call another display of ‘stiff resistance and sudden 
collapse’63 Member states in Bali again signed a deal marginalizing developing countries’ 
interests, especially in terms of the most legitimate interest imaginable, i.e. providing food 
security through public stockpiling where only a 4-year ‘peace clause’ on bringing such 
subsidies to the DSM was achieved (see below: ‘Domestic Support’). As Professor Bello 
suggests, the collapse was due to: ‘pressure exerted by developed countries; Brazil, one of 
whose representatives fills the post of director general; and host country Indonesia, which 
wanted a deal at any cost for prestige reasons.’64 Bribery and blackmail have also played an 
important role, as the package of measures to support LDCs was used as a bargaining chip to 
get low-income countries on board.65 The package included another ‘carrot and stick’ 
proposal, where the carrot was a trade facilitation initiative, and the stick was a demand that 
developing countries get rid of significant support programs for farmers and consumers while 
nothing would change in terms of developed countries’ subsidies.66  
Even the ‘carrot’, i.e. trade facilitation, was not something that developing countries were 
really asking for as they understood that it would not happen magically on its own and they 
were afraid of costly commitments, with little aid from developed countries.67 As noted by 
the Africa Trade Network, the text on trade facilitation is the very opposite of what African 
countries need to address in terms of the fundamental and peculiar challenges that they face 
in moving goods and services across national borders as it obliges all countries to adopt 
customs procedures which are already standard in the advanced industrial countries, but 
would mean massive legislative, policy and infrastructural changes for African countries to 
implement. In Art. 9 of Section II of the Bali Declaration donor Members agree to facilitate 
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the provision of assistance and support for capacity building to developing country and least 
developed country Members, on mutually agreed terms, however, the prior understanding to 
provide commensurate policy, technical, institutional and financial space and support for 
African countries to meet these changes was not adequately addressed.68 Others feared that 
the only outcome would be increased imports but there would be no positive effects on the 
supply-side constraints affecting exports.69 
Above all, rather than simplify customs procedures, the text introduces new processes which stand to 
give foreign corporations undue influence in the customs of African countries and diminish the role of 
domestic customs operators, further undermining African agenda of boosting intra-African trade and 
regional integration.’70 The network claims that there is ‘hardly anything of substance in the just 
adopted Bali package that addresses Africa’s developmental imperatives.71  
 
Another part of the ‘carrot’ should have been the least controversial part of the Bali deal, i.e. 
the LDC package, however it turned out to be its weakest part bringing minimal 
improvements. Apart from the LDCs limited bargaining power, the reason for the weakness 
of this package was also due to the fact that LDCs had difficulties in articulating common 
positions during the negotiations.72  The package dealt with rules of origin73, trade in 
services74 and duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access for LDCs75 however it failed at 
a substantial improvement on all three fronts. In Bali guidelines were introduced urging states 
to adopt transparent, simple and objective Rules of Origin (RoO), however these guidelines 
were unfortunately non-binding, which robbed them of any real significance.  
In terms of trade in services the package was no more revolutionary, as it merely set up a 
process towards operationalising a waiver enabling trade preferences for services and service 
suppliers of LDCs, already adopted at the 8th ministerial conference in 2011. Finally, the 
commitment to duty free/quota free (DFQF) market access for LDCs was not strengthened 
since the 2005 ministerial conference, but merely reiterated at Bali.  
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Professor Bello provides us with an insight into Philippine’s negotiating team’s positions in a 
bid to understand the ‘collapse’ at Bali. Before going to Bali the Philippine’s Secretary of 
Trade and Industry Gregory Domingo was of the opinion that the proposals put on the table 
were unbalanced in favour of the developed countries as they were not even willing to 
entertain cuts in their export subsidies while demanding cuts in the subsidies of developing 
countries, whereas the proposed trade facilitation deal, favoured mainly big corporate players, 
and not the small and medium enterprises of developing countries that were engaged in 
global agricultural commerce.76 ‘In other words, the Philippine negotiating team was going to 
Bali with eyes wide open.’77 As the negotiations drew to a close in the early morning of 
December 7th, however, the Professor got the following message from Secretary Domingo: 
“Congressman Bello, the Bali Package is a balanced package, and while parts of it, like some 
parts in the Trade Facilitation deal, will benefit others more, we benefit also big time in the 
more transparent processes that we will have, particularly in customs. The peace clause is 
also of significant benefit to the Philippines as revised without a fixed term limit.”78 In the 
words of the Professor:  
There is now a consensus that the Philippines -and most other developing countries- lost out by joining 
the WTO nearly 20 years ago. Our agriculture and industry are now on their last legs after becoming part 
of a global organization whose main “principle” is trade liberalization for developing countries and 
continued protectionism for the developed countries. I thought we had learned from the debacle of 1995. 
Our negotiators have not, being steeped in the art of swallowing the rosy calculations of the WTO 
spinmasters and caving in at the slightest pressure from the powerful. As in 1995, developing countries 
will live to regret joining the frightened herd and signing the Bali deal. 
 
In the same tone of blaming the weakness of developing country negotiators rather than the 
approach of developed countries, another commentator states that ‘[t]ime was when 
developed countries could be blamed mostly for the state of affairs during ministerials but in 
Bali African ministers could be blamed for their own downfall as they gave in without a fight 
to the so-called Bali Package.’79 African civil society groups present at Bali have said in a 
statement that the welcoming of the package by their Ministers, ‘underlies the fact that at this 
ministerial, African ministers can be said to have colluded with the marginalization of the 
interests of their people by the developed countries.’80 The African Trade Network further 
states that they ‘will expect [their] States to wake up, go back to the drawing board, take the 
negotiations seriously as having grievous implications for their people, and revisit the 
numerous proposals for redressing the imbalances in the multilateral trade system, arrest the 
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introduction of new issues that expand and deepen the inequity of the WTO and to deliver 
development for Africa’s peoples in international trade.’81 
Despite the limited nature of what had been agreed at Bali, the outcome was significant as an 
indicator of the lack of developing countries’ ability to protect their interests at the WTO. 
Furthermore there seems to be a discrepancy in the perception of the merits of the Bali deal 
between developing country ministers who mainly hail it as a success, and the civil society 
which despite intensive efforts has failed yet again to significantly affect the outcome of the 
negotiations. At the same time this is the first multilateral trade deal since the creation of the 
WTO and it would not be hard to imagine that developing countries preferred to accept a less 
than perfect deal than to admit the defeat of the system in rulemaking altogether. Wilkinson 
rightly warns against this sort of search for ‘quick fixes to the ills of the multilateral trading 
system in a way that privileges expediency over contemplation and root-and-branch reform’ 
trying to get the system working ‘quickly and at almost any cost’.82 
Bali brought what seemed to be improvements in the negotiating process itself, at least when 
it came to trade facilitation. Since the beginning of discussions in the mid-1990s and up until 
Bali, developing countries played an active role and were expressing their concerns about 
various issues such as a lack of capacity and resources to implement potential Trade 
Facilitation Agreement (TFA) obligations83; not being able to reap the benefits of such an 
agreement (or merely in a disproportionate way); and the fear of mandatory disciplines 
potentially subject to the dispute settlement mechanism, preferring non-binding disciplines.84 
During the process they managed to shift what was at first an ambitious mandate to one that 
emphasized flexibilities and implementation support for developing countries and LDCs, 
however there was disagreement with developed countries on matters such as the amount of 
assistance and the specifics of SDT.85 This disagreement was one of the last to be resolved 
before the Bali conference86 where a rather ‘lacking’ deal was accepted in the end. 
Nevertheless just in terms of how negotiations had been conducted, the TFA brought some 
welcome changes, especially during and after the period in which a Negotiating Group was 
established with ambassador Muhamed Noor of Malaysia as its first president who adopted a 
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transparent and Member-driven mode of operation where the main input would come bottom-
up from the delegations and there was an approach of inclusion in stark contrast to the 
infamous green room meetings characteristic of WTO negotiations.87  
 
b) Nairobi Ministerial Conference, December 2015 
Headlines accompanying results of the Bali Ministerial were almost identically repeated after 
the Nairobi Ministerial in 2015. While the WTO reported that this was a historic deal, 
headlines in India read ‘Nothing at Nairobi: WTO Ministerial leaves India and developing 
countries in the lurch,’88 ‘An Opportunity missed at Nairobi,’89 etc. The blaming of the 
ministers and bureaucrats acting on behalf of developing countries was again one of the main 
issues raised and some accused them of clearly ‘collude[ing] with developed countries, 
perhaps out of ignorance’ whereas the UN Independent Expert on the Promotion of a 
Democratic and Equitable International Order, Mr Alfred de Zayas noted that pressure was 
once again put on developing countries aimed at the introduction of new issues that would 
undermine the promotion of the right to development.90 As mentioned in chapter III, the 
DDA, although not completely abandoned, was not reaffirmed unanimously and most of the 
pending agricultural issues of utmost importance for developing countries were again not 
resolved (see below discussion under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) on public 
stockholding, special safeguard mechanism, export subsidies and cotton). India’s former 
commerce finance secretary SP Shukla, who has a wealth of experience representing India at 
such meetings, described the current status of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) as 
‘dead in the water.’91 From paragraph 32 which shows no unanimity on the Doha structure to 
paragraph 34 which states that ‘[s]ome wish to identify and discuss other issues for 
negotiations, while others do not’, the Nairobi Declaration brings back contentious topics 
such as investment, global value chains, competition policy, transparency in government 
procurement, labour standards, environment and so on, which can now be used by developed 
countries as bargaining chips to stall any progress on all pending issues of the Doha Round.92 
In trying to identify reasons for the latest failure of India’s negotiators, Shukla enumerates 
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intimidation of developing countries’ representatives; the fact that there was no reference to 
the Trade Negotiating Committee, the supreme organ for conducting the Doha negotiations; 
the fact that India chose not to mobilize other developing countries and most importantly, the 
fact that it surrendered its only bargaining chip by agreeing to the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA) unilaterally without asking in return for a resolve on the disputed issues in 
the field of agriculture.93 This was despite the Commerce minister Nirmala Sitharaman and 
commerce secretary Rita Teotia repeatedly indicating in the run up to the ministerial that 
India would play hard ball on the issues of the public stockholding of food and the special 
safeguard mechanism for developing countries (see below in the section on the Agreement on 
Agriculture) and despite the fact that prior to the Ministerial India refused to agree to a 
protocol on a TFA until the peace clause on public stockholding became indefinite.94 The UN 
Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, Mr 
Alfred de Zayas has since suggested that developing countries now withhold the deposit of 
their instruments of ratification of the TFA until they secure their own demands, including on 
public stockpiling.95 
India’s refusal to act as a deal-breaker was attributed also to the fact that the Ministerial was 
held in Africa for the first time, while regional and plurilateral trade agreements were also 
seen as having cast their shadow, but most importantly the blame was to be placed on India’s 
lack of a clear-cut strategy, lack of preparation and even a lack of the best and brightest trade 
experts and lawyers amongst its delegation.96 The newspaper the Hindu further made this 
disillusioned comment: ‘so much for all the talk of solidarity among developing countries 
making them a formidable block to reckon with.’97 The cohesion of G33, G90 and the Cairns 
group had indeed been eroded by changes in the global economy. For example while the G90 
has been calling for the extension of preferences (APC, LDC and African groups) this runs 
counter to the agenda of G20 and in some cases even the interest of a member of a group may 
differ from those of the group itself. For example South Africa’s interests sometimes 
strikingly differ from the African Group it seeks to lead.98 Nairobi exposed clearly the 
growing reluctance of smaller Members to get behind India and other larger developing 
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countries in opposing aspects of the negotiations in order to further interests which do not 
necessarily align with their own.99 However it is important to note that India is not the only 
country with public stockholding programmes and several African countries like Tunisia, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Egypt and Kenya also have such programmes in place, thus it 
is rather odd that so little of a fight was put up and the issue ended up being the most 
neglected at the ministerial.100  
The ministerial did however bring an important step forward for development, in terms of 
market access for LDCs. It achieved for the first time a binding multilateral agreement on the 
Rules of Origin to be implemented by December 2016 (see below: Generalized System of 
Preferences). In other parts of the LDC package, the C4 – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and 
Mali finally got their demands for both developed and developing countries to eliminate 
export subsidies in cotton as well as provide DFQF access for cotton from LDCs. However 
the biggest issue for C4, i.e. domestic cotton subsidies, remained as before. On the issue of 
the services’ waiver101 all Nairobi brought was 1) an extension of the waiver in light of the 
three year lag between the initial adoption of the waiver and the first notification of a 
Member indicating their intention to make use of it; and 2) another best-effort commitment 
by Members to ‘redouble efforts’ to operationalise it.102  
All in all the gains for the LDCs could not rebalance the losses sustained by developing 
countries as a whole.103 Importantly, the ministerial introduced a new mode of negotiating 
which built consensus through a complex multi-layered series of bilateral processes in 
behind-the-scene meetings. Despite this appearing to be a radical departure from the old 
‘green room’ style of negotiations, Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, who attended the 
conference explain that it was in reality rather an evolution thereof.104 Participation was at the 
core of the talks, which unfolded in a multi-layered process of concurrent bilateral meetings 
aimed at building consensus on easy-to-reach areas before tackling the thornier issue of the 
future of the DDA as a negotiating framework.105 This approach – which built a critical mass 
of agreement as the conference proceeded - also built trust among Member delegations while 
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at the same time buying them into the idea that a Nairobi package could be agreed.106 At the 
very last stages of the conference when Members were trying to finalise the most contested 
issues, however, there was an evident move back to the more undemocratic and exclusionary 
small group style negotiating involving the key protagonists USA, EU, China, Brazil and 
India to resolve outstanding differences in agriculture. 107 As mentioned above, at Nairobi the 
single undertaking was abandoned in favour of a ‘variable geometry’, much like that at the 
Hong Kong ministerial, with similar implications for developing countries from the loss of 
the DDA to a prospect of future gains of almost certainly lesser potential value than before.108 
Much like the resort to regional trade agreements, this move clearly sends the signal that 
developed countries will not be coerced into adjusting the current system in order to be able 
to pursue their interests in new sectors. All this does not bring much hope for the future. As 
Shadlen describes, the blocking power of developing countries is based on them being 
Members of the institution and can be made useless with a de iure or de facto abandonment 
of this institution by Members which exert more power without it – this happened with the 
creation of a new GATT in 1994 and is happening now with the proliferation of regional 
agreements bringing WTO-plus rules.109 While the WTO may not need to step back and leave 
the floor to bilateral and regional agreements, it will stay relevant at the expense of a 
meaningful rebalancing of the existing rules as developing countries give up on their 
coalitions putting up meaningful demands and resistance. For the sake of stability, certainty 
and predictability, developed countries are willing to give up the power they would enjoy 
outside the system, however only to a very limited extent. Unsurprisingly on the other hand, 
developing countries are prepared to give up much more and accept unfavourable agreements 
to protect the system. In a world of power asymmetries bad rules are better than no rules.110 
In other words, they do not want to push too far for their interests for fear of diminishing 
developed countries’ respect of and support for the institution, which is why time and again 
they are willing to accept bad deals.111 A recent WTO publication asks the following 
question: ‘How can you ensure that trade is as fair as possible and as free as is practical?’ to 
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which it then replies: ‘By negotiating rules and abiding by them.’112 Considering the above 
described and what will be presented in the following pages, such a conclusion is nothing 
short of comical. 
 
2. Accession and WTO Plus Obligations 
Another crucial problem that creates an ab initio unfair position for many developing country 
Members is the process of accession itself. Acceding Members (also known as Art. XII 
Members) are often bound by additional terms and conditions compared to the original 
Members on everything from export subsidies and export restrictions to rules of origin, trade 
related investment measures, intellectual property, state ownership and privatization of 
enterprises, etc. Acceding Members have set tariff ceilings (‘bound rates’) for virtually all 
their agricultural and non-agricultural goods, while existing Members have, on average, 
bound only 74% of their product tariffs.113 Furthermore the average final bound rate of Art. 
XII Members for all products is 13.8 %, significantly lower than the corresponding 45.5 per 
cent of original Members and they have made significant specific commitments in services 
sectors and sub-sectors, including in financial and business services.114 Acceding Members 
are also required to put in place appropriate mechanisms for submitting notifications upon 
accession and thus have a consistently higher ‘notification’ rate than original Members115 
thus exposing themselves more to potential litigation or pressure to remove certain measures 
than the original Members. When Russia acceded in 2012 it had to enact a staggering 1166 
legislative/regulatory changes, second only to China from which the WTO demanded no less 
than 2300 changes.116 
These ‘WTO Plus’ conditions are then reciprocated by the original Members with ‘WTO 
minus’ conditions. Needless to say, most acceding states are developing countries and how 
this discrepancy in obligations can be justified remains a mystery. The narrative is that this is 
for their own good, as ‘more liberal commitments’ supposedly bring stronger trade growth 
and stability,117 however if more commitments were indeed that beneficial, one would expect 
original Members to voluntarily and unilaterally commit themselves to the same standards, 
however this is clearly not the case.  
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3. Results of Unbalanced Negotiations – Free Trade or a War of Interests? 
It is important to understand that in spite of the world today being ‘under a single economic 
orthodoxy which presents trade liberalisation as the only way to economic growth and 
development’,118 actual ‘free trade’ has hardly been the result of the unbalanced negotiations 
at the WTO. The Preamble of the GATT instructs Members to pursue ‘reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce’. Instead, however, the GATT/WTO rules coming out of unbalanced negotiations 
have generally rather reflected the interests of specific exporter groups in the US or Europe or 
compromises between them and other domestic groups, which can for example clearly be 
seen in the different treatment of manufacturing and agriculture, or of clothing and other 
goods within manufacturing, the antidumping regime, and the intellectual property rights 
regime among other anomalies within the WTO rules.119 GATT kick-started a deep inequality 
of opportunity for the Member states which was only extended, consolidated and amplified 
once the Tokyo round (1973-9) ushered in a codification of rules.120 Even within the same 
category of products, differentiation can be found for example between allowed and illegal 
subsidies, along the lines of those that are used chiefly by the rich countries and those that 
can be afforded by the poorer countries. Their agricultural subsidies are notorious, but they 
have also very actively used the permitted research and development subsidies to promote 
high-tech industries in amounts which are impossible to match for developing countries or 
regional equalisation subsidies for foreign investors (provided that they locate in a poor 
region), or so-called green subsidies, to bail out national manufacturers in the name of the 
environment121 while prosecuting discriminatory subsidization of local green energy 
providers in developing countries. Furthermore, while stepping up the ‘ideological crusade’ 
against government intervention in developing countries through the Washington Institutions, 
the US has many times increased government assistance to business by giving subsidised 
finance specifically targeting manufacturing industries as well as providing tax reductions for 
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exports of industrial goods worth billions to companies including GE, Boeing, IBM and 
Microsoft.122  
It is quite clear that even though internationally regulated, there is still a mercantilist trade 
war being fought, mainly through negotiating the rules themselves, but also later on in 
successfully circumventing the rules and carving out policy space even when it constitutes a 
breach of the rules, as long as it is a so-called ‘efficient breach’.  
In the words of Dani Rodrik: 
The rules for admission into the world economy not only reflect little awareness of development 
priorities, they are often completely unrelated to sensible economic principles. WTO rules on anti-
dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, agriculture, textiles, TRIMs, and TRIPs are utterly 
devoid of any economic rationale beyond the mercantilist interests of a narrow set of powerful groups 
in the advanced industrial countries. The developmental payoff of most of these requirements is hard to 
see.123 
 
The bias in the rules has even been recognized by former Director General Mr Lamy, when 
he stated that ‘a number of the current substantive rules of the WTO do perpetuate some bias 
against developing countries’ and that negotiations needed to continue the rebalancing of 
rules in favour of developing countries otherwise the economic colonization would persist. 124 
Lamy was referring to rules on subsidies in agriculture that allow for trade-distorting 
subsidies which favour developed countries and high tariffs applied by developed counties on 
imports of agricultural and industrial products, in particular from developing countries.125  
However the bias goes further than what has been recognized by Lamy.  
It is further reflected in the status of organizational bodies within the WTO. Development 
issues which undoubtedly concern the vast majority of the Membership are relegated to a 
committee, i.e. the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), while intellectual property 
rights, which only a small number of states promoted at the Uruguay Round, went on to get 
their own full Council instead of a Committee,126 and a separate agreement, namely the 
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), to deal with 
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complex and long-term intellectual property issues in the WTO.127 Furthermore the mandate 
of the CTD is limited and the WTO’s activities to assist developing countries have been 
confined to a focus on technical capacity-building, insufficient to address complex and long-
term development issues on trade and development.128 It has thus been suggested that in order 
to address this imbalance the WTO would have to elevate the CTD into a Council which 
would cooperate with United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to set a trade and 
development agenda on a regular basis and impose certain commitments on Member 
states.129 In its recent publication, the WTO justifies the discrimination between the TRIPS 
council and the CTD committee by relying exactly on the fact that the committee’s scope is 
‘more limited’, basically contradicting its earlier claim that everything at the WTO is about 
development which would imply that the CTD’s scope would extend to all the issues at the 
WTO.130 
 
4. Obstacles to Meaningful Participation of Developing Countries in the Early 
GATT 
Developing countries faced major obstacles in trying to meaningfully participate in the 
shaping of the system already in the early periods of the GATT, mainly due to the principal 
supplier rule and the focus on tariffs only. 
It is natural that during the creation of international institutions some of the founding states 
will try to ensure that its decision making conforms to the prevailing distribution of power.131 
Some ponder about whether this process was consciously undertaken in the case of the GATT 
due to its ‘accidental’ beginnings, however in terms of actual trade expansion it certainly only 
benefited a small subset of privileged signatories, while the trade of states that acceded to the 
regime was not significantly impacted.132  
a) Product-by-product, principle supplier rule and principle of reciprocity 
Under its protocol, GATT tariff bargaining followed the product-by-product, principal 
supplier method, a method, insisted on by the US, which meant that a country could only be 
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requested to make tariff cuts on a particular product by the principal supplier of that product 
to that country.  
This lead to the expansion of trade only between Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the 
US.133 Developing countries at that time were seldom principal suppliers of any product, 
except raw materials that entered industrialized countries duty-free.134 This meant that they 
were effectively prevented from requesting concessions on items that they did not produce in 
large quantities but in which they hoped to expand production135, thus denying them the 
possibility of trade-led development. Only at the Fourth Geneva Round of GATT in 1956 
was this rule modified to allow developing countries to negotiate collectively in requesting 
concessions. 136  However, they were still effectively prevented from requesting concessions 
in any products that they did not produce in large quantities. Thus the principal supplier rule 
had the effect of locking out developing countries from the tariff-cutting negotiations and 
their lack of significance across a range of products ensured that they had little say in 
negotiations as a whole. The situation of the non-principal suppliers was supposed to be 
mitigated by the fact that according to MFN concessions were extended to all Members 
without discrimination, allowing tariff cuts to trickle down.137 However, GATT’s focus was 
only on manufactures, semi-manufactures and capital goods, and not agriculture or textile and 
clothing.  Interestingly this locked out also Japan and Italy, who might have been equally 
plausible candidates for membership in the privileged group, however because both countries 
specialised in products which the group succeeded in exempting from GATT rules, namely 
textiles, labour-intensive products and agriculture they were equally unwelcomed.138 The 
benefits of trade liberalisation were therefore in fact even more narrowly concentrated than 
conventional wisdom long held.139 
The adoption of the principal supplier rule was consistent with the balance of power that 
prevailed at the end of World War II, however divergent trade policy goals in US domestic 
politics also played a crucial role. Officials of the Roosevelt administration sought to promote 
European and transatlantic trade, to create a Western bloc strong enough to deter Soviet 
expansion140 while the Congress merely wanted to maximize market access abroad without 
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jeopardizing domestic industry. To respect the MFN principle and expand exports while 
protecting domestic industry, administration officials developed ‘the so-called chief-source, 
or ‘Principal Supplier’ rule which enabled the administration to defend itself against 
complaints that ‘other countries were getting something for nothing.’141  
The GATT was further based on the principle of reciprocity. This meant that all contracting 
parties were expected to reciprocate for concessions received, which proved troublesome for 
the developing countries that participated in the negotiations.142 In these principles, the 
GATT system was, in the opinion of the developing countries, which joined later on, in 
essence biased in favour of the rich countries, which is reflected nicely in the following 
quotation from a report to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting preparatory 
to the 1964 UNCTAD Conference 
By the very nature of its philosophy, which is based on liberalism, GATT inevitably shows a marked 
lack of understanding of the interest of the underdeveloped and developing countries. This is primarily 
due to the inequality between the industrialized and developing countries in the matter of bargaining 
power. Article 1 of the General Agreement is based on the fiction that there is complete equality 
among Contracting Parties. There is however no equality of treatment except among equals.143 
 
Developing countries ‘could not participate on an equal footing in tariff negotiations 
partly because their need for tariffs, as an indispensable weapon of economic development 
and as a source of revenue, is much greater than that of developed countries; and partly 
because the role of quantitative restrictions is very different in the two groups of 
countries’.144 
 
b) Focus on tariffs only 
Another major problem for developing countries’ export interests was the fact that 
negotiations focused on tariffs only, while internal taxes on tropical products in industrial 
markets and quotas posed a bigger problem for their exports. Internal taxes were included in 
the negotiations in the Dillon Round, but faced fierce opposition by the US and EEC and 
were rendered rather useless for developing country interests as the non-tariff barriers 
increased in agriculture which was excluded from the negotiations.145 Quotas put in place by 
developed countries to protect against adverse balance of payments situations were further 
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not a part of the negotiations. While these countries were supposed to lift the quotas once 
their balance of payments improved, they tended not to do so on products from developing 
countries.146 
Actually the GATT was no accident. It fit perfectly with the post-war US plan of perpetuating 
its, at the time, unrivalled economic pre-eminence, which meant the US was in a position to 
sell ‘everything to everybody’ while needing to buy very ‘little of anything’ from anybody.147 
The GATT ‘facilitated the liberalization of those sectors at the cutting edge of US 
industrialization, largely manufactures, semi-manufactures and capital goods) while 
forestalling liberalization in areas of political and economic sensitivity (at that point in time 
largely agriculture)’.148 Apart from ensuring that its goods entered foreign markets as 
competitively as possible, it further took care of the lacking capacity to pay for those goods 
by giving financial assistance to partner states.149 Europe was thus offered a programme of 
loans and grants known as Marshall Aid, i.e. European Recovery Program.150 
Developing countries unsuccessfully tried to change the rules of the system from within for 
quite a long time only to conclude that the whole system should be challenged, since it was 
heavily biased in favour of the rich countries, and it hampered their efforts to achieve growth 
through trade.151 The Western dominant view on the universal beneficial impact of liberal 
trade was challenged by the political struggles of newly independent countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s and with the emergence of dependency theories, which served as the theoretical 
complement for developing countries’ requests for more flexibility within GATT.152 Other 
factors such as ‘the rise to prominence of Keynesian theories, the concomitant experience 
with public intervention in Western economies and the Cold War with the tensions it 
generated with respect to the geopolitical influence on the so-called Third World’ led to the 
fact that eventually developing countries managed to retain a degree of autonomy in their 
tariff regimes to pursue industrial policy programmes.153 Initiatives such as Part IV of the 
GATT and especially non-reciprocity, the so-called Enabling Clause, the Generalised System 
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of Preferences and other initiatives came to be in this context.154 Even though de facto the 
flexibility applied only insofar as it did not challenge the interests of the major capitalist 
powers155 it nevertheless proved the theoretical need for exceptions to the underlying 
principles and a formal acceptance by developed countries of the non-reciprocity principle. 
However of the initiatives in Part IV of GATT resulted in not much more than lip service (see 
below for further analysis) and its ‘emptiness… is a measure of how little developed 
countries were willing to spend to save GATT from UNCTAD – or, perhaps, a measure of 
how little it took to persuade developing countries that abandoning the GATT was not in their 
best interest.’156 
 
5. Unfair Rules in Agriculture – The Mother of all Injustices 
Perhaps the biggest injustice of the GATT/WTO system and a constant cry from developing 
countries for reform has been the lack of liberalization in developed countries’ agricultural 
markets. The promises of correcting the enormous unfairness of the status quo have acted as 
a perpetual bargaining chip in the hands of developed countries making developing countries 
accept deals less favourable to them in other areas throughout the rounds for the sake of 
incremental improvements on agricultural rules. Thus the nature of the system has enabled 
the initial bias in the field of agriculture to work as a mechanism to achieve biased rules also 
in other areas and while developing countries have been trying to reverse the damage done in 
agriculture they have been losing important policy space needed to protect their 
manufacturing elsewhere.  
As mentioned above, the US conceived of GATT as a tool for the liberalisation of only those 
sectors in which it had a clear advantage over its partners. At the time agriculture was not 
among these sectors. GATT provisions dealing with agriculture thus excluded it from the 
general rules. Despite persistent calls by the ever increasing number of developing country 
Members for the inclusion of agriculture in the remit of the general GATT rules, for decades 
the situation remained the same: there were no tariff bindings in agriculture;157 there were 
important exemptions from the prohibition on non-tariff barriers;158 quotas were permitted to 
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protect domestic industry against a surge in imports;159 export subsidies were permitted as 
long as the country did not gain a ‘more than equitable share of world export trade’ by doing 
so;160 and domestic subsidies were only indirectly addressed.161 US was practicing heavy 
export subsidisation and imposition of quotas on imports of dairy products, while the EU was 
imposing substantial levies on agricultural imports in addition to tariffs under its Common 
Agricultural Policy.162 It was not until the US wanted to slightly curb its own subsidies for 
budgetary reasons and felt it could only do so by restraining EU subsidies as well, that 
agricultural reform became a priority at the GATT.163 Developing countries’ voices calling 
for more drastic change were therefore soon left out of the negotiation process and the EU-
US bargaining took central stage.164 The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) which came out as 
a result was thus an embodiment of US and EU back-room negotiations presented to the rest 
of the world as a fait accompli.165 In the words of one commentator, ‘the current agricultural 
trade rules are an affront to the principles of free trade and fairness that the multilateral 
trading system is meant to embody’.166  
Below is a brief account of the current rules governing agriculture, exposing their deficiency. 
 Agreement on Agriculture - market access  
The AoA sets out in Art. 4(2) that all quantitative restrictions or other non-tariff measures,167 
should be replaced with tariffs, while Members should subsequently reduce these tariffs: 
developed countries by an average cut of 36% over 6 years (minimally by 15% for each 
product line), and developing countries by an average cut of 24% over 10 years (minimally 
by 10% for each product line), while LDCs had no reduction commitments imposed.168 The 
majority of OECD countries (and only a few developing countries), however, engaged in so-
called ‘dirty tariffication’ and set the tariff equivalents for the removed non-tariff barriers at 
excessive rates to nullify the benefits of tariff bindings and tariff reductions which resulted in 
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even higher protection than before.169 Moreover, since most of the reductions had to happen 
only on the average, tariff peaks as high as 350-900 percent ad valorem remained on certain 
food exports from developing countries and generally speaking sugar, tobacco, meat, milk 
products, cereals, fruits and vegetables, all of particular interest to developing countries, were 
subject to the highest tariffs.170 Even today tariffs on products from developing countries 
which compete with developed countries’ products, remain higher and more complex than 
those on products which do not pose such competition.171 Under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) schemes, which are purportedly set up to encourage trade from developing 
countries into developed countries, tariffs nevertheless remain on products such as cotton, 
sugar, cereals and horticulture (see below Generalized System of Preferences).172 Meanwhile 
tariff escalations discourage processing industries and the export of higher-value-added 
products by developing countries. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
described tariff escalation as ‘one of the more pernicious forms of perverse graduation’.173 In 
its 2005 Human Development Report it noted that developed countries typically apply low 
tariffs to raw commodities but rapidly rising rates to intermediate and final products with 
Japan putting 7 times higher tariffs on processed food products than first stage products; 
Canada applying the same concept with a ratio of 12 to 1; and the EU tariffs rising from 0% 
to 9% on cocoa paste to 30% on the final product.174 In the words of the Report: 
Tariff escalation is designed to transfer value from producers in poor countries to agricultural 
processors and retailers in rich ones – and it works. It helps explain why 90% of the world’s cocoa 
beans are grown in developing countries, while only 44% of cocoa liquor and 29% of cocoa powder 
exports originate in those countries. Escalating tariffs help to confine countries like Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana to the export of unprocessed cocoa beans, locking them into a volatile, low value-added raw 
cocoa market. Meanwhile, Germany is the world’s largest exporter of processed cocoa, and European 
companies capture the bulk of the final value of Africa’s cocoa production.175 
 
The status quo clearly illustrates the battle over interests played out at the WTO instead of a 
true ‘free trade’ agenda. Especially with tariff escalation one can clearly recognize the 
mercantilist golden rule of ‘import raw, export processed’.  
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On the other hand the AoA further exacerbated the one-sided market opening in developing 
countries already demanded by the IMF and World Bank conditionalities in the preceding 
decades. Unlike the adoption of aggregate decreases which allowed developed countries to 
engage in selective tariff reductions, many developing countries agreed to implement a 
uniform (sometimes very low) rate of binding and a uniform level of reduction across all 
agricultural products taking away the flexibility of providing higher tariffs for sensitive 
products.176 The increase of cheap food imports from heavily subsidised developed countries’ 
producers, including surges in meat and dairy products, caused a decline in food production 
and threatened key agricultural sectors in developing countries that were important for 
economic development, employment, food security and poverty alleviation.177 The 
deficiencies of the AoA in tackling this subsidisation are described below. 
 Agreement on Agriculture - domestic support 
In terms of domestic support, the AoA instructs the reduction of Members’ Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS)178 by 30% in 6 years for developed countries and by 13% over 10 
years for developing countries. Exempt from these reductions is product specific support that 
does not exceed 5% of total value of production of that product in the case of developed 
countries or 10% in the case of developing countries. Non-product specific support is exempt 
from reductions in equal percentage of the value of total agricultural input (5% for developed 
and 10% for developing countries).179 Developing countries are also exempt from reducing 
direct or indirect investment subsidies generally available to agriculture in these countries, 
input subsidies for low-income or resource-poor farmers and support to encourage 
diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops.180 The AoA further exempts from 
reduction obligations the so-called ‘green’ and ‘blue box’ subsidies, which are purportedly 
minimally trade-distorting,181 such as direct income payments to farmers that are decoupled 
from production, income safety net programs, and crop insurance programs.182   
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This does not reflect the reality that no matter under which box they fit, subsidies have a 
considerable protectionist effect and the actions following Upland Cotton and EU-Export 
Subsidies on Sugar clearly exposed the game of merely recasting the subsidies under another 
category when a certain kind is found not to comply with the AoA scheme. The AoA 
furthermore creates a system in which developed countries were exempted from the reduction 
of many subsidies that they had been traditionally using. They are furthermore allowed to use 
even officially trade distorting subsidies as long as these are subject to reductions, regardless 
of the fact that the period which provided the base for the reductions was 1986-1988, a period 
of extremely high subsidisation in these countries. On the other hand developing countries 
were prohibited from utilizing such support beyond the de minimis 10% described above as 
they had no subsidies in place at the base period. Furthermore, most developing countries 
lack the resources for even such a low level of subsidisation or the subsidies allowed under 
the green or blue box.183  
An additional problem has been the subject of controversy at recent negotiations, especially 
at Bali, i.e. that even though green box subsidies are generally not capped, footnote 5 of 
Annex 2, Art. 3 still contains a limitation that has important implications for the protection of 
the right to food and the protection of local agriculture, a vital issue for many developing 
countries. Government stockholding of food procured from domestic farmers is allowed 
under this section, provided that the difference between the acquisition price and the external 
reference price (ERP) is accounted for in the AMS.184 In other words if the government sets 
the administered price for acquiring and releasing stocks higher than the ERP which was 
based on the years 1986 to 1988, the difference must not exceed 10 % of the value of 
production. Anything above that constitutes what is considered an introduction of a trade 
distorting (amber box) subsidy. It was this cap that was legitimately being opposed to in Bali. 
On behalf of G-33, India proposed the expansion of policy space beyond the AMS threshold 
which would allow its government to continue procurement of wheat and rice at the 
minimum support price from low-income resource-poor producer, claiming it is not trade 
distorting as it is meant for domestic distribution. 
Such a proposal was highly reasonable especially since the ERP based on the years 1986 to 
1988 fails to reflect the effects of inflation. Even though, for example, India’s administered 
prices for rice and wheat between the years 2007 and 2011 have been substantially higher 
than the ERP, they have been actually lower than what would have been the ERP adjusted for 
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inflation.185 In the case of wheat especially the administered price would have to be much 
higher to even reach such an adjusted ERP.186 Furthermore as Matthews puts it, from an 
economic perspective, if the administered price merely reflects domestic inflation, it cannot 
be said to be creating trade distortions on world markets.187  
However countries such as the US and Canada were not willing to allow the crossing of the 
10% of the total value of food production limit of already allowable subsidy levels. India was 
vilified and singled out as the one responsible for the impasse at the ministerial, while in fact, 
its stance was supported by the G-33 who were further supported by campaign groups from 
over 30 countries188 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who was even 
tweeting his support during the talks. In the end nothing more than a 4-year ‘peace clause’ on 
bringing such subsidies to the DSM was achieved. A merely short-term solution, which is 
further only applicable to traditional staple food crops and to existing food support programs, 
meaning any new such measure is open to a complaint under the DSM. In this sense ‘[p]oorer 
African countries who have the need to, but have not yet mobilised the finances to start these 
programmes, are restrained’ from introducing them in the future while again ‘[o]ther issues 
that affect agriculture in Africa such as subsidies and dumping have been effectively 
sidelined.’189 Therefore it is hard to understand statements which accompanied the outcome 
of the ministerial in western media such as that of a Guardian journalist saying that ‘[t]he 
[positive] implications [of Bali] for developing countries are huge.’190 Expectations were high 
also at the Nairobi ministerial for an unrelenting push on the issue of developing countries’ 
rights in stockholding, however the outcome brought zero improvement on what has already 
been stated in previous Ministerials and no short deadline for a permanent solution was 
introduced.191 
All of this is despite the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Task Force on the Global Food 
Security Crisis, which includes the WTO secretariat, calling on states to use strategic grain 
reserves for the purpose of stabilizing prices and to immediately review trade policy options 
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and their impacts on poor consumers and farmers.192 The Special Rapporteur pointed out the 
unfairness of the existing system by saying that: ‘[i]t should not be forgotten that developed 
countries are able to subsidize their farmers to the tune of more than US$ 400 billion per 
year, without breaching WTO rules… Support must also be allowed to reach smallholders in 
developing countries.’193 Perhaps most ironic is the fact that OECD countries have actually 
increased the total level of their domestic support since the 1986-1988 period when they were 
subsidising at a level of around US$ 308 billion a year.194 And it is not small farmers which 
are getting these subsidies; a recent report has found that from 1995 to 2012, 50 billionaires 
or their businesses in the US were on the list of those being subsidized.195 
 
 Agreement on Agriculture – export subsidies 
In stark contrast to the prohibition on export subsidies in terms of non-agricultural products in 
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM), in agriculture export 
subsidies were allowed until Nairobi and some continue to be until 2020. The AoA merely 
required developed countries to reduce their export subsidies by 36% and the volume of 
subsidized exports by 21 % over 6 years, while the corresponding percentage for developing 
countries was a 24% reduction of subsidies and 14% reduction of the volume of subsidised 
exports over 10 years.196 Subsidies for marketing cost reduction and transporting exports are 
excluded from reduction commitments for developing countries, while LDCs are exempted 
from reducing export subsidies altogether however no Member is allowed to introduce new 
subsidies for products which were not subsidised from 1986-1990.197 Like in domestic 
support, here too the levels of subsidisation in the base period were vastly different for 
developed and developing countries. While the former had historically subsidised their 
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production, the latter actually taxed the agricultural sector in that period in their focus on 
building the manufacturing sector. Therefore the AoA reduction commitments were 
completely inadequate at adjusting the situation. Furthermore while some export subsidies 
were reduced, similarly to re-boxing in domestic subsidisation, the OECD countries resorted 
to promoting their exports through what remained permitted and not subject to reductions 
under the AoA.198 Also the reductions were to be applied on a commodity-by commodity 
basis which proved to give additional policy space for developed countries. Some have 
treated for example wheat, wheat flour and other wheat derivatives as a single group and in 
the event that they had subsidised these products during the base period they can now shift 
subsidies between the subgroups while the commodity as a whole would still not exceed the 
allowed level of subsidisation.199  
In the words of Azevêdo, Nairobi brought the ‘most significant outcome on agriculture in the 
organization’s 20-year history’ in its Decision on Export Competition, which tackles the issue 
of the enormous distorting potential of developed countries subsidies for farm exports ‘once 
and for all’.200 Azevêdo however fails to mention that Art. 6 of the decision which states that: 
‘Developed Members shall immediately eliminate their remaining schedule export subsidy 
entitlements as of the date of the adoption of this Decision’201 also has a footnote stating that  
This paragraph shall not cover processed products, dairy products, and swine meat of a developed 
Member that agrees to eliminate as of 1 January 2016 all export subsidies on products destined for 
least developed countries, and that has notified export subsidies for such products or categories of 
products in one of its three latest export subsidy notifications examined by the Committee on 
Agriculture by the date of adoption of this Decision. For these products, scheduled export subsidies 
shall be eliminated by 2020, and quantity commitment levels shall be applied as a standstill until the 
end of 2020 at the actual average of quantity levels of the 2003-05 base period. Furthermore there shall 
be no export subsidies applied either to new markets or to new products.202 
 
This is not a minor exception as processed products and dairy products from the EU and US 
are increasingly posing an existential threat to local developing countries’ food industries.203 
Other export subsidies have largely already been discontinued by developed countries, due to 
historically high food prices seen after the 2008 financial crisis and they were thus not giving 
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up much at Nairobi.204 In the words of US Department of Agriculture economist, Sharon 
Dydow, ‘[a] big objective here was to harvest what has been done and put it on paper’.205  
The welcome part of the Nairobi deal is that surprisingly, developing countries have been 
allowed to continue subsidising transportation, processing and marketing costs until 2023 (the 
poorest Members until 2030) despite the US and many others claiming that such subsidies 
had already expired in 2004, with the end of the implementation period set by the Uruguay 
Round.206 On the other hand under the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 2005, 
developed countries were supposed to eliminate all their export subsidies already by 
December 2013 and have now effectively extended the ones which they need until 2020.207 
It is important to note that in the negotiations on export competition issues, the EU and Brazil 
along with Argentina, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Moldova submitted their 
draft proposal with the view of tackling not only export subsidies, but also food aid and credit 
guarantees which have a similar effect.208 Opposing this were the US and several developing 
countries which have recently started to use export subsidies in breach of their WTO 
commitments, among them India (sugar), Thailand (rice) and China (cotton) none of whom 
appreciated the sudden focus on export competition.209 Despite the progress on export 
subsidies, in the other areas of export competition the results were merely best-endeavour 
provisions. Thus the US can continue to use its large and extremely trade distorting export 
credits.  
In terms of cotton, the C4 – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali finally got their demands 
for both developed and developing countries to eliminate export subsidies at Nairobi - 
developed countries have to end theirs immediately, while developing countries have one 
year to do the same (by 2017). Furthermore both developed and developing countries have to 
provide DFQF access for cotton from LDCs. However the biggest issue for C4, i.e. domestic 
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 Import surges 
Subsidisation in developed countries is a huge, although not the only cause of repeat import 
surges in developing markets, which have been occurring before and after the introduction of 
the AoA causing great damage to local farmers.210 Apart from the mechanisms to combat the 
negative impact of import surges provided for in the Agreement on Safeguards (AS), the 
AoA allows Special Safeguards under its Art. 5., which gives the permission to states parties 
to trigger higher safeguards duties automatically when import volumes rise above a certain 
level, or if prices fall below a certain level and unlike under the AS it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that serious injury is being caused to the domestic industry. However, the special 
agricultural safeguard can only be used on certain products that are already subject to 
tariffication – which amount to less than 20% of all agricultural products and they cannot be 
used on imports within the tariff quotas.211 Since developing countries mostly did not use 
tariffs on their products prior to the AoA, they have little use of this mechanism.212 Out of 39 
WTO Members which reserved the right to use special safeguards on agricultural products, 
only 22 were developing countries while in 1999 FAO reported that more than 80% of 
tariffied items of the OECD were subject to this provision.213 Not surprisingly, the 
mechanism itself was included in the AoA at the insistence of the EU, not developing 
countries. In practice it has been used in relatively few cases.214 A study by the FAO came to 
the conclusion that existing WTO compatible policy options are relatively limited and 
difficult to implement by many developing countries.215 The revised first draft ‘modalities’ 
under the Doha Round negotiations thus proposed a removal of developed countries from 
entitlement under the AoA Art. 5 and the establishment of a new so-called Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM) additionally available above bound ceilings for developing countries. 
Already in 2005, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration stated that developing countries will 
have the right to have recourse to a SSM216 however until today this has remained unusable 
since common ground on its contours has been unattainable. This issue was among the 
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disappointments at Nairobi, where literally nothing apart from a reaffirmation of what was 
stated in 2005 has been achieved.217 
 
 Food aid 
While stockpiling has been severely attacked, food aid remains mostly unchallenged even 
when clearly used as a form of subsidy. There have been recognitions of this problem and at 
the Hong Kong Ministerial, WTO Members reiterated the need to eliminate the abuse of food 
aid while ensuring genuine food aid in emergencies, however how this will be achieved was 
still to be worked on.218  
As one observer notes: ‘direct delivery of in-kind food aid constitutes a form of agricultural 
subsidy. The US food aid program was originally set up to dispose of agricultural surpluses 
generated by domestic farm subsidies.’219 The focus on the US economy becomes even more 
apparent, when you consider the fact that  
US legislation requires that 75 percent of food aid be procured, processed and packed 
domestically and that it be transported by US vessels. The US government buys this 
food aid from a handful of large agribusiness companies and then pays for shipping – 
all at above-market prices. In 2003, Cargill and Archer-Daniels Midland provided a 
third of all US food aid and in 2001, four shipping companies – Wilson Logistics, 
BKA Logistics, Fettig & Donalty and Panalpina – handled 84 percent of US food 
aid.220  
If the aim was to provide long term benefit to affected areas, such food programs would 
consist of mainly local and regional food purchases, however in 2007 the US Department of 
Agriculture suggested using only up to 25 percent of the aid budgets for such purchases and 
even that was rejected by the US Congress under the pressure form agribusinesses, shipping 
companies and an unconventional alliance of relief non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).221  
Thus instead of bringing benefit to the affected areas, food aid often plays a role detrimental 
in the long run, similar to that of import surges. Even if on the one hand, food aid is aimed as 
a genuine effort to relieve affected areas from hunger, its overriding motivation of providing 
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an outlet for surplus production results in ‘non-optimal targeting with respect to development 
issues. An example for this is the high prevalence of food aid in periods of low world market 
prices as shown in the case of wheat.’222  
The illustration below shows a graph of wheat food aid in its relation to international wheat 
prices (1973-74-2002/03). 223  
 
The Nairobi agreement on food aid continues to allow aid in-kind and merely encourages 
countries to ‘increasingly procure international food aid from local or regional sources to the 
extent possible’ but does not mandate it. Furthermore, monetization of food aid, whereby 
such aid is sold to raise cash for non-food activities, is still permitted. Thus in the frank words 
of David Salomon, a trade policy specialist for the American Farm Bureau Federation, the 
food aid provision ‘basically leaves [US] programs to continue as they are.’224 
The Nairobi text furthermore does not distinguish between emergency and non-emergency 
food aid, effectively legalising dumping by labelling food exports as food aid which is 
actually a step back from the mandate of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration which 
demands such a distinction.225 
Thus the unbalance in favour of developing countries’ agricultural sectors is profound and 
multi-layered and it is the initial exclusion of agriculture from the general GATT obligations 
through the completely inadequate AoA that have created a situation where developed 
countries can use its incremental improvements as bargaining chips to get developing 
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countries to accept all sorts of deals not beneficial to them in other areas. The DDA was 
supposed to rectify this imbalance without a ‘payment’ by developing countries in other 
areas, however as mentioned, the Nairobi ministerial made it clear that this was not going to 
happen.   
It is interesting to note that when Mr Gary Horlick, who on the side of the US legal team 
participated in the drafting and negotiating of the SCM Agreement, was asked about 
distorting subsidies in agriculture, he replied that the AoA was ‘negotiated in clinical 
isolation from the subsidies agreement by different people with different concepts and 
different definitions, which has proven … quite a problem in litigation.’226 The statement 
seems to reflect the reality of the US approach to negotiations, where each of their lobbies 
fights for their own benefit, leading to a very incoherent and unbalanced system, a far cry 
from a uniformly applied free trade agenda.  
 
6. Unjustified Protectionism in Textiles  
Agriculture has not been the only notorious area where the system had been blatantly tilted in 
favour of developed countries. Trade had been restricted also for manufactured products of 
interest to developing countries. Like agriculture, the issue of restricting trade in textiles ‘was 
one of the hardest fought issues in the WTO, as it was in the former GATT’.227 Due to the 
limited possibility of developing countries to actively participate in the early negotiating 
rounds it was easy for developed countries to create mechanisms such as the so-called Multi-
Fibre Agreements (MFAs). Through these judicially separate agreements in early 1960s and 
then from 1974 until 2005 ‘voluntary’ quotas were imposed on the imports of textiles and 
clothing in a discriminatory manner, which would otherwise have been – and de facto was - a 
violation of the GATT disciplines. The Multi-Fibre Agreement was later replaced with the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) under which the EC, US, Canada and Norway 
were permitted to maintain quotas but were supposed to progressively decrease them in three 
stages until 2005 when no quotas would remain. However these countries only partially 
implemented the ATC.228 They backloaded their quota reduction commitments and used 
permissible safeguards as much as possible to delay the liberalisation to the detriment of 
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developing countries.229 This was in stark contradiction to the theory being sold at the same 
time to the developing countries about how bad quantitative restrictions were in general and 
how they should not be allowed. Developed countries’ protectionism, furthermore, had no 
basis for legitimacy as they had by that time dominated the exports in the textile sector, with 
the ATC states increasing their export shares between 1995 and 2002.230 Other measures to 
restrict trade in textiles have included tariff peaks, tariff escalations, safeguard measures and 
arbitrary anti-dumping practices.231 For example in the DFQF scheme of the US, only 82.4 % 
of imports from LDCs are duty-free, with exclusions hitting 1,834 national tariff lines, 
essentially covering textiles and clothing to avoid competition from countries like 
Bangladesh and Cambodia.232 In 2005 the UNDP noted that:  
On average, low-income developing countries exporting to high-income countries face tariffs three to 
four times higher than the barriers applied in trade between high-income countries… For example, 
while the average tariff on imports from developing countries is 3.4%, Japan imposes a tariff of 26% 
on Kenyan footwear. The European Union taxes Indian garment imports at 10%, Canada levies a 17% 
tariff on garments from Malaysia… Developing countries account for less than one third of developed 
country imports but for two-thirds of tariff revenues collected. They also account for two-thirds of 
developed country imports subjected to tariffs higher than 15%. In concrete terms this means that Viet 
Nam pays $470 million in taxes on exports to the United States worth $4.7 billion, while the United 
Kingdom pays roughly the same amount on exports worth $50 billion. Customs revenue collection as a 
share of imports… illustrates perverse taxation in operation. The effective US import duty for 
countries like Viet Nam and Bangladesh is some 10 times higher than for most countries in the 
European Union.233  
 
In the same vein the US collected more tariffs from Cambodia than from French imports, 
even though the amount of the former equated with one tenth of the latter.234 
Just as a result of the Uruguay round, some estimate the losses suffered by 48 LDCs to be 
around US$ 600 million per year235 while the World Bank in its Development Report of 2008 
estimated that the annual welfare gains for developing countries would have been five times 
the amount of aid they receive, had developed countries removed their protectionist measures 
against them.236 Keeping these figures in mind it is not surprising that developing countries 
have been fixated on rectifying said anomalies. 
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In the same way as the imbalance in agricultural rules, the promise of removal the removal of 
blatantly unfair rules in textiles served as a bargaining chip to get developing countries to 
accept agreements in areas such as intellectual property, services, investment and other areas 
against their interests.  
 
7. Proposed Swap between Agriculture and Industry 
However, giving up essential policy space for development in the said areas did not bring the 
rectifying of the imbalances of the system. As Wilkinson explains, the limited liberalisation 
of agriculture and textiles in the Uruguay round gave hope to developing countries that they 
would finally benefit from it, however their lack of capacity and resources ensured that this 
was not to be the case. On the other hand developed countries were to benefit greatly by the 
liberalisation of services and investment measures and the codification of intellectual 
property rights: 
What Uruguay clearly did, then, was to further divide up the areas of economic 
activity in which member states could specialize and in so doing, accentuated the 
problems facing developing countries seeking to diversify their export 
portfolios.237 
This division has since been perpetuated through projects such as the DDR’s Non-
Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations which propose a swap between the 
liberalisation of agriculture by developed countries and a further liberalisation of industry in 
developing countries along the lines of the comparative advantage theory. This would bring 
the former too late and the latter too soon. Paragraphs 16, 31 (iii) and 50 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration declare the objective to reduce or eliminate tariffs including tariff 
peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation and non-tariff barriers. This deal would lower industrial 
tariffs in developing countries and in return they would ‘get’ the reduction of subsidies in the 
rich countries. This would take away essential policy space for industrialisation, which as 
described above is essential for development.238 Such a swap would therefore hardly be 
encouraging for true economic development.  
Before Doha, many developing countries opposed the launch of yet another round of 
industrial tariff reductions. Being at the core of the WTO’s agenda, however, they found it 
difficult to oppose strongly such reductions, despite proving their negative implications for 
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development.239 Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia, 
with the support of Egypt, India and Brazil, called for a study process taking into account the 
impacts of previous liberalization on domestic firms, employment and government revenue, 
and tariff peaks and tariff escalation in developed countries. The result was a paper showing 
that the liberalization under the structural adjustment programs led to serious problems, such 
as local industries losing market share and closing down, causing unemployment and loss of 
government revenue in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Zaire, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Cameroon, Malawi, 
Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Brazil.240 These results are no surprise, considering what this 
thesis has argued in chapter III. 
As Chang points out, we have been made to believe that the main beneficiaries of the 
proposed swap between agriculture and industry would be ‘poor farmers in Ghana’, however 
even according to the World Bank, the main beneficiaries would actually be agro-
corporations in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand which would gain some 70-75% 
of the benefits, while the only two developing countries that would benefit would be Brazil 
and Argentina, leaving small farmers in developed countries as the only real casualties of 
such a deal.241  
Most developing countries have long lost their ‘comparative advantage’ in agriculture. They 
have been unable to attract investment in agriculture for more than 30 years due to the regime 
being heavily biased against them and the fact that structural adjustment programmes lead to 
the dismantling of whatever limited support schemes existed in the past in favour of the 
agricultural sector.242 This vast discrepancy in support given to farmers in the richest and the 
poorest countries over more than 30 years has led to an almost unimaginable discrepancy in 
productivity between them. Most African countries thus have an old-fashioned agriculture – 
not industrialised and ‘not the type of agriculture that is bringing development’.243 Of the 
United States population, less than 1% claim farming as an occupation and only 45% of those 
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claim farming as their principal occupation.244 Corporate farms account for only 4% of US 
farms.245 It is quite clear that this is not an agricultural society, yet their farmers’ productivity 
is far greater than that in the poorest agricultural societies to a ratio of 1:1000. One can speak 
of the benefits of traditional farming for the environment, the preservation of the culture of 
ethnic groups living this lifestyle or even food security of the small farmers246; however one 
cannot speak of international competitiveness. So unless there is a return to self-sufficiency 
and a disconnect from global markets altogether, the mere liberalisation of developed 
countries markets will not be help much.  
Therefore at present times, even though the anomalies stemming from the reluctance of the 
developed countries’ to end their subsidies and open their markets in their once weaker areas 
such as agriculture and textiles, are rightly criticised and fought against, development 
scholars identify as a bigger impediment to development in the present situation the 
diminishing policy space available to developing countries to support domestic economic 
activities and promote industrial policies more actively. In this regard it is not just the AoA or 
diminishing tariffs, but agreements such as the TRIPs, TRIMs, General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) which all severely limit such policy space for developing countries.247 It is 
therefore pertinent to examine some of the most important restrictions on Members’ policy 
space and whether developing countries have been provided with enough special and 
differential treatment in this regard, which is the aim of the next part of this chapter. 
 
8. The Background of a Call for Special and Differential Treatment – Legitimate 
Effort for the Retention of Necessary Policy Space 
Before analysing several aspects of the WTO rules in terms of policy space still available and 
the limited nature of the so-called special and differential treatment for developing countries 
which they provide, it is important to explain that developing countries sought to retain their 
policy space from the very beginning of the world trade project. They maintained that their 
position demanded meaningful exceptions from the rules applicable to developed countries 
and sought to preserve policy space, especially in terms of the right to impose tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions. Their loss of policy tools for development to the present extent has 
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thus been met with reluctance every step of the way, yet one way or another they were 
coerced into accepting it while being told that this is for their own good. On the other hand, 
already in the beginnings, both the ITO and the GATT Charter contained a very large number 
of exceptions written for the benefit of developed-country producers. The US had to ask for 
two glaring exceptions of this kind – the right to use quantitative import restrictions on 
agricultural imports and the right to use export subsidies.248 Hudec describes the position of 
the US as being full of internal contradictions, since while claiming that: 
market distortions do not ‘help’ in the long run, from the very beginning their own conduct belied this 
message… In addition, the theory of the United States legal design made it very hard to argue that 
freedom from GATT legal obligations was not a valuable good that developing countries ought to seek… 
The fixation with reciprocity, expressed a clear mercantilist view of international trade: ‘Reductions in 
our own trade barriers hurt us by permitting more imports; they must be paid for, therefore, by reductions 
in your trade barriers, which will help us by increasing our exports.’ In short, the theory was saying that 
higher trade barriers were better than lower trade barriers. While it was possible to rationalize the 
insistence on reciprocity in non-mercantilist terms  - ‘It’s for your own good’, or ‘The gains from trade 
are maximized this way’, or even ‘We need it for political reasons back home” – most developed-country 
governments behaved otherwise.249  
 
On the other hand, having had experienced several massive disruptions to their exports and 
critical imports through external shocks in the 30 years prior, developing countries lost their 
confidence in an export-led growth strategy.250 They wanted to retain the capability to pursue 
industrialisation and develop a capacity to produce necessary manufactured goods 
domestically. Developing countries were furthermore aware of the hypocrisy in the stance 
against tariffs and quantitative restrictions, ‘given the extensive use of tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions used by the industrialised countries during their own industrialisation.’251 There 
were other reasons for developing countries to be sceptical regarding tariff cuts requirements. 
Firstly their tariffs were already low at that time compared to developed countries252 and 
secondly their exports were primarily raw materials which were already entering core 
markets duty-free.253 
The legitimate interest of developing countries to industrialise however, was being dismissed 
by the USA with one commentator even calling it the ‘fetish of industrialisation’, claiming 
that it was an ‘irrational belief’ to think that industrialisation was necessary to raise the 
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standards of living, and characterizing the role of developing countries as being purely 
oppositional with an attempt to destroy the enterprise.254  
The Final Act establishing the GATT did not end up prohibiting governments from protecting 
domestic industries but all such protection was to be in the form of tariffs, and governments 
committed themselves to participate in periodic negotiations aimed at gradually reducing 
existing levels. Hudec described the trade-policy discipline required, as ‘a far cry from free 
trade’:  
Moreover, the actual code of behaviour adopted in 1947 contained a substantial number of exceptions. 
Nevertheless, the rules of the General Agreement did represent a coherent discipline requiring gradual 
trade liberalization.255  
 
In the 20 years that followed the developed countries achieved a very substantial reduction of 
trade barriers. As Hudec points out, however, the developing Members, ‘never agreed to 
accept the same discipline’.256 For example, in the ITO negotiations they highly contested the 
principle of reciprocity and raised concerns about their own lack of bargaining power to 
extract concessions on a reciprocal basis.257 The proposed Charter submitted by Brazil also 
stated that the MFN principle should be adhered to unconditionally only by countries in the 
advanced stage of development and it talked about the need for special measures to assist less 
developed countries facing their unique problems.258 Despite this, both MFN and the 
principle of reciprocity later became core GATT principles, however developing countries 
never stopped challenging them.  
Developing countries did accept the overall principle of tariff liberalisation, at least at the 
Preparatory Committee at the ITO negotiations, however by Havana other developing 
countries joined the process and Latin American countries put up substantial resistance 
against the requirements to negotiate on tariffs.259 Despite opposition to reducing tariffs in 
principle however, during the GATT Geneva Round in 1947, it was only two developing 
countries Syria-Lebanon and Brazil that, according to the US negotiators, made offers for 
tariff cuts considered to be sufficient, whereas countries such as France and the UK were 
making insignificantly small offers.260 When the US made cuts on the other hand, with an 
average cut of 35 per cent, this was made only on select industrial products, and not across 
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the board or applied to import-sensitive sectors, such as agriculture goods or labour–intensive 
manufactures, reflecting the protection of the interests of the major powers.261 This approach 
was then repeated in each further GATT round. 
In the US/UK first proposal for the ITO, there was no reference to development and as India 
pointed out at the time, it was only ‘[u]nder pressure exerted by countries of the British 
Empire, [that] the UK made a half-hearted attempt to assert the right of undeveloped 
countries to apply tariffs ‘for a limited period under adequate safeguards for the protection of 
infant industries’ - the USA, however, forgetful of its own history was not prepared to 
concede even this limited right.262 
In terms of quantitative restrictions, developing countries were being persuaded by the US 
that these are the most damaging of all measures and should not be allowed; instead the US 
suggested supporting infant industries through the granting of subsidies to domestic 
producers.263  Since developing countries would de facto not be able to use subsidization to 
the same degree as developed countries due to fiscal restraints, this would suggest that they 
would have preferred other countries to be more constrained in their rights to offer subsidies, 
since they could never win a ‘subsidy war’.264 Indeed as the US delegate observed during the 
early GATT negotiations: 
These countries, deeply concerned with the problem of industrialization and full employment, want to 
use restrictive measures to protect their infant industries. In general, they remain unimpressed with our 
contention that subsidies offer the least objectionable method for this purpose. They point out that, 
while tariffs and subsidies both amount to charges on their economies, the very real difficulties in 
raising the revenue to pay subsidies make the latter impractical for them.265  
 
Therefore, while the USA was trying to achieve complete freedom for the use of export 
subsidies on primary goods in Havana, countries such as Brazil and India were actually 
looking for a more restrictive approach towards their use.266 
Despite several exceptions for the benefit of developed countries, in the end the original 
GATT from 1947 only contained one article which exempted developing countries from any 
obligations, i.e. Art. XVIII on ‘Governmental assistance to economic development and 
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reconstruction’, but this applied as much also to countries undergoing post-war 
reconstruction, such as the UK or France.267  
It was only at the 1954 review where a significant part of the temporary exemptions was 
introduced to Art. XVIII, followed by the waiving of reciprocity in tariff negotiations as an 
element of Part IV (Art. XXXVI.8) in 1964 and the introduction of GSP in 1971.268 The 
GATT went on to incorporate a number of exceptions to its general principles of MFN and 
national treatment through SDT provisions, which are however considered to be largely 
ineffective.269 These measures were agreed to by developed countries partly because of the 
increasing pressure that developing countries created in the GATT for them and also because 
of the recognition by developing countries that the prevailing techniques of negotiation, the 
increasing protectionism in developed countries for products of interest to developing 
countries, and the outcomes of the early rounds were not resulting in market access gains for 
developing countries.270 
In the 1980s trade policy changed in a lot of developing countries and there was a move from 
the belief in import substitution industrialisation to export orientation and integration into 
world trade.271 This shift had an important influence on the SDT resulting from the Uruguay 
Round as it no longer took the form of derogation from multilateral rules, but the form of 
more flexible time frames for adhering to multilateral rules and provisions of technical 
assistance in the implementation of these rules in domestic legal and administrative 
systems.272 When trying to protect their policy space, developing countries have not only 
been vilified at the international institutions, but have also had to deal with domestic interest 
groups and domestic economists ideologically committed to the free market who would like 
to see the policy space of their own governments to be restricted in the name of the ‘science’ 
of economics.273 These governments have further been accused of not representing the needs 
of their people but acting out of their own interests ‘at the expense of their poorest and most 
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defenceless citizens.’274 All of this has undoubtedly played a role in the lowering of 
developing countries’ demands and the limited nature of the resulting SDT, which is analysed 
in the next section of this chapter.  
 
9. Limitations of SDT and Remaining Policy Space  
While the anomalies in favour of developed country interests have no particular name, rules 
providing for some very limited positive discrimination for developing countries are called 
‘special and differential treatment’ and in the name of creating a ‘level playing field’ their 
removal is constantly called for. WTO Agreements are full of statements recognizing special 
needs of developing countries, which are supposedly taken into account in the SDT 
provisions. However it is questionable whether they amount to much more than lip service. It 
is important to recognize that when measures aim to merely alleviate to some extent the 
harshness of an existing economic system, they ‘could be another way of stabilizing this 
system.’275  Thus it has to be examined just how special this treatment really is.  
As Chang points out, the problem with SDT starts with the word ‘special’ itself, which 
implies that the recipient of the treatment is getting an unfair advantage; ‘in the same way we 
wouldn’t call stair-lifts for wheelchair users or Braille writings for the blind ‘special 
treatments’, we should not call the higher tariffs and other means of protection more 
extensively (but not exclusively) used by the developing countries ‘special treatments’ – they 
are just differential treatments for countries with differential capabilities and goals’.276 In the 
same vein Rajamani has stated that:  
Differential treatment is the legitimate outcome of the democratic dialectic process that sets the fact of 
inequality against the fiction of equality.277 
 
There are several SDT provisions found in the WTO agreements, especially from the 
Uruguay round, and they usually relax the requirements for developing countries, give them 
more compliance time or require the protection of the interests of developing countries by 
developed countries.278 Also traditionally considered as SDT are limited reciprocity in trade 
negotiations and trade preferences given to LDCs through the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) and other provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities of 
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developing countries.279 SDT is supposed to serve three broad objectives: promoting trade 
between developed and developing countries, promoting trade between developing countries 
themselves and preserving domestic policy instruments used for development.280 In practice it 
has however largely constrained policy space, while promoting the other two objectives 
unevenly.281  
There are several problematic aspects of SDT provisions and only a handful of them proven 
useful enough to be invoked consistently during GATT years and even fewer since the 
beginning of the WTO.282 Furthermore most have had a time limit put on them of roughly 
between 10 to 15 years, expecting development after decades and centuries to happen literally 
overnight and then regardless of whether it actually does, the SDT is removed.283 Permanent 
exceptions are often given only to a very limited number of developing countries. For 
example in the case of export subsidies, only a handful of LDCs enjoy a permanent exception 
from the prohibition. Some have thus advocated for permanent SDT in areas such as tariff 
bindings, subsidies, antidumping and trade-related IP.284 A welcome change in the WTO 
practices in terms of time limits has happened at the Bali conference, however, with the 
Trade Facilitation (TF) agreement285 allowing developing countries and LDCs to self-define 
their implementation period. The TF essentially divides its provisions into those which are to 
be implemented immediately upon the entry into force of the agreement; those that will be 
implemented after a transition period selected by the countries themselves; and those for 
which a transition period does not have to be notified by the LDCs until assistance 
arrangements are notified by donor countries. Hopefully this model will be used also in future 
SDT provisions, better yet an objective and generous criterion for when a country reaches an 
adequate level of development could be put in place which would trigger the removal of the 
SDT. 
In the case of some other SDT provisions, even though they are technically still available (for 
example balance of payment provisions) they have been in practice virtually phased out in the 
early years of the WTO, due to WTO’s committees aggressively pushing for the 
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discontinuation of their use.286 On the other hand, sometimes SDT is cancelled already in the 
accession process which demands ‘WTO Plus’ obligations from Art. XII Members. For 
example Tonga has been fully bound by TRIPS since day one of becoming a Member.287 
Recent proposals put forward by developed countries at negotiations further threaten to limit 
much of the SDT. 
Another important problem of SDT provisions in terms of increasing the trade opportunities 
of developing countries is that out of fourteen dedicated to that goal, only three contain actual 
legal obligations: GATS Art. IV:I and IV:2 and Art. 2.18 of the now defunct ATC.288 
Somewhat better is the situation with provisions aimed at safeguarding the interests of 
developing countries, where twenty-one out of fifty-four are binding according to the CTD.289 
Also problematic is that, many provisions mix the language of legal obligation with a ‘best 
efforts’ substance, such as the word ‘shall’ coupled with ‘make every effort’/‘give active 
consideration’/‘have special regard,’ etc.290 Historically such clauses have not been 
understood to embody any legal obligation291 and it is politically unlikely to reverse the trend 
now.292 However Rolland claims that because of the long-standing connection between 
development and human rights, and because most SDT clauses were drafter in the 1990s 
when ‘best efforts’ provisions became commonplace in other areas, one can argue that they 
now express a legal commitment and that the historical view no longer holds as firmly in the 
trade law context.293 She finds support for this ‘new’ interpretation in reference to 
environmental law, where ‘best efforts’ and ‘endeavour’ are now commonly understood to 
translate into an obligation of due diligence by the state294 and in reference to human rights 
law, where many treaties are drafted with ‘best efforts’, ‘reasonable efforts’, ‘endeavour’ and 
similar language without rendering the provisions devoid of any legal substance.295 Despite 
the convincing nature of Rolland’s legal reasoning, the current DSM shows no signs of going 
into the direction of any revolutionary interpretations in this regard. In fact time and again the 
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dispute settlement bodies show reluctance in giving practical and enforceable meaning to 
such provisions. 
The diminished usefulness of SDT provisions has therefore been criticised and the 2001 
Doha Ministerial Declaration notes 
the concerns expressed regarding their operation in addressing specific constraints faced by developing 
countries, particularly least-developed countries. In that connection, we also note that some members 
have proposed a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment (WT/GC/W/442). We 
therefore agree that all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational. In this connection, we 
endorse the work programme on special and differential treatment set out in the Decision on 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.296  
 
At Bali a monitoring mechanism on SDT has been established which is to analyse and review 
all SDT provisions and make recommendations when deemed necessary.297 Although this 
may sound encouraging one must not lose sight of the fact that this agreement came to be 
instead of discussions on concrete changes proposed for the strengthening of several SDT 
provisions, which were dropped from the package a few months ahead of the ministerial298 
therefore it can be just another way of trying to avoid actual reform. 
 
a) Shrinking Policy Space 
The limited nature of SDT has meant that the process of substantive liberalisation and the 
drastic shrinking of policy space for development has not meaningfully been mitigated. In 
terms of tariffs as a result of the Uruguay Round developing countries undertook 
proportionally deeper tariff cuts than developed countries. Although their tariff bindings were 
higher before, which allowed room for significant cuts, many were forced to maintain tariff 
levels lower than those they had committed to, due to loan conditionalities imposed on them 
after the Debt Crisis of 1982 by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.299 
Instead of being tied to a particular project, the loans have been concerning budget deficits, 
monetary expansion, privatisation, trade liberalisation, and following the 1997 financial crisis 
even areas such as democracy, judicial reform, corporate governance, health and education; 
in other words ‘there is virtually no area on which the Bank and the Fund do not have (often 
very strong) influence.’300 In terms of trade and industrial policies the shrinkage in policy 
space has been particularly striking with a key condition attached to the loans being trade 
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liberalisation – involving tariff cuts, tariffication of quantitative restrictions, and the reduction 
in non-tariff barriers.301 Similar conditions have also been attached to aid by donor developed 
countries.302 The lowering or removal of tariffs is problematic from the point of view of 
necessary policy space for the protection of local industries but also from the point of view of 
lost revenues. Tariff revenues comprise one third of the budgets of LDCs and they are easier 
to collect than other types of taxes due to lack of infrastructure for proper policing of the 
collection and the prevalence of informal workforces and black markets in these countries.303  
At the moment developing countries still have the freedom to protect certain industries up to 
the ceiling tariff rates, which can be quite high, while having low tariffs on other products to 
preserve the average level at the capped level. However, the Non Agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA) negotiations are threatening to drastically cut tariffs line by line, on every product 
and under the so-called Swiss formula which means that higher tariffs would be cut steeper. 
The push for a steep cut of tariffs in developing countries in exchange for a slight cut in the 
tariffs and domestic support for agriculture in developed countries is hardly surprising. The 
share of non-agricultural products in the goods exports of the US is drastically growing and 
now amounts to more than 90% of total goods exports so it is not surprising that the US is 
‘seeking significant new competitive opportunities for US businesses through cuts in applied 
tariff rates’, especially in key emerging markets like India and Egypt, which still retain 
ceiling tariff rates as high as 150 percent.304 The US has been joined by the EU in their 
aggressive attempts to achieve market opening in other economies.305 Oxfam, War on Want, 
Action Aid and other NGOs see the NAMA proposals as ‘an unacceptable recipe for de-
industrialisation’306 and they have been trying to persuade developed country governments to 
ensure that a development-friendly result is reached at any negotiations, in a sense that it will 
ensure poor countries are given the flexibility to decide, plan and sequence trade reforms as 
part of a wider poverty reduction and development strategy.  
Similarly to goods, in the area of services, The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) brought liberalization, unsurprisingly in areas where developed countries have a 
comparative advantage, i.e. financial, telecommunications and other similar services, while 
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unskilled labour, where developing countries have a comparative advantage, has seen little 
progress with regard to its cross-border provision.307 The WTO has further severely curtailed 
policy space in areas such as intellectual property protection which also has important 
implications for development (see chapter V). 
There is no doubt that the policy space of developing countries has been substantially 
lessened,308 however the important question is whether the WTO has gone too far in this, or 
are there still some policy options available which allow countries to pursue industrialisation. 
While some developmental scholars argue that the ‘ladder has been kicked away’,309 others 
claim it is still there albeit a bit harder to climb.310 For instance, while measures such as 
voluntary export restraints (VERs) are no longer allowed, countries could still increase tariffs 
up to their bound levels to protect their infant industries. In addition, countries have at their 
disposal, other types of mechanisms to protect their industries, such as non-tariff barriers and 
anti-dumping measures.311 They can theoretically further use safeguards in emergency 
situations and use exceptions which allow them to increase tariffs to address balance of 
payments problems and to support infant industries.312 It has been claimed therefore that the 
main problem lies in a political vision infected with the liberal trade tenets, rather than the 
law itself.313 However it is more likely that in different situations governments may find 
different tools to be more or less useful, therefore it is hard to defend the withholding of any 
important policy tools which had been used for successful development in the past, for the 
low income countries of today. It is also important to note that most of the policy options 
available to developing countries do not fall under SDT and are thus equally available to 
                                                            
307 Joseph, supra note 125, p. 152. 
308 K. Gallagher, Putting Development First, (Zed Books, 2005); S.R. Khan ‘WTO, IMF and the Closing of 
Development Policy Space for Low-Income Countries: A Call for Neo-Developmentalism’, 28 Third World 
Quarterly, (2007), pp. 1073-1090; R. Wade, ‘What Strategies are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The 
World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space’’, 10 Review of International Political 
Economy (2003), pp. 621-644; UNDP, supra note 173. 
309 H-J. Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder, (Anthem Press, 2003); S. J. Lee and T. Han ‘The Demise of Korea, 
Inc.: Paradigm Shift in Korea’s Developmental State’, 36 Journal of Contemporary Asia, (2006); I. C. Moon 
and S. J. Rhyu ‘The State, Structural Rigidity, and the End of Asian Capitalism: A Comparative Study of Japan 
and South Korea’, in R. Robinson, M. Besson, K. Jayasuriya, and H.R. Kim (eds) Politics and Markets in the 
wake of the Asian Crisis, (Routledge, 2000). 
310 A. H. Amsden and T. Hikino, ‘The Bark is Worse than the Bite: New WTO Law and Late Industrialization’, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, July 2000; R. Rasiah, ‘Trade-related Investment 
Liberalization under the WTO: The Malaysian Experience’, 34 Global Economic Review, (2005); D. Rodrik, 
‘Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century’ Research Paper prepared for UNIDO, (2004); K.C. Shadlen, 
‘Exchanging Development for Market Access? Deep Integration and Industrial Policy under Multilateral and 
Regional-Bilateral Trade Agreements’, 12 Review of International Political Economy (2005); UNCTAD, Trade 
and Development Report, 2006, Global Partnership and National Policies for Development (United Nations, 
2006). 
311 Amsden, ibid, p. 109. 
312 Ibid, p. 110. 
313 Ibid, p.105. 
145 
 
developed countries, who usually have more technical expertise and resources to use them 
more efficiently and also against developing countries, while the latter may be reluctant to 
use them to avoid starting a tit-for-tat war. Other options require a particular ‘payment’ in 
return or have strict conditions placed on them which may make them too costly or 
practically useless in some instances. In the next sections some of the most important policy 
tools still allowed are analysed and whether they are practically useful and broad enough for 
a meaningful pursuit of development. 
 
b) Increasing Tariffs to Support Infant Industries or for Balance-of-Payment 
Purposes 
As previously mentioned, the first time provisions were adopted to address specifically the 
needs of the developing part of the Membership, was during the 1954-55 GATT review 
session. During that time Art. XVIII was revised allowing the imposition of trade restrictions 
for developmental reasons.314 The requirement of binding concessions under Art. II of GATT 
is relaxed in Art. XVIII, which allows for the possibility of increasing tariffs for certain 
purposes.  
Tariff structures remain flexible in a sense that the Schedule of Concessions can be modified 
to grant tariff protection for infant industries (GATT XVIII:A). However reciprocity is 
required and in order to be able to modify the Schedule, the applicant must go through 
several steps, if it considers it ‘desirable, in order to promote the establishment of a particular 
industry with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people, to modify or 
withdraw a concession included in the appropriate Schedule.’315 The applicant, 
 
shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this effect and enter into negotiations with any 
contracting party with which such concession was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting 
party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest therein. If agreement 
is reached between such contracting parties concerned, they shall be free to modify or withdraw 
concessions under the appropriate Schedules to this Agreement in order to give effect to such 
agreement, including any compensatory adjustments involved. 
(b) If agreement is not reached within sixty days … the contracting party which proposes to modify or 
withdraw the concession may refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES which shall promptly 
examine it. If they find that the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession 
has made every effort to reach an agreement and that the compensatory adjustment offered by it is 
adequate, that contracting party shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession if, at the same time, 
it gives effect to the compensatory adjustment. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not find that the 
compensation offered by a contracting party proposing to modify or withdraw the concession is 
adequate, but find that it has made every reasonable effort to offer adequate compensation, that 
contracting party shall be free to proceed with such modification or withdrawal. If such action is taken, 
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any other contracting party referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be free to modify or withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the contracting party which has taken the 
action.316 
 
Therefore a modification of the Schedule requires a compensatory adjustment offered by the 
modifying country, which is further subject to acceptance. If an agreement is not reached and 
the contracting parties do not think that the offer was adequate, other Members with a 
substantial interest are free to adopt retaliatory measures, in case the modifying Member 
chooses to take unilateral action. A provision granting the right of veto to certain affected 
contracting parties was deleted, to make the imposition of quantitative restrictions easier317, 
however, the requirement of offering compensation may still impose a substantial burden on 
the economy of the modifying developing country, while the consultations and negotiations 
may cause considerable delays in implementing trade measures for development purposes.318 
The fact that no state has ever made use of it, was identified by Van den Bossche as the 
clearest indicator of its uselessness.319A more flexible approach should be available, one 
which would allow unilateral imposition of modification of the schedule, when a country can 
demonstrate the need for it with a concrete plan for industrial facilitation.320  
 
Similarly, modifications are allowed under GATT XVIII:B for balance-of-payment purposes. 
Unlike GATT XVIII:A, this instrument has been the main ‘flexibility’ prominently used by a 
small but diverse group of developing countries for prolonged periods of time to adjust their 
obligations to the challenges of economic development.321 The main users were Asian 
countries, but also Latin American countries and from Africa, Egypt, Tunisia and Ghana.322 
These countries pursued very different developmental models, from import-substitution 
policies and export-driven development models to models used by Members transitioning 
from a communist to a capitalist economy - however they all found GATT XVIII:B a useful 
policy tool.323 Despite this, such measures have been virtually phased out in the early years of 
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the WTO due to the overseeing Committee aggressively demanding countries to remove such 
measures or not impose them at all, de facto stripping them of this policy tool.324 
 
c) Safeguards  
One of the other remaining tools which can be used for the protection of domestic industry 
are so-called safeguards. The GATT Art. XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) allow 
for the use of restraint on trade flows in certain situations of import surges. Like many other 
tools still available, safeguards however have a number of conditions attached to them which 
have proven to be hard to use in practice. For example the AoS defines import surges in Art. 
2 as follows: 
 
When a product is imported into a country in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic 
production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic 
industry that produces like or directly competitive products. 
 
Thus safeguards can be applied only after a detailed investigation has been conducted to 
substantiate the presence of significant injury or threat of serious injury. Furthermore, a 
causal link needs to be established between the claimed damage and the import surge. The 
rules are generally cumbersome and difficult to interpret particularly as regards to causality 
and the non-attribution of other factors to the damage.325 Another requirement for the 
safeguards to be justified is proof that the surge is a result of ‘unforseen developments’.326 
The subjectivity of this requirement contributes to the difficulty of constructing a reasoned 
and adequate account of the causal chain.327 Numerous disputes involving safeguard 
measures have been brought before the WTO, however the Appellate Body decisions have 
failed to give useful guidance for resolving the vagueness of the terms found in the provision, 
which only makes employing safeguard measures increasingly difficult and can defeat one of 
its major purposes – to help countries nurture their infant industries.328 To date no measure 
brought before the DSM has been ruled to be an acceptable safeguard measure. Safeguard 
measures allowed under the AoA are also severely limited for use by developing countries in 
their own way, as discussed above.  
                                                            
324 Ibid, 132. 
325 FAO, supra note 215. 
326 GATT, Art. XIX (a). 
327 T. Raychaudhuri, ‘The Unforseen Developments Clause in Safeguards under the WTO: Confusions in 
Compliance’, 11 Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, (2010), p. 302. 
328 A. O. Sykes, ‘The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence’, John M. Olin, Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 187 (2D Series), May 2003. 
148 
 
Furthermore safeguards can also be used against developing countries’ imports. As Stiglitz 
observes, the ‘safeguard measure has probably been underused by developing countries and 
been overused by developed countries, especially the United States’.329 The vagueness of the 
rules has enabled the latter to abuse the system, until affected countries go through the costly 
procedure of dispute settlement to stop the abuse.330 Stiglitz describes a lack of distinction 
made in the US safeguard legislation between industries which are declining because of trade 
and those which would be in decline even in the absence of trade liberalization331 and 
advocates for SDT in terms of higher standards that would need to be met by developed 
countries when imposing such measures (for example demonstrating that at least 1% of jobs 
in the country have been lost and the burden on the country’s social safety net is such that it 
cannot absorb it) and lower standards when developing countries want to use them.332  
There is currently SDT in the sense that AoS, Art. 9.1 demands an exemption from putting 
safeguard measures on developing countries’ imports, however only when those imports are 
lower than 3%, and lower than 9% collectively with imports from other such developing 
countries. These ceilings are too tight. On the other hand Art. 9.2 provides for the possibility 
of an extension of the period of safeguard measures for two years for developing countries. 
This extension is too small.333 
Furthermore a country implementing a safeguard measure needs to offer compensation in 
trade concessions of equivalent value, regardless of whether it is a developed or developing 
country. If no compensation can be agreed to, other Members can ‘retaliate’, by increasing 
tariffs on products from the country in question (Art 8) but not in the first 3 years if the 
measure is taken based on an absolute increase of imports and otherwise conforms to the 
provisions.  
 
d)  Antidumping Measures 
Anti-dumping law is one of the most controversial areas of WTO law. It is regulated by 
GATT VI and the Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (ADA). Similarly to safeguards, antidumping duties can be used for 
the protection of domestic industry when it is established that imported goods have been 
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‘dumped’ on the market, i.e. sold below their price on the domestic market or below the price 
of production with the intent of driving out competition and establishing a monopoly in the 
market. Unfortunately when it comes to antidumping measures, exports from developing 
countries have been the primary target. This has been a critical problem for developing 
countries which rely on low prices (based on low labour cost) for the competitiveness of their 
products.334 Between January 1985 and December 2011 China suffered more than 630 such 
measures imposed against its exports, which is more than four times the amount of such 
measures that were imposed against products from the US (i.e. 136 anti-dumping 
measures).335 It has been said that the complexity of the rules favours those with more 
technical expertise, i.e. developed countries.336 However, the impression that anti-dumping 
measures are used only by developed countries against developing countries would be 
misleading as the most avid user has recently been India which had imposed 534 such 
measures between 1995-2014, followed by the US with 345 and the EU with 298 measures 
respectively.337 
An example of anti-dumping duties imposed in 2006 by the EU against shoes from China 
illustrates the classic conflict between the official free trade/WTO goal of lowering prices for 
consumers and the desire for continued protectionism by EU manufacturers via anti-dumping 
measures after the removal of quotas on footwear in 2005. Italian and European footwear 
manufacturers, alarmed by an increase of 300% in imports of leather footwear from China 
depressing prices by 25% and forcing thousands of footwear firms out of business, made an 
appeal to the EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson for implementation of anti-dumping 
measures. Despite opposition by many EU countries (Scandinavian countries, Germany, UK), 
the measures were eventually implemented, with 16.5% extra duties placed on shoes from 
China and 10% on those from Vietnam.338 The most interesting statement in this regard, 
however came from Mendelson in respect of Europe’s own manufacturers, which have 
outsourced their production to maintain a competitive edge. He observed that:  
while Europe should tackle unfair trade, globalisation means the definitions of what is European-made 
have become blurred… If producing cheaply in China helps generate profits and jobs in Europe, how 
should we treat these companies when disputes over unfair trading arise?339 
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While it is not quite clear how such outsourcing would create jobs in Europe, the war 
between ours and theirs is rather transparent. So-called unfair practices quickly become fair, 
when they are practiced by ‘our own’. 
Similarly to safeguards, there is an inherent arbitrariness and complexity in determining 
dumping and its particular components, such as what is ‘the normal value’ of the product. 
There may not be a single home market price to compare and thus the complex adjusted 
average may have to be calculated; the home price may not even represent the true market 
price, or the product may not even be sold (in sufficient quantities) in the home market to 
determine a valid home price.340 In these cases the price needs to be constructed by an 
evaluation of cost and reasonable profit.341 Depending on the methodology adopted in 
assessing the ‘market price’ and other variables (i.e. ‘reasonable profit’, ‘export price’) 
results can vary greatly.342 According to one study of the US antidumping laws, these do not 
reliably identify either price discrimination or below cost sales.343 ‘Of the five different 
calculation methodologies used by the Commerce Department… only one has any relevance 
to detecting market-distorting price discrimination; only 2 of the 107 affirmative dumping 
findings reviewed in this study relied exclusively on this methodology… [T]he law lacks any 
mechanism for determining whether the pricing practices it condemns as unfair have any 
connection to market-distorting practices abroad… [and] frequently punishes foreign firms 
for unexceptionable business practices routinely engaged in by American companies.’344 As 
Stiglitz and Charlton describe, the US standards used to determine if the company of another 
state is engaging in dumping are not the same as those used for determining predatory pricing 
of their domestic firms under their anti-trust law.345 Therefore their goal does not seem to be 
protecting competition but merely to reduce the threat of foreign competition.346 
Particularly harmful for developing country imports has been the notorious method called 
zeroing. The dumping margin is calculated by getting the average of the differences between 
the export prices and the home market prices. Zeroing happens when export prices higher 
than the home market prices are disregarded or a value of ‘zero’ is attributed to them in the 
calculation, artificially inflating the dumping margins. This method has been highly 
                                                            
340 Lee, supra note 127, p.121. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
343 B. Lindsey and D. Ikenson, ‘Reforming the Anti-Dumping Agreement:  A Road Map for WTO 
Negotiations’, Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis No. 21 (11 Dec. 2002).  
344 Ibid. 




contentious and several disputes have been launched by the EU, Japan and a number of 
developing countries including Brazil, China, Ecuador, Korea, Mexico, Thailand and 
Vietnam against the US for its use. Over a period of ten years the Appellate Body has 
consistently condemned the practice and upheld Art. 2.4 claims against its use,347 finding that 
‘it cannot be viewed as involving a ‘fair comparison’ within the meaning of the first sentence 
of Art. 2.4.2’.348 However the US failed to commit itself to bringing its methods into 
conformity with WTO rulings until 2010 when it adopted the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act and published a notice349 entitled "Antidumping proceedings: Calculation of the 
Weighted Average Dumping Margin and Assessment of the Rate in Certain Antidumping 
Duty Proceedings" by means of which it proposed abandoning the use of zeroing. Regardless, 
the method is still being used, and most recently in US – Washing Machines the Panel 
confirmed its inconsistency with ADA Art. 2.4.2350 as it artificially inflates dumping margins 
which furthermore leads to a violation of ADA Art. 9.3. 351 The latter article stipulates that 
the ‘amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established 
under Art. 2’ while the dumping margins artificially inflated by zeroing lead to any collected 
duties being excessive.352 
SDT treatment in anti-dumping is set out in Art. 15 of the ADA which states that  
special regard must be given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing 
country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping measures under this Agreement. 
Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before 
applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country 
Members. 
 
However the Panel in India Steel Plate made it clear that the first sentence of this article does 
not impose any specific or general obligation on Members to undertake any particular action 
as ‘[m]embers cannot be expected to comply with an obligation whose parameters are 
entirely undefined.’353 This clearly illustrates the uselessness of SDT when expressed in such 
terms as ‘special regard’ and interpreted in a restrictive way at the dispute settlement. 
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Furthermore the ‘special situation of developing country Members’ was not interpreted to 
extend to its exporters.354  
As for the second sentence, the Panel stressed in EC-Brazil Cotton Yarn, that the obligation is 
to explore the possibilities of constructive remedies, not the remedies themselves, which 
clearly does not require the investigative authorities to adopt such remedies (merely because 
they were proposed).355 All that is required is that they actively consider such possibilities 
with an open mind (i.e. a willingness to reach a positive outcome) prior to imposing anti-
dumping measures that would affect the essential interests of a developing country.356 
The constructive remedies have been interpreted as encompassing only two options, the 
possibility of which need to be considered: a lesser duty as provided for in Art. 9 of ADA or 
price undertakings as provided for in Art. 8 of ADA. 357  Thus the investigative authority does 
not need to consider the possibility of any other remedy (such as using a different 
methodology for calculating the dumping margin in the case of developing countries from 
that used for developed countries exports).358 Furthermore, since a lesser duty is only 
desirable under Art. 9.1 it is not mandatory that domestic legislation even provides for this 
option.359 
The disappointing outcomes in these disputes concerning the interpretation of Art. 15 may 
have been the reason why it was subsequently not invoked at the DSM for a long time. Some 
more recent disputes, still under consideration, however, do invoke it and one can hope for a 
more useful interpretation to emerge.  
 
e) Trade Related Investment Measures  
Historically managing foreign direct investment (FDI) was at the heart of countries’ 
development strategies.360 Amongst the tools widely used in the past with the goal of 
increasing domestic value added, job creation and technology transfer are the following now 
WTO-prohibited tools; local content requirements (LCR) and trade-balancing investment 
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measures.361 LCRs require the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin 
or domestic source, while trade balancing measures limit the allowed purchase or use of 
imported products by an enterprise to an amount related to the volume or value of local 
products that it exports. Such policies are now prohibited under the Agreement on Trade 
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)362 and are furthermore inconsistent with Art. III:4 of 
the GATT as they involve discrimination against imported products in favour of domestic 
products.363 Also prohibited under TRIMs364 and in violation of the prohibition on imposition 
of quantitative restrictions of Art. XI:1 of GATT are measures which limit the importation by 
an enterprise of products used in its local production, generally or to an amount related to the 
volume or value of local production exported by the enterprise. Similarly a contravention of 
TRIMs and Art. XI:1 of GATT are measures which restrict an enterprise’s access to foreign 
exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise, 
in order to restrict imports.365 
Not surprisingly on the issue of investment measures developed and developing countries 
again had quite different objectives in the Uruguay round.366 Despite the outcome restricting 
policy space in some key areas, developing countries nevertheless managed to exploit the 
differences between developed countries during the negotiations and thus prevented the 
prohibition of a wide range of measures.367 A significant degree of latitude in investment 
regulation therefore still exists whereby states can demand joint ventures, or require foreign 
firms to transfer technology to local firms or regulate their hiring practices, with the aim of 
enhancing development of human capital and skills.368 A stricter agreement has however 
been sought by developed countries ever since and with the fall of the DDA it is questionable 
whether developing countries can continue to successfully block new disciplines in this 
regard. 
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When TRIMS was to be implemented in 2000, 26 developing countries notified LCRs and 
other TRIMS related policies mostly in their automotive industry (or agro-foods).369 The 
automotive industry offers scope for the progressive import-substitution of a very wide range 
of components by local firms, therefore it is not surprising that developing countries such as 
Thailand and Malaysia chose this industry together with local content policies as their way 
into industrialisation.370 It has been observed for example that the Australian motor industry 
became more efficient after liberalisation, however the local component supply would have 
not even come into existence, if local content policies had not been used in the first place.371  
The TRIMS agreement takes away an important development instrument and it further   
‘seems to mainly target the investment regulations of developing countries, but there is no clear 
need for such multilateral control on investment… [since M]ajor investors are often in a position 
to negotiate the terms of their investment with the host country’372  
 
Around 2600 bilateral investment treaties exist around the world which already require 
national treatment of foreign investors and prohibit a wider range of TRIMs than those 
restrained by the TRIMs Agreement. If a developing country is ready to give up certain 
TRIMs it will do so unilaterally or bilaterally and multilateral control should not prevent it 
from adopting TRIMs if it deems them necessary for its development objectives.373 
The SDT under TRIMs stipulates that developing countries that notified TRIMs inconsistent 
measures after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement could keep them if the Council for 
Trade in Goods extended their transition period.374 The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
further allowed LDCs to introduce new TRIMs inconsistent measures for a duration of up to 
five years subject to the Council for Trade in Goods giving them ‘positive consideration’ 
when notified.375 The measures can be renewed after a review and decision by the Council for 
Trade in Goods. However no such notifications have been made so far. 
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As has been noted, subsidies undoubtedly play an important role in a successful development 
process, especially when a country is trying to venture out of specializing in the production of 
primary goods. However there exists a disagreement as to which types of subsidies are 
essential for this and whether the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) leaves enough policy space to developing countries in this 
regard. The wide scope of possible countervailing duty (CVD) action does not reflect the 
explicit recognition in the SCM Agreement that subsidies may play an important 
development role.376 
As mentioned before, at the ITO negotiations the USA and UK’s Suggested Charter proposed 
to phase-out export subsidies, however from the outset they included the exceptions which 
they wanted such as the exclusion of agriculture and provisions for applying domestic and 
export subsidies to fit in with their agricultural policies.377 It is not surprising that regarding 
export subsidies on primary goods, developing countries actually sought ‘a more restrictive 
Charter’ contrary to the perception of them demanding no restrictions on commercial policy, 
although their wishes were not reflected in the Havana Charter which remained as the USA 
and UK intended.378 Articles 25-28 of the Charter dealt with subsidies in general and 
separately with export subsidies while primary commodities fell under Art. 28 which limited 
them merely with the condition that such subsidies would not lead to a Member gaining 
‘more than an equitable share of world trade’ in the product. The GATT however did not 
include a principle prohibition on export subsidies nor any substantive discipline on 
subsidies. 
However the battle resumed in the 1950s between the different interests as developing 
countries kept opposing the idea of a more flexible treatment of primary products while 
calling for more policy space for their needs.379 Thus they were unwilling to subscribe to the 
1960 Declaration which would have provided a list of prohibited subsidies on non-primary 
products. In the Tokyo Round, the adopted Subsidies Code was a sort of a compromise 
between the conflicting interests and while it strengthened CVD disciplines, prohibited export 
subsidies on non-primary products and allowed flexible disciplines on domestic subsidies it 
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excluded developing countries from virtually all new subsidy disciplines.380 Furthermore the 
Subsidies Code was only signed by 24 countries. 
However this prompted the US to declare that it would not offer Subsidies Code treatment 
(i.e. they refused to use the injury test in their domestic law) to any developing country which 
did not commit to reducing its export subsidies, even though this was a condition for signing 
up to the Agreement.381 Disagreeing with this, Colombia, Chile and India as well as a list of 
other developing countries stated that such forcing into these commitments was not in line 
with the provisions of the SCM Agreement itself and it did not open the way for wide 
participation of developing countries in the Agreement.382  
During the Uruguay round, interests formed along the same lines, however this time the SCM 
Agreement managed to bring stronger subsidy disciplines for developing countries, arguably 
curtailing their policy space too severely. The 2006 UNCTAD Trade and Development 
Report concluded that the Agreement 'impinges directly on national rulemaking authority'.383 
According to Art. 1 and 2 the Agreement only applies to subsidies which are specific. These 
exist when a government directly or indirectly through a private body provides a financial 
contribution which confers a benefit to an industry or group of industries. If such subsidies 
are contingent upon export performance (export subsidies) or upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods (local content subsidies), they are prohibited according to Art. 3. This is 
because ‘they are designed to directly affect trade and thus are most likely to have adverse 
effects on the interests of other Members.’384 Most subsidies however are not prohibited but 
actionable, which means they are subject to challenge, either through multilateral dispute 
settlement or through countervailing (CVD) action, if they cause adverse effects to the 
interests of another Member. 
The SDT treatment excludes from the prohibition of export subsidies those developing 
countries that are listed in Annex VII, which includes LDCs and all Members whose GNI per 
capita was below US$ 1000 per year at the time of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round until 
they reach such GNI. The initial interpretation considered current US dollars which meant 
Members could graduate based upon inflation and changes in exchange rates rather than real 
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economic growth, thus at the Doha Ministerial in 2001 the WTO adopted an alternative 
approach, calculating the threshold in constant US$ 1990 GNI per year, which must be 
reached for three consecutive years.385 Members can further be re-included in the list if their 
GNP falls back below this threshold. However the possibility of a Member who has never 
been on the list to be included on it, does not exist, even if their GNP is below the threshold. 
Thus Vietnam was surprised to learn during the negotiations that it could not benefit from 
SDT treatment, even though its GNP was below the threshold.386 The exemption extinguishes 
for products that have reached export competitiveness, after which the subsidies are to be 
phased out in eight years. Furthermore such subsidies can still be subject to an actionable 
subsidy claim and CVD action.387  
All other developing countries388 were to phase out their export subsidies in eight years after 
2003 but the SCM Committee was allowed to authorise extensions based on the development 
needs of the Member. The needs had to be reviewed on an annual basis with a phase-out 
period of two years after a negative determination, which generated large uncertainty for 
governments and their business communities.389 The phasing out has to happen in reference 
to the overall level of a country’s export subsidies in terms of the actual expenditure (not 
merely budgeted amounts) in the year 1994.390 This posed an unjustifiable prejudice against 
those that perhaps could not afford such subsidisation in the said year. Another possible 
benchmark year is provided, i.e. 1986, if the developing country autonomously eliminated its 
export subsidies before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, without a multilateral 
obligation to do so.391 If said country did not have a useful level of subsidisation at this time 
either, the additional benchmark did not add much flexibility. Thus for example, in Brazil - 
Aircraft, Brazil wanted its ceiling level of export subsidies to be determined by its levels of 
subsidisation in 1991, when the main export subsidy programmes were put in place. This was 
however not accepted by the Panel and only a choice between either 1994 or 1986 benchmark 
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levels was considered appropriate.392 The proposal by Brasil to at least consider a weighted 
average of the three or four years prior to 1994 as the relevant period - which would have 
helped to reduce the distortion of the impact of a single year on the volatile economies of 
developing country Members - was also rejected.393  
The SDT treatment for local content subsidies has expired, so developing countries are 
treated the same as developed countries in this regard. This prohibition of local content 
subsidies from Art. 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement also annihilates any SDT in this regard still 
allowed under the TRIMS Agreement.394 
When it comes to actionable subsidies all developing countries enjoy SDT treatment in the 
sense that action against their subsidies may not be authorized or taken unless nullification or 
impairment of tariff concessions or other obligations under GATT is found to exist as a result 
of such subsidies or unless injury to a domestic industry in the market of an importing 
Member occurs,395 however action can be taken also on the basis of presumption of serious 
prejudice.396 Serious prejudice can be demonstrated and action taken in four situations: 
 (a) the total ad valorem subsidization14 of a product exceeds 5 per cent;  
 (b) if subsidies are covering operating losses sustained by an industry;  
 (c) if subsidies are covering operating losses sustained by an enterprise  
 (d) direct forgiveness of debt and grants to cover debt repayment.397 
 
This SDT treatment however does not restrict the use of CVDs which Members can impose 
to offset specific subsidies from developing countries causing injury to their domestic 
industry. Still the threshold set by Art. 27.10 calls for CVD investigations to be terminated if 
(a) the overall level of subsidies granted upon the product in question does not exceed 2 per 
cent of its value calculated on a per unit basis; or 
(b) the volume of the subsidized imports represents less than 4 per cent of the total imports of 
the like product in the importing Member, unless imports from developing country Members 
whose individual shares of total imports represent less than 4 per cent collectively account for 
more than 9 per cent of the total imports of the like product in the importing Member. 
Despite these higher thresholds398 the majority of CVD action is still taken against 
developing countries’ imports, more than one third of those against Chinese and Indian 
                                                            
392 Brazil-Aircraft, Panel Report, para. 7.63. 
393 Ibid, para. 7.64. 
394 Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, Panel Report (WT/DS54, 55, 59, 64 R, 
adopted 23 July 1998), paras. 14.47-14.55. 
395 SCM Agreement, Art. 27.9.  
396 SCM Agreement, Art. 5.   
397 SCM Agreement Art.27.9 with Art. 6.1.  
398 The thresholds for developed countries’ subsidies are set in SCM Agreement, Art. 11.9. 
159 
 
imports.399 On the other hand, the reason why developing countries are less able to take 
advantage of this tool themselves is because it is quite resource intensive and there is no SDT 
in terms of relaxing procedural requirements.400 Furthermore as all other remedy tools this 
one is no less politically sensitive, which might be another reason for the reluctance to use it.  
From the argument of ‘enhancing welfare’, subsidised imports should be considered 
beneficial anyway, since they are cheaper, thus contributing to an aggregate gain in national 
economic welfare, while the effect of CVDs will be much like the effect of any other tariff 
and should therefore be considered equally damaging to the importing country’s economy.401  
Coppens advocates for a non-challengeable, green light category of domestic subsidies, 
which he believes are more essential at least in later stages of development than export 
subsidies, although he thinks there is also space for export subsidies, especially in terms of 
battling market failures while ‘budgetary restraints might de facto prevent governments from 
overly subsidizing their exporting sector or entering into subsidy wars’.402 Hoekman et al. 
propose the reactivation of the green light status of research and development (R&D) 
subsidies for developing countries that would go beyond the current Art.8 rule which allows 
R&D subsidies aimed at inventing new product, and that would also allow subsidies 
supporting firms to discover which existing products could be produced domestically at 
competitive prices.403   
However despite the predominant belief that domestic subsidies are more essential for 
development than export subsidies, it has been shown that selective interventions with export 
subsidies to enable export diversification are useful for low-income countries, especially to 
overcome market failures related to inducing self-discovery as well as other market failures 
which are more prevalent in developing countries and particularly in the trading sector.404 
Rodrik is a firm believer in export subsidies and claims that their prohibition may prevent 
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developing countries from adopting the same strategies for as were followed by the Asian 
Tigers.405  
At the moment the SDT is too restrictive as export competitiveness is measured in terms of 
the product having reached a share of at least 3.25% in world trade of that product in two 
consecutive years, which is too short to neutralize increased market shares due to short-term 
fluctuations in the market.406 Furthermore re-inclusion should be allowed if exports fall back 
under the 3.25%.407 Subsidies to enterprises or industries in difficulties might be warranted at 
least temporarily, in cases of enterprises having a dominant position in an undiversified 
market. 
Furthermore it is important to understand that those subsidies that are prohibited or actionable 
under the WTO rules, are not the only trade distorting subsidies and vice versa. 
Distinguishing between those that are allowed and those that are not on unconvincing 
grounds can create more undesirable then desirable effects. An important example can be 
seen in the case of energy subsidies, where those given for renewable energy have caused 
bigger controversies and a greater number of requested consultations and disputes at the 
WTO than fossil fuel subsidies, due to the current rules allowing the former while prohibiting 
the latter because of their discriminatory application, despite the fact that fossil fuel subsidies 
also lead to market distortions.  
Fossil fuel subsidies ‘encourage wasteful consumption, distort markets, impede investment in 
clean energy sources and undermine efforts to deal with climate change.’408 Fatih Birol, 
director of the International Energy Agency further claims that a phase-out of such subsidies 
could potentially avoid 2.6 gigatonnes of CO2 by 2035, which could provide around half the 
emissions reductions needed ‘to reach a trajectory that would limit global warming to 2C, 
considered the limit of safety by many scientists.’409 Furthermore neither the cost of global 
warming resulting from the use of fossil fuels, nor the cost to human health from particulate 
matter and air pollution are internalised by the polluters and thus emission externalization has 
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rightly been characterized by many as an implicit subsidy.410 In the Paris Climate Agreement, 
the G7 countries pledged a phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies by 2025, yet the WTO makes no 
plan for enforcing this. The US subsequently withdrawing from said Agreement furthermore 
does not indicate any positive steps in changing the status quo at the WTO. Currently, 
because these subsidies neither fulfil the conditions of prohibited nor actionable subsidies 
under the SCM Agreement they cannot be challenged at the WTO, even if it is a case of dual 
pricing, where a lower price is set for domestic consumption than the price charged for 
exported fuel. Pascal Lamy has rightly noted that fossil-fuel subsidy reform and renewable 
energy incentives are two of the most important contemporary challenges, however the 
‘discussion on the reform of fossil-fuel subsidies has largely bypassed the WTO.’411  It is thus 
not surprising that fossil fuel subsidies average 400-600 billion US dollars annually 
worldwide while renewable energy subsidies amounted to 66 billion in 2010 and are 
predicted to rise to 250 billion annually by 2035.412  
The below graph shows the absurdity of the situation. 413 
 
The WTO’s ‘plan’ in terms of climate change mitigation is merely removing trade barriers to 
environmental goods and services, thereby lowering their prices and making it ‘easier’ for 
countries to move towards climate-friendly alternatives from carbon intensive technologies. 
In this context a group of WTO Members are negotiating an Environmental Goods 
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Agreement to lower their trade barriers on a number of important environmental products. 
The second part of WTOs plan in combating climate change is merely allowing for 
exceptions to its rules, when the Members voluntarily decide to pursue legitimate 
environmental policy goals, ‘keeping protectionism firmly in check’414 however, to prevent 
countries from using measures for environmental protection simultaneously as a tool to 
pursue economic development (see detailed discussion in Chapter VI). Arguably this goes 
against the goal claimed by the WTO which is to create a ‘virtuous circle of trade and 
environmental policies which promote sustainable production and consumption while being 
pro-growth and development’; a system in which ‘trade, development and environmental 
agendas complement each other’.415 It is further this effort of preventing any advantage from 
being given to domestic producers, which allows renewable energy programmes to be 
continuously brought to the DSM. These have included a Canadian feed-in tariff program 
guaranteeing certain prices to renewable energy facilities; the Indian Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Solar Mission Program, providing benefits to solar power generators; a number of 
US states’ and local incentives for renewable energy; Chinese grants, funds or awards to 
enterprises manufacturing wind power equipment or silicon solar panels and solar glass; as 
well as some EC renewable energy measures.416 The reason for the challengeability of these 
programs is that they are conditioned upon the use of domestic inputs, potentially violating a 
number of WTO provisions, such as GATT Art. III:4, TRIMS Art. 2.1 and the SCM 
Agreement. The most recent case at the DSM has resulted in a US victory over India 
regarding its domestic content requirements concerning solar cells and/or modules used to 
generate solar power in the initial phases of its ongoing National Solar Mission.417 In the 
dispute India argued that the domestic content requirement measures are justified under Art. 
XX(d) of the GATT, on the grounds that they secure India's compliance with laws or 
regulations requiring it to take steps to promote sustainable development. India submitted that 
its ‘international law obligations … embodied in various international instruments’ are: (a) 
the Preamble of the WTO Agreement; (b) the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change; (c) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; and (d) the 
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United Nations General Assembly Resolution adopting the Rio+20 Document: The Future 
We Want, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2012.418 However, the Panel 
considered that international agreements may constitute ‘laws or regulations’ within the 
meaning of Art. XX(d) only insofar as they are rules that have ‘direct effect’ in, or otherwise 
form part of, the domestic legal system of the Member concerned and that the instruments 
identified by India did not meet that standard.419 Therefore, the Panel found that India failed 
to demonstrate that the challenged measures were justified under Art. XX(d). In other words 
the Panel did not allow for sustainable development commitments to trump the liberalisation 
commitments. In the words of one researcher: ‘[t]he existence of domestic content 
requirements in renewable energy programs is likely a political condition for passage by 
governments that wish to show that they are not subsidizing foreign investors.’420 And why 
should they not be allowed to gear the necessary expenses for converting from a carbon 
economy to a green economy towards the growth of their own industry at the same time? As 
Bill Waren, senior trade analyst at Friends of the Earth, remarks, it is ‘reasonable’ that India 
would provide some preferences for local producers of solar energy in this process. Such 
common sense however, unfortunately means nothing in the legal framework of the WTO 
and because of the status quo, instead of investing into green energy innovating, $700 billion 
have been invested by companies in 2014 looking for new fossil fuels, even though climate 
change will reach catastrophic levels if we burn as much as slightly above one fifth of the 
fossil fuels already dug out of the ground. It is important to note, that India is not one of the 
countries negotiating for an Environmental Goods Agreement. It prefers to protect its 
industry and it furthermore perceives this sectoral agreement as merely another cherry 
picking by developed countries for liberalisation in sectors where they are strong, so that 
there is nothing left to negotiate on in terms of the DDA in favour of developing countries’.421   
Current rules regulating the subsidisation of energy provide a good example of why an 
enforceable right to economic development is needed in the system. Bringing into the 
equation a broad interpretation of said right, the current rules would have to drastically and 
quickly change. The current level of development attained by most developed countries is to 
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a large extent thanks to a vast degradation of the environment globally, not just in said 
countries.  
Unfortunately, climate change is not karma which would come back and punish strictly those 
who have created the most pollution. All the models of climate change suggest that 
developing countries in the equatorial regions of the world will be hit the most, greatly 
affecting not just their possibilities for development, but their bare livelihoods. And the only 
‘punishment’ for the developed world will be when billions of people from the affected 
regions start migrating North for survival because they will no longer have a place to live, 
there will be no water and their agricultural systems will be gone. Incorporating and 
enforcing the right to development (RTD) at the WTO should take all such questions into 
equation when evaluating current rules. Currently in the development debate historical 
injustices which have led to the status quo are being ignored.422 An enforceable RTD would 
hopefully bring them all back on the discussion table. One of the ways it could do that is by 
declaring the current subsidy rules to be incompatible with the RTD in the sense that they are 
against the use of certain industrial policies aimed at encouraging economic development but 
also in the sense that they perpetuate global warming by encouraging fossil fuel consumption 
and thus inflict disproportionate harm on LDCs. Furthermore WTO intellectual property 
rules, as much as they inhibit the transfer and dissemination of carbon-reducing, ‘green’ 
technologies, to developing countries, could further be declared against the RTD for both 
above mentioned reasons. As in every other area, IP protection here can function as an 
incentive for research, development, but it may also severely limit the transfer and 
dissemination of these technologies to developing countries (see chapter V for general 
discussion). All these rules would thus have to be revised or exceptions to them allowed in 
the context of enforcing the RTD.  
 
10. Is There Still Enough Policy Space for Development? 
On the question of the amount of policy space left for a meaningful pursuit of development, 
let us look at one example, i.e. that of the automotive industry in Thailand and Malaysia. It is 
evident that many of the tools heavily used by these two countries in the past to promote the 
domestic production of vehicles and vehicle components are now prohibited, however other 
tools which are still allowed have been used since. However the growth in Malaysia has since 
stagnated while Thailand has become one of the leading countries in automotive producing. 
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In the 1960s both countries were in the repair business importing completely built up vehicles 
(CBU).423 To move into local automotive assembly industry in collaboration with foreign 
capital and to develop local content manufacturing for the industry Thailand at first used 
higher tariffs on CBU vehicles than on completely knocked down kits (CKD).424 These tariffs 
kept rising until an import ban was put on CBU passenger vehicles under 2300 cc and a 
300% tariff on such vehicles over 2300 cc.425 Thailand further used LCR with a peak of 72% 
in 1994 and mandatory deletion programmes, forcing smaller assemblers unable to meet the 
conditions out of the market.426 Shifting its policies to become WTO-compliant, Thailand 
later picked two products (pick-up trucks and Eco-cars) and provided tariff exemptions and 
tax incentives for consumers, parts suppliers and assemblers regardless of whether they were 
foreign or domestic, however under the Eco-cars scheme it linked these incentives to local 
content requirements in 4 out of 5 most important components. These policies are TRIMS 
compliant.427  
Malaysia similarly used mandatory deletion programmes (MDPs) and high tariffication of 
passenger vehicles, however unlike Thailand it also established 2 joint ventures, i.e. 
Malaysian national car, Proton, between state-owned enterprise and Mitsubishi Motors 
Corporation and Mitsubishi Corporation as well as Perodua, between Malaysian Firms and 
Daihatsu Motor.428 Malaysia further gave US$ 22 million in subsidies to Proton to create 
greater linkages with the domestic high-tech component manufacturers as well as supporting 
industry drastically increasing the numbers of domestic supplier firms.429 It further gave 50% 
discount on excise duties and low interest subsidised loans for the purchase of national cars 
for public servants, possibly in violation of SCM rules.430 To be WTO-compliant, Malaysia 
lowered tariffs, removed preferential tariff rates on CKD and preferential excise duties for 
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national producers and abolished LCRs and MDPs.431 However it implemented a new excise 
duty system linking refunds to the local content ratio and it further gave subsidies based on 
this ratio, while providing low interest loans to component manufacturers to enable them to 
merge and thus survive the effects of the reduction of tariffs.432 
As mentioned above, Malaysia’s automotive industry has remained more or less at the same 
level of exports since 2002, while Thailand has seen unprecedented rapid growth in vehicle 
exports. Before declaring it a success story, however, it is important to know that 90% of 
Thailand’s market share is made up of Japanese producers433 and the component makers are 
also predominantly Japanese, whereas there has not been much upgrading of the technology 
and efficiency of domestic suppliers.434 In Malaysia Proton and Perodua still have leading 
positions on the market and the component suppliers are predominantly domestic, however 
they are still having problems in meeting international standards.435  
While Thailand’s ability to attract FDI has been praised one can question the ultimate 
usefulness of such investment if it brings little development to domestic component 
manufacturers. In this respect one has to distinguish between measuring economic 
performance by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Income (GNI). GDP 
measures the value of all goods/services created within a state, while GNI measures income 
which stays within a country or is imported into it by its nationals, but not income exported 
out of the economy by MNCs.436 If production in a state is dominated by foreign MNCs with 
little trickle-down to local business and the state is home to a few investors with offshore 
activities, its GNI will leg significantly behind its GDP. In such a situation, GDP is an over-
optimistic indicator of the state’s economic performance.437 Furthermore if tomorrow 
conditions for investment are even better in another country the MNCs can pack up their 
business and leave with little left behind.  
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Both countries would have been better off keeping LCRs and MDPs however coupled with 
WTO-compliant tax incentives and more importantly R&D investment in the components 
industry and investment conditionalities demanding the sharing of technology by the foreign 
assemblers. One of the biggest obstacles for Proton’s development has been its reliance on 
Mitsubishi for technology in a TRIPS-compliant manner. Mitsubishi’s high licensing fees and 
a reluctance to share latest technologies438 forced Proton to search for access to such 
technologies elsewhere at high expenses and with unsuccessful results in order to avoid 
TRIPs non-compliant activities.439 This brings us to the questions of IP protection and 
arguably one of the biggest problems posed by the WTO to developing countries’ policy 
space, i.e. the protection of intellectual property under the WTO, discussed in chapter V.  
Although some studies have doubted the positive impact of LCRs on economic growth 
generally440 one should not over-generalize. Certainly all circumstances have to be taken into 
account, such as how much restrictions can a country put on FDI before it starts jeopardising 
its entry into the market and what other measures it is taking to ensure the technological 
development of the component industries, before LCRs can have a good chance at spurring 
economic development and growth in the long run. Some have suggested that more useful 
than LCRs would be to directly subsidize the downstream industry or provide subsidies for 
FDI in this industry.441 However it is hard to find a justification as to why both approaches 
could not be taken at the same time, i.e., LCRs for FDI, coupled with direct subsidization and 
R&D in the downstream industry, which might give the best results. Furthermore, direct 
subsidisation of domestic manufacturers is not an economically feasible option for 
developing countries with limited resources.442  
In the opinion of Professor Rodrik, industrial policy is a ‘state of mind more than anything 
else’, meaning that as long as there is some policy space left, the instrument or modality of 
intervention is not essential, as long as one can identify which are the areas which necessitate 
intervention443 That being said, he also recognizes that ‘the pendulum between policy 
autonomy and international rules may have swung too far in the direction of the latter in 
recent trade rounds’ especially in terms of the SCM Agreement and its prohibition on export 
subsidies and the TRIPS Agreement’s prohibition of copying and reverse-engeenering (see 
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chapter V).444 In conclusion, there is still some policy space available for the pursuit of 
development and it goes without saying that it should be used wisely by developing 
countries. However the law of the WTO does overly restrict policy space in many aspects and 
there is further a tendency towards more restriction and lesser SDT. Furthermore the liberal 
narrative makes developing countries reluctant to use the remaining policy space, as does the 
fear of being brought before the DSM or suffering other repercussions. 
In other words the ladder is still there, however with only half the rungs remaining most of 
which are being slowly sawed off, while others will give you an electric shock if you step on 
them and you do not know which ones they are, and all the while there is someone standing 
next to the ladder telling you it is unwise to climb it at all.  
 
11. Limitations of SDT in Market Access for Developing Countries’ Products  
The analysis below turns to the question of market openings for goods of importance to 
developing countries. The current framework at least officially embraces an asymmetrical 
liberalisation where developed countries open up unilaterally without developing countries 
having to reciprocate, however this has proved to be far less ideal in practice than it sounds in 
theory.    
In 1964 the GATT adopted Part IV: Trade and Development, which was the first time it 
addressed development considerations in three new articles, XXXVI to XXXVIII.445 The 
Principles and Objectives elaborated on in Art. XXXVI recognize the wide gap between 
standards of living in less-developed countries and other countries and recall that the basic 
objective of the GATT is raising those standards and the progressive development of the 
economies of all contracting parties.446 They further recognize the essential need for 
individual and joint action to further the development of less-developed contracting parties 
and the need for international trade rules to be consistent with these objectives.447 The article 
elaborates on the need for the expansion of the export earnings of developing countries and to 
secure their share in the growth in international trade.448 This is to be achieved through more 
favourable and acceptable conditions of access to world markets for products of export 
interest to developing countries and the stabilization of these markets.449 Furthermore to 
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enable the necessary diversification of the economies of less-developed Members a need for 
increased access in the largest possible measure to markets under favourable conditions for 
processed and manufactured products from these countries is recognized.450 Also stressed is 
the need for close and continuing collaboration between the contracting parties and the 
international lending agencies so that they can contribute most effectively to alleviating the 
burdens the less-developed contracting parties assume in the interest of their economic 
development.451 Paragraph 8 states that ‘developed contracting parties do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs 
and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties’. However the adoption of 
measures to give effect to these principles and objectives shall be merely a matter of 
conscious and purposeful effort on the part of the contracting parties.452  
Art. XXXVII then states the commitment of developed countries to pursue these objectives 
and claims that they ‘shall to the fullest extent possible — that is, except when ‘compelling 
reasons’, which may include legal reasons, make it impossible — give effect to the 
following’: 
a) Accord high priority to the reduction and elimination of barriers to products of export interest to 
developing Members, including restrictions which differentiate unreasonably between products in their 
primary and in their processed forms. 
b) Refrain from introducing or increasing import barriers to such products 
c) According high priority to the reduction and elimination of fiscal measures which hamper the growth 
of consumption of primary products, in raw or processed form developing countries453 
 
The article further allows for the reporting of situations when it is considered that effect is not 
being given to any of these commitments454 followed by consultations, if requested, with the 
contracting party concerned and all interested parties with a view to reaching a satisfactory 
solution.455 
Developed country Members are also required to  make every effort, in cases where a government 
directly or indirectly determines the resale price of products from developing countries, to maintain 
trade margins at equitable levels456; give consideration to adopting measures designed to provide 
greater scope for the development of imports from these countries and collaborate in appropriate 
international action to this end457; and have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed 
contracting parties when considering the application of other measures permitted under this Agreement 
to meet particular problems and explore all possibilities of constructive remedies before applying such 
measures where they would affect essential interests of those contracting parties.458 
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Also, these articles are littered with declaratory, best endeavour statements, such as ‘making 
every effort’ or ‘having special regard to’ rather than obligatory provisions and as such do not 
appear to trigger any legal obligation. Apart from the ability to report and request 
consultations there is no enforcement mechanism backed by effective sanctions. It is 
therefore doubtful if these articles have affected the policies of developed countries in any 
significant way at all.459   
However, here also, an interpretation has been suggested that would give mandate to the 
GATT parties to act towards the objectives of increasing trade from developing countries, as 
it would be unreasonable or ‘manifestly absurd’ to suppose that the parties intended no legal 
obligations to flow from the addition of an entire part to a treaty.460 Yet it has also been 
acknowledged that any claim to give more legal force to the provisions of Part IV may seem 
spurious, considering how little relevance it has had to date and states’ practice is unlikely to 
evolve for political reasons, not to mention that during the drafting of Part IV, it was not 
considered ‘binding’.461 At the same time it would be premature to shelve these provisions 
entirely, since some renewed interest has appeared on the part of China raising development 
arguments under Part IV in recent disputes.462 
Another problem is that regardless of the nature of the commitments, these can be 
disregarded for ‘compelling reasons’ which includes the option of simply legislating against 
them in domestic legal systems.  
It is also important to note, that although recognizing and covering many important 
considerations for development for the first time since the failure of the ITO Charter, these 
provisions remained subordinate to a narrow perspective on trade liberalization.463 In effect, 
developing countries did not gain any additional opportunity to derogate from GATT 
obligations for developmental reasons or a duty for developed countries to make additional 
concessions to them, however it did include for the first time, the principle of non-reciprocity 
(see below).464 
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a) Limited Reciprocity  
At the insistence of developing countries that they were unable to make the same level of 
concessions as their developed counterparts, non-reciprocity was introduced. In the Tokyo 
round this meant that the new agreements would only bind those parties that specifically 
opted into them, thus giving developing countries more flexibility. They were thus able to 
retain policy space, for example in government procurement. However this flexibility came at 
a price, i.e. developing countries could also not gain important concessions, as in the logic of 
the mercantilist GATT/WTO ‘getting something for nothing is not really an option, which 
strips non-reciprocity of its value as a flexibility instrument.’465 The same system with the 
same problems seems to be the way forward after the last ministerial re-introduced variable 
geometry in terms of Members’ obligations. The other aspect of non-reciprocity are 
generalized system of preferences schemes described below.  
 
b) Generalized System of Preferences  
A mixture between allowing policy space while still opening up foreign markets for 
developing country products is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which allows 
for the exemption from the more general rules of the WTO, such as the most favoured nation 
principle for the purpose of lowering tariffs for developing countries without lowering them 
also for rich countries. Arguably the best SDT in principle, it nevertheless proved less than 
ideal in practice due to its several limitations. 
The concept of preferential tariff rates for developing countries in the markets of 
industrialized countries was first introduced in 1964 by Raul Prebisch, the first Secretary-
General of the UNCTAD at its first session and adopted in New Delhi in 1968 at UNCTAD 
II under the title of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) with the objective of increasing 
the export earnings, industrialization and economic growth of developing countries.466 The 
UNCTAD observed that the MFN rule had been discouraging richer countries from reducing 
tariffs or other trade restrictions for developing countries because they would then have to do 
the same for everyone else. 
In 1971, ‘recognizing that a principal aim of the contracting parties is promotion of the trade 
and export of developing countries for the furtherance of their economic development’ and 
‘recalling that at the Second UNCTAD, unanimous agreement was reached in favour of the 
early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
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discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries’467 the GATT enacted two 
waivers to the MFN principle which permitted that ‘without prejudice to any other Article of 
the General Agreement, the provisions of Article I shall be waived for a period of ten years to 
the extent necessary to permit developed contracting parties… to accord preferential tariff 
treatment to products originating in developing countries and territories with a view to 
extending to such countries and territories generally the preferential tariff treatment… 
without according such treatment to like products of other contracting parties.’  
Later, the Contracting Parties decided to adopt the 1979 Enabling Clause,468 entitled 
"Differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of 
developing countries", creating a permanent waiver to the most-favoured-nation clause to 
allow preference-giving countries to grant preferential tariff treatment under their respective 
GSP schemes. The enabling clause was seen as the first instance of ‘real’ preferential 
treatment for developing countries, even though it was expected that they would ‘reciprocate 
appropriately’ for it in future rounds.469 
As the name suggests, this ‘enables’ developed countries to provide preferences but does not 
oblige them to do so. The fact that these schemes can be withdrawn with no consequences for 
the developed countries which are providing them, has given these countries the power to 
manipulate such schemes ‘to secure desirable outcomes for the importer rather than the 
intended beneficiary, the exporter.’470 Similarly to aid, the threat of removal of GSP schemes 
has been used to pressure developing countries into accepting duties they otherwise would 
not have accepted. In this manner the US has threatened to remove its preference for states 
that do not apply TRIPS plus standards.471 As Rolland observes, the cost of playing the GSP 
card has been substantial for developing countries both in terms of their bargaining power 
within GATT/WTO and the impact of these schemes on their domestic policies.472 
Developed countries can further put requirements on any preferences granted and these 
requirements discriminate between developing countries sometimes in a very controversial 
way. For example the way the EC accorded tariff preferences based on the recipient country 
(i) combating drug production and trafficking and (ii) their protection of labour rights and the 
environment; denying it to all other developing countries. This was however successfully 
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challenged by India at the DSM where the Appellate Body concluded that, in granting 
differential tariff treatment, preference-granting countries are required, by virtue of the term 
‘non-discriminatory’, to ensure that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated 
GSP beneficiaries, that is, to all GSP beneficiaries that have the same ‘development, financial 
and trade needs’ to which the treatment in question is intended to respond.473 
There are currently 13 national GSP schemes notified to the UNCTAD secretariat. For 
example, the EU sets out its GSP schemes in ten-year cycles. Currently 176 developing 
countries and transitional economies are included in its Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
(EU GSP). Out of these, 101 countries fall under the standard EU GSP scheme, which offers 
a partial or entire removal of tariffs on two thirds of all product categories; 16 countries are 
included in the GSP+, which offers a full removal of tariffs on essentially the same product 
categories, based on the willingness of the benefiting country to ratify and implement 
international conventions relating to human and labour rights, environment and good 
governance; while 49 LDCs are benefiting from the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, 
which grants duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access to all products, except for arms and 
ammunitions.474 Other countries granting GSP preferences are: Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Estonia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey 
and the US.475  
It is important to note however that the preferences have little impact on the beneficiaries if 
their main exports already have duty-free access. With tariffs falling rapidly in general, 
DFQF access does not present as much benefits as would improvements in tackling non-tariff 
barriers such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, safeguards 
and the above mentioned rules of origin.476 Even more importantly, LDCs cannot benefit if 
their main exports do not enjoy duty-free access already, but are nevertheless left out of the 
preference schemes. The LDCs portfolio of exports is normally very limited, therefore a less 
than 100% coverage ‘is of little practical use’.477 The EBA is a welcome departure from the 
normal practice of states excluding goods of the greatest interest to developing Members 
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from GSP schemes, however even this scheme used exclusions for a long period of time.478 It 
set out to cover at least 97% of the tariff line items from LDCs to have DFQF access by 2008, 
however implementation was stalled because agreement could not be reached on the 
determination of the 3% which would be excluded.479 Even with only a 3% exclusion, large 
volumes of LDC exports can be precluded from enjoying preferential access, since their 
exports are not diversified, especially if the designating of the 3% is specific to each LDC, 
rather than applying it across the board to all of them.480 Similarly the US excluded 3% of 
tariff lines for each country differently. This has been dubbed the ‘EBP’ or ‘everything but 
what LDCs produce’ initiative, since agricultural products, processed food and textiles could 
all be excluded.481 For example in the case of Bangladesh, the 3% exclusion could cover its 
top twelve tariff lines exported to the US which accounted for 59.7% of the total value of its 
exports to this country; for Cambodia this would be 62% of its trade to the US.482  
For those LDCs with exports that could substantially benefit from the schemes another 
obstacle has been posed by the cumbersome rules of origin (RoO). These determine whether 
goods from LDCs may or may not enjoy preferential treatment based on how much 
processing has to actually happen in a LDC for a good to qualify. The RoO of particular 
countries determine the criteria differently and they pose substantial administrative and 
compliance costs on the LDCs in terms of proving that the production of the product took 
place in a LDC thus they have been suspected to be the main cause of the low percentage of 
requests (only 50% of non-ACP LDCs) for preferential access to the EU under the EBA.483. 
LDCs have long been demanding that RoO be harmonized and made more flexible. As 
mentioned above, the Bali package addressed both the rules of origin and the percentage of 
goods covered in the preference schemes, however in both instances developed countries 
were again only urged to make necessary reforms, with no actual obligation to do so. It was 
promised that those developed countries that do not yet provide DFQF market access for at 
least 97% of tariff lines exported from LDCs, ‘shall seek to improve’ their existing coverage, 
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whereas developing countries, declaring themselves in a position to do so, ‘shall seek to 
provide’ DFQF market access for such products, or if they are already providing it ‘shall seek 
to improve’ their existing coverage.  
Members were instructed to notify their DFQF schemes pursuant to the Transparency 
Mechanism for Preferential Trade Arrangements and The Committee on Trade and 
Development would continue to annually review the steps taken and report to the General 
Council for appropriate action, while the Secretariat would prepare a report on DFQF access 
for LDCs based on their notifications. The General Council was further instructed to report, 
including any recommendations, on the implementation of this Decision to the next 
Ministerial Conference. Thus apart from the procedural improvements and a call to those that 
have not yet provided a 97% DFQF access, to do so, the commitment was not extended to the 
100% necessary to make a substantial difference.  
Nairobi on the other hand brought an important progress in terms of RoO, allowing 75% of 
the final value of export products to contain materials not originating from a LDC to still 
qualify for preferential treatment and furthermore introducing relaxed administrative 
requirements. Most importantly preference-giving Members also agreed to grant standard 
preferential treatment, finally addressing the problem of variable preference giving.484 
Current GSP schemes hardly make full use of the potential provided by the GSP waivers, 
however in the opinion of UNCTAD itself ‘Even the most generous market access 
enhancements alone may not be sufficient to strengthen the links between trade and 
development in the poorest countries in the world.’ 485 This is mainly due to supply-side 
factors, rather than limitations on market access which resulted from the longterm existence 
of unfair rules and three to four times higher tariffs imposed on low-income developing 
country exports. 
A study of potential gains from expanded country and product coverage, as well as a 
deepening of the preferences (where the preferential rate is non-zero) has estimated an overall 
increase in LDC exports to the markets it analysed at 2.9 per cent, with important variations 
across these markets.  
For example, in the Canadian and EU markets the increase is very small but positive. This is 
also the case for China, where the rates facing LDCs are very low on average. However, 
LDCs could make important increases in exports to the Indian, Korean and US markets – 
21.7 percent, 12.9 per cent and 11.8 percent, respectively – a combined increase of over 
US$5 billion. With regard to the US market, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Haiti stand to gain 
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the most as they currently face MFN tariffs on a substantial proportion of their textiles and 
clothing exports. Malawi would also benefit (mainly tobacco). There are few losses (less than 
2 percent), notably for Lesotho and Madagascar, most likely linked to trade diversion in 
textiles and clothing to Asian LDCs. 
 
In short, there is still much to be gained if developed countries improve the existing market 
access by completely eliminating tariffs for LDCs products. The impact would be even great 
if non-tariff measures affecting access were also addressed.486 These results are similar to 
those of other recent studies487 and indicate that there is still much to be gained by improving 
the existing market access for LDCs products, however this would have to be coupled also 
with addressing the non-tariff measures affecting the access. 
 
Conclusion 
Negotiations between countries have always brought results in line with the interests of the 
most powerful among them. At the WTO one can however further talk about the better 
organized, better represented and more consistent states versus the seemingly more confused, 
mislead, under-represented and unorganized ones. Despite coalitions being formed at the 
WTO, there is still not enough unity between developing countries at the negotiations. This is 
hardly surprising in situations where larger and stronger developing countries do not share 
the same interests or concerns with smaller low-income countries; however this is not always 
the reason for a lack of unity.  
For example, at the 8th Ordinary Annual Meeting of the Conference of African Union 
Ministers of Trade held in Addis Abeba, a declaration was issued which strongly objected to 
‘any attempt to link non-trade issues or add new issues to the DDA, before development 
issues such as agriculture (including cotton), LDC issues, SDT and implementation related 
concerns are satisfactorily addressed and the DDA is fully exhausted and successfully 
concluded’. The declaration, wholly agreed to by African countries in preparation for the Bali 
Ministerial, was outright ignored at Bali, where the same countries accepted a package that 
clearly runs counter to the declaration, not to mention what happened with the DDA at 
Nairobi.488 At least where their interests conform, developing countries should strive to be 
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more prepared to put up a unified front against undesirable rules and for the achievement of 
what they want to get out of the negotiations. Before developing countries can stand as one at 
the WTO, however, they need to set firm development agendas at home. As one commentator 
describes:  
Lack of institutionalisation of trade policy by African countries is also a great setback to 
efforts by Africa to remain on point as far as trade negotiations are concerned. As 
developed countries and blocs of countries like the US and the EU have trade policy 
entrenched in their development agenda and so whether governments, ministers and 
negotiators change or not keep to their ‘regional or national strategies’ African countries 
keep vacillating or at best change their policies at will depending on who is in 
control.489 
 
All that being said, it is questionable whether better organised, stronger and more consistent 
developing countries’ coalitions could have made any significant difference considering the 
above mentioned threat by the developed countries to abandon the enterprise altogether when 
developing counties’ coalitions demand too much.  
Current results of the negotiations clearly show a lack of meaningful SDT for developing 
countries which would have safeguarded the necessary policy space for their development, 
their pursuit of diversification and to be able to venture out of their current comparative 
advantage into more technologically advanced and beneficial areas. At the same time 
allowance is still made for developed countries’ protectionism while past and present 
constraints placed on external market access against developing countries reveal the profit 
maximising approach to negotiations rather than a desire to provide for meaningful 
opportunities for developing countries to pursue export-led development. 
This goes to the heart of the legitimacy gap claim of this thesis both in terms of the lack of 
democratic legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of substantive rules, both of which are 
inevitably and intrinsically linked to one another. 
 
                                                            
489 Ibid, p. 8. 
178 
 
All Our Patents Are Belong to You1 
 
Chapter V 
THE ILLEGITIMACY OF IP PROTECTION  





Technological capabilities of a country determine its level of industrialisation, success in 
export activity and the sophistication of the production and export structures.2 In other words 
‘a prerequisite for sustainable development in any country is the development of an 
indigenous scientific and technological capacity.’3 One cannot stress enough the importance 
of the possession of superior knowledge when it comes to true development, especially in the 
current world economy. There are several determinants of successful technological capability 
building. Arguably the main reason for the wide gap between the scientific and technological 
capabilities of states is their availability of resources to support research and development 
(R&D). The US remains the world’s largest R&D investor with around $465 billion spending 
in 2014, which equals around 2.8% of US GDP.4 Not only is manufacturing innovation 
directly being subsidised5 but spillovers of innovation and technology from other areas, such 
as the US defence industry, the largest benefiter of investment into research, have long 
benefited civilian industries such as information technology and aviation.6 China has recently 
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surpassed Japan for the number two position in funding R&D aiming at a 2.2% of GDP 
investment by 2015.7 Together with the EU, they spend nearly 80% of the total $1.6 trillion 
invested in R&D around the world.8 Needless to say, most developing countries cannot 
compete with such investments. Another very important element in building scientific and 
technological capabilities is of course education, which is also largely dependent on the 
availability of resources of states. Last but not least, however, the ability of developing 
countries to progress technologically and eventually catch up with developed countries is 
dependent both on the industrial policy still allowed as well as the international intellectual 
property (IP) regimes in place.  
When opening their domestic markets to trade, developing countries exposed themselves to 
political and economic pressure to protect foreign IP, which has resulted in the ‘odd scenario 
of developing countries financing not just or primarily their own growth, but promoting the 
economic growth of developed countries, possibly to the detriment of their own economic 
development.9 The cost of paying royalties and licensing fees that intellectual property rights 
(IPR) protection requires for the use of IP, may more than offset gains in potential to increase 
foreign direct investment (FDI).10 Three main negative points of over-protecting IP is that it 
drains developing countries’ scarce resources; renders cutting-edge technologies inaccessible 
and prevents the development of local industries.11 The Marrakesh Agreement establishing 
the WTO included in its single undertaking the controversial Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) with important implications for developing 
countries in various aspects, including their technological advancement.  
This chapter critically examines whether intellectual property protection under the WTO 
negatively affects essential policy space necessary for technological development, including 
technology transfer and whether this contributes to WTO’s legitimacy gap. The chapter 
outlines how the TRIPS Agreement has substantially strengthened IP protection and what this 
means for the policy space of developing countries in their pursuit of technological 
advancement and the upgrade of their productive structure. It analyses the theory behind 
strong IP protection domestically and internationally and evaluates its main claims in terms 
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of benefits to innovation and technology transfer (TT). It further looks at the history of IP 
protection in order to highlight the fact that much like free trade, countries have introduced 
stronger protection of IP mostly after a certain level of development had already been 
achieved, whereas the protection of foreigners’ IP rights had been delayed for even longer. 
The chapter considers the different channels of potential technology transfers and aims to 
evaluate how IP protection impacts each of them and whether the positive impacts on some 
channels justify the negative impacts on others or whether developing countries should be 
essentially left alone to devise their own IP strategies instead of the WTO imposing a strict 
and non-discriminatory IP protection scheme on them. Finally it looks at whether the 
flexibilities under TRIPS can help developing countries regain necessary policy space. 
The main argument is that historically, theoretically and empirically speaking IP protection 
can have opposite effects on innovation and technology transfer, depending on several factors 
and it is essential for developing countries to retain maximum flexibility in applying a policy 
which suits their particular situations. Taking away such policy space with the TRIPS 
Agreement thus unnecessarily curtails the ability of pursuing economic development and can 
be perceived as adding to WTO’s legitimacy gap. Furthermore the negotiations and the 
events leading up to them show the absolutely undemocratic origins and nature of the push 
for the intellectual property protection at the WTO which was based solely on special 
interests in developed countries.   
 
1. The TRIPS Agreement  
The TRIPS Agreement has become one of the most important agreements of the WTO, even 
though its predecessor GATT contained only a few IP provisions.12 TRIPS encompasses 
almost all types of intellectual property rights (IPR) from copyright and related rights, 
trademarks, geographic indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs (topographies) 
of integrated circuits, and the protection of undisclosed information.13 Yet the ‘biggest money 
in intellectual property is in the protection of inventions, via patents, sought by companies in 
technology, bio-technology, pharmaceuticals and related fields.’14 It is exactly this part of 
                                                            
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187 Can.T.S. 1947 No. 27 (entered 
into force January 1, 1948) (hereinafter GATT), Art. XX(d), XII.3(iii), XVIII.10, IX.6. 
13 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C (hereinafter TRIPS), Art. 9-39; however, authors’ moral 
rights, utility model protection, and protection against unfair competition are left to individual Members’ 
legislation.  
14 L. Crump and D. Druckman, 'Turning Points in Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property', 17 
International Negotiation, (2012), p.12. 
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intellectual property rights protected by TRIPS and other laws and agreements that is most 
relevant to technological development and will be the focus here.  
TRIPS introduced so-called minimum standards of protection, which have significantly 
strengthened IPRs in comparison to previous international treaties such as the Paris 
Convention for the Protecting of Industrial Property (1883) or the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886). Under the Paris Convention, countries were 
allowed to determine the duration of patents and they could also revoke them, plus they could 
exclude chosen fields of technology from protection. TRIPS has drastically restricted policy 
space – precluding or at least seriously complicating the use of many instruments historically 
used to manage knowledge and technology.15 With TRIPS there has been a widening of 
exclusive rights; the extension of duration of protection, i.e. at least 20 years counted from 
the filing date; a legal recognition of the patentee’s exclusive rights to import the patented 
products; a strengthening of the enforcement mechanism; patent rights are enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced; virtually all fields of technology have become patentable, 
including such areas as software, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, chemicals, food, and micro 
organisms where most developing countries previously used to provide no or little patent 
protection; and new restrictions have been placed on the state’s ability to issue compulsory 
licences.16 Furthermore it has brought a number of new obligations in relation to geographical 
indications, trade secrets, and measures governing how IP rights should be enforced both 
domestically and at national borders. The increase in IP protection after TRIPS was 
especially sharp in developing countries, which generally were given until 2000 to comply 
with the Agreement.17 In the case of least developed countries (LDCs), these were granted a 
far longer implementation period, firstly set as ending on 1st January 2006, but later extended 
to July 2013, and until 1 January 2016 for pharmaceutical patents. Further extensions were 
granted in 2015 postponing the obligation to implement patents for pharmaceuticals until 
January 2033. On the other hand the general special and differential treatment (SDT) 
transition periods were not just too short, but the US furthermore pressurised and threatened 
developing countries to forego them and accelerate implementation as well as to forego other 
policy measures still allowed by TRIPS, such as compulsory licensing. Thus countries, 
                                                            
15 K. C. Shadlen, ‘Resources, Rules and International Political Economy: the Politics of Development in the 
WTO’ in S. Joseph et al., eds., World Trade Organisation and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
(Edward Elgar, 2009), p. 117. 
16 C. M. Correa, ‘Patent Rights’ in C. M. Correa and A. A. Yusuf (eds.) Intellectual Property and International 
Trade: The TRIPS Agreement, 2nd edn., (Kluwer, p. 2008), pp. 227, 229. 
17 TRIPS, Art. 65(4). 
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although not in breach of TRIPS, were still subject to penalties for not adapting ‘TRIPS Plus’ 
regimes.18 
Furthermore since the adoption of TRIPS continuing efforts by the IP lobby have been 
pushing for further international harmonisation through the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) and stronger standards of protection, i.e. ‘TRIPS Plus’ standards or 
even higher, through bilateral and regional negotiations on intellectual property agreements, 
free trade agreements and investment treaties  attempting to conform patent law of the 
ratifying countries to the standards in force in the USA, and in some aspects arguably even 
stronger.19 One of the key elements of US bilateral agreements is a higher protection of 
pharmaceutical inventions where the conditions for compulsory licensing are stricter than 
under TRIPS.20 It has been suggested that further harmonization would be welcome through 
WIPO would at least discourage stricter US bilateral agreements, which due to the most 
favoured nation (MFN) principle than have a multilateral effect.21 While development within 
the WTO and WIPO sometimes show a certain sensitivity to the perceived needs of 
developing countries including broad exceptions to obtain permissions and licenses, the 
bilateral and regional trade agreements mirror the so-called maximalist approach.22 
These trends of strengthening IP protection make it increasingly difficult for today’s 
developing countries to adopt strategies for acquiring technical capabilities similar to those 
that were followed by countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan during their 
development.23 Furthermore the flow of royalties and licence fees from developing to 
developed countries has substantially increased, due to the vast differences in technology 
generation between countries.24 During the negotiations on TRIPS India, supported by other 
developing countries demanded that any principle or standard relating to IP rights was to be 
carefully tested against the needs of developing countries and it further highlighted the 
inappropriateness of focusing only on the protection of monopoly rights of IP holders when 
                                                            
18 Shadlen, supra note 15, p. 118. 
19 S. K. Sell, ‘The Geo-politics of the World Patent Order’, in F. M. Abbott, C. M. Correa, P. Drahos, (eds.), 
Emerging Markets and the World Patent Order, (Edward Elgar, 2013), p. 8; M. F. Jorge, ‘TRIPS-Plus 
Provisions in Trade Agreement and Their Potential Adverse Effects on Public Health’, 1 Journal of Generic 
Medicines, 2004), pp. 99-211; F. M. Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal Law’, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, 
Issue Paper No. 12, (UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2006). 
20 J. Strauss, ‘The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The Role of the Intellectual 
Property Rights System’, 15 European Law Review, (2007), p. 53. 
21 Ibid, p. 53. 
22 D. J. Gervais, ‘TRIPS and Development’, in Gervais, supra note 9. 
23 L. Kim, ‘The Dynamics of Technological Learning in Industrialisation’, UNU/INTECH Discussion Paper 
Series, (2000).  
24 N. Kumar, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of Asian 
Countries’, 38 Economic and Political Weekly, (2003), p. 222. 
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almost 99% of the patents were owned by industrialised nations.25 Although this was 
discussed at the negotiations, developing countries were eventually forced to drop their 
demands and accept, in the words of Bhagwati, the legitimation of the WTO ‘to extract 
royalty payments’ from the poor to the rich.26 Stiglitz agreed with Bhagwati in characterizing 
the efforts of including IPRs into the WTO as pure rent-seeking.27 
 
2.  TRIPS: Issues of Concern for Developing Countries 
The TRIPS Agreement is creating several grave problems for developing countries. For 
example it is affecting the right to health by raising the prices of essential drugs to levels 
unaffordable by poor people; it is negatively affecting the right to food by making it 
increasingly difficult for poor farmers to be self-reliant; it is allowing piracy of traditional 
knowledge, and furthermore the mere enacting of laws and the creation of necessary 
institutions and enforcement mechanisms for the protection of IPRs in poor countries cost 
them several million dollars.28 
The effect of TRIPS on the increase of drug prices has garnered perhaps the most attention 
and condemnation. TRIPS does allow for certain flexibilities, however a ‘combination of 
factors, namely the TRIPS Plus provisions introduced through free trade agreements, political 
pressure from developed countries though trade sanctions, and pressure from transnational 
pharmaceutical companies – either through protracted court proceedings, and or lobbying, 
have robbed the developing countries and the LDCs from exercising their rights under the 
TRIPS Agreement.’29 Furthermore through the practice known as evergreening (i.e. patent-
                                                            
25 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 7. 
26 J. Sundaram, ‘Analysis of TRIPS Agreement and the Justification of International IP Rights Protection in the 
WTO’s Multilateral Trading System, with Particular Reference to Pharmaceutical Patents’, 24 Information and 
Communications Technology Law, (2015), p. 127; J. Bhagwati, ‘Afterword: The Question of Linkage’, 96 
American Journal of International Law, (2002), p. 127; UNDP, Human Development Report 2005: 
International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World (United Nations, 
2005), p. 135 
27 J. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, (Norton, 2006), pp. 116-117. 
28 UNCTAD, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, (UNCTAD/ITE/1, 1996); for some of the 
research on the effects on public health see: H. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO – The Case of Patents 
and Access to Medicines, (Oxford University Press, 2007); M. Varella, ‘The WTO, Intellectual Property and 
Aids – Case Studies from Brazil and South Africa’, The Journal of World Intellectual Property, (2004); F. 
Abbott, ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the 
WTO’ Journal of International Economic Law, (2002); D. Matthews, ‘WTO Decision on Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to 
Essential Medicines Problem?’, 7 Journal of International Economic Law, (2004); ‘UN Economic and Social 
Council, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human 
Rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (27 June 2001); UNHCR Sub-Commission on Human Rights, ‘Intellectual 
property rights and human rights’, resolution 2000/7. 
29 Sundaram, supra note 26, p. 155; see also P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns 
the Knowledge Economy? (Earthscan, 2002), pp. 6-8. 
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layering or life-cycle management) some pharmaceutical companies effectively block the 
entry of generics into the market beyond the 20-year period.30 
While not denying the urgency of these issues which has brought them to the limelight and 
helped garner public outrage and support for reform, arguably in the long term there is 
another more important issue at stake, which is the impact of TRIPS on development itself. 
Because the impact on technological development is less evident and less immediate than for 
example the lack of sufficient food for survival during a famine or the lack of medicine 
during an outbreak of a deadly disease, it is harder to draw attention of the general public to it 
and easier to selectively present data in a manner that distort the real impact. 
As mentioned, it is the protection of inventions which is most relevant to technological 
development and is the main focus here, yet it needs to be mentioned that copyright may also 
affect access to knowledge and is particularly relevant in terms of access to academic 
journals, textbooks and increasingly software. For instance ‘a reasonable selection of 
academic journals is far beyond the purchasing budgets of university libraries in most 
developing countries.’31 Based on the three-step test enacted in the 1967 revision of the Berne 
Convention, TRIPS does allow for the limitations and exceptions to copyright in Art. 13: 
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the right holder. 
 
However there are concerns that certain forms of encryption designed to counter widespread 
copying from digital resources, will make the materials even less accessible for fair use 
purposes than it has applied to printed works, and ‘at the extreme may provide the equivalent 
of perpetual copyright protection, by technological rather than legal means.’32 This will have 
an additional negative impact on scientists and researchers in developing countries who 
already experience difficulties accessing printed media due to lack of resources.33 
 
3. Intellectual Property and Innovation 
Similarly to how the push for the liberalisation of developing countries was based on 
Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory, TRIPS was introduced based on the dogmatic 
theory that introducing ‘Western IP norms would induce development and not on actual 
                                                            
30 L. J. Glasgow, ‘Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone 
Too Far?’, 41 IDEA (2001), p. 227; J. Sundaram, ‘India’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Compliant Pharmaceutical Patent Laws: What Lessons for India and Other Developing Countries?’, 23 
Information and Communications Technology Law, (2014), pp.1-30. 
31 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, p. 17. 




supporting analyses or data. In other words, TRIPS put the policy cart before the empirical 
horse.’34 This theory and its controversies are thus analysed below. 
In essence IPRs confer an exclusive legal right on the owner to exploit them, and the 
monopoly over whether to allow licensing (and under what conditions) to third parties who 
may wish to exploit them. According to the mainstream economic theory IP protection is 
necessary for an optimal allocation of resources to invention and creation. Because to copy a 
product costs less than investing into inventing it and marketing it originally, lack of 
protection would lead to ‘market failure’ where the initial investment could not be 
recovered.35 This would take away the incentive to invest into research and development 
(R&D) unless a separate incentive would be provided by the government. A solution would 
be for the government to subsidise innovators until the costs of the subsidies equalled the 
benefits to society and to allow the dissemination of knowledge gained this way, at marginal 
cost.36 It is claimed that this is nearly impossible in practice, and thus IPRs are introduced as 
a second-best solution. A look at some of the most important innovations in the US in the 
past decades however reveals that the most risky and creative work is subsidised by the 
public for decades but then handed over to private corporations for marketing and profit 
protected by monopoly pricing rates.37 
However some have argued that such market failures are exaggerated and they would not 
happen in situations where the initial investment was not great. They also point out the fact 
that there would still exist an essential competitive advantage just by the fact that the initial 
investor is the first on the market.38 Arguably when it comes to basic innovations, which can 
be used in wide areas, a lack of patent protection, may cause the innovator to delay the 
disclosure of his discovery to get a head start in developing the applications of it before 
commercializing any product, which would in turn postpone the diffusion of the knowledge 
                                                            
34 Gervais, supra note 22, p. 28, referring to W. G Park and D. Lippoldt ‘International Licensing and the 
Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries, OECD Economic Studies, Executive 
Summary (OECD, 2005), p. 1. 
35 S. Martin and J. T. Scott, ‘The Nature of Innovation Market Failure and the Design of Public Support for 
Private Innovation’, 29 Research Policy, (2000), pp. 437-47; M. G. Colombo and M. Delmastro, ‘How effective 
are Technology Incubators? Evidence from Italy’, 31 Research Policy, (2002), pp. 1103-22. 
36 K. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, (Institute for International Economics, 2000), 
p. 30. 
37 N. Chomsky, ‘On contact: Noam Chomsky - Part II’, interview by Chris Hedges, (9.7.2017), available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkWVRlqzAMk, (last accessed, 20.7.2017). 
38 H. V. J. Moir, ‘What are the Costs and Benefits of Patent Systems?’, Working Paper, Centre for Governance 
of Knowledge and Development, (October, 2008); R. Posner, ‘Why There Are Too Many Patents in America’, 
The Atlantic, (12 July 2012); A. E. F. Schäffle, Die Nationalӧkonomiche Theorie der ausschliessenden 
Absatzverhältnisse, (Tübingen) (1867), p. 141, in F. Machlup and E. Penrose, ‘The Patent Controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century’, 10 The Journal of Economic History, (1950), p.18. 
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of the basic innovation and secondly withhold desirable products from the market.39 Still 
patents which are too broad do more harm than good in terms of development, as other 
parties are often more active or creative than the pioneer patent holder, while it is superior 
design, production, and marketing rather than strong patent protection which are the 
principal sources of profit, and the inventor has a natural lead time advantage in 
incorporating his or her own invention into the product or process.40 In any case, limiting 
imitation with high IP protection slows down the global rate of innovation, as expecting a 
slower loss of their technological advantages, firms which own the patent do not need to 
engage in further R&D.41 
The value of IP also depends on the industry in question. An important study from 1986 
revealed that IP protection had only been essential in the pharmaceutical industries, where it 
was shown that around 65% of pharmaceutical and 30% of chemical inventions would not 
have taken place but for patent protection, whereas in the case of most engineering industries, 
especially electrical and electronic goods and instruments, IPRs were not essential for 
bringing about inventions.42  
It is clear that IP protection can bring costs as well as benefits in terms of innovation. The 
costs of excluding people from valuable information via IP rights may take the form of a 
simple barrier to access to existing technology or it can take the form of another dynamic cost 
such as preventing follow-on innovation. If IP protection goes to extremes the costs outweigh 
the benefits in terms of social welfare.  
This leads to the conclusion that there exists a balance that would create an optimal level of 
IP protection.43 Parameters such as the length of protection should be limited at a point where 
longer protection would unduly stifle further innovation by non-rights holders. Ideally the 
length of patent protection would vary instead of being set uniformly, however due to 
asymmetry of information and inherent uncertainty of invention, the perfect length would be 
                                                            
39 C. Matutes, P. Regibeau, and K. Rockett, ‘Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations’, 27 RAND 
Journal of Economics, (1996), pp. 60-83. 
40 R. Merges and R. Nelson, ‘On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent 
Scope Decisions’, 25 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, (1994), pp. 1-24. 
41 J. A. Glass  and K. Saggi, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment’, 56 Journal of 
International Economics, (2002), pp.387-410; E. Helpman, ‘Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property 
Rights’, 61 Econometrica, (1993), pp. 1247-80  
42 E. Mansfield, ‘Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study’, 32 Management Science, (1986), pp. 173-181.  
43 P. Drahos, ‘″IP-World″ - Made by TNC Inc.’ in G. Krikorian and A. Kapczynski, (eds.), Access to Knowledge 
in the Age of Intellectual Property, (Zone Books, 2010), p. 198. 
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nearly impossible to determine in reality.44 TRIPS unfortunately sets the uniform length of 20 
years protection, which takes away the necessary flexibility for determining the right balance 
by individual countries according to their needs. In the words of Bhagwati, ‘few believe that 
the optimum [level of protection] extends as high as the 20-year patent rule that was forced 
into the World Trade Organization by the business lobbies.’45 Yet it should be acknowledged 
that the length is not always the problem but more the breadth of the patent which is not 
determined by TRIPS but left to Member parties’ interpretation. If the duration of a patent is 
too long but it is not overly broad, competitors can start ‘inventing around’.46    
Similarly, if a patent is too broad, that is, if it goes considerably beyond the claimed invention 
itself, it discourages subsequent innovation by other researches, whereas narrower claims will 
encourage others to ‘work around’ the patent, putting less restriction on further related 
research.47 Thus the former leads to the so-called ‘tragedy of anti-commons’ as opposed to 
the famous ‘tragedy of commons’.48 The granting of too many patents, or in other words 
patents for minor improvements of the product, can further unduly prolong monopolies. 
Despite the clearly mixed effects of IP protection on innovation, it is being presented by the 
IP lobby as an inherently positive thing and along the lines of the conviction that if IPRs are 
good, more IPRs must be better, there has been an unprecedented increase in the level, scope, 
territorial extent and role of IP protection.49 However, ‘countries with little export trade in 
industrial goods and few, if any, inventions for sale have nothing to gain from granting 
patents on inventions worked and patented abroad except the avoidance of unpleasant foreign 
retaliation in other directions.’50 It is hard to understand what a country such as for example 
New Guinea whose economy is based on weak manufacturing and minerals, could gain from 
adopting a patent system, however as the single undertaking of the WTO only offered an 
indivisible package, New Guinea has had to sign up to TRIPS like all the other Members. As 
UK High Court Patents Judge Sir Hugh Laddie replies to the question of whether IPRs are 
generally ‘a good or a bad thing’: 
                                                            
44 W. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change, (MIT 
Press, 1969); F. M. Scherer, ‘Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation’ 62 
American Economic Review, (1972), pp. 422-7. 
45 J. Bhagwati ‘Economic Freedom: Prosperity and Social Progress (keynote speech at the Conference on 
Economic Freedom and Development in Tokyo, 17-18 June 1999, in Joseph, supra note 6, p. 153. 
46 N. T. Gallini, ‘Patent Policy and Costly Imitation’, 23 Rand Journal of Economics, (1992), pp. 52-63.  
47 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, p. 14. 
48 Heller and Eisenberg coined the phrase ‘tragedy of anti-commons’ to describe the underuse of scarce 
resources due to the blocking effect of patents, as opposed to the overuse of such resources due to a lack of 
patents, i.e. ‘tragedy of commons’ coined by Garrett Hardin. M. Heller and R. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’, Science, (1998), pp. 698-701. 
49 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, p. 2. 
50 E. Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System, (The John Hopkins Press, 1951) pp. 116-117.  
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[T]he developed world has come to an accommodation with them over a long period. Even if their 
disadvantages sometimes outweigh their advantages, by and large the developed world has the national 
economic strength and established legal mechanisms to overcome the problems so caused. Insofar as their 
benefits outweigh their disadvantages, the developed world has the wealth and infrastructure to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided. It is likely that neither of these holds true for developing and 
least developed countries.51 
 
Despite this, all but 3 of the 30 African LDCs have long been providing patents according to 
TRIPS,52 regardless of the SDT allowing them not to do so.53 
Looking at the history of national patent systems one finds ‘enormous diversity in terms of 
both administration and standards relating to things such as patentable subject matter, 
infringement and duration of protection. This diversity, at least on the face of it, suggests that 
states have engaged in a process of steering their systems to suit their industrial context’.54 It 
is essential to recognize that the optimal level of IP protection is struck at a different point for 
different states, depending on their particular stage of development, capabilities, R&D 
expenditures, nature of the innovative process and other particular circumstances. In terms of 
GDP per capita, some have found the optimal break point to be at US$ 3,400, where only 
countries above that level can see an increased growth with stronger IP protection.55 However 
in terms of actual policy, available historical cross-section evidence shows that the turning 
point at which countries chose to strengthen their patent protection was even higher than that 
at US$ 7.750 per capita in 1985 prices, a fairly high-income level for the developing world.56 
An increasing convergence on standards of IPR protection is therefore hardly desirable, even 
though this is exactly what has been the international development.  
Diversity does not exist only between developed and developing countries, but also among 
developing countries’ themselves in terms of technical capabilities as well as their other 
relevant circumstances, such as social and economic structures and inequalities of income 
and wealth. For example China, India and several smaller developing countries have 
significant scientific and technological capabilities, including ‘world class capacity in a 
number of scientific and technological areas including, for instance, space, nuclear energy, 
computing, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, software development and aviation.’57 On the 
                                                            
51 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, p. 2. 
52 P. Thorpe, ‘Study on the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement by Developing Countries’, Study Paper 7, 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Commission Secretariat, (2002), p. 2. 
53 K. Maskus and J. Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global 
Public Goods’ (2004) 7 Journal of International Economic Law, p. 279. 
54 Abbott, supra note 19, p. 5. 
55 M. Thompson and F. Rushing, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Patent Protection of Economic 
Growth’, 21 Journal of Economic Development, (1996), pp. 61-79. 
56 Lall, supra note 2, p. 8. 
57 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, p. 2. 
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other hand Sub-Saharan Africa mainly has weak technical capacity and accounts for only 
0.5% worldwide research expenditure.58 Several scholars have also pointed out that because 
not all industrial sectors develop at the same time, even within the same country, certain 
industries may benefit from a weaker and others from a stronger protection of IPRs. China 
may well welcome stronger protection in entertainment, software, semi-conductors and 
selected areas of biotechnology, but not in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and 
foodstuffs.59 In its Art. 27, TRIPS however prohibits discrimination not only as to the place 
of invention and whether products are imported or locally produced, but also as to the field of 
technology. Therefore the minimum protection as set out by TRIPS has to be guaranteed 
across the spectre yet there is no reason to assume that such a unitary patent system would 
encourage innovation in the wide range of diverse industries that it is expected to cover.60 
In Articles 7 and 8, the TRIPS Agreement spells out its Objectives and Principles which talk 
about the balance between rights and obligations and the fact that IPR should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and that Members may adopt 
measures necessary to protect public interests such as health and nutrition and other interests 
important to their socio-economic and technological development. However any such 
measures must be consistent with other TRIPS provisions and the proper balance between 
patent rights and other important national interests has allegedly already been struck in the 
Agreement itself, so Articles 7 and 8 do not offer any additional policy space to Member 
countries. This was made clear by the Panel in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents. Based on 
the Objectives and Principles of TRIPS, Canada sought a liberal interpretation of the 
conditions stated in Art. 30 of the Agreement, to have the necessary flexibility to adjust 
patent rights to maintain the desired balance with other important national policies.61 The 
Panel however confirmed the position of the EC, which claimed that Articles 7 and 8 reflect 
the balance already achieved in the Agreement and the limiting conditions of Art. 30 ‘testify 
strongly that the negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Art. 30 to bring about what 
would be equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic balance of the Agreement.’62 
                                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 P. K. Yu, ‘Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle’ in Gervais, supra note 9, p. 
208. 
60 D. L. Burk and M. A . Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’, 89 Virginia Law Review, (2003) p. 1577; M. 
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4. History of Intellectual Property Protection – A History of Controversy 
History shows that the industrialized countries of today did not adopt strong IP protection 
when they were at early stages of industrialisation, especially not for foreign inventors.63 
Statutory intellectual property rights evolved out of the medieval system of privileges that 
existed across Europe and which sovereigns used to entice foreign skilled workers to defect 
from their guilds and relocate to another territory, thus providing the sovereign with skills 
and techniques needed in the competition for a commercial and military upper hand.64  
Whereas the internationalisation of IPRs did not start until the 1883 Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property,65 triggered by the refusal of American firms to participate at 
the Global Exposition of Vienna held in 1873, unless their displayed inventions were 
protected with the same standards as they enjoyed in America.66  
Furthermore the development of IP protection was never a stranger to controversy. Two 
hundred years after the enactment of the Statute of Monopoly in 1623 in England, various 
groups demanded an even more favourable law for inventors which provoked a counter 
attack by those who wished to see the patent system completely abolished, including the 
London Economist, the Vice President of the Board of Trade, some outstanding inventors of 
the time, members of Parliament, and representatives of manufacturing districts such as 
Manchester and Liverpool.67 In Germany there was a strong movement against the patent of 
invention which economists using free-trade arguments almost unanimously condemned. The 
main advocates of patent protection on the other hand were graduates of technical schools 
organized in technical associations, the most active of which was the Association of German 
Engineers representing civil engineers mostly also active as entrepreneurs.68 They gained 
importance after the Congress of German Economists passed a resolution in 1863 suggesting 
the abolition of all patent laws.69 A leading patent advocate was Werner Siemens, however it 
is essential to mention that he recognized the importance of timing when it came to patent 
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legislation. He argued that the German economy had grown so fast exactly because of a lack 
of a patent system and the possibility of simply imitating foreign inventions without having to 
invest in R&D.70 However to develop not only quality products based on foreign inventions 
but also completely new products of a higher quality than the products of foreign competitors 
it was necessary to make sure that the value of technical work would be socially recognized, 
which he believed could best be accomplished by a new patent system.71 The turnaround in 
public opinion for the pro-patent movement happened at the International Congress for the 
Protection of Patents in Vienna72 following elaborate propaganda.73 In a similar fashion, in 
the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry engaged in aggressive lobbying coupled with funding 
of academic studies aimed at proclaiming the merits of patent protection, when it began its 
campaign of securing US IPR protection abroad.74  
On the other hand, Holland and Switzerland industrialized without a patent system.75 
Unsurprisingly however, the Swiss themselves were enthusiastic patentees in other 
countries.76 The government kept rejecting proposals to adopt one on the basis of a statement 
issued by faculty members of the Zurich Institute of Technology, however it finally gave in at 
a referendum in 1887, after the lack of a patent system was externally given the stigma of 
‘piracy’ and the ‘pirate nation’ was threatened with discrimination in commercial policy.77 
This left Holland as ‘the last bastion of free trade in inventions’ until 1912.78  
When still a net importer of technology between 1790 and 1836, the US restricted the issue of 
patents to its own citizens and residents and furthermore kept highly discriminatory patent 
fees until 1861, where foreigners were charged ten times the rate of US citizens and two 
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thirds as much again if they were British. In terms of copyright protection, it was restricted to 
citizens until 1891 but the US continued even after that with several discriminatory 
restrictions on foreign copyrights, which was the reason for its late entry to the Berne 
Convention in 1989.79   
As for Japan, ‘[f]or a large part of the 20th century, [it] designed and used a patent system that 
placed emphasis on the diffusion of knowledge, rather than on the right to appropriate 
knowledge.’80 Japan has benefited greatly from IP generated in other developed countries in 
the early stages of its development.81 The patent system utilized by Japan has been 
recognized as ‘a mechanism for promoting technological catch-up and diffusion through 
incremental innovation.’82 Although its patent system was established quite early in 1885, it 
excluded from protection food, beverage, pharmaceuticals and chemical compounds until 
1975 when its firms developed their technological capability enough to require protection for 
their own innovative activity.83 Japan further allowed its firms to receive protection on 
technologies that were ‘only slightly modified from the original invention.’84 Through its 
Utility Model Law enacted in 1905 it provided protection for adaptations and improvements 
over the imported machinery or equipment by domestic investors and granted 99.9% of all 
utility models between 1905-79 to its own nationals.85 In 1980 it granted 49.000 utility 
models to Japanese nationals and only 533 to foreigners.86 Similarly the Japanese Patent 
System allowed for the protection of industrial design on mere novelty, without the need for 
inventiveness, granting 31.000 patents to nationals compared to only 600 to foreigners in 
1980.87 Not surprisingly, there have been complaints of discrimination and claims that 
foreign applicants faced longer pendency periods than domestic applicants.88  
During the transformation of Taiwanese and Korean economies between 1960 and 1980, both 
countries ‘emphasised the importance of reverse engineering as an important element in 
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developing their indigenous technological and innovative capacity.’89 Both had weak IPR 
protection during their development. South Korea adopted its patent law only in 1961 and 
amended it in 1981 to conform with the Paris Convention, but still excluded food, chemical 
substances and pharmaceuticals from protection until 1987 when it finally caved into US 
pressure with its threats of trade sanctions and strengthened the law.90 The duration of 
protection rose from 12 to 15 years91 and there was a further strengthening of the law in 1995 
again due to US pressure.92 Apart from the law itself, however, it was the lacking 
enforcement and discrimination in favour of nationals in granting utility models 
(approximately 92-95% of all utility models were granted to nationals) which made the IP 
system work in favour of South Korean technological development and which also kept the 
country on the US watch list for a long time.93 Similarly lack of enforcement was the main 
strategy of Taiwan which openly encouraged counterfeiting to develop local industries.94 
Again, like South Korea it eventually strengthened its law in 1994 and prolonged the 
protection from 15 to 20 years, due to US pressure.95 
Looking at the history of IP protection and the debates surrounding its theory, it is obvious 
that countries changed their regimes at different stages of development to further their 
economic interests, and not to honour some abstract ‘human right’ of intellectual property. 
According to the evidence the ‘intensity of patents first falls with rising incomes, as countries 
slacken patents to build local capabilities by copying, then rises as they engage in more 
innovative effort.’96  
Also important to note is that the idea of IPR protection is contrary to many traditional non-
western philosophies. For example, Confucianism, which has had a large influence on 
Chinese culture, emphasizes sharing and community commitment rather than individual 
profit, which explains why in China a patent system did not emerge the way it did in Europe, 
even though China has a remarkable history of technological and creative enterprise’97 and 
‘the Chinese invented a number of items prior to their invention or use in the West’ such as 
papermaking, typography, the compass, and gunpowder, all of profound influence on the 
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world’s economy and the human culture.98 In the 19th century the industrial powers 
introduced IPRs into their colonies and dominions, in conflict with the majority of traditional 
and indigenous approaches to knowledge and innovation hitherto prevalent in these 
societies.99 
 
5. The Birth of TRIPS and Developing Countries’ Resistance 
Developing countries have been fed the narrative that in order to get rid of poverty by 
stimulating invention, and thereby production, they need to adopt strong IPRs.  Although it is 
undisputed that invention is necessary for development, unlike the pro IP lobby in developed 
countries, there is a strong lobby in developing countries that believes IPR do little to 
stimulate invention, and instead only harm the local population benefiting none but the 
developed world.100 Developing countries have tried to reform treaties such as the Berne 
Convention and the Paris Convention in a way that would take into consideration their 
socioeconomic circumstances already in the 1960s and 1970s, however this was without 
much success and their efforts eventually faded.101 In the 1980s the debate between 
developing and developed countries on IPR reached its most contentious form as developed 
countries ‘sought to pry open large, untapped consumer markets in the developing world’, but 
when trade and investment increased they were concerned about imitation of their products in 
these new markets and contended that foreign piracy had cost them billions of dollars and 
eliminated millions of jobs in their home countries: ‘Ideas had become the new economic 
battleground between developed and developing countries.’102 Exporting corporations sought 
an artificial monopoly that would block domestic producers from entering the market to 
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produce the same products, while investors wanted their investments guaranteed.103 
Eventually the failure to revise the Paris Convention pushed those who were looking for a 
more internationally uniform and effective system to start linking the IP regime with the 
world trade regime, which they achieved at the Punta del Este Conference, where trade 
related aspects of the protection of IP were added to the GATT agenda.104 The wide 
Membership of GATT and its dispute resolution procedures would mean greater 
enforceability against a greater number of states.105  Despite vehemently opposing the idea at 
first, many developing countries later unfortunately accepted the substantially strengthened 
IP rules at the TRIPS negotiations. However this was not because they necessarily bought 
into the accompanying narrative which promised that this would foster their domestic 
innovation and increase FDI and technological transfer (TT), but was rather in order to gain 
concessions elsewhere or to receive greater aid.106 Whether they actually did, remains a 
mystery.107  
It has been said that the negotiations involving TRIPS were an ‘international story driven 
primarily by American corporate interests,’ which is clear even from the way in which IPR 
were brought onto the WTO negotiating table.108 In the 1980s the idea that IPR could be 
addressed in a trade policy framework was far from commonly accepted and it was 
essentially Edmund Pratt, Pfizer CEO and John Opel, IBM Chair that firstly shifted US 
government perception while serving on the US President’s Advisory Committee on Trade 
Negotiations and later established the Intellectual Property Committee in an effort to 
convince European and Japanese trade officials which appeared uninterested to include IPR 
in the GATT negotiations.109 The pharmaceutical lobby and the software industry were 
greatly supported by the music and motion picture industry.110 After much dialogue they 
successfully persuaded their colleagues in Europe, including representatives from the Union 
of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe and the Japan Federation of 
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Economic Organizations (Keidanren) to pressure their governments to include IPR on the 
GATT agenda.111  
US, EC and Japan proceeded to seek an expansive IPR agenda within GATT, which 
motivated their private-sector Trilateral Industrial Group (US, EC and Japan) to develop a 
detailed consensus position.112 When developing countries joined the debate it brought:  
the talks to a standstill until April 1989 in Geneva. Adoption of a GATT IPR framework at that meeting 
was an abrupt departure precipitated by a crisis at the Uruguay round mid-term review a few months 
earlier in Montreal… Developing countries finally accepted the legitimacy of GATT as a venue to 
negotiate IPR, with India as the last to accept… This breakthrough led to a more intense phase of the 
talks.113  
 
According to the analysis of Drahos, developing countries caved in as a result of threats of 
continued unilateral action, decreased trade aid and exclusion from increased market access 
granted by the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and they accepted the inclusion of 
IP in the negotiations in exchange for promised concessions in other areas such as agriculture 
and textiles.114 Stiglitz describes how this ‘Great Bargain’ was going to reduce developing 
countries’ access to knowledge and extract from them billions in royalties in return for 
greater access in agriculture and reduced agricultural subsidies by developed countries, 
however the latter did not keep their side of the bargain.115 As per usual, therefore, 
negotiations at the WTO in this instance were completely initiated by developed countries, 
more particularly the US while developing countries were more pressured than persuaded 
into accepting to negotiate on the matter. The promise of the levelling out of the playing field 
in agriculture was once again used to lure developing countries into a bad deal in another area 
and the withdrawal of the US and EU from GATT 1947 also played a decisive role in 
‘convincing’ them to accept GATT 1994 with all the attached agreements such as TRIPS (see 
chapter IV). In the words of Professor Rodrik: 
I think bringing TRIPS into the WTO framework was just a lousy idea, and I think most economists 
will agree to that. I think this was largely driven by the interest of pharmaceutical companies in the 
United States, and I wish we had never come down that path.116 
 
In 1883 the Paris Convention aimed at harmonizing patent protection between developed and 
still developing countries of that time which were seeking to participate in world trade, 
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namely Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and thus diminished their autonomy in regulating 
technical information.117 With TRIPS it was the African and Asian states which traded their 
autonomy in this field for the participation in world trade, however the less developed 
countries in 1883 ‘had more opportunities with which to influence the regulations’ and the 
German Empire did not even join the Paris Convention until 1903.118 Stiglitz describes how 
during his time with the Council of Economic Advisors under the Clinton Administrations, he 
observed that it was ‘clear that there was more interest in pleasing the pharmaceutical and 
entertainment industries than in ensuring an IP regime that was good for science, let alone for 
developing countries,’ whereas the negotiators who framed the TRIPS Agreement were 
‘either unaware of all this, or more likely, uninterested.’119 Despite all this, developing 
countries did manage to positively influence the negotiations and prevent the inclusion of at 
least some of the strictest and most egregious restrictions on national policy by exploiting the 
differences between the US, EU and Japan.120 Furthermore, global corporate actors played an 
important role in ensuring the subsequent effective implementation of TRIPS into each 
Member through surveillance carried out by their local branches and agents.121  
 
6. Claims of Benefit for Development 
Arguably, the demand for ever stronger IP protection in developing countries does not come 
from wanting to provide innovation incentives in said countries, but to create new export 
markets and lower-cost production centres, while maintaining the technological superiority of 
the West (where R&D is based).122 Whereas IPRs may indeed stimulate invention when a 
country possesses the necessary human and technical capacity, the same does not hold for 
countries which have not yet achieved the sufficient level of development. The IP system 
may provide the incentive, however without a sufficient capacity, incentives are of little use. 
Furthermore, even in countries with large markets and considerable industrial development 
the claim has not been supported by evidence. In the case of Mexico for example, a study 
found a drastic decline in domestic patent application after 10 years of stronger patent 
protection.123 Also ‘when technologies are developed, firms in developing countries can 
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seldom bear the costs of acquisition and maintenance of rights and, above all, of litigation if 
disputes arise.’124 More importantly, strengthening IPRs increases imports, whether that be 
high technology machinery imports or low technology consumer items, which merely drive 
out indigenous industries that are based on imitation125 and replace their ‘pirate’ goods with 
more expensive ‘genuine’ ones.126 Although increased trade flows may lead to new jobs, 
these are usually low-skilled, low-paying positions (distributorship or retail sector).127 
Probably the most problematic impact of IPRs however is that they limit the possibility of 
technological advancement through imitative production and learning, which are essential to 
the technological advancement of developing countries, as these methods require less 
capital.128 It seems then that IPRs are here no longer a way to encourage domestic innovation 
[but an] instrument to affect profit flows among nations. To affect profit flows favourably, 
each country wants the strongest possible protections in foreign countries and the weakest 
possible protections for foreigners in its own domestic market.129 Still the proponents of 
strong IPR claim they are beneficial to developing countries as they attract FDI and with it 
technological transfer. However FDI is not always straightforward in this regard, neither is a 
strong IP regime always necessary to attract it. This is examined below.  
 
7. TRIPS and Technological Transfer 
Art. 7 of TRIPS contains the alleged objectives of the agreement. It states: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage 
of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
 
The word ‘should’ merely suggest that this is what we are hoping for if the mainstream 
economic theory is correct. Art. 8.2 envisages situations of abuse of IP or the resort to 
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the ITT, and permits countries 
to adopt policies to combat it, of course in a TRIPS consistent manner. One of the biggest 
debates surrounding TRIPS has been, whether the ‘objective’ of technology transfer, 
especially in terms of developing countries is actually achievable through TRIPS or do other 
provisions of the agreement preclude it.  
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Technology transfer is ‘any process by which one party gains access to a second party’s 
information and successfully learns and absorbs it into her production function.’130 This can 
occur through market and non-market channels. There are essentially two main market 
channels for TT:  
‐ trade in technological inputs, such as high technology imports, industrial chemicals, 
hardened metals, fertilizers and software; countries with stronger IPRs usually have 
more capital goods imports, however this may be from other variables that tend to 
accompany increased IPR protection, such as higher levels of income, stronger 
technological capabilities, greater ability to pay, etc.131 Also looking at Korea and 
Taiwan, they did not have a problem buying advanced capital goods in their most 
intense period of industrialisation despite weak IPRs protection.132 
‐ foreign direct investment (FDI) including the deployment of newer and more 
productive technologies to subsidiaries and licensing, which is the purchase of 
production or distribution rights and the technical information and know-how required 
to make effective use of them.133 This arrangement can be between unrelated firms or 
as a part of a joint venture, i.e. contractual arrangement between two or more firms, 
where each one provides some advantage that should reduce the cost of joint 
operations, where the contribution of the multinational enterprise (MNE) is to provide 
technically superior production information through licensing.134 Terms may include 
non-disclosure mandates, ‘no-compete’ clauses for personnel, and grant back 
provisions on adaptive innovations.135  
The quantity and impact of these outflows have been very diverse. Between the years 1970 
and 2000, low-income countries only had a small and declining share in these outflows, upper 
middle-income nations had the fastest-growing market for technology-intensive exports, 
while licensing and other types of arm’s length trade in technology have been largely the 
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8. Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer 
Strong IP protection is largely considered to attract FDI. Although there is some evidence to 
this effect, other factors may be more important, such as the size of the market, expected 
growth in demand and monetary and fiscal stability,137 investment costs, local labour prices 
and labour productivity. Even those who claim that the most decisive factor in attracting FDI 
is IPR protection, admit the role of other factors.138 Some studies on the other hand found no 
relationship between IPRs and FDI flows at all,139 while other studies have found 
significantly lower levels of FDI in Africa and Eastern Europe than in Brazil, India and 
China, despite the former having higher levels of IP protection.140 What is more is that firms 
intending to establish plants in another country, mainly need the protection in terms of non-
disclosure of technologies (i.e. trade secrets and contractual protection), not strong copyright, 
patent and trademark protection, which is more important for firms seeking to use the country 
only as a market for finished products.141 Furthermore IPRs are only a relevant factor in 
investment decisions when it concerns sophisticated technologies which are easy to copy and 
the recipient country possesses the necessary scientific capacity to copy and a sufficiently 
large market to justify the costs of patenting and enforcement.142  
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This brings us to the fact that without the ability to absorb the foreign technology from the 
MNEs, FDI cannot lead to successful TT in the first place. Such an ability depends on 
whether the country has: 
‐ at least simple R&D capacity;  
‐ an adequate supply of engineering and management skills and; 
‐ an adequate amount of competitive suppliers so that MNEs can increase their 
productivity and standards in backward spillovers, i.e. by increasing the demand for 
their products and improving the technologies and standards which they use by 
offering engineer visits and by sharing blue-prints, know-how and comments with 
them; 
‐ geographical proximity to input suppliers and consumers143 
 
Furthermore as Ostergard has noted, when ‘investment and technology transfer does occur, 
there is no basis for believing that local knowledge may be increased. In fact, transnational 
corporations may be reluctant to allow certain types of technology to be adapted for fear of 
losing their competitive advantage in these markets.  Hence, often the promise of increased 
local knowledge bases is hollow.’144 As seen in the case of the Thai and Malaysian 
automotive industry, even in joint ventures foreign companies may refuse to share latest 
technologies with domestic producers (example of Proton) whereas if possible foreign 
companies will use the market and its benefits without even involving domestic producers 
instead bringing with them foreign suppliers. Of course from the point of view of the 
orthodox theory FDI is also good because the injection of capital and technology stimulates 
competition in the local market: on the one hand, the entry of MNEs into a foreign market 
forces the domestic firms to adopt newer and more advanced technologies because of the 
increased risk of a loss of market share; on the other hand, it increases average productivity 
of local plants, since only the best firms can survive the competition so-called ‘selection 
effect.’ 145 
From the point of view of development however it is problematic when foreign firms merely 
drive out domestic competition by obtaining patent protection and supply the market through 
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imports, rather than domestic manufacture.146 Therefore FDI is not intrinsically a good thing 
and it furthermore does not automatically bring TT, especially not in terms of allowing 
MNEs’ cutting edge technologies to be absorbed into the local knowledge base. 
Whereas whether domestic firms can make productivity gains from transnational corporations 
operating in their country is profoundly affected by the rules that govern imitative production 
and to what degree reverse engineering is permitted.147  
Strong IP protection will therefore, at least in theory, contribute to attracting FDI and 
licensing (with or without FDI) when complex but easily copied technologies are at stake, 
whereas other factors will be more important in attracting FDI in sectors that have old 
products and standardized, labour-intensive technologies. Still the fact that even in IPR-
sensitive industries such as pharmaceuticals transnational corporations have not refrained 
from investing large sums in countries like Brazil or India which have large capabilities in 
producing generic drugs, again points out to the fact that other factors are more important 
than IPRs in attracting FDI.148 Furthermore MNEs have been opening R&D centres and R&D 
joint-ventures and contracting research in India in the field of chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals.149 Indeed some studies show that while the link with FDI is less significant, 
stronger IPRs still increase arm’s length licensing and arm’s length trade.150  
Furthermore higher levels of IP protection attract FDI and licensing precisely because of the 
efforts of MNEs to keep their technologies as much as possible to themselves or at best their 
subsidiaries and local suppliers, instead of other producers in the domestic market, however 
so-called technology spillovers into the rest of the economy may still happen. An example 
would be the departure of local personnel after they had been employed and trained by the 
MNEs, the potential for which is large.151 Again the legality of this depends on trade secret 
law and the contractual terms agreed to, such as ‘no-compete’ clauses in licensing 
agreements. Another possible spillover is the imitation of easily observable technologies such 
as management, accounting, marketing techniques or re-organization of product lines after 
they have been ‘demonstrated’ to be effective in the local economy by the MNEs.152 The 
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likelihood of such spillovers may be expected to be accounted for by the MNEs when setting 
contractual terms, and if it is high they ‘may choose not to transact at all, to offer older-
generation technologies keep the information within the firm by dealing only with 
subsidiaries, or offer to licensees a large share of rents (i.e., lower licensing fees) to induce 
them not to defect with the information.’153 Not surprisingly, in the long run spillovers then 
discourage FDI and licensing. Bottom line – spillovers into the rest of the economy, which 
would be the most desirable outcome in terms of development is at best an unintended 
byproduct of FDI, and certainly preferably avoided by the MNEs. 
The quality of TT from FDI depends in great part on how technologically advanced domestic 
firms already are and how advanced are the multinational firms investing. For example until 
the mid-1990s China, a great beneficiary from FDI, remained dependent on the import of 
advanced technology from abroad, even though it had narrowed its gap with developed 
economies in the low and intermediate technology areas mainly due to the fact that larger 
joint ventures often found that the latest technology was not suitable for China’s firms who 
used low technologies and that early-generation equipment was more appropriate.154 
Furthermore the main sources of FDI were Hong Kong and Taiwan which mainly transferred 
low or standardised technology as they were not major sources of advanced technology.155 
The leap from US$ 16.3 billion in high-tech exports in 1997 to US$ 165.4 billion in 2004 
only happened after further reforms, such as tax incentives, VAT exemptions, subsidized 
credit for high-tech exports, a partial tax deduction for R&D expenditures, a tax exemption 
for all income from the transfer or development of new technologies; a preferential 6% value-
added tax rate for software products developed and produced in China and the listing of new 
high-technology companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.156 Furthermore 
the government not only strengthened efforts to attract FDI, but issued systematic guidelines 
to encourage FDI accompanying advanced technology transfers to China.157  
In other words several factors come in play when it comes to TT through FDI and licensing 
that may help or prevent the absorption of technologies into domestic economies. Indeed the 
determinants of effective TT are ‘many and various’.158 It must be looked at from a 
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sustainability point of view. If the domestic economy is not able or allowed to absorb the 
latest foreign technology brought by FDI and licensing, and further innovate on the basis of 
that, then there is little benefit of such TT in terms of development.  
Apart from market channels TT happens also through non-market channels such as: 
‐ imitation through product inspection, reverse engineering or decompilation of 
software. The legality of this form of ITT depends on the level of IP and trade secrets 
protection.159 Even though there is no compensation to the original developer of the 
technology, the process itself may still incur high costs.160  
‐ by technical and managerial personnel leaving a firm and starting a rival firm. Here 
again there is no compensation while the legality depends on labour mobility, ‘non-
compete’ clauses and the like. Usually trade secret law prohibits the use of 
information without making any improvements to it to produce competing goods, 
while adopting the information and improving it into something new is ‘the basis for 
much information diffusion and competition in industries for which cross-fertilization 
of ideas and techniques is common.’161  
Thus from all the possible channels, IPRs can be beneficial to some forms of ITT while they 
are detrimental to others. Considering the costs brought by a stronger IP protection, such as 
the costs of administration and enforcement, adjustment costs due to labour displacement, 
social costs, monopoly pricing, resulting from the abuse of IPRs and last but not least higher 
imitation and innovation costs,162 some countries prefer to use weak IP regimes as a means 
of gaining access to foreign technologies and developing them using reverse engineering, 
thereby enhancing indigenous technological capacity, yet TRIPS now restricts this option for 
them.163 
 
9. The Importance of Reverse Engineering for Development  
Countries have been preferring low-cost imitation until they move into a middle-income 
range with domestic innovative and absorptive capabilities.164  There is an effort to dismiss 
imitation as a method of a bygone era, suggesting that FDI and the TT it brings act as 
                                                            
159 Maskus, supra note 37. 
160 Maskus, supra note 130, p. 12. 
161 Ibid, p. 13. 
162 K. E. Maskus, S. M. Dougherty and A. Mertha, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in 
China’ in C. Fink, supra note 141 pp. 133, 295, 302-306. 
163 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, p. 24. 
164 World Bank, supra note 99, p. 7. 
205 
 
substitutes for internally generated local development.165 However empirical analysis shows 
the opposite, with China being the latest in a series of countries that leap-frogged up the 
development curve with a weak patent system that encouraged local imitation of foreign-
generated technology.166 Indeed, reverse engineering has been one of the most important 
factors in giving developing countries the ability to catch up with the more technically 
advanced nations.167 Reverse engineering is not however always the most cost efficient 
method of acquiring foreign technology as some products, such as complex machinery and 
financial services, are not easy to reverse engineer. On the other hand, some other products, 
such as software and pharmaceuticals have been said to ‘wear their technologies on their 
face’.168 Several empirical studies have shown that weaker IPRs stimulate domestic 
innovative activity in developing countries. 
For large and middle income developing countries with a domestic competence in imitation, 
the costs of royalty payments brought by stronger IPRs may just outweigh the benefits of 
attracting TT through FDI and licensing.  
[E]ven mature technologies, available for simple imitation at low investment cost prior to TRIPS, 
could command significant license fees in the future. With the bottom range of the technology ladder 
thus raised, especially for the poorest countries with a skill basis that is too limited to manage the 
initial jump, the scope for imitation is narrowed. More broadly TRIPS affords technology developers 
greater leeway to refuse to license a protected technology or product, to demand markedly higher 
licensing fees and prices, and to impose restrictive conditions on licensing contracts.169 
 
On the other hand developing countries which lack the market conditions to attract FDI and 
licensing have little use of trying to attract it with high IPR protection and even if they 
managed to attract it, they could not absorb it, due to lack of such capacity. 
Professor Sanjaya Lall classified countries based on national technological activity and 
analysed the benefits and costs of a strengthened IP system concluding that countries with 
moderate technological activity, (i.e. they conduct some R&D and have medium levels of 
industrial development; for example Russia, Poland, Hungary, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico) are likely on balance to benefit from stronger patents, whereas for countries with 
low technological activity (for example China, India, Egypt, Thailand and Indonesia) it 
depends whether they are building their innovation systems based on copying foreign 
technology and importing technologies at arm’s length or on a strong transnational 
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corporation presence, with the later on balance gaining more than the former, who are more 
likely to benefit from slack IPRs in some aspects and from strong IPRs in other aspects.170 
Countries with no significant technological activity on the other hand incur far more cost than 
benefit from a strong IPR regime.171 In other words, whether a country can benefit from high 
IPRs depends on its ability to purchase, absorb and deploy new technologies. If they lack this 
ability, the IPRs will not bring TT, whereas if they have this ability, the benefit of IPRs 
depend on ‘the extent to which [they] raise buying technologies, and whether the alternatives 
of copying and reverse engineering would have been feasible, cheaper and more rewarding in 
building up local technological capabilities.’172 There is a trend among emerging market 
countries (BRICs) in deployment of financial and other incentives to induce local production 
of technologically sophisticated products. 173 Their ‘policymakers seem to have concluded 
that passive reliance on patents to induce technology transfer and local production is not 
working, and that a more direct approach is required.’174  
a) India  
For example a study of the way Indian enterprises absorbed foreign R&D found that weak 
IPRs allow spillovers simultaneously to promote domestic R&D and to have a positive direct 
effect on productivity, while stronger IPRs are not optimal in this respect, not even in the 
long run.175 In this sense, the absence of patents on pharmaceutical products enabled the 
development of a highly successful adoptive R&D domestic effort aimed at discovering new 
ways of producing known drugs which were not protected by IPRs.176 Before 1970, India 
followed an IP regime which was comparable to those of developed countries but then 
changed its policy and adopted a weaker patent regime after a number of cases in which 
foreign patent owners were neither using their patents for domestic manufacture nor 
allowing them to be used by local firms.177 The Patents Act from 1970 ‘reduced the scope of 
patentability in food, chemicals and pharmaceuticals to only processes and not products’ and 
‘the term of process patents was reduced to seven years in food, drugs and chemicals and to 
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14 years for other products.’178 ‘In 1970 much of the country’s pharmaceutical consumption 
was met by imports and the bulk of domestic production of formulations was dominated by 
MNE subsidiaries. Of the top 10 firms by retail sales in 1970 only two were domestic firms 
and the others were MNE subsidiaries.’179 By 1996, however six of the top firms were 
Indian.180 However, in the engineering and other industries India’s performance was not that 
high, which may be due to the fact that its system lacked an encouragement of the adaptive 
and minor inventive activity of domestic enterprises such as the utility model systems 
analysed below.181  
a) China 
China is generally speaking an important case to study in the search for a formula to rapid 
economic growth through upgrading technological capabilities, however one must keep in 
mind its unique features, i.e. its gigantic market and human resources, which make any 
conclusions of such an analysis of limited applicability to many other developing countries.  
As mentioned above, a patent system did not fit well with China’s traditions and 
philosophies, nor with the approach of a centrally planned economy followed by the Chinese 
government, therefore in the first three decades after the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949 all inventions were considered as state property.182 External pressure from the 
US and the desire to contribute to the national modernization goals were the main drivers 
behind early IP reforms, while ‘the development of local stakeholders who benefited from 
stronger protection, the determination to develop a knowledge-based economy, the economic 
and reputational gains of China’s WTO accession, and the country’s increasing shift toward 
an export-driven economy were primary drivers for later reforms.’183 China’s first patent law 
was only enacted in 1984, in the hope that it would be a factor in attracting FDI.184 It was 
weak and contained merely the essentials for an effective patent scheme.185 It excluded foods, 
beverages and condiments and pharmaceutical products from patentability; the scope for 
compulsory licenses was quite broad; it obliged the patent holder to work the patents in China 
and the mere importation of patented products did not constitute ‘working’; the term of 
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protection of patents was maximum 15 years and utility models and designs were protected 
for maximum 5 years; innocent infringement was excluded from any liability; and 
enforcement was merely a matter of administrative prosecution at the local level.186 It was 
only under threats of trade sanctions by the US and intense negotiations between the two 
countries, that China gave into US demands and in 1992 included protection for all chemical 
inventions, including pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, whether products or 
processes; extended the scope of protection to 20 years for patents and 10 years for utility 
models and designs; prohibited unauthorized importation of products which infringe on 
patents; removed the sufficient local working requirement and restricted the use of 
compulsory licences to exceptional circumstances such as refusal to deal, national 
emergency, public interest, or dependent patents; a compulsory license is neither exclusive 
nor transferable; other restrictions on the conditions included a reasonable exploitation fee 
and the possibility of judicial review.187  
In the process of joining the WTO, China was again pressured in strengthening its IP law to 
comply with a number of TRIPS-plus obligations, such as providing effective enforcement 
and new substantive rights for patent holders (ex. rights of ‘offering for sale’); narrowing the 
scope of exceptions to infringement; improving enforcement; and further limiting the grounds 
for compulsory licences.188 It is important to note that during the negotiating process, the IP 
rights reforms kept pace with the negotiations themselves; ‘[w]hen the negotiations 
encountered obstacles, the IPRs reform slowed down; when the negotiations reached 
agreements to promote the accession process, the IPRs reform accelerated noticeably.’189 
The Chinese Science and Technology Minister Xu Guanhua reported in 2006 that as a 
consequence of joining the WTO in 2001, China lost a total of US$ 1 billion in disputes over 
intellectual property rights since it joined which had struck a ‘devastating blow’ to parts of its 
economy.190 This cost led to the ‘government’s first attempt to publicly encourage companies 
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to develop products that aren’t dependent on technologies from other countries’.191 The 
Chinese government’s plan is now to transform the country from a global manufacturing hub, 
based on cheap labour, low-cost resources and extensive environmental pollution into an 
innovation engine by 2020.192 In this context a further strengthening of IP law came with the 
reform in 2009 which was enacted out of China’s own incentive to bolster domestic 
innovation.193 This in fact proved a strong encouragement for the growth of domestic patent 
applications, however some doubt the existence of a link with genuine innovation since even 
though the volume of applications is dramatically rising, the majority are not for invention 
patents but for utility model and design patents.194 Furthermore there is a low rate of renewal 
and the percentage of Chinese-owned patents at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office and EPO remains low in comparison with the main countries of origin.195 From the 
year 2000 to 2006 out of 248057 patents granted 92867 were domestic and 155190 foreign, 
while out of 493119 utility models, 488276 were domestic and only 4843 foreign.196 
However statistics from 2010 show a substantially larger number of patents granted for 
domestic inventions (79767), than those for foreign applications (55343), while on the other 
hand there are 342258 domestic and 2214 foreign utility models. 197 Still there are almost 
twice as many utility models as there are invention patents and the average life span of 
invention patents awarded to domestic entities (around 6.9 years) is significantly lower than 
for foreign-owned invention patents in China (around 10.3 years).198  
Despite the recent development of indigenous technologies, foreign invested enterprises still 
account for a significant proportion of high-tech products in China.199 Chinese entities still 
hold mostly patents in traditional sectors, including food, chemicals, civil engineering and 
medicine, whereas ‘foreign investors still hold the advantage in high-tech industries, 
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especially in optics, transportation, audio-visual technology, medical technology, 
semiconductors and engines’.200 Still further investments in R&D will no doubt lead to an 
increase in technological accomplishments as the government is devoting very substantial 
financial resources to high technology fields. Even if it is still lagging behind at the moment, 
China will eventually become more internationally competitive in high technology fields, 
however not because of stronger IP protection, but because of devoting substantial financial 
resources to this endeavour and it is important to ‘distinguish the cart and the horse’ when 
this happens.201 Furthermore China has already moved into high-end technology markets, 
such as cars and regional jets202 and more importantly is driving the world innovation on 
renewables on green energy and solar manufacturing, technologies that are not as sexy as the 
latest iphone, but perhaps technologies that will be much more important to the world than 
what Apple computers bring for the rest of us.203 
It is thus quite clear that the Chinese government does not seem to be relying only on the 
strengthening of the patent system to create a high technology environment even at this stage 
of its development. In terms of successfully attracting FDI and using it for its technological 
development, some claim that this is due to China’s open access to global markets which it 
got through the WTO and the development of its IPR protection through TRIPS.204 Others 
however see as a more important factor in attracting FDI the access to its huge market, lower 
production costs, and its human resources which China exchanged for FDI and the transfer of 
advanced technology from abroad.205 Chang claims that in the case of the Chinese automobile 
industry it was actually the fact that the market was protected which in the beginning allowed 
the Chinese government to get a lot of TT from the ‘Volkswagens of this world’ by using its 
bargaining power and only allowing them to come and build their cars in China in joint-
ventures with Chinese producers, with lots of conditions attached.206 China has been further 
creating a ‘business friendly environment’ with preferential tax rates and tax exemptions for 
potential investors as well as providing them with financial support.207 
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Like other emerging markets, China is not only relying on TT from FDI and is using vast 
financial and other incentives to induce local production of technologically sophisticated 
products and industrial policy to promote local production, which is an essential component 
for technological advancement. This challenges ‘one of the tenets of the multinational 
business community’s patent lobbying premises, that is, that granting local patents will result 
in increased licensing opportunities, transfer of technology and local production’ on its own, 
as it does not even apply when economies have already achieved such a substantial level of 
income as China. 208 
Furthermore, its revision of the IP law in 2009 represents a balanced approach to patent 
reform. It kept the controversial ‘utility model’ which brings advantages for Chinese 
companies over foreign companies. The utility model enhances access to patent protection to 
small domestic innovators209 for various reasons. Firstly, unlike the invention patent, which is 
granted for new technical solutions proposed for a product, a process or the improvement 
thereof, a utility model applies to technical solutions proposed for the shape and structure of a 
product, or the combination thereof which is fit for practical use.210 Secondly the application 
fee is about one seventh of that for an invention patent and it is granted on average in less 
than 8 months. Most importantly, however, the requirements of novelty and inventiveness are 
lower. Formally, since the law introduced in 2009, a utility model must meet the same 
absolute novelty requirement as an invention patent, however in practice ‘the cursory 
examination procedure often turns the absolute novelty requirement into a mere formality’.211 
Before the reform, absolute novelty was not even formally a requirement, which meant that 
sale or use outside China was not considered prior art,212 thus allowing for situations such as 
in the case of Chint.213 Due to the loose examination of applications, more than 60% of all 
Chinese utility model patents are later invalidated, leading to prosecution and litigation 
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uncertainty.214 Furthermore the lower standard of inventiveness means that obvious 
improvements on basic technology, which would have remained in the public domain, are 
now eligible for patent protection.215 Although a subject of criticism, the use of the utility 
model has been shown to have contributed to Japan’s rise in productivity and to have 
successfully promoted innovation in Brazil and the Philippines.216 The utility model, allowed 
under TRIPS, can therefore play an important role in countries where domestic innovation 
cannot compete yet with the level of the leading world innovators.  
Chinese patent policies have generally been criticized as being unfairly biased against foreign 
companies217 and MNCs complain of having to deal with economic protectionism on a large 
scale.218 Furthermore, instead of waiting for technology spillovers induced by IP protection, 
Chinese enterprises are using modern methods of reverse engineering and imitation by 
penetrating US and European industry computers and databases to ‘appropriate’ 
technological information, including the latest technologies.219 The advancement of 
technology has generally enabled the rapid dissemination of information across the globe and 
thus compromised the monopoly market conditions created by IP protection.220 Also some 
Chinese enterprises are actively reviewing pending US patent application publications and 
filing duplicate utility model patents in China to save their backs in any future 
counterfeiting.221 The enforcement of IPRs generally remains weak and US and other foreign 
industries lose billions of dollars annually due to piracy and counterfeiting.222 A telling 
example of weak enforcement is when Dyson sued in China a Chinese firm manufacturing a 
copy of its bladeless electronic fan. Sir Dyson claimed that his company had spent more than 
3 million dollars on legal fees and subsequently won the case however the infringing 
company was only fined $7,500 and did not even pay that amount but was still allowed to 
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continue the production.223 The concept of promoting ‘indigenous innovation’ has also been 
used to discriminate in favour of domestic companies when giving access to tens of billions 
of dollars in government contracts.224 Executives from Siemens, General Electric, and 
Microsoft further assert that China’s IP policies force foreign companies to share their trade 
secrets with Chinese companies.225 
It is clear that although China may now formally comply with international IP standards, such 
as the TRIPS Agreement, its policies and practice still resemble more those that Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan used in their early industrialisation stage. US and other developed countries had 
pressured Taiwan, Japan, Korea as well as Thailand, Phillipines and numerous other 
countries to change their IPR protection practices, however China has experienced the most 
pressure out of all of them.226 Strong enforcement of IPRs is only expected to happen when 
the benefits of such protection start outweighing its overall cost, and the current weak 
enforcement suggests that China is not at that point yet.227 China however can afford the 
luxury of weak IP enforcement, as despite paying a price for it, it is economically powerful 
and significant enough to resist much of the pressure. Weaker countries on the other hand 
cannot be expected to be able to do the same in carving out their policy space. Sir Dyson has 
however threatened China that it risks being expelled from the WTO over IP breaches, such 
as those of copying his inventions.228 
 
10. The Role of Other Policy Tools for Technological Development 
In order to be able to absorb foreign technology, local firms need to be engaged in R&D.229 
The inventive activity of enterprises is determined by ‘firm size, market structure, national 
innovation system, technological opportunities’ etc.230 IPRs on the other hand have little 
proven effect and can in fact even choke the absorption of knowledge spillovers.231 One must 
also not lose sight of the fact that FDI can decline the productivity of domestic firms because 
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of premature exposure to competition.232 To allow firms to reach the appropriate size and 
competitiveness, industrial policy thus also plays a role in encouraging inventive activity. 
Part of the Korea and Taiwan strategy was considerable industrial policy: import protection, 
export subsidies, credit targeting and FDI restrictions.233 It is important to stress that 
scientists, engineers and R&D laboratories are not enough to foster the necessary innovations 
which will restructure the economies of low-income countries.234 There has to be a demand 
for innovation by the entrepreneurs. This demand however is low because of the uncertainty 
of the profitability of new activities.235 As discussed in chapter III, industrial policy and 
governmental subsidization are necessary to overcome this lack of demand, but is seriously 
curtailed by WTO rules.236  
 
11. TRIPS – Remaining Policy Space 
TRIPS does provide some bases for exclusion from patentability or for limitations to be put 
on the enjoyment of exclusive rights, however they have proven to be of limited usefulness 
for developing countries even in the context of health, let alone for the pursuit of the 
technological development.   
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement states that ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application’ and it prohibits discrimination 
between imported and locally produced products: ‘patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and 
whether products are imported or locally produced.’ However, TRIPS does incorporate some 
exceptions to the absolutist nature of IPRs. During the negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement 
many countries, especially developing, expressed concern over potential anti-competitive 
abuse of the rights guaranteed therein. They managed to include into the Agreement 
provisions allowing for the use of competition law to tackle anti-competitive licensing 
practices and conditions. 
Five provisions of the TRIPS Agreement allow for the option of either preventing the 
granting of or limiting the enjoyment of the exclusive rights.  
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Art. 27.2, allows Members to exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the 
exploitation is prohibited by their law.  
Art. 27.3, allows Members also to ‘exclude from patentability plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals 
other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide 
for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or 
by any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years 
after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.’  
Most important exception is found in Art. 30 on compulsory licences, which allows ‘limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties.’  
Art. 31 then lists the bases and limitations for such exceptions when compulsory licenses (i.e. 
involuntary contracts authorized by the national authorities between patent holders and third 
parties which are seeking a license to use the patent) can be granted, whereas Art. 32 gives 
the right holder the opportunity for judicial review of any decision of revocation or forfeiture 
of patents.  
Therefore public interest considerations, as well as abuse of patent rights, can be a basis for 
limiting the exercise of IPRs under TRIPS, however these provisions are legally highly 
complex and have strict conditions attached to them.237 They cannot be applied generally, or 
without any criticism or objection.238 There is a growing trend among developing countries 
such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Brazil of enacting and utilizing statutory 
powers to grant, or to compel a patentee to grant patent licenses to third parties in the 
interests of public health.239 Amongst emerging markets, China is an exception in that it 
hasn’t issued a compulsory license in over two decades, however it has signalled its 
willingness to do so including through UN-sponsored drug access workshops where 
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compulsory licensing was the key topic of discussion as well as indirectly through adopting 
healthcare goals.240 Although TRIPS explicitly allows compulsory licenses, albeit in a very 
limited manner, developing countries have had to subsequently fight for the re-affirmation 
that the right actually exists. This was because developing countries using compulsory 
licences were put on the US ‘Watch list’ and subjected to punishments such as for example 
the removal of GSP preferences (ex. South Africa) as if they had done something wrong.241 
Developing countries thus conditioned the launching of multilateral trade negotiations in 
1999 in Seattle at the third Ministerial on the clarification that they had the right to 
compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are 
granted.242 They eventually got this clarification with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health243 which obviously did not in any way change the law but 
merely stated the obvious in the face of US pressure aimed at annulling the rights contained 
in TRIPS.244 
Since TRIPS Art. 31(f) restricts the use of the subject matter of a patent authorised under 
compulsory licencing predominantly to the supply of the domestic market, this meant that 
WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing when needed. 
Ministers in Doha thus instructed the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to 
this problem.245 In this respect, it was a question of actually changing the law, and 
unsurprisingly developing countries were far less successful here, eventually settling for an 
unsatisfactory resolution.246 In 2003 the General Council of the WTO adopted the Decision 
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, which is essentially a waiver of the restriction set out in Art. 31(f) with respect 
to pharmaceutical products in exceptional circumstances.247 Several problems exist with the 
use of this waiver which is reflected in the fact that to date the only notification of its use 
came in 2008 when a Canadian generic pharmaceutical firm, Apotex Inc. shipped 7 million 
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doses of antiretroviral drugs to Rwanda for the treatment of HIV/AIDS.248 It has even been 
predicted that the waiver will never be used again based on how many factors had to come 
together in this one and only time that it was successfully used. Since public health is not the 
subject of the present discussion further analysis will not be conducted here on this topic. 
It is evident, however, that apart from urgent health matters such as epidemics, compulsory 
licensing under Art. 31 is not really useful. The conditions are quite restrictive and they 
eliminate nearly all prospects for effective TT.249 One of the further deficiencies of 
compulsory licenses is that they fail to acquire the essential know-how that goes with the 
patented information.   
 
Conclusion 
Even though strong international IP protection can bring benefits in terms of attracting FDI, 
its influence is limited and other factors arguably play a more important role in this respect, 
while the quality and quantity of TT from such investment is by no means necessarily great 
and depends on several factors. On the other hand strong IP protection drastically limits the 
possibilities of TT through reverse engineering and copying, it poses great costs in acquiring 
licenses and is a financial burden in terms of the implementation itself. It is thus fair to 
conclude that TRIPS obstructs development and brings more cost than benefit for 
technologically less advanced countries while taking away necessary policy space by 
preventing discrimination between fields of technology, by imposing a 20 year period of 
protection, by strengthening the enforcement mechanism etc. Evidence shows that it is 
countries which had weak patent regimes in the past and those that are poorly implementing 
their international obligations in this area that are managing to upgrade their capabilities. This 
is however not a luxury all developing countries can afford especially not with the political 
pressure placed on developing countries even in cases of using measures which are clearly 
allowed under TRIPS. 
Similarly to the free trade agenda, the IP agenda is also accompanied by effective 
propaganda. This propaganda against imitation may be nothing more than a desire to 
discourage the emergence of another China to challenge the existing organization of 
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multinational business.250 A look at the history of countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, 
Japan or China more recently, shows how much these countries benefited from reverse 
engineering at a scale which they would not have been able to do if TRIPS had applied to 
them at the time.251 This ‘does not mean that developing countries ought not to have patent 
rules, or should not have IPR protection. It just says that this is an area where it would have 
been very valuable for developing countries to maintain autonomy to figure out what would 
be the best system for that.’252 It is essential to acknowledge that developmental economics 
must strive to be more like clinical medicine in its approach to problems, meaning countries 
must have the freedom to design their policies according to the diagnosis of their particular 
economic situation, rather than prescribing the same medicine for everyone.253 Developing 
countries need flexibility in trying to upgrade their technological base and it is unacceptable 
that the protection of IP under the WTO threatens this flexibility. While it needs to be 
acknowledged that TRIPS is a simplistic set of rules which still allows countries to define 
patents in terms of their breadth and interpretation, their policy space is undoubtedly more 
restricted than before. The fact that this restriction is dictated through an organisation which 
claims to promote free trade is additionally absurd. This chapter thus concludes that despite 
the fact that the propaganda promoting intellectual property protection provides perceived 
legitimacy to the fight against ‘piracy’, the TRIPS Agreement in fact adds substantially to the 
legitimacy gap of the WTO and events surrounding its birth furthermore reveal a large 
democracy deficiency.  
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‘so as the great may have no greater 
hope of impunity when they do violence, dishonour, 
or any injury to the meaner sort than when one of 
these does the like to one of them. For in this 
consisteth equity’1  
 
Chapter VI 
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM – A STRONG WEAPON IN 
REBALANCING POWER INEQUALITIES AND CARVING OUT NECESSARY 




While the GATT/WTO system has brought disproportionate economic benefits mostly to a 
small group of industrial states for reasons such as the before mentioned principal-supplier 
rule and the low influence of developing countries in bargaining over the rules, there may be 
another important reason for unequally distributed benefits, namely the weak enforcement of 
WTO rules when developing countries (successfully) challenge violations against their 
interests.2 A well-functioning dispute settlement mechanism, equally accessible and equally 
effective in its enforcement for all Members is thus crucial in preventing further disadvantage 
to developing countries in a system which is already tilted to the other side.  
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism gives a unique opportunity to developing countries, 
which otherwise lack the political or economic power to be able to challenge developed 
countries and bring cases against them. As one study clearly illustrates, in disputes being 
dealt with outside the WTO framework, developing countries face much greater challenges in 
bringing a case against a larger trading partner, such as ‘a refusal to negotiate…, arbitrary 
standards, limited interest from third countries in their trade problem, and lack of leverage to 
bargain for concessions… Simply getting a trade partner to agree to talk about its 
protectionist trade barriers is difficult for a developing country’.3 The WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM) is therefore a substantial improvement to bilateral dispute 
settlement, especially in light of several studies4 showing that economic imbalances between 
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the parties do not seem to be affecting the conduct and results of WTO dispute settlements.5 
However the system still allows for the imbalance of power to affect developing countries’ 
very access to the dispute settlement as well as their ability to see the rulings in their favour 
being successfully enforced. The biggest problems that developing countries face and which 
feed of off each other are costs, lack of experience, lack of institutions and the uncertainty of 
whether a decided issue will actually be implemented. The fact that they have participated 
less actively in the DSM than developed countries has been attributed to these factors. This 
contributes to the procedural or democratic legitimacy gap of the organisation. However there 
has been positive development on all the mentioned issues and a continuous increase in 
developing countries’ active participation.  
This chapter looks at whether the DSM can act as a strong weapon in rebalancing the power 
inequalities of the WTO system. The first part considers capabilities of developing countries 
in terms of sufficient legal strength to bring disputes against more powerful players. It looks 
at challenges posed in terms of the costs involved which they have to surmount as well as the 
built up of necessary institutions. It examines the statistics of the dispute settlement and 
highlights successful strategies of a substantial number of developing countries in 
overcoming their capacity constraints. The chapter also delves into the question of 
enforcement against economically stronger parties and whether it can be successful. The 
second part of this chapter then looks at substantive hurdles in terms of rebalancing the 
system through the DSM in a way that would give more weight to development. It thus 
analyses the effectiveness of recourse by developing countries to ‘development’ or 
‘sustainable development’ as found in the WTO Preamble or other international as well as 
domestic laws and policies, the use of arguments based on sovereignty or a right to economic 
diversification, in order to justify developmental policies strictly speaking in breach of WTO. 
Similarly it looks at the possibility of recourse to the objects and purposes of the TRIPS 
Agreement in this context. On the other hand it considers the (im)possibility of challenging 
market restrictions placed on goods of importance to developing countries. The main 
argument is that the barriers in accessing the DSM, which developing countries face, can be 
overcome and the DSM can give valuable power to essentially less powerful states. The 
problem however lies in the biased law itself and an expansion of the mandate to include the 
consideration of the right to development (RTD) at the DSM could rectify this problem.  This 
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implies that the procedural legitimacy gap is not as great (albeit it does exist) as is the 
legitimacy gap of the rules applied and the fact that the purported goals give no space to 
panels and the Appellate Body for more flexibility in interpreting the law towards more 
development friendly decisions.  
 
1. Statistics on Dispute Settlement  
Looking at the number of disputes initiated it is evident that the DSM has been extremely 
active, especially since the adoption of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) with the establishment of the WTO. In just over 
20 years, the system has received 507 requests for consultations, much more than the 300 
disputes GATT dealt with in 47 years. Compared to the International Court of Justice which 
has received only 162 cases in 68 years or compared to most other international courts, this is 
‘a remarkable level of activity’ covering in the first 16 years around US$ 1 trillion of trade 
flows.6 Such high levels of activity also cannot be found in dispute settlement mechanisms of 
RTAs which are in turn rarely used. According to the Director-General the number of 
disputes and their increasing complexity has even lead to severe problems such as the 
overburdening of the Appellate Body (AB) as the rate of appeal, which on average is 
approximately two-thirds, is much higher than was anticipated when the negotiators created a 
body of 7 part time Members.7 The rate of appeal however is not exactly a sign of success but 
can be, in many instances, rather a reflection of Members wishing to keep in place an 
‘effective breach’ for as long as possible and thus intentionally prolonging the procedure by 
appealing the dispute settlement body (DSB) decisions. 
Still, generally speaking, the high levels of activity are a sign of a relatively successful 
international dispute settlement mechanism. To see how developing countries have 
participated in this activity, it is useful to look at some statistics.  By far the most frequent 
users of the dispute settlement have been the United States and the European Union (formerly 
European Community). This is hardly surprising considering the theory that the more trading 
partners a country has and the larger its exports to them are the more likely it is for a dispute 
to arise.8 The United States have thus far initiated 107 disputes which is more than three 
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times as many as the third most active complainant (Canada) and it has had 123 complaints 
brought against it, which is almost four times the number of complaints faced by the third 
most active respondent (China).9 However on the list of countries which have initiated more 
than 20 disputes, after USA, EU and Canada, one finds four developing countries, namely 
Brazil (27), Mexico (23), India (21) and Argentina. Furthermore many other developing 
countries namely Thailand, Chile, Republic of Korea, Guatemala, Indonesia and of course 
China have each initiated at least 9 disputes. Considering China’s significance in 
international trade, it is also not surprising that in the last 100 disputes, much of the ‘great 
power’ litigation, previously fought between the US and EU has now moved to US-China 
and EU-China relations.10 
In the first years after the Uruguay Round, dispute-settlement was used frequently, with an 
average of 41 disputes11 initiated per year, whereas there was a decline to just over one half 
of that number in the period between 2001-08 and a slight further decline since to only 17 
disputes on average per year.12 Out of this the decline has been much steeper for the US/EC 
and other industrialized complainants, whereas for developing countries it has only been a 
drop from 13 disputes initiated per year between 1995-2000 to 10 per year between 2001-
2008, while in the period from 2009 until present they have been initiating around 9 disputes 
per year.  
Furthermore, it is important to see who is filing against whom. In around 39% of disputes 
initiated by the US or EC in the early period after the Uruguay round (1995-2000), the two 
were simply challenging each other. In the period between 2009-2014, however, only a total 
of 3 disputes fell into this category, whereas 29 (88%) of the disputes initiated by the US or 
EC were against developing countries. Other developed countries further initiated 9 disputes 
against developing countries. Unsurprisingly the most targeted country by developed 
countries during this period has been China with 16 disputes brought against it. In this regard 
it is not hard to sympathise with China’s own proposal of putting a quantitative limitation on 
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the number of complaints per year that countries can bring against a particular developing 
country.13 
Developing countries on the other hand consistently through the years target the US or EU in 
about half of all cases and increasingly also other developed countries (9% between 2009-
14), while the number of disputes initiated against other developing countries which was 
rising for a while, has quite diminished in the last five years to only 34%.  
This also means that in the last 5 years, the EU and USA have again become the biggest 
initiators of disputes against developing countries as was the case in the initial period after 
the Uruguay round, whereas in between these periods, fellow developing countries initiated 
the majority, i.e. 60% of such disputes. Thus importantly, together with other developed 
countries in the last 5 years, the EU and USA have brought a total of 38 disputes against 
developing countries compared to only 20 brought by fellow developing countries. This is a 
quite concerning statistic, especially considering that developing countries have lost too much 
of necessary policy space for development and in light of the fact that reliance on sustainable 
development as a justification for certain policy measures does not provide a meaningful 
legal tool for developing countries (see below for further discussion).  
Looking at the disputes by sectors, developing and developed countries both file most of their 
complaints and in about equal measure in the agriculture, beverages and seafood industry. 
Not surprisingly, however, in other sectors one finds great discrepancies between the two 
categories of states. For example in R&D intensive categories such as pharmaceuticals and 
IT, as well as in capital intensive industries such as aircraft, shipbuilding and the automotive 
industry the dominant complainants are developed countries and complaints by developing 
countries are rare, whereas the apparel and textiles industry is dominated by developing 
country complaints and to a lesser extent also other manufacturing which is not R&D or 
capital intensive. The steel industry is another frequent matter of dispute in which complaints 
are filed to an approximately equal extent by developing and developed countries.14  
Least developed countries, however, are basically completely absent from any dispute 
settlement activity, be it challenging others or being challenged by others. In fact, looking at 
the last 100 disputes reveals that the total number of litigating Members of the WTO is 
merely 21% of the whole Membership, with 7.5% alternating as complainants and 
                                                            
13 Improving the Special and Differential Provisions in the Dispute Settlement Understanding,” Communication 
of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Proposals from China: TN/DS/W/29, No. 122 
(January 2003); TN/DS/W/57, No. 1.  
14 C. P. Bown, Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement, (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2009), pp. 73-74. 
224 
 
respondents in over 80% of litigation.15 Most notably absent from any litigation are African 
countries, with Egypt and South Africa being the only African countries to have ever 
participated as parties in the DSM. In the words of Dapo Akande, ‘[t]his would not be a 
problem if it were a result of a lack of trade disputes, but this is unlikely to be the case… In 
their relations with large WTO Members,…, African countries simply do not resort to dispute 
settlement at all. This may mean that disputes are being settled politically, without reference 
to the WTO’s rules.’16 Considering how weak these countries are generally in negotiations, 
one can only expect that the outcomes of such behind-the-scenes settlements are biased 
against their interests. However developing countries face major hurdles in trying to access 
the more desirable DSM therefore it is not surprising if so many states are reluctant to 
overcome them. Below is an analysis of the issues most important in this regard and how they 
can be tackled.  
 
2. Legal Strength  
The successful participation of Members in the dispute settlement mechanism is still 
dependent on their economic strength, especially when it comes to enforcement, however 
their legal strength is of equal importance, especially in identifying and bringing disputes to 
the DSM as well as being able to keep up with the proceedings once in front of a panel. It is 




The ability to cover the costs of the proceedings is the first determinant of a country’s legal 
strength. The lack of resources prevents smaller developing countries from bringing cases to 
the DSM and having adequate legal representation before the panels. ‘Typically, a case that 
goes through the Appeals process may take 18 months to complete. Enforcement, however, 
may take years. Consequently, the present value of economic losses associated with a dispute 
that proceeds to the end is enormous.’17 All in all costs of cases vary, but generally speaking 
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they are in the range of several million dollars over three years.18 The short deadlines dictate 
a rhythm of work which is far more intense than in normal court litigation and demands staff 
more or less dedicated full time to the process, which only very few countries can afford.19 
Other essential expenses include administrative support costs, supervision by senior officials 
and Ministers, data collection from business, statistical sources and foreign sources, 
consultations with Agencies and Ministries in the Capital which are affected by the decisions 
in a case, representation in Geneva throughout the various phases of the case and the help of 
external legal firms.20 The latter especially is vulnerable to being cut if a country does not 
have a sufficient budget. 
The US and EU each have between twenty and thirty specialized lawyers hired on an ongoing 
basis, and the possibility to draw on a large number of other ‘in-house’ WTO specialists, 
whereas on the other side about a quarter of the WTO Member countries do not even have a 
single WTO mission, while others may have a mission but they still lack staff with proper 
training on international trade.21 Because US and EU lawyers are hired on an ongoing basis, 
their costs of participating in a WTO dispute are fixed, which makes it easier to decide to 
start a case or defend one, rather than settle immediately, or even to throw up as many 
obstacles as possible for the other party during litigation.22 On the other hand many 
developing countries are forced to rely on outside lawyers (costing at least USD 250.000 per 
case (or double that if the US/EU is on the other side) thus the cost of starting a case will be 
the first question they have to confront.23  
Still Mexico claimed in its proposal presented to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, that 
financial aspects of engaging in a WTO dispute were not the ‘core of the problem’ as they are 
not impossible to cover by most arguments, especially as low-cost legal assistance can be 
obtained from the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL).24 It is true that given a sufficient 
trade interest most developing countries could afford the legal fees for a typical WTO case.25 
However the situation would have been easier if there was a possibility of monetary 
                                                            
18 P. Gallagher, Guide to Dispute Settlement (Kluwer Law International, 2002), p.63. 
19 G. N. Horlick, K. Fennell, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement from the Perspective of Developing Countries’ in Y.-S. 
Lee et al., eds. Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press), p. 166. 
20 Gallagher, supra note 18, pp. 63-64. 
21 Horlick, supra note 19, p. 164, 165. 
22 Ibid, p. 166. 
23 Ibid. 
24 ‘Diagnosis of the Problems Facing the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Some Ideas by Mexico,’ proposal 
presented to the WTO DSU Body, Geneva, November 2003, pp.5-7. 
25 C. L. Davis, and S. B. Bermeo, ‘Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication’, 
71 The Journal of Politics, (2009), p. 1039. 
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compensation in cases where the complainant is a developing country, which would attract 
outside counsel, however that option is not available at the moment.26  
An important factor is the financial support from the affected industry which can even 
‘reverse the imbalance in favour of the developing country’ as was the case with Brazil 
versus the US (Cotton Subsidies) and the EU (Sugar).27 Other cases where the domestic 
industry was strong and active enough to be able to defend its interests before the WTO by 
hiring an external legal counsel include Ecuador’s complaint in Bananas, Guatemala’s 
defence in Cement and Antigua and Barbuda’s representation in Online Gambling.28  
 
b) Institutions  
Governmental institutions also play an important role in the matter of legal strength. Brazil’s 
successes in the DSM are to a large extent due to the Brazilian government’s organization 
with respect to international trade matters. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs is professionalized 
and meritocratic and it prioritizes international trade.29 Brazil’s institutional legal 
infrastructure ‘includes a trade team in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, a variety of intra-
ministerial trade groups, and established coordination mechanisms between the government 
and the private sector and civil society. The Foreign Ministry Lawyers have been sent for 
training to Brazil’s permanent mission in the WTO and to trade litigation firms in 
Washington, D.C. and elsewhere.’30 It has thus been able to create a cadre of lawyers who are 
able to represent the government in the WTO dispute settlement system, while still 
occasionally hiring outside counsel, particularly from the US.31 
Therefore although generally speaking, all developing countries face certain difficulties in 
accessing the benefits of the DSM, due to lack of institutions and resources, unsurprisingly, 
these are substantially lesser for countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (so-called 
BRICs), the larger and far more economically powerful countries than the rest of the 
                                                            
26 Ibid. 
27 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, DS267; Horlick, supra note 19, p. 167; G. Shaffer, M. R. 
Sanchez and B. Rosenberg, ‘The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies behind Brazil’s Success’ (2008) 41 
Cornell International Law Journal, pp. 456-464. 
28 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, DS27; Guatemala – 
Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of Portland Cement from Mexico, DS60. 
29 Shaffer, supra note 27, p. 388.  
30 A. Santos, ‘Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization: The 
Experience of Brazil and Mexico’, 52 Virginia Journal of International Law, (2012), p. 609. 
31 M. R. Sanchez Badin, ‘Developmental Responses to the International Trade Game: Examples of Intellectual 
Property and Export Credit Law Reforms in Brazil’, 14-15 (on file with the Virginia Journal of International 
Law Association) (2011) in Santos, supra note 30, p. 609. 
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developing group.32 Brazil has even been seen as the greatest and one of the most successful 
users of the DSM, India is becoming an increasingly prominent player and China, although 
reluctant at first, filed several important cases against the US and the EU since 2007.33 
 
c) Economies of Scale  
However it is important not to overlook the fact that it is not merely large developing 
countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and India who are filing cases, but increasingly 
also small states. For example Chile has been a complainant in already 12 cases, Indonesia in 
9 and the Philippines in 5. Only 30 Members so far, have filed more than one case and of 
these thirty 22 are developing Members.34 Analysis shows that weaker countries which 
overcome initial capacity constraints progressively benefit from the mechanism as past 
experience in trade adjudication, in either the role of complainant or defendant, enhances the 
likelihood of a developing country initiating further disputes.35 In other words economies of 
scale are just as important in the context of dispute settlement as anywhere else. There are 
initial substantive but relatively fixed costs related to developing institutional capacity and 
knowledge in the first five or six cases a country is involved in and if it surmounts these 
costs, subsequent litigations will be less costly and alien to it.36  
When Pakistan requested consultations with the US in 2000 regarding a transitional safeguard 
measure applied by the US on combed cotton yarn from Pakistan37 it had no institutional 
framework to deal with WTO-related dispute settlement cases, but during the proceedings it 
established WTO sections in both its permanent mission in Geneva and in its Ministry of 
Commerce, as well as a 13-member high-level WTO Council chaired by the Minister of 
Commerce.38 To manage the costs it was agreed that these would be shared between the 
affected industry and the Export Promotion Board. 39 The Government also became an initial 
                                                            
32 A. D. Mitchell and J. Wallis, ‘Pacific Countries in the WTO: Accession and Accomodation, The Reality of 
WTO Accession’ in Yong Shik-Lee et al., eds. Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law, 
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Treatment of Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization, Report of the Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Global Development Studies 2, (2005), pp. 79-95.  
33 Horlick, supra note 19, p. 164.  
34 WTO, Disputes by Country supra note 9, (statistics done: 28.1.2015). 
35 Davis, supra note 25, pp. 1033-1049. 
36 Ibid, pp. 1034. 
37 United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, DS192. 




member of the ACWL.40 These and other initial investments into the capacity building and 
knowledge acquiring turned Pakistan into a confident player in the system.  
 
d) Joining In 
Joining a complaint initiated by another country is also a good way of increasing experience, 
examples being China, shortly after its accession to the WTO joining eight other countries in 
the case against US safeguards on steel imports,41 or Ecuador joining the dispute regarding 
the EU banana regime.42 China furthermore participated as a third party in 114 disputes so far 
similar to India which participated in that capacity in 102 cases. Of course developed 
countries are also making full use of this possibility however it is arguably most important for 
Members with very limited resources which may find that being a complainant or even a co-
complainant would not be viable and may thus limit their involvement to participation as a 
third party.43 It has thus been suggested that the role of third parties be strengthened. One of 
the proposals is that they ‘should not only be allowed to attend all substantive panel meetings 
and receive copies of the parties’ submissions to the panel prior to the issuance of the interim 
reports44 but also issues addressed by third parties in their submissions should be reflected in 
the rulings and recommendations of the panel and/or AB.’45 Although many Members (not 
just developing countries) support this idea, it might bring more complexity to the dispute 
process and it would not be in the interest of judicial economy that the panel and/or AB 
would be bound to take into consideration all the arguments presented by third parties, thus a 
limitation to only the arguments relevant to resolving the matter at issue in the dispute seems 
a more reasonable option.46 
Members have further proposed that it would no longer be necessary to prove a substantial 
interest in order to participate as a third party and that showing a generic interest in the 
procedure would be sufficient. Since the development of rule interpretation can be as 
                                                            
40 Ibid. 
41 United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, DS252. 
42 Davis, supra note 25, p. 1038. 
43 Y. N. Hodu, Theories and Practices of Compliance with WTO Law, (Kluwer Law International, 2012), at 
§4.02[C]. 
44 Chairman’s Text as of 28 May, Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, TN/DS/9, 5-7 (6 June 2003). 
Members in this respect have also made proposals relating to expanded third-party rights in the appeal stage, 
where third parties should also be allowed participation, even when they do not participate at the panel stage as 
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ibid, §4.02[C] fn 185/186; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, 
Ambassador Ronald Saborio Soto to the Trade Negotiations Committee, doc. TN/DS/25 (21 April 2011). 
45 Hodu, ibid, §4.02[C]. 
46 N. Boschiero et al, (eds.), International Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in Honour 
of Tullio Treves, (Asser Press, 2013), p. 703. 
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important as the rules themselves, denying Members the option to weigh in on a particular 
legal matter would not be justified, not to mention the value of experience they are gaining by 
participating as third parties, as mentioned above. 
 
e) ACWL – Collective Experience 
Another important player not just in cutting costs for developing countries but in enabling an 
environment for accumulating and sharing experience and knowledge is the ACWL. Two 
thirds of the developing countries that have previously participated in the DSM - 32 in total – 
have become members of the ACWL which means they can use its services in exchange for a 
membership fee, while the 43 leased developed countries (LDC) who are WTO Members or 
soon-to-be Members are entitled to its services without having to become members of the 
ACWL. Developed countries can also be members but they are not entitled to the services.47 
The ACWL yearly provides over 200 legal opinions on any procedural or substantive issue 
arising from WTO law to its developing country Members and the LDCs free of charge and it 
further organises annual courses, occasional seminars and training sessions on topical issues 
of interest and a series of workshops designed to build capacity in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings in developing countries.48 How highly appreciated the legal opinions are by their 
users can be seen from surveys carried out by the ACWL themselves, where in the recent one 
98 % of the respondents found them to be either "highly" or "very" satisfactory while no 
respondents found them to be merely “somewhat satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory”.49 One 
respondent described the ACWL as a "panacea for the legal capacity constraints [of] many 
developing countries". 50  
In 2013, the ACWL provided country specific training seminars on topics including: (i) the 
rules and procedures governing WTO disputes; (ii) legal aspects of the Bali negotiations; and 
(iii) various issues relating to rules governing the conduct of trade remedy investigations. The 
ACWL welcomes requests from its developing country members and the LDCs for training 
on specific issues of WTO law identified by the members and the LDCs themselves.51 The 
first part consisted of a two and a half day workshop focused on the practical aspects of 
managing WTO dispute settlement proceedings, such as pre-dispute preparation, 
                                                            
47 Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Members, available at: http://www.acwl.ch/e/members/Introduction.html, 
(last accessed, 7.2.2015). 
48 Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Report of Operations 2013, available at:  
http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/reports/Oper_2013.pdf , (last accessed, 7.2.2015), p. 32. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Advisory Centre on WTO Law, (hereinafter, ACWL), News, http://www.acwl.ch/e/news/news-00085.html , 
(last accessed, 7.2.2015). 
51 ACWL, supra note 48, p. 25. 
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consultations, panel establishment and composition, as well as Appellate Body procedures. 
The participants in the workshop included 37 trade officials from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.52 All these 
activities are clearly helping the members build up their legal capacity, most importantly 
however the ACWL offers direct help in dispute settlement.  
 
i. ACWL – Membership and Finances 
The membership of the ACWL is comprised of 32 developing and 11 developed countries.53 
Developing countries contribute to the ACWL Endowment Fund based on their share of 
world trade and income per capita, while the LDCs do not need to contribute to the Fund at 
all. Developed country members on the other hand, contribute the larger share of the Centre’s 
finances, contributing at least US$ 1,000,000 each to the Endowment Fund or to the annual 
budgets of the ACWL or to both. These members are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Australia. Notably 
absent however are both the US and EU as a whole. Apart from the member countries non-
governmental contributions are also accepted however this is strictly for ‘specific purposes 
that are not related to dispute settlement cases, such as training and the traineeship 
programme’54 which insures that there is no influence on dispute settlement by private 
funders. Apart from the notable absentees, it is highly commendable that several developed 
countries voluntarily contribute to these efforts, especially since they really make a difference 
in terms of the legal strength of developing countries.  
 
ii. ACWL – Direct Help in Litigation 
Although not gratis when it comes to litigation, the ACWL fees are based on the income of 
the member.55 Thus for example in the European Communities-Trade Description of 
                                                            
52 Ibid, p. 26. 
53 Among the developing countries category A Members are Hong Kong, China and Chinese Taipei; category B 
Members are Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, 
Uruguay, Oman, Mauritius, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, Seychelles; and category C Members are: Bolivia, 
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54 ACWL, Organizational Structure, Financial matters: available at: 
http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/org_structure.html, (last accessed, 7.2.2015). 
55 The ACWL divides its developing country Members into categories A, B, and C, according to their GNP per 
capita and share of world trade, with category A Members having the highest GNP per capita and the largest 
share of world trade. Membership fees and litigation fees correspond to these categories. 
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Sardines dispute Peru was charged only $100 an hour for legal services.56 The prices are 
fixed in Swiss francs and according to the current exchange rate would now equal closer 
to $174 per hour for Category C members, in which Peru is classified, $260 per hour for 
Category B members, and $348 per hour for Category A members, while LDCs would have 
to pay $43 per hour.57 This is not a small change and the ACWL may need to reconsider the 
pricing especially in light of the recent dramatic rise of the Swiss franc. Most importantly, 
there is a maximum number of billable hours, which is also set correspondingly to the 
different categories of members. With a case going all the way to the appellate stage, for 
LDCs for example, the maximum price can only reach 34,160 Swiss francs, whereas on the 
other end for category A countries it can reach a maximum of 276,696 Swiss francs.58 This is 
very important, since it may positively encourage developing countries to refrain from 
settling on less favourable outcomes from fear of accumulating unsurmountable cost in 
pursuing the matter further.  
Since its inception in 2001 the ACWL has provided direct support in 44 separate WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings,59 which equals 1/5 of all new WTO complaints, and has thus 
acquired the legal experience compared to that of other frequent users, such as the US and 
EU.60 Out of the first 10 disputes in which the ACWL gave its assistance, only two were 
disputes between developing countries. Out of the 10 most recent disputes, on the other hand, 
eight are between developing countries. When parties pursuing incompatible objectives in a 
dispute request the support of the ACWL, the help to the party that requested it later is 
provided through external counsel, however this does not entail additional costs for the party, 
as the ACWL finances the difference in fees.61 
Furthermore ‘[w]hen litigating a case ACWL staff work closely with officials from the home 
government in a conscious effort to create a learning process….While few individual 
                                                            
56 Davis, supra note 3, p. 265. 
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60 ACWL, supra note 48, 2013, p. 14. 
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developing countries will ever participate in more than a handful of WTO disputes, the 
Centre is quickly building experience as a repeat player to rival that of the US or EU trade 
ministries.’62  
In 49% of the cases, assistance in DSP was provided to category B countries and 48% to 
category C countries. The remaining 3% was provided to LDCs.63 The graph below shows 
the 33 countries which have participated either as complainant or respondent in the DSM 
since 2001 when the ACWL was established. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Korea, and 
Mexico have significant experience in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and have not 
acceded to the ACWL. Of the remaining 27 developing countries that have participated as 
complainant or defendant in dispute settlement proceedings since 2001, only five have not 
joined the ACWL: Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Moldova, South Africa, and Ukraine. The 
other 22 developing countries have all joined the ACWL. Thus, the ACWL has attracted as 
developing countries that have become actively involved in WTO legal matters but lack legal 
capacity or experience in these matters. Since, these are the very countries that the ACWL 
was intended to benefit, the institution is clearly bringing important improvement against the 
restraints in developing countries’ legal strength.  
 
Arguably, however, the progress in encouraging LDCs to seek redress through the DSM is 
still too limited. It is also important to note that, only in the case of Nicaragua,64 Bangladesh65 
and El Salvador,66 their first complaints were brought with the help of the ACWL. 
Furthermore, while Bangladesh only participated as a third party in one case before, El 
Salvador participated in such capacity many times prior, and apart from being a third party, 
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Nicaragua had previously been also a respondent in two cases. This indicates that ACWL 
fails to play an important role in encouraging new players to enter the DSM and help them 
overcome their initial reluctance. This is perhaps not surprising, since the ACWL provides 
legal advice or assistance in WTO dispute settlement proceedings only at the request of a 
developing country member or an LDC: the ACWL may not develop or propose dispute 
settlement proceedings to its developing country members or LDCs on its own initiative (the 
no "ambulance chasing rule").67 At the request of a developing country member, however, the 
ACWL may – and frequently does – evaluate a potential dispute and assist in developing the 
legal aspects of the case. From the point of view of assuring impartiality it is understandable 
that the ACWL can only step in after a request from a government had been made, however 
this ‘creates gaps and a demand for other groups to step in’ in the crucial stages before that 
request is made.68 In other words, ACWL cannot independently and proactively gather 
information at the pre-litigation stage about possible violations of WTO commitments to alert 
a developing country that their market access might be at risk.’69 This is problematic since it 
represents costs on the firms and other private entities most in need of the legal assistance 
that have to take on the task alone. The ACWL cannot subsidize the cost of acquiring the 
economic, legal and political information that a lawyer of a firm will need in order to 
convince his/her firm and his/her government that a foreign market access complaint is worth 
pursuing.70 Looking at it from this point of view, the ACWL is a tool only useful to those 
who already have enough knowledge about the WTO and the dispute process as well as 
knowledge about other relevant data and the resources to access it. Generally speaking the 
WTO approach where certain measures must be notified and others not, creates the problem 
of identifying breaches when the country affected does not have the expertise and resources 
to discover the breach. In terms of subsidies, Members are required to make regular 
notifications to the WTO as to their use. Interestingly many developing countries, including 
India and Brazil, have started out by making such notifications in the first few years of the 
WTO, but have since stopped, perhaps out of a ‘reluctance to disclose politically sensitive 
information and expose themselves to litigation.’71 This is a form of rebellion against the 
system in which notified measures are more easily targeted for litigation or pressure to 
discontinue them, such as was the case for balance of payments duties.   
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3. Different Phases of the Proceedings and the Vulnerability of Developing 
Countries 
As mentioned before, no bias has thus far been found in favour of either developed or 
developing countries in the outcomes of panel or Appellate Body proceedings. However the 
dispute settlement process includes also stages which are outside the control of these bodies, 
i.e. the consultations and the enforcement. Here the weaker party is again left to the power 
politics and developing countries have done notably less well at these stages in cases where 
the other party has been a developed country. 
 
a) Consultations  
Before being able to request the establishment of a panel, according to Art. 4.2 ‘[e]ach 
Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity 
for consultation’. Outside the WTO framework it is hard for a developing country to even 
enter into negotiations with a larger trade partner.72 For example when Vietnam sought 
negotiations with the US on its unilateral change of labelling policy which was preventing 
Vietnam from selling its catfish on the US market under the label ‘catfish’ it was met by a 
simple refusal to negotiate any compromise.73 The US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement 
(BTA), modelled closely on the WTO Agreements, does not provide for the adjudication of 
disputes, but establishes merely a joint committee that is given the mandate to serve as a 
forum for consultations.74 Despite the patent nature of the US violation of the BTA between 
the two countries and despite the fact that in the Peru-EC sardine dispute at the WTO the US 
had opposed a similar labelling restriction imposed by the EU when this was harming US 
producers, Vietnam had no leverage to urge a reconsideration of the policy and eventually 
had to accept to label its catfish as basa and tra when exported to the US market.75 At the 
WTO however, a party cannot simply refuse to enter consultations.  
However consultations may be problematic in the sense that they do not offer the same 
protection from power-inequalities yielding unfair results as do the panels. If the 
consultations fail, the complaining party can make a request for the creation of a panel and a 
rigorous procedure is followed to ensure an unbiased panel, where developing countries 
further have the right to a minimum of one panellist from another developing country when 
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they are in a dispute with a developed country.76 The responsible division of the Secretariat 
and the Legal Affairs Division provide the parties with the names of potential panellists from 
the indicative list of governmental and non-governmental individuals.77 Negotiations on the 
panellists are often highly contentious with multiple slates of candidates considered and 
discarded based on several indicators which may convince the parties that a candidate may be 
or may not be sympathetic to their case. For example a party may prefer candidates with 
professional credentials in economics over candidates with legal credentials; or capital-based 
diplomats over Geneva-based diplomats, as the former may be more sensitive to the 
complexities that Members face in complying with WTO rules; or they may prefer candidates 
from particular countries/regions where there is a similar economic situation; or candidates 
from countries where the measures at issue are also maintained, etc.78 If there is no agreement 
within 20 days, the Director General composes the panel, keeping in mind the selection 
criteria of the parties provided to him and aiming for a composition of the panel which will 
appear balanced to both sides.79 While in more than half of all cases the panels have been 
composed by the Director-General it has often been only to complete the panel composition 
after the parties already agreed on one or two candidates.80 This procedure has thus been 
characterized as guaranteeing an at least unbiased panel if not even ‘more’ than that. 
The Panel in Korean Liquor Taxes stated that the ‘conduct of consultations is not the concern 
of a panel but that the panel need only concern itself with the question whether consultations 
took place… The only requirement under the DSU is that consultations were in fact held’.81 
Indeed, in their study Busch and Reinhardt show that the reason why developed countries 
tend to gain more full or partial concessions from the dispute settlement proceedings for their 
complaints (72%) than developing countries (63%), is due to the vulnerability of developing 
countries in the consultation period, rather than after a panel has been established.82 ‘Early 
settlement’ actually offers the greatest likelihood of securing full concessions from a 
defendant, as the threat of legal condemnation83 or the costs of the proceedings84, rather than 
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a ruling per se is what induces settlement. As the representative of Antigua and Barbuda 
stated, “many small developing countries had made… informal settlements that were 
beneficial to United States economic interests after being told their laws were in violation of 
WTO law.”’85 Rich countries thus gain more concessions because developing countries are 
less able to negotiate concessions in the early stage of the dispute process due to their limited 
legal capacity and inability to meaningfully threaten retaliation whereas they do not want to 
proceed to a panel to avoid further costs.86  
It is thus understandable that power considerations seem to be less important than capacity 
constraints, as when countries with low income choose to initiate a dispute, it is more likely 
to be against a wealthy trade partner.87 However there still exist substantiated or 
unsubstantiated fears of repercussions outside the frame of the WTO. For instance Costa Rica 
was reluctant to challenge the US from fear of harming relations with them, however after 
filing the complaint against their transitional safeguard provisions for cotton underwear, the 
US complied with the ruling and there were none of the anticipated negative diplomatic 
repercussions.88 It has been further observed that the less dependent a country is on aid from 
another country, the more cases the former raises against the latter.89 Being in a preferential 
trade agreement with the other country also reduces the likelihood of engaging in a dispute 
with them.90 Countries may also simply lack the confidence to challenge a much larger 
trading partner, so they do not even try. The fact that the DSU wants Members to be judicious 
and only consider invoking the DSM when they feel their actions ‘would be fruitful’ and 
‘secure a positive resolution to a dispute’, may not be helpful in this regard.91 
The following discussion now turns to another element where power inequalities play a 
detrimental role in terms of developing countries seeking redress through the DSM, i.e. the 
enforcement of rulings by weaker countries against bigger players.  
 
b) Enforcement 
According to the legal positivism of John Austin, a rule should be accompanied by 
enforcement through sanctions administered by a legitimate central authority in order to 
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amount to law.92 When it comes to WTO law and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
arguably the biggest problem of developing countries, which furthermore has a negative 
impact on the costs of the procedures, is enforcement, or lack thereof. There is no mechanism 
at the WTO level for enforcement. The WTO has no economic powers to enforce dispute 
settlement decisions, it does not issue fines and it cannot tell sovereign Members what precise 
policy decisions they must take.93 A panel merely tells the ‘losing’ party to bring its measures 
into conformity with the Agreements somehow or another and it is only when the respondent 
does not take any steps towards conformity or if the complainant or the DSB do not find such 
steps to be satisfactory, that the dispute settlement can be re-activated with a second panel 
established to develop a recommendation on implementing measures.94 In the words of some 
observers ‘compliance remains substantially an elective choice’ while ‘the issue of 
mandatory enforcement is still open to interpretation.’95  The parties can either voluntarily 
comply with a ruling, agree on compensation or it is on the complainants to enforce it by 
themselves via WTO-sanctioned retaliation. Since compensation can only be due from the 
time of the expiry of the ‘reasonable period of time for implementation’ and not from the 
time that the measure in breach was enacted, it provides an incentive for resorting to litigation 
and prolonging it in order to gain time to maintain the domestic measure in question instead 
of conforming it to WTO rules. For example bringing the matter through the appeals process 
allows for an additional period of time during which WTO-inconsistent measures can remain 
in place.96 Similarly such an incentive is provided by the fact that when it comes to litigation 
fees, each party pays only for its own, and there is no additional risk of paying for the other 
party’s litigation fees in the event of losing the case. Thus WTO rules do not reach the 
threshold of what Austin describes as law and perhaps the realist view is more easily 
applicable since the latter describes the international system as one void of any authority to 
enforce existing rules, where abiding by obligations is guided merely by strategic interests 
and perceived cost-benefits or payoffs.97 In this view it is not surprising that studies have 
shown countries are more likely to impose new trade restrictions on partners that are less able 
to retaliate against them or enforce their commitments.98 On the same note studies have found 
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that trading partners with greater capacity to retaliate against US exporting firms are both less 
likely to be named in antidumping investigations and are less likely to have antidumping 
measures imposed against them after an investigation.99 
 
i) Enforcement from the GATT Years to the situation under the WTO 
All the above being said, still enforcement (or self-enforcement) at the GATT/WTO has 
come a long way, especially considering its beginnings. Under the 1947 GATT the dispute 
settlement system was far less elaborate than the one which came into existence with the 
DSU. The parties had more flexibility and greater control over their disputes and 
understandably the weight of each party was a relatively influential factor in the end result.100 
However according to Hudec, efficiency and enforcement was not much of an issue, since in 
his words, the nuanced diplomatic style of adjudication which was practiced was effective, 
because the GATT was ‘essentially a small ″club″ of like-minded trade policy officials [who] 
did not need a very elaborate decision-making procedure to generate an effective consensus 
about what particular governments were expected to do’ and ‘[u]ltimately… [the] rather 
delicate procedure worked because GATT’s member governments wanted it to work.’101 
Looking at developing countries’ participation in the initial period, it fit well into this system. 
Four out of the first 8 cases involved developing countries and ‘the nature of their complaints 
was identical to those of the other founding countries: they addressed concerns of balancing 
tariff concessions rather than attempting to enforce legal obligations.’102 Soon however, when 
five out of eight complaints brought by developing countries failed to result in a formal 
decision, they began to perceive the dispute settlement process as a useless exercise which 
provided them with no effective enforcement when the larger losing party refused to comply 
with the outcome.103 
Not surprisingly things got worse when the number of developing country Members 
drastically increased in the 1960s and suddenly there was an unwillingness to adjudicate ‘the 
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long agenda of legal claims being put forward by an increasingly aggressive Group of 77.’104 
Developing countries sought to address the discrepancies with basic GATT policy in sectors 
such as agriculture, with two cases particularly standing out: a complaint by Uruguay against 
the entire developed-country Membership, accusing them of preventing developing countries 
from receiving the overall level of benefits contemplated by GATT (see last part of this 
chapter) and a complaint by Brazil against a UK tariff increase on bananas.105 When the 
Uruguayan complaint failed many developing countries rightly saw it as a sign that the 
dispute settlement system was not designed to tackle the problems they faced or to protect 
their interests.106 Furthermore even though the UK withdrew its tariff increase it was joined 
by the US in condemning the ‘new’ strict legalistic approach in what they saw was a system 
that still required time for adjustment.107 This caused any legal claim to be perceived as an 
unfriendly act of aggression effectively incapacitating the DSM for over six years.108 From 
the 1970s onward there was a revival of the system, but a much more contentious 
Membership than the ‘club’ of the 1950s forced the GATT Secretariat to recognize that ‘the 
dispute settlement procedure would need to rely more heavily on the authority of "law" itself’ 
rather than semi-diplomatic procedures.109 There were essentially two differing views in the 
GATT on what kind of dispute settlement system was desirable. One group wanted a ‘power-
oriented approach’ where negotiations and diplomacy would be key and the dispute 
settlement procedures would only provide assistance to negotiators to resolve their 
differences; while the other group preferred an impartial panel which would make objective 
rulings.110 Despite the benefits of the former approach the latter is no doubt better for 
predictability and certainty, which is essential for entrepreneurs to be able to make 
appropriate efficient investment and market development decision.111 Especially criticized by 
analysts and legal scholars of GATT was the fatal flaw of its dispute-resolution procedures in 
that Member states could essentially undermine the creation of dispute-resolution panels as 
well as any decision that went against them by simply not agreeing to it, as all decisions 
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required consensus.112 This was done in a number of significant cases, particularly relating to 
subsidies.113 Another concern linked with the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism was 
the powerlessness of the system in preventing unilateralism and a general evasion of GATT 
rules by the powerful states when it suited them. The US for example ‘increasingly turned to 
unilateral remedies for perceived trade infractions’.114  
After the DSM was partially strengthened in the Tokyo Round there was an increased 
participation by the developing countries, however they nevertheless remained powerless 
about a number of quantitative restrictions operating outside GATT rules which were placed 
on textiles and electronics and for which there was no remedy through the DSM, while their 
attempts at opening up agricultural trade still faced panels more eager to avoid confrontation 
and seek compromise than making legally sound  decisions.115 
 
ii) Enforcement Under the WTO  
According to the realist theory, the efficiency of an international legal regime depends on the 
political will of the players and not on how strict the dispute settlement rules are, therefore it 
is not surprising that a more stringent legal regime brought about by the DSU did not 
eradicate enforcement issues. Yet the reforms brought important improvement in taming 
power through the establishment of an impartial judicial review of complaints and its 
introduction of the ‘right’ to a panel and the automatic adoption of panel reports. Under what 
is known as the ‘reverse consensus’ set out in Art. 6.1 of the DSU, a panel will be established 
unless there is a consensus against it and panel reports must be adopted within 60 days of the 
ruling unless there is a consensus against it or a party to the dispute appeals it.116 It is this 
which has typically been seen as the cause for greater confidence and participation of 
developing countries in the dispute settlement, with commentators attributing to the reverse 
consensus the ability to temper the power politics.117  
In terms of implementation of the rulings, Artile 22 of the DSU clearly states that full 
conformity with rulings is the preferred of all options: 
neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full 




112 J. Goldstein, et al., (eds.), Legalization and World Politics, (MIT Press, 2001), p. 293. 
113 Jackson, supra note 109, p.123. 
114 Goldstein, supra note 112. 
115 Clayton, supra note 102, pp. 259-261. 
116 DSU, Art. 16.4 
117 Busch, supra note 82, p. 719; Clayton, supra note 102, p. 251. 
241 
 
However Art. 3.7 the DSU sets out the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism as follows:  
to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and 
consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed 
solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of 
the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered 
agreements. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of 
the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which 
is inconsistent with a covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the 
Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of 
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the 
other Member, subject to authorization by the DSB of such measures.  
 
It is clear from both provisions that even though full conformity with rulings is ‘preferred’ 
the system still strives to appease all parties involved, even the party whose measures are in 
violation of WTO law and to not force it into anything it does not want to do. The fact that 
compliance is not induced by penalties or other aggressive measures has often been seen as a 
positive feature of the system as it keeps the balance between the WTO’s institutional 
legitimacy and the national sovereignty of its Members.118 As Palmeter explains on the case 
of the US, the Congress and the public accepted the WTO based on statements of the 
Executive Branch such as: 
[N]either the WTO nor its dispute settlement panels have any power to compel the United States to 
change its laws and regulations. Only the United States can decide how it will respond to WTO dispute 
settlement reports; and only the Congress can change US law.119 
[O]ur government was careful to structure the WTO dispute settlement rules to preserve our rights. The 
findings of a WTO dispute settlement panel cannot force us to change our laws. Only the United States 
determines exactly how it will respond to the recommendations of a WTO panel it at all. If a US 
measure is ever found to be in violation of a WTO provision, the United States may on its own decide 
to change the law; compensate a foreign country by lowering trade barriers of equivalent amount in 
another sector; or doing nothing and possibly undergo retaliation by the affected country in the form of 
increased barriers to US exports of an equivalent amount. But America retains full sovereignty in its 
decision of whether or not to implement a panel recommendation.120 
The United States maintains that it has the right not to comply with WTO rulings.121 
 
Toughening of the regime to induce the US to comply and arm-twisting would therefore 
justifiably upset them. As shown in the preceding chapters, the institutional legitimacy of 
WTO rules is weak in terms of development and indeed sovereignty would be welcome in 
order for developing countries to be able to protect their economies and carve out their policy 
space when necessary.122 The existing sovereignty however works in the other direction. It is 
                                                            
118 D. Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System: Essays on International Trade Law and Policy (Cameron May, 
2003), pp. 357-359.  
119 United States Trade Representative, 2000 Trade Policy Agenda and 1999 Annual Report of the President of 
the United States on the Trade Agreements Program 30, in Palmeter, ibid, p. 359. 
120 United States Trade Representative, America and the World Trade Organization 13, (emphasis in the 
original) in ibid. 
121 United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives, World Trade Organization: Issues in Dispute Settlement, at 16 (August 2000), in ibid. 
122 Santos, supra note 30. 
242 
 
only useful for those who can afford it, and they are usually the powerful states against which 
smaller states cannot retaliate effectively. Such selective sovereignty would then be worse 
than no sovereignty.  
 
a) Compensation 
Where a Member fails to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB within the 
‘reasonable period of time’, the DSB may authorise compensation whereby the Member must 
enter into negotiations with the other party, with a view to developing mutually acceptable 
compensation.123 Such compensation usually entails liberalising a different sector from that 
which was subject to the dispute. The rationale behind this is questionable, since ‘[f]rom the 
injured State’s perspective, [it] does no good to the private sectors suffering from the WTO-
inconsistent measures’ whereas in the non-complying Member private sectors which are not 
the focus of the proceedings are essentially paying for the governmental failure to respect 
international obligations.124 Still it provides some valuable policy space for developing 
countries which are able to afford such compensation in one sector to protect another. The 
problem lies rather in the fact that compensation has to happen on a MFN basis, meaning it 
has to be offered to all the trading partners, which makes it less useful or attractive.125 It does 
however reflect the fact that beyond individual private entities the overall economy of a 
country is more important to governments, which is understandable. Compensation in this 
sense allows for policy space in choosing which vital sectors need more protection. However 
it is clear that compensation is meant as a temporary measure and not as a substitute for 
bringing measures into conformity with the Agreements precisely to discourage Members 
from ‘buying their way out’ of their obligations.126 In terms of monetary compensation, it has 
been agreed to only once so far, in the amount of € 1,219,900 per year for a three-year period 
between the US and the EC in US-Copyright Act.127 
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of 
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings, Art. 21.5 provides that such 
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including 
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wherever possible resort to the original panel. As of 30 November 2012, 36 disputes had 
ended up in this procedure.128  
 
b) Retaliation 
If a Member does not voluntarily comply with a WTO ruling, and there is no satisfactory 
compensation agreed to within 20 days after the expiry of the ‘reasonable period of time’ the 
burden of enforcement falls on the complainant, which has the right to raise its tariffs or 
otherwise suspend WTO obligations against the products of a noncomplying Member.129 Art. 
22.4 of the DSU provides that ‘[t]he level of suspension of concessions or other obligations 
authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment’. How to 
determine such equivalence is of course another question. Art. 22.6 states that ‘if the Member 
concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed…, the matter shall be referred to 
arbitration’, however the DSU does not provide any further explanation on how this 
equivalence might be established.  
Between 1995 and 2007 only 17 disputes reached the stage at which respondent countries (a 
mix of developing and developed countries) sought and were granted the right to retaliate, 
however not all retaliations were actually carried out.130 This is not surprising however, 
considering that a greater capacity to retaliate increases the likelihood of the respondent 
increasing the foreign market access extended to the complainant at the conclusion of the 
dispute, whereas a lesser retaliation capacity will discourage the potential complainant from 
even fighting the matter at the dispute settlement system.131 
A further irony of the right to retaliate is that it turns the whole philosophy of the WTO on its 
head since that philosophy claims that for example raising tariffs would be just as harmful to 
the ‘victim’ as it would be to the noncomplying Member. As is argued in this thesis 
protectionism and such retaliation can have very beneficial effects on development, 
especially when it is done in the context of a country’s industrial plan. However this is not the 
free trade mantra. Thus the free trade proponent Friedman commented that ‘competition in 
masochism and sadism is hardly a prescription for sensible international economic policy!’132 
Indeed such retaliation can have a negative effect on the victim, in cases when they are a 
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smaller economy dependent on imports from the noncomplying Member which tend to be 
either necessities such as food or medicine, or fuel and inputs for local manufacturers.133 
Retaliation has thus even been accused of being inconsistent with both its own objectives, i.e. 
to provide an effective safeguard for compliance, as well as the underlying principles of the 
WTO, i.e. increasing global welfare through a liberalised global market.134 When retaliation 
is detrimental to the victim, it may simply choose not to retaliate. For example in US – Byrd 
Amendment eight complainants got authorization to retaliate, however only the EC, Canada 
and Mexico actually did, while Chile, India, Korea and Brazil chose not to retaliate.135  
Worse still it is often the case that when a small economy is retaliating against a large 
economy, the latter is hardly affected. The size of the respondent’s exports to the complainant 
is an important factor in determining its retaliation capacity, as the larger they are, the more 
flexibility the complainant has to choose sufficiently credible retaliation targets, which in turn 
usually guarantees a favourable outcome from the dispute in the first place.136 Other reasons 
for a reluctance to retaliate unsurprisingly include the unwillingness of developing countries 
to upset the system.137  
Regardless of these difficulties however it has been shown that when the conditions are met, 
developing countries have a strong weapon for ensuring effectiveness of their retaliation in 
Art. 22.3 (c) of the DSU which allows for the suspension of concessions under another 
agreement than that of the initial violation. 
 
c) Suspension under the Same Agreement or Alternative Suspensions 
Art. 22.3 of the DSU sets out that in considering what concessions or other obligations to 
suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures: 
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions 
or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as … [the] violation or other 
nullification or impairment; 
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(b) if that party considers that [this] is not practicable or effective…, it may seek to suspend 
concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement; 
(c) if that party considers that [this] is not practicable or effective…, and that the 
circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations 
under another covered agreement. 
In applying these principles the party is further required to take into account the trade in the 
sector or under the agreement which was violated and its importance to that party, the 
broader economic elements and consequences of a suspension, and if it chooses option (b) or 
(c) it has to clarify its reasons for such a request.138 
This list of certain qualitative and quantitative economic factors that must be weighed is not 
exclusive, however due to strong disagreements during the drafting of the DSU the 
Understanding did not specify a standard of review which should be used to examine 
countries’ trade measures, or their determination that they could not suspend concessions 
under similar provisions of The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).139 Such 
determinations were left for panels to subsequently determine.140 A number of noteworthy 
disputes have already taken place regarding the type and level of retaliation to be authorized, 
however this number is still small and there is no consistency in arguments or in the way they 
influence arbitrators.141  
 
d) Suspension under TRIPS 
Arguably the most effective means of retaliation is the possibility of suspension of TRIPS 
obligations. In three cases so far,142 such retaliation has been authorized, however it has never 
been actually implemented. Still it has served as a threat. In the words of one commentator 
such retaliation ‘constitutes a grave threat to developed economies while imposing minimal 
unpleasant effects on the inflicting country’.143 
When Brazil was allowed $800 million in retaliation in the Cotton dispute, it asked to 
suspend intellectual property rights on certain products. While it only identified categories of 
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intellectual property rights it was considering for retaliation and was days away from 
imposing this kind of retaliation in 2010, ‘officials from the US Trade Representative’s office 
flew down to hurriedly negotiate a compromise. The agreement was that Brazil would 
postpone retaliation and the US would pay Brazil $147.3 million annually until a new Farm 
Bill was enacted.’144 Similarly in the EC - Bananas case, after threatening retaliation under 
TRIPS, Ecuador entered into successful negotiations with the EC.145  
 
e) Antigua-Gambling and suspension under TRIPS 
An illustration of why retaliation under TRIPS is important in cases where an economically 
more powerful opponent has no intention of implementing the panel’s recommendations is 
US – Gambling. In this case Antigua was awarded the right to suspend TRIPS obligations at a 
value of $21 million. Even though the amount authorized was a mere fraction of the amount 
requested, which was $3.443 billion, and by the account of the separate opinion of one of the 
arbitrators, a mere fraction of the amount that Antigua deserved,146 the decision was still far 
more positive than if retaliation had only been allowed in the same sector or under the same 
agreement as the violation. 
Antigua alleged that the US was in breach of its commitments under the GATS Art. XIV, by 
passing laws which restricted credit card company involvement in payments related to 
Internet Gambling, a service Antigua’s economy still largely depends on despite attempts at 
its economy’s diversification.147 The US, on the other hand, claimed that its statutes were 
necessary to protect public morals and to maintain public order, which was accepted by the 
Appellate Body as a valid argument, however the US failed to show that the prohibitions in 
one of these acts, i.e. the Interstate Horseracing Act applied to both domestic and foreign 
suppliers and was therefore found to be discriminatory.148  
The US took no action to bring its laws into conformity with the recommendations of the 
Appellate Body and the matter eventually reached a Compliance Panel under Art. 21.5. 
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Ignoring the nature of this Panel, the US continued with the same arguments as before 
basically claiming that the laws were never a breach of the agreements and therefore the 
inaction of the US was actually ‘conformity’.149 In other words, the US showed a complete 
disregard of the Appellate Body’s ruling and authority and showed no intent of compliance. 
The Panel rejected the US reasoning and declared that for conformity to exist ‘some change 
must come about’.150 Antigua therefore requested authorization to suspend certain GATS 
privileges and TRIPS concessions. 
Antigua’s arguments for a TRIPS suspension included the fact that it was the smallest WTO 
Member ‘by far’ to have made a request for the suspension of concessions and that it was an 
import-dependent economy where 48.9 per cent of its imports came from the US, and thus to 
retaliate in the goods or service sectors would essentially mean hurting its own population by 
making services more expensive for them, while there would be ‘virtually no impact’ on the 
US.151 Furthermore it proved that the ‘circumstances were serious enough’ with the fact that 
its economy was completely dependent on tourism and financial services.152 This was also 
sufficient for the requirements and Antigua was granted the right to suspend TRIPS 
obligations. The arbitrators concluded that based on the low volume of imports in the sector 
where the violation was found and based on the effect on Antigua’s consumers, it would not 
be practicable or effective for Antigua to retaliate in the same sector153 and that the 
circumstances were serious enough due to the extreme inequality of trade between the two 
countries and Antigua’s heavy reliance on tourism and services.154  
In the same way as in the 22.6 arbitration decision in EC-Bananas III, the arbitration decision 
in US – Gambling indicated that a country requesting the third option under Art. 22.3 is 
entitled to a ‘margin of appreciation’: 
‘We agree with the arbitration in EC-Bananas III (Ecuador) that this includes a determination 
‘whether the complaining party in question has considered the necessary facts objectively’ 
and also ‘whether, on the basis of these facts, it could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it 
was not practicable or effective to seek suspension within the same sector under the same 
                                                            
149 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services: Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, Panel Report, WT/DS285/RW, para. 6.4. 
150 Ibid, paras. 6.12-6.14. 
151 US-Gambling, supra note 145, paras. 4.2, 4.89, 4.92-4.94, 4.97-4.99.  
152 Ibid, para. 4.3.  
153 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services: Recourse to 
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU; WT/DS285/ARB, para. 4.60 
154 Ibid, paras 4.110-1, 4.113. 
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agreements, or only under another agreement provided that the circumstances were serious 
enough.’155 In the words of one commentator,  
[a]ffirming the standard for an Article 22.3 suspension along these lines indicates a significant amount of 
flexibility for the complaining country. For developing countries seeking an asymmetrical remedy, a 
flexible ‘reasonableness’ standard represents a significant benefit. What this means for Antigua, and 
other developing countries, is that the WTO has chosen to defer to such countries’ determinations that 
they cannot effectively retaliate against developed economies using traditional means.156  
 
Even though Antigua’s argument that it was ‘not practicable or effective’ to suspend services 
or goods under GATS, was largely based on its claim of a $3 billion loss, ‘the 22.6 arbitration 
decision still found authorization for the 22.3 action, even where the amount at issue was 
reduced to roughly $20 million. Such a finding strengthens the conclusion that the suspension 
of TRIPS could become a frequent recourse for smaller economies.’157  
To convince the Panel in EC-Bananas III, Ecuador in turn submitted numbers to the 
arbitrators showing the vast inequality between them and the EC as well as how their whole 
economy depended on the banana trade (calling it the ‘lifeboat’ of its economy) and how 
their exports to the EC only made up a negligible portion of EC’s trade in those areas.158 The 
arbitrators were convinced that it was not ‘realistic or possible’ for Ecuador to implement 
normal retaliation against the EC and authorized retaliation under a different agreement, 
namely TRIPS.159 In contrast to these successful arguments the right for cross-retaliation was 
not granted in cases where a country’s trade in the disputed sector was considered sufficient 
for retaliation, even if the country was a developing one. For example in US – Upland Cotton 
Brazil argued that to suspend trade in the goods sector with the US would be against its 
objectives as a developing country and thus ‘costly and impracticable by definition’, however 
this argument was rejected as the arbitrator did not find it sufficiently explained why it would 
not be ‘practical or effective’ to retaliate in such a manner if the total goods imports from the 
US greatly exceeded the level of permissible countermeasures.160 
Not surprisingly India wants an automatic right to retaliate under another agreement for 
developing countries, which would be a positive step even though retaliation capacity is not 
related to a country’s level of development and it varies considerably across nations.161  
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f) The benefit of TRIPS Suspension as Retaliation 
So what are the advantages and limitations of retaliation under TRIPS? Its first advantage is 
that it does not harm the local consumers by making services or goods more expensive for 
them. On the contrary it rather lowers the cost of payments for intellectual property, 
essentially only harming the holders of IP rights. In this sense suspending copyright would 
make goods more available to the consumers in the domestic market while suspending 
patents would make endeavours such as imitation and reverse technologies more feasible, 
thus enhancing the technological advancement of a retaliating developing country.162 These 
arguments further prove the fact that TRIPS has a solely negative effect on development. 
Furthermore in instances such as the production of generic drugs, the suspension of patent 
rights could mean an increased availability of life saving drugs for those who can otherwise 
not afford them. 
Also, because having less IP protection is usually beneficial to small developing countries 
and because the suspension of TRIPS as a form of retaliation can be tailored to maximize its 
beneficial impact, it is easier to convince the targeted Member, that it will actually be 
implemented, thus constituting a credible, more effective threat.163  
The owners of intellectual property in developed countries are a powerful political 
constituency and if targeted have sufficient political influence to lobby their government for 
compliance.164 
However it is important to realize that retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement is still not a 
magic wand that works in any situation. The protection of other interests may still override 
the concern from the targeted Member about IP rights holders’ losses. Townsend for example 
does not attribute the efforts at compliance with the WTO ruling by the US in US – Cotton to 
any threat of retaliation or cross-retaliation by Brazil.165 On the contrary, in as much as the 
US did seek to comply it was merely due to its desire to comply.166 However it only made 
changes to those of its four farm programs found to be in violation of the SCM Agreement 
that were easier for it to reform but it did not change those policies that were the ‘pillars of 
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US farm policy’,167 namely the so-called ML payments regulating sales of commodities, 
helping stabilize the price farmers receive for cotton and discouraging slumps in market 
prices immediately following harvest and the CC (counter-cyclical) payments compensating 
farmers if market prices fall below a specified trigger.168 Both of these encourage over-
production and were proven to be actionable subsidies which caused serious prejudice to 
Brazil, however regardless of an existence or non-existence of an imminent threat of a TRIPS 
retaliation, it would have been too costly to US interests to scrap these policies or even 
acknowledge their illegality as doing so would have called into question much of the US farm 
support system.169 In the words of Palmeter: ‘Probably the only Members of the WTO 
presently able to impose a cost that would induce the United States, the EC or Japan to 
comply with their WTO obligations are the United States, the EC and Japan.’170 In all other 
cases if these countries bring their measures into compliance it is because they choose to. Not 
because they would be forced to by any adverse consequences.  
4. The Law Itself as the Ultimate Limitation of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
In the words of Koskenniemi, ‘[w]hile the way international law is spoken, and thus applied, 
reflects the profoundly inequitable constellation of power today, it also offers avenues of 
resistance and experimentation. It may be used to support and to challenge hegemony. 
Though it often empowers the ‘wrong’ people and justifies the ‘bad’ decision, this is by no 
means necessarily the case.’171 This statement rings true for the WTO DSM. As discussed 
above, developing countries face many challenges in their access to redress via the dispute 
settlement and more importantly in trying to enforce rulings in their favour. Many of these 
challenges however can be surmounted as practice has shown and weaker countries can use 
the DSM as a weapon against much stronger players. However, as long as the law applied is 
fundamentally unjust and in many ways anti-developmental, there can only be so much scope 
for a true rebalancing of the system. The goal of development has been characterised as a 
‘constitutional and legislative tenet of the WTO’172, however despite its prominent place in 
the Preamble, sustainable development is not included in any of the binding agreements 
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establishing rights and obligations aimed at achieving it. Thus according to the nulla poena 
sine lege principle, it seems that a de iure or de facto protection of sustainable development 
under the WTO is not actually possible in the current framework.173  
 
5. The Limitations of Taking into Account the Objects and Purposes of WTO 
Agreements in Treaty Interpretation  
The following section looks at the limitations of the possibility of developing countries to 
rely on exceptions to general rules and the objects and purposes found in the WTO 
Agreements to carve out policy space needed for development.  
Some people claim treaty interpretation is an art, while others claim that when the meaning 
sought after is ‘inferred from sound premises according to the accepted rules of inference’ 
then it is clearly a science and the rules limit the scope of creative lawmaking.174 The 
introduction of the Appellate Body to the GATT/WTO system with the Marrakesh 
Agreement in 1995 has brought a more strictly legal approach to the interpretation of WTO 
rules than previously, relying heavily on public international law rules of interpretation found 
mainly in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). According to the VCLT, a 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.175 The 
context includes the preamble and annexes and several other indicators,176 while 
supplementary means of interpretation include the travaux preparatoires and the 
circumstances of the conclusion of a treaty.177 While some claim there is no hierarchy 
between the means of interpretation, others see the recourse to the object and purpose of a 
treaty only possible when the text itself is not determinative. In the words of Howse, the 
object and purpose of a treaty cannot be a basis for reading into the text a diminution of a 
right or an increased obligation, unless the words themselves at least point to the application 
of such extrinsic interpretative materials.178 Interpretation in light of the object and purpose of 
a treaty is part of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is an essential part of WTO 
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jurisprudence179 and requires Member states to put into effect the rules and principles arising 
under the treaty. This means that the treaty needs to be implemented in ‘good faith’, i.e. in a 
way that pays due respect to the purpose of the treaty so that the intentions of the Parties can 
be realized.180 Consequently Member states must refrain from any action which would defeat 
a treaty’s object or purpose.181 Yet, adjudicators at the DSM have been relying far more on 
the dictionary meaning of the agreements (i.e. the literal approach) than looking at their 
object and purpose. This ‘judicial conservatism’ has been justified by Ehlermann as 
providing protection to the AB from criticism that it is ‘adding to or diminishing the rights 
provided in the covered agreements’, while it has been criticised by developing countries who 
claim that the hierarchy between text and context is not supported by the VCLT.182  Perhaps 
the crux of the matter is that the ultimate aim of the treaty interpretation process is to 
establish the legally correct meaning of a treaty, which lawyers naturally understand to be the 
communicative intention of the treaty parties, i.e. what the parties intended the treaty to 
express. When the object and purpose is only there to provide perceived legitimacy to the 
substantive rules and does not really reflect the desire of the state parties, it cannot be given 
equal weight in the interpretation process.  
The preamble is the commonly used source and, according to the International Law 
Commission, the main guidance on the object and purpose of a treaty.183 Some treaties have 
provisions among their substantive articles specifically listing the treaty’s objective and 
purpose. Such an example would be the TRIPS agreement. In terms of where the object and 
purpose is specified, i.e. in the preamble or the substantive articles, it practically makes no 
difference. Furthermore, practice shows that courts and tribunals tent to find it difficult to 
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establish a reasoned distinction between the object and purpose of a treaty and that of 
particular provisions.  
In the Oil Platforms case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) took into consideration the 
terms of the preamble which were the ‘encouraging [of] mutually beneficial trade and 
investments and closer economic intercourse generally’ as well as ‘regulating consular 
relations’ between the two states, to interpret the treaty’s Art. 1 stating that ‘[t]here shall be 
firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship between the two states.’184 The provision in 
question was itself of a general formulation which was why the Court considered that it could 
not be interpreted in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty itself.185 The ICJ 
further made substantial use of the preamble in the case concerning Rights of Nationals of the 
United States of America in Morocco and the Asylum (Colombia/Peru) case.186 Important 
international arbitrators have likewise resorted to preambles as guides to their 
interpretations.187 Both the VCLT and practice make it clear, however, that the substantive 
provisions of the treaty provide a fuller indication of the object and purpose.188 In other 
words, the object and purpose of the preamble cannot be used to counter clear substantive 
provisions. As the Iran-US Claims Tribunal put it: ‘[t]he object and purpose is not to be 
considered in isolation from the terms of the treaty; it is intrinsic to its text [and] is to be used 
only to clarify the text, not to provide independent sources of meaning that contradict the 
clear text.’189 Thus the object and purpose of a treaty can play a great role but only when it is 
not in direct contradiction with the text of specific provisions or other objects and purposes of 
a treaty.  
After the Marrakesh Agreement came into force its Preamble had become an important 
reference point in legal discourse.190 Yet as the analysis of this thesis shows the Preambular 
object and purpose of development and the raising of standards of living is many times in 
direct conflict with substantive provisions of the WTO Agreements and the liberalisation 
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mandate of the Preambule itself. Considerations of the object and purpose of economic 
development could play a greater role at least in interpretations of special and differential 
treatment (SDT) since here it cannot really be seen as being in conflict with the substantive 
provisions or the Preambular acknowledgement of developing countries’ special needs. Such 
an approach could ensure a meaningful application of SDT. Yet as shown in chapter IV, 
adjudicators at the DSM have nevertheless looked at SDT provisions mainly very 
conservatively, taking great care not to afford any rights to developing countries or impose 
obligations on developed countries which are not strictly specified as mandatory in the text to 
the point where it seems in practice many hortatory SDT provisions become completely 
useless. In terms of SDT providing additional policy space for developing countries, the 
Panel referred in Brazil — Aircraft (Article 21.5 — Canada) to the Preambular ‘need for 
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development’. It stated that: 
[t]his overarching concern of the WTO Agreement finds ample reflection in the SCM Agreement. 
Article 27 of that Agreement recognizes that "subsidies may play an important role in economic 
development programmes of developing country Members" and provides substantial special and 
differential treatment for developing countries, including in respect of export subsidies.191  
 
The Panel further referred to the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement.192 Importantly 
the Panel agreed with Brazil that: 
the SCM Agreement should not be interpreted in a manner that provides special and less favourable 
treatment for developing country Members in the field of export credit terms if the text of the Agreement 
permits of an alternative interpretation. In particular, an interpretation of the SCM Agreement that 
allowed developed country Members to consistently offer export credit terms more favourable than those 
that could in practice be offered by developing country Members – at least as of the date the export 
subsidy prohibition applies to any given developing country Member – would be at odds with one of the 
objects and purposes of the WTO Agreement generally and the SCM Agreement specifically.193 
 
Thus the Panel used the Preamble for little more than an affirmation and praise of the text of 
the SCM Agreement (which is in reality far from perfect in this regard) and clearly stated that 
even if it considered a specific provision to be in conflict with said object and purpose it 
would only interpret it differently, if the text of the Agreement allowed it to do so.  
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6. US-Shrimp as a False Sign of Judicial Activism 
The dispute settlement has been accused of a ‘structural bias in favour of trade liberalization 
at the expense of members’ regulatory discretion in promoting other national interests’.194 
This is reflected in the asymmetrical pattern in the outcomes of the disputes, which reveals 
that complainants enjoy much higher success rates than defendants.195 This bias has 
undermined the perceived legitimacy of the DSM196 yet it is most likely rooted in the law 
itself which drastically curtails policy space to an anti-intuitive extent. Articles 3.2 and 19.2 
of the DSU require that both the panels and the AB ‘must not add to or diminish rights and 
obligations provided in the WTO Agreement'. The adjudicators are furthermore not permitted 
to adopt readings of the law ‘that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a 
treaty to redundancy or inutility’.197 Revolutionary interpretations in light of goals and 
purposes not specifically reflected in substantive provisions are thus highly unlikely and 
indeed rarely happen.  
The US-Shrimp198 case has been seen by many as an exception in this regard and thus 
criticised for so-called ‘judicial activism’. The case involved trade restrictive measures 
against shrimp which was caught in a manner that was harmful to turtles. Citing evidence 
from the Preamble, the Uruguay negotiations and the Decision on Trade and Environment the 
AB noted that neither Art. XX nor WTO law in general can be read so as to give effect to 
overarching trade objectives brushing aside all other considerations.199 It took the position 
that trade restrictive measures were allowed not merely on the basis of the final product but 
also on production methods and it further considered turtles to fall under the category of 
‘exhaustible natural resources’.200 Bhagwati stated that he was astounded that the AB in US-
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Shrimp reversed what he characterised as long-standing jurisprudence on process and 
production methods and that he had little doubt that the jurists were reflecting the political 
pressures brought by the rich-country environmental non-governmental organisations  and 
essentially made law that affected the developing countries adversely.201 Gardiner in turn 
criticised the decision for in effect taking a one-sided view of the object and purpose of the 
WTO Agreement when it fashioned ‘a new test not found in the text of the Agreement.’202 
Thus US-Shrimp has been seen as one of the rare example of the DSM showing willingness 
to broadly interpret reasons for trade-restrictive measures and since the decision was in 
favour of the US, it has been speculated that this willingness depends mainly on who benefits 
from it, believing that dispute settlement panels are not immune to US pressure.203 In other 
words, the flexibility in the law is seen to already exist even for the allowance of protectionist 
measures with the goal of economic development, if panels merely chose to use it for 
developing countries, the same way they used it for the US.204 The present author does not 
share this impression. In US-Shrimp the AB specified that:  
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be 
interpreted. It is the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose 
of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is 
equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is 
desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.205 
 
The AB further alluded to the potential conflict between the objects and purposes of the 
WTO Agreement by stating that:206  
most treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose but rather a variety of different, and possibly 
conflicting, objects and purposes. This is certainly true of the WTO Agreement. Thus, while the first 
clause of the preamble to the WTO Agreement calls for the expansion of trade in goods and services, this 
same clause also recognizes that international trade and economic relations under the WTO Agreement 
should allow for ‘optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development’ and should seek to ‘protect and preserve the environment.’  
 
The AB reverted to the Preamble to establish that the meaning of ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’ had to be understood in evolutionary terms, in light of the development of 
international environmental law, science, and policy. Importantly, the AB acknowledged 
that the Preamble which was written nearly 40 years after the original GATT was the new 
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framework for its interpretation – ‘that the creation of the WTO represented a fundamental 
moment, one that in this case placed the relevant provisions of GATT within a broader 
universe of international law and policy relevant to environment and development, as well 
as general public international law.’207 Yet in this sense it would be hard to claim that the 
Panel or AB really departed from standard principles of treaty interpretation and the 
perception that they went beyond the substantive provisions of the Agreement is 
exaggerated. Equally misleading are conclusions that there exists general flexibility in the 
law, which is only used when it benefits the US. Furthermore as to disregarding the 
distinction in treatment between final product and process, the only ‘jurisprudence’ 
establishing a principle to the contrary had been two unadopted Tuna/Dolphin Panel 
reports, whereas there is no such principle specified in the text of the Agreement.208  
The fact that the Panel and AB were able to use more flexibility in US-Shrimp than they 
would have been in a situation of protectionist measures for the sake of economic 
development, is hardly surprising considering the wording of the articles on general 
exceptions. Art. XX allows for trade restricting measures if these are necessary for the 
protection of the listed legitimate interests: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
  
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the 
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the 
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;… 
 
Economic development is clearly not specifically listed as one of the legitimate interests 
which can be protected, while the conservation of exhaustible natural resources is. A question 
relevant for the present discussion would then be, whether economic development could fall 
under any of the listed interests. In terms of the public morals exception, all major WTO 
agreements include it, however they do not define it. The AB defined it in the 2005 case of 
US-Gambling as ‘standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a 
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community or nation’.209 One could convincingly argue that protecting the economic 
development of poorer countries, forms the common morals and values of the community and 
especially the nations of developing countries, and thus a developing country could claim that 
its measures imposing restrictions on trade are necessary for the protection of public morals. 
Similarly, and perhaps even more convincingly, one could argue that development is a 
precondition for the sustainable guarantee of human health and thus justifies measures for its 
protection under paragraph b). Furthermore paragraph d) seemingly offers unlimited 
possibilities for justifying exceptions, as long as a country’s own laws or regulations 
necessitate it, and why should development not simply be added to a Member state’s national 
legal system (see below an analysis of India’s recent failed attempt to justify domestic 
content requirements in this regard)? Theoretically and with a more open interpretation, this 
could all be successfully argued. However, as discussed, economic development is almost 
equated with liberalisation at the WTO and thus the only equilibrium which is being sought at 
the DSM is between free trade (as far as it has been agreed in the separate agreements) and 
the protection of the environment or human rights. There is no recognition that economic 
development may necessitate protectionist or discriminatory measures and if it does this is 
already perfectly reflected in the Agreements without need for allowing more exceptions.210 
Thus developing countries cannot invoke the goal of sustainable development to successfully 
defend their industrial policies aimed at economic development. Furthermore protectionist 
measures are forbidden ab initio in the chapeau of Art. XX. It is exactly this part of the two-
fold test of Art. XX that has been most rigidly interpreted by the WTO/GATT jurisprudence. 
This is understandable as it goes to the core principles of GATT/WTO which are MFN and 
national treatment. For example in Herring and Salmon, Canada claimed that its prohibition 
on the exportation of certain unprocessed salmon and unprocessed herring was put in place to 
enable a precise catch control indispensable for managing the stock, however the Panel found 
Canada’s primary aim211 to ‘have been the protection of employment within the fish 
processing industry by increasing the amount of processing done in Canada, rather than the 
                                                            
209 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
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conservation of exhaustible natural resources.212 Unsurprisingly this ‘hidden protectionism’ 
caused Canada to lose its case. Canada is not a developing country and it further did not 
claim its measures to be justified under protecting their economic development, but a 
developing country would equally lose a case under similar circumstances. The avoidance of 
protectionist measures is at the core of Art. XX and its interpretations. In the pre-WTO era, 
even if alternative measures of protecting a legitimate interest under Art. XX would be at a 
great expense to the country in question, the country was still expected to choose those 
alternative measures, before it should consider restrictions on trade under Art. XX.213 In other 
words, the idea is to allow for space for the pursuit of legitimate environmental and other 
policy goals, ‘while keeping protectionism firmly in check’ as Deputy Director General, Mr 
Bauer recently noted:  
The case law has confirmed that members may be permitted to apply trade-restrictive environmental 
measures as long as they are not applied arbitrarily or used as disguised protectionism. The outcome has 
been often more coherent and consistent environmental policies.214  
 
Direct or indirect references to sustainable development are used mostly to deepen the 
exceptions of Art. XX of GATT, XIV of GATS and Art. 27 of TRIPS regarding exclusions 
from patentability necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that 
such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.215 Not 
surprisingly however, the individual arguments raised mainly apply to a concern with the 
protection of human rights or the environment. Rarely can one find an openly expressed 
preoccupation with economic development or poverty as such. One example would be India-
Quantitative Restrictions on Imports, where India tried to justify the restrictions based on its 
concern about the impact on wages and employment especially in the context of cheap 
agricultural imports entering the market.216 As expected, however, this did not prevent the 
Panel from finding the restrictions to be in violation of WTO law. Much more common 
therefore is the use of protectionist measures with the aim of economic development, which 
are not presented as such at the DSM. Instead, the country employing the measures tries to 
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justify them by claiming for example solely the protection of the environment, exhaustible 
natural resources or human rights. This is analysed in detail in the next section.  
Some flexibility beyond what the practice has shown is nevertheless implied by the wording 
of Art. XX in the sense that the discrimination must be ‘justifiable’, not ‘arbitrary’ and that 
the measures must be ‘necessary’. In this regard, a study by the International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development suggested that the ‘developing condition’ could inform what is 
‘necessary’ in terms of Art. XX GATT, XIV GATS or 27 of TRIPS and that the 
‘development condition’ could even provide justification in terms of ‘unjustifiable 
discrimination’ under Art. XX GATT.217 Especially the latter option would be highly useful, 
as it could potentially allow for protectionism and other discriminatory measures by 
developing countries to protect their economic development if the panels ever displayed a 
willingness to allow for such a flexibility. In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the AB noted that 
analysing whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable usually involves an analysis that 
relates primarily to the cause or the rationale of the discrimination.218 It further noted that 
‘discrimination can result from a rational decision or behaviour and still be ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable’, because it is explained by a rationale that bears no relationship to the objective 
of the measure provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs of Art. XX, or goes against 
that objective.219 Theoretically thus, a country could claim its trade restricting policies were 
necessary to protect its economic development - a legitimate interest forming part of public 
morals or the countries’ laws and regulations. In practice, these arguments would not go far.  
7. The Goal of Development and other Developmental Arguments as Weak Shields 
at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
Below is an analysis of case law involving situations where developing countries tried to 
justify their trade restrictive measures either by reference to sustainable development or 
directly to economic development. The analysis uncovers the limitations of this in the current 
practice. 
One important policy space for development is the ability to regulate trade in one’s natural 
resources. As Members of the WTO, countries take on liberalisation commitments in this 
regard, it is thus essential to ask whether they can carve out additional policy space at the 
DSM, beyond what they have secured in the WTO agreements or their individual accession 
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protocols, by reference to their development needs. In this regard the case of China-Raw 
Materials220 is examined, concerning China’s export restrictions and export taxes on several 
raw materials (i.e. bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon 
metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc). At the DSM China sought to defend these measures by 
claiming that as a developing country and as a matter of its sovereignty it could limit exports 
to foster economic development based on these resources.221 
Initially problematic was the finding that China could not even rely on GATT exceptions 
with respect to some of its accession commitments, regardless of whether its measures would 
have met the conditions of Art. XX. China argued that the text of Paragraph 11.3 of its 
Accession Protocol shows that WTO Members, in imposing an obligation on China to forego 
export duties in certain circumstances, did not exclude the right to regulate trade, which was 
‘an inherent power enjoyed by a Member government’ and a sovereign right found in the text 
of the covered agreements read as a whole.222 Despite agreeing with China, that Members 
have an inherent and sovereign right to regulate trade, the Panel nevertheless concluded that 
China exercised that right when negotiating and agreeing with the provisions of its Accession 
Protocol, thus the text of this Protocol is now ‘the ultimate expression of China’s 
sovereignty’ and the wording and context of Paragraph 11.3 determines its scope.223 Since the 
respective paragraph does not explicitly provide China with the possibility of invoking Art. 
XX of the GATT, the Panel concluded that allowing such invocations would ‘change the 
content and alter the careful balance achieved in the negotiation of China’s Accession 
Protocol. It would thus undermine the predictability and legal security of the international 
trading system.’224 Therefore it is clear that bargaining takes precedence over the values 
contained in Art. XX or the objects and purposes purported in the various WTO Agreements. 
At the AB, China referred to the language contained in the preambles of the WTO 
Agreement, the GATT 1994, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Import Licensing 
Agreement, the GATS and TRIPS, to argue that the Panel distorted the balance of rights and 
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obligations established in China’s Accession Protocol by assuming that China had abandoned 
its right to import export duties to promote fundamental non-trade interests.225 The AB 
however simply stated that it understands the WTO Agreement, as a whole, to reflect the 
balance struck by WTO Members between trade and non-trade-related concerns, whereas the 
lack of any textual reference to Art. XX of the GATT in Paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession 
Protocol gives no basis for the applicability of this article.226 Here again, it is reaffirmed that 
the preambles give no extra rights or values to be protected beyond the strict readings of the 
texts of the various Agreements. Thus one can rightly conclude that these preambles and their 
boastful proclamations add nothing of practical value. They only serve as a legitimising tool 
for agreements which severely lack legitimacy due to their bargaining nature which secures 
the interests of the more powerful over the rest, regardless of essential values and rights 
which countries should have the ability to protect.  
Based on what it claimed was its right to economic diversification, China sought to justify the 
discriminatory nature of its measures. It argued that GATT Art. XXXVI:5 can be used as 
legal context in the interpretation of Art. XX(g) and that Art. XXXVI:5 confirms that it is 
entitled to use and conserve its natural resources for itself with a view to diversifying its own 
economy. Supporting its steel industry would help it to diversify due to its positive influence 
on the infrastructure sector, which in turn, would spur China’s overall economic 
development, industrialisation and diversification.227  
The Panel was however less than impressed with this argumentation and expressed:  
a certain difficulty in seeing how a reference to the right to diversification set out in Article XXXVI:5 can 
assist it in its interpretation of Article XX(g). Even assuming that China has properly identified an 
interpretative ambiguity in Article XX(g), and that Article XXXVI:5 includes a right to economic 
diversification – which we are not suggesting it does – we cannot agree with China that such a right could 
undermine or even contradict the terms of paragraph (g) that require even-handed domestic restrictions on 
production or consumption.228 
 
This is a clear example of the inability of developing countries to claim economic 
development as a justification for restrictive measures on trade and it goes to the core of the 
problem highlighted in this thesis. China furthermore tried to justify its measures with Part IV 
of the GATT, in relation to Art. XI:2(a). It argued that Art. XXXVI:5 and its Ad Note support 
the view that Art. XI:2(a) may be applied to address a product that is important to domestic 
processing industries. It submitted that the essential nature of a ‘primary product’ for a 
developing country may derive from the product’s role in securing economic diversification 
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through the development of domestic processing industries claiming it provided context to 
justify a broad understanding of Art. XI:2(a) when applied to developing countries.229 The 
Panel found that China did not meet the conditions of Art. XI and rejected the possibility of a 
broader interpretation of Art. XI for developing countries, concluding that the conditions of 
the article apply equally to all Members. Thus China’s efforts of justifying restrictive 
measures with the goal of its economic development again hit a wall. The Panel and AB 
further found the same non-availability of exceptions under XI:2 in terms of China’s 
Accession Protocol as they did for Art. XX exceptions with regards to some products. 
There was a similar result of the legal analysis in China – Rare Earths.230 The dispute 
concerned China’s restrictions on the export of various forms of rare earths, tungsten and 
molybdenum which included export duties, export quotas and other measures. The materials 
in question are essential in the production of various kinds of electronic goods and the main 
argument from Japan, the EU and Canada, which were the complainants, was that these 
restrictions were designed to provide Chinese industries that produce downstream goods with 
protected access to the subject materials, whereas China claimed its export duties were 
designed to reduce pollution caused by mining and to conserve its natural resources. China 
thus sought again to rely on Art. XX under paragraph (b) which envisions the protection of 
human life or health and paragraph (g) which envisions the conservation of natural resources. 
Unfortunately, as in China - Raw Materials, it was again established at the Panel and 
confirmed at the Appellate Body that China could not invoke the general exceptions 
contained in Art. XX with regards to obligations undertaken in its Accession Protocol.231 
Regardless, the Panel engaged with the question of whether China met the requirements 
under the mentioned paragraphs of Art. XX on an arguendo basis and concluded that it failed 
to meet said requirements. 
Most important for the present discussion is how the Panel considered the relationship 
between Art. XX exceptions and sustainable development. Firstly, it clearly stated that 
Member’s sustainable economic development needs are not a standalone justification for the 
imposition of WTO-inconsistent measures.232 However it considered such needs as a 
legitimate consideration that may be taken into account when deciding whether and how to 
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design and administer a conservation policy. Despite this purported acceptance of 
development needs, the actual reasoning of the Panel report shows that any development 
goals or policies were considered as problematic. This is described below.   
China argued that a conservation policy is not limited to preserving natural resources in their 
current state, but also covers use and management of these resources in line with a Member’s 
sustainable economic development.233 The Panel explained that the conservation objective 
embodied in Art. XX(g) ‘allows Members to take their sustainable development needs into 
account in deciding whether to adopt a conservation policy, how to design that policy, and 
what instruments will be used to implement that policy’.234 At the same time it stated that 
measures the objective of which is to promote economic development are not ‘measures 
relating to conservation’ but measures relating to industrial policy.235 Thus the Panel seems to 
suggest that one excludes the other.  
The Panel exposed as problematic the below enumerated goals and effects of the measures at 
dispute which show a connection to economic development goals.  
Firstly, the Panel noted that several Chinese laws and regulations alluded to goals such as 
establishing or accelerating the establishment of specific domestic industries; preventing the 
illegal mining and thus the illegal exploitation of China’s comparative advantage (which the 
Panel considered to be primarily an industrial policy goal); strengthening the industrial scale 
of rare earths new materials (which the Panel understood to be clearly a reference to 
industrial rather than conservation policy); encouraging growth for the rare earth industry in 
certain provinces; and vigorously developing rare earth new materials and industry 
applications and development of new products and acceleration of new technology.236 The 
Panel found such industrial development goals to ‘sit in tension’ with the objective of 
reducing domestic consumption for the purpose of conserving exhaustible natural 
resources.237  
Secondly, the Panel took issue with the fact that the measures may lower domestic prices 
which in turn stimulates domestic demand.238 Ensuring lower prices for Chinese processing 
industries is clearly an industrial policy tool, beneficial for China’s economic development, 
however it is not surprising that the Panel could not find this compatible with the 
requirements of Art. XX(g).  
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Thirdly the Panel found China’s desire to moderate speculative demand surges that could 
upset the market balance and certainty sought by China, again to be an aspect of its industrial 
policy and thus an indicator against the purported conservation goal.239 Even though the 
Panel found such industrial policy concerns to be legitimate and possible to address under 
GATT Art. XI.2 (a), they were nevertheless unacceptable under Art. XX(g).240 
The Panel also found China’s desire to manage uncertainty and volatility in the market as an 
industrial and thus not conservation policy.241 The Panel found that generally speaking, 
‘managing an international resources market cannot be considered to fall within the meaning 
of ‘conservation’ since it relates instead to industrial policy.  
In the same vein, the Panel took issue with China’s calculations of the quotas, as they seemed 
to focus on industrial policy concerns, including prior export performance and overall value 
of exports from China. As already established in China-Raw Materials, measures that would 
increase the cost of a raw material to foreign consumers, but decrease its costs for domestic 
users, were considered incompatible with the goal of conservation.   
The Panel also pointed out the fact that China puts no restrictions on the export of the 
materials at stake when in the form of finished products, which it interpreted as showing 
China’s lack of a real concern with conserving these resources.242 This last finding is 
particularly absurd, since it is normal that China is not conserving these materials out of 
principle, but to provide its industries with the necessary inputs for their production. Once the 
materials have been processed, it is clear that restrictions on their exports no longer make 
sense. Indeed this is an industrial policy aimed at encouraging the processing of raw materials 
before exporting them. A welcome industrial policy for developing countries, yet 
unsurprisingly considered problematic by the Panel.  
China thus ‘lost points’ trying to prove a conservation policy whenever any industrial policy 
goals were found in its policies. Unsurprisingly China on the other hand denied altogether 
that its ‘supply management’ was intended to protect or promote the domestic industry.243 
The Panel considered China’s measures to encourage domestic extraction and secure 
preferential use of the materials by Chinese manufacturers. The Panel found that Chinese 
export and domestic restrictions worked together to secure the supply of rare earths to 
downstream domestic users and thus not for the goal of conserving exhaustible natural 
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resources.244 In other words, it found China not to be concerned with conservation but with 
other considerations, possibly a desire to respond to domestic industrial needs.245 
The conclusion was thus that the quotas were designed to achieve industrial policy goals, 
rather than conservation, whereas a better finding in principle would have been at least that 
they were designed only to achieve industrial policy goals without conservation, if this was 
indeed the case. Otherwise it is hard to see how economic development goals could actually 
be taken into account, since industrial policy goals are not permitted.  
The Panel stated that it ‘acknowledges that there is nothing objectionable about Members 
accounting for their own and other countries’ development needs when adopting, designing 
and implementing a conservation policy’, but that it nevertheless ‘does not believe that export 
quotas that delimit a maximum amount of products available for export from already limited 
rare earth product supply are ‘closely’ or ‘substantially related’ to conservation.246 
Considering all the above, it is thus fair to say, that despite a declaratory acceptance of the 
incorporation of development needs into one’s conservation measures, the Panel could not 
reconcile any industrial policy measures with the text and previous interpretation of Art. 
XX(g). This is not surprising since the wording of Art. XX(g) itself demands that restrictions 
also be placed on domestic production or consumption, albeit not necessarily to the same 
extent, and thus ab initio excludes the possibility of conservation only at the expense of 
foreign users, or conservation for the sake of domestic users. The latter must also carry some 
of the burden, thus an industrial policy promoting domestic processing is in principle 
incompatible with Art. XX(g). Also the fact that WTO-consistent alternatives need to be 
considered before any discriminatory measures, similarly excludes any industrial policy 
approach.  
In terms of the chapeau of Art. XX, China tried to argue that the export quota system was not 
applied in a manner that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates against users of rare earths 
in the complaining countries, whereas the latter argued that the discrimination was arbitrary 
and unjustifiable since it did not serve a conservation-related purpose.247 In the context of the 
chapeau, the Panel exposed another effect of the measures as problematic, i.e. the rise in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in China as a result of foreign companies trying to avoid 
uncertainty and ensure a stable supply of rare earth inputs by relocating to China.248 The fact 
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that measures attracting FDI are vilified here is quite ironic, considering how for example, 
one of the main arguments of the propaganda for strong IP protection is that it may attract 
FDI which is good for development. In the context of export quotas, however, the effect of 
attracting such investment was deemed a disproportionate cost for foreign enterprises and a 
distortion of international trade and investment.249 The Panel further took issue with China 
providing competitive advantage to its producers by creating potential price differences for 
domestic and foreign producers and was concerned with this creating advantage for the 
Chinese.250 In sum, whether measures were justifiably discriminatory or not, was again 
judged solely based on whether the discrimination was linked to conservation.251  
It is thus quite clear, that this or indeed any other WTO panel, would not accept 
discriminatory measures based on a Member’s economic development needs as justifiable 
under the chapeau of Art. XX.  
Perhaps even more interesting and morally questionable from the perspective of the verdicts 
reached are cases involving renewable energy programmes. Current rules regulating the 
subsidisation of energy provide a good example of how development, if properly taken into 
account, would drastically change the status quo. As has been described, the current system 
allows for enormous fossil fuel subsidies (about $10 million a minute) whereas the 
subsidizing of green technology companies in developing countries has been vastly 
persecuted due to the breach of the national treatment and MFN rules. Below is an analysis of 
the latest dispute brought to the WTO concerning the Indian National Solar Mission, India - 
Solar Cells, and show how India tried in vain to justify its measures based on a reliance on 
sustainable development.252 Not surprisingly, India was reluctant to claim a right to economic 
development, attempting to rely only on arguments that its measures were essential for the 
protection of the environment in that they would allow for a stable and continuous production 
of solar panels.  
The measures at issue were domestic content requirements (DCR measures) under Phase I 
and Phase II of the National Solar Mission inconsistent with Art. 2.1 of TRIMs and Art. III:4 
of GATT 1994. They were found both by the Panel and AB not to be covered under the 
government procurement derogation in GATT Art. III:8(a) because India’s government 
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purchased electricity, while the discrimination related to solar cells and modules.253 
The next question was then whether the DCR measures could be justified under the general 
exceptions found in Art. XX(j) or Art. XX(d). The first is provided for measures 'essential to 
the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply', while the latter is 
for measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT Agreement. 
India argued that the DCR measures were necessary to increase the domestic manufacturing 
capacity and thereby reduce the risk of disruption in access to a continuous and affordable 
supply of solar cells and modules needed to generate solar power. It furthermore claimed this 
would increase skilled human resources that can understand and use the technology 
associated.254 All this would prevent the vulnerability to supply and market fluctuations 
associated with the current dependence on imports. 
Most importantly for the present discussion, India claimed that the measures were ultimately 
essential for attaining the objectives of energy security and sustainable development and it 
relied on several international obligations as well as domestic law to back the legitimacy of 
these objectives. In terms of international law obligations it relied on the Preamble of the 
WTO Agreement and its objective of sustainable development, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution adopting the Rio+20 
Document 'The Future We Want' (see chapter II for details about these documents in terms of 
their understanding of 'sustainable development'), while in their domestic law, India relied on 
its Electricity Act, its National Electricity Policy, its National Electricity Plan and its National 
Action Plan on Climate Change. These national instruments contain obligations to ensure 
ecologically sustainable growth while addressing energy security and compliance with 
obligations relating to climate change. They refer to sustainable development as their 
'ultimate goal',255 they recognise 'that the poor are the most vulnerable to climate change, and 
that rapid economic growth is an essential prerequisite to reduce poverty'256 thus they identify 
measures to promote development objectives, while also yielding co-benefits for addressing 
climate change. 
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The Panel however found the international legal obligations to be irrelevant for the exception 
under Art. XX as in its determination they do not form part of the domestic legal system of 
the WTO Member in question.257 India claimed the opposite stressing the fact that rules of 
international law are accommodated into its domestic law without express legislative 
sanction, provided they do not run into conflict with laws enacted by the Parliament.258 It 
based its claim on the fact that the law of India permits acts of government to implement 
international obligations without any legislation of the Parliament to this effect. Furthermore 
its Supreme Court has found principles of international environmental law and the concept of 
sustainable development to be fundamental to the environmental and developmental 
governance in India and 'has also noted that the concept of sustainable development is part of 
customary international law.'259 
 The Panel however proclaimed the findings of the Supreme Court to be irrelevant in terms of 
proving 'direct effect' of international obligations in Indian domestic law and furthermore that 
the mandate given to the government shows that international law obligations 'may possibly 
be acted upon' rather than them having such 'direct effect'.260 The AB added to this that 
‘while these Decisions and Observations by the Supreme Court may serve to highlight the 
relevance of the international instruments and rules identified by India for purposes of 
interpreting provisions of India’s domestic law, as well as for guiding the exercise of the 
decision-making power of the executive branch of the Central government, we do not 
consider that this is sufficient to demonstrate that the international instruments’ are rules that 
form part of India’s domestic legal system.261 India was furthermore not able to rely on most 
of the domestic instruments in their references to (sustainable) development and other goals, 
as the US and the Panel dismissed such general objectives as inapplicable and not to be 
understood as 'law' for the purpose of XX(d). This is because they are not legally binding or 
enforceable262 but are rather just guidelines263 full of hortatory, aspirational, declaratory and 
at times solely descriptive language and there are no sanctions for failure to achieve these 
objectives.264 The AB disagreed with the Panel in that ‘laws and regulations for the purpose 
of Art. XX(d) are limited to those legally enforceable under the domestic legal system, 
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however it found enforceability an important factor to consider in determining whether the 
rules, obligations or requirements in question operate with a sufficiently high degree of 
normativity and specificity as to set out a rule of conduct or course of action.265 Thus, as the 
Panel before it, the AB found the hortatory, aspirational, declaratory and at times solely 
descriptive texts in question not to set out with a sufficient degree of normativity and 
specificity a ‘rule’ to ensure ecologically sustainable growth, as India alleged.266 The Panel 
found section 3 of the Electricity Act to be the only 'law' for the purpose of Art. XX(d) in that 
it gives the mandate for the preparation of the National Electricity Policy and the National 
Electricity Plan.267 However it cannot be said that the DCR measures prevent the government 
from acting inconsistently with their obligations to prepare such plans and policies.268 In the 
words of the Panel, 'it is well established in GATT/WTO jurisprudence that the phrase 'to 
secure compliance with laws and regulations' in Art. XX(g) means measures 'to enforce 
obligations under laws and regulations' and not measures 'to ensure the attainment of the 
objectives of the laws and regulations.'269  
This is a very disappointing interpretation as norms involving hortatory language are not 
given any weight, and this is the only language in which one could phrase the RTD in one’s 
own domestic legal. Even more problematic, international agreements stating and re-stating 
the objective of sustainable development are simply dismissed.  
The same ultimate objectives were not considered relevant for Art. XX(j) either, where the 
only relevant question was whether there was an imminent or present shortage, which the 
Panel did not find to exist.  
What is also clear from this case is that despite alluding to economic development as being an 
essential part of sustainable development in its various references to international 
environmental agreements and its domestic principles, laws and regulations, essentially India 
did not try to justify its DCR measures on the grounds that they might bring economic/social 
development with the increase of domestic manufacturing capacity. The ultimate goal was 
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presented throughout as ensuring the continuous supply of solar cells and modules for the 
production of solar power.270 Thus it can be claimed that developing countries find it easier to 
claim that they are merely trying to protect the environment instead of 'admitting' that they 
are trying to support their domestic industries for the purpose of economic development 
itself. 
Unsurprisingly, the DCR measures would have probably also failed the threshold of not being 
'applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail' if the Panel had found it 
necessary to examine the measures under the chapeau of Art. XX. As the EU pointed out that 
'if discriminating against imports with the express aim of favouring domestic industry were 
acceptable under the specific exceptions and the chapeau of Art. XX, then the notion of 
preventing 'arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination'... would be devoid of content, as 
protectionism of that nature 'is precisely what the chapeau is meant to control.'271 This 
reflects the above mentioned conclusion of the present author in terms of the usefulness of 
Art. XX in providing a tool for carving out necessary policy space for the pursuit of 
developmental programs of particular Members. Since it is not a stand-alone right, Members 
try to bring in developmental needs through provisions such as Art. XX, however a closer 
reading of this article and its applications at the DSM soon show the very meagre possibility 
of consolidating it with developmental goals. General exceptions in fact cannot be read with 
sustainable development in mind, except for the ‘sustainable’ part. Furthermore they are 
essentially handicapped as general principles since they do not automatically apply to 
accession protocols. The above analysed case law shows that despite being somewhat 
reluctant to do so, developing countries are nevertheless testing whether arguments relating to 
their economic development could open up more policy space for them at the DSM, however 
both the law and its application have proven too rigid for this possibility while taking into 
account the needs of economic development remains but an empty promise.  
Friends of the Earth have observed that ‘[t]he WTO ruling against the National Solar Mission 
shows how arcane trade rules can be used to undermine governments that support clean 
energy and local jobs. The ink is barely dry on the Paris Climate Agreement but clearly trade 
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still trumps real action on climate change.’272 The UN Independent Expert on the promotion 
of a democratic and equitable international order referred to Wade in his conviction that this 
is paradigmatic of what is wrong with the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ that consistently 
opposes industrial policy-making by states.273 The Expert further accused the DSM of being 
incapable of showing flexibility in accommodating the new priorities imposed by climate 
change in the sense that there is still unwillingness to interpret broadly the general exceptions 
provided under GATT.274 He called the National Solar Mission of India a ‘reasonable plan’ 
consistent with Sustainable Development Goal 7 and the goals of the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. 275 
In a sense, yes, the panels and the AB could show more flexibility. Arguably they have most 
leeway to do this in the context of interpreting SDT provisions. Elsewhere, however, WTO 
law and the law on treaty interpretation do not really let them ‘improvise’ to an extent which 
would significantly address the injustices of the current system. There is a general sense that 
something went wrong when decisions such as that on the Indian Solar Mission come about, 
yet it is mostly the underlying legal framework that is the problem and not the panels/AB 
which apply it.   
8. Reference to Developmental Goals under TRIPS 
Parallels from the above analysis can be drawn in terms of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
Agreement sets out is own objectives and principles in the following manner: 
Article 7 
Objectives 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage 
of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 




1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement.  
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2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may 
be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. 
 
Thus, much like sustainable development in the WTO Preamble, technological development 
is undeniably set out as an objective of the system: IP rights should contribute to 
technological innovation and technology transfer (TT) and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare and Members are seemingly allowed to formulate their laws with a 
view of promoting their socio-economic and technological development. However already in 
the respective articles themselves, it is clear that any measures taken need to be consistent 
with the TRIPS Agreement, which drastically limits available policy space (see chapter V). 
Thus whereas the first part of Art. 8 might suggest that countries could exclude certain fields 
of technology from patentability or at least shorten the duration of patents based on their 
developmental needs, the second part of the same article clearly defeats this option.  
In terms of the Objectives the wording is even more peculiar. It states that IP protection 
should contribute to innovation and TT. It is unclear whether this indicates that we are not 
necessarily sure about such an effect of IP protection, but it certainly does not indicate an 
option for testing and adjusting the system. Therefore the two articles ab initio seem to offer 
little in terms of carving out policy space for development by reference to them. Furthermore, 
based on the driving force behind the introduction of TRIPS, it is clear that the primary 
objective of the Agreement was to secure the rights of IP owners to exploit their protected 
assets in the jurisdiction of all parties to the GATT, purportedly to encourage innovation.276 
The reference to access to, and transfer of, technology to developing countries as found in 
Art. 7 is the result of a compromise with developing countries who feared that a strengthened 
protection of IPRs would limit such access and transfer.277 In the opinion of Correa, the use 
of the word ‘should’ seems to indicate that IPRs do not necessarily promote innovation and 
the dissemination of TT, but that they should do so to satisfy the overall objective of the 
TRIPS Agreement.278 It thus resembles reference to sustainable development in the WTO 
Preamble, something which can be read as a merely hortatory provision and in part in 
contradiction with the other provisions of the Agreement. Correa has suggested that the 
inclusion of objects and purposes not in the preamble but Part I of the Agreement, gives it 
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more weight.279 This is however unlikely as it is in practice more important whether a stated 
object and purpose is in line with the rest of the agreement or at least not in contradiction to 
it, than whether it is written in the preamble or an article of the agreement.  
The two articles generally seem to have little legal relevance and there is reluctance by the 
adjudicators to grant them recognition. In Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents Art. 7 and Art. 8 
have thus been declared to be mere expressions of the inherent characteristics of the 
international IP system.280 In other words there is no seeking any additional balance between 
the guaranteed IP rights and other policy concerns through the DSM, apart from the one 
already set out in the TRIPS Agreement. The decision has been widely criticized for what has 
been perceived to be an inadequate application of the principles of treaty interpretation.281 In 
interpreting the exception claimed under Art. 30, the Panel only considered its impact on the 
rights holder, whereas a proper analysis should have also considered the application of the 
objects and purposes within Art. 7 and Art. 8.282 It furthermore took recourse to the 
negotiating history of TRIPS and even the Berne Convention for interpretative guidance, 
rather than consider the purported object and purpose of the Agreement.283 
A statistical analysis284 of TRIPS disputes showed that in 60 instances of interpretations of 
TRIPS provisions, the adjudicators relied on the ‘object and purpose’ of TRIPS only 14 
times, while resorting to either the ‘ordinary meaning’ or the ‘context’ 79 times. Articles 7 
and 8 were applied in only two instances, while being merely acknowledged in another three, 
whereas other objectives of TRIPS or its provisions were applied in the remaining instances. 
There is generally speaking a ‘quantitatively limited, and qualitatively rather arbitrary use of 
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TRIPS object and purpose in the interpretation exercise.’285 Perhaps it is due to the 
substantive ambiguity of Articles 7 and 8, or a number of TRIPS disputes being more 
technical in nature with less obvious balancing of societal objectives, but parties have rarely 
used them as (interpretative) arguments.286 However even where parties have relied heavily 
on said articles, as in the mentioned Canada- Pharmaceutical Patents dispute, the Panel 
essentially only paid lip service to its commitment of taking them into account in the analysis 
of the law.287 The AB decision reflects exactly how easily the purported objectives can be 
discarded when the ‘real’ reasons behind patent protection are given priority. The AB clearly 
defined the ‘normal practice of exploitation by patent owners’ to be exclusion of ‘all forms of 
competition that could detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a 
patent’s grant of market exclusivity.’288 The AB went on to state that [p]atent laws establish 
carefully defined period of market exclusivity as an inducement to innovation, and the policy 
of those laws cannot be achieved unless patent owners are permitted to take effective 
advantage of that inducement once it has been defined.’289 While the Panel’s view 
emphasises stimulation to innovation, it fails to consider other (purportedly) equally essential 
objectives of the patent grants, i.e. the diffusion of knowledge and its continuous 
improvement.290  
Slade nevertheless finds an encouraging development in Canada–Term of Patent Protection 
and even more so in the US - Section 211 case.291 In the former, the AB stated that: 
[O]ur findings in this appeal do not in any way prejudge the applicability of Article 7 or Article 8 of 
the TRIPS Agreement in possible future cases with respect to measures to promote the policy 
objectives of the WTO Members that are set out in those Articles. Those Articles still await 
appropriate interpretation.292 
 
Thus the door was open for further applications of the objects and principles in a more 
constructive manner. In US - Section 211 the Panel went further and found Art. 7 to impose 
good faith obligations and thus should be taken into account both in implementing and 
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interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.293 In the particular case the Panel was referring to abus de 
droit as part of the good faith principle.294  
Even with these slightly broader applications of the objectives and principles as contained in 
Articles 7 and 8, it is however highly doubtful that they should ever go as far as permitting 
large scale departures from obligations as contained in the Agreement based on the 
development needs of Member states. In terms of additional policy space, it seems these 
Articles can only function as aids in evaluating whether conditions have been met for the 
application of Art. 30 (or Art. 17 in the case of trademarks) in exceptional circumstances 
probably involving the protection of the right to health. Ruse-Khan criticizes the shyness of 
adjudicators in using Articles 7 and 8 and wants them to realise that said articles are not only 
relevant for public health issues but should inform the interpretation of each provision of the 
TRIPS Agreement as was envisioned in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 
para. 5(a).295 This is however highly unlikely, considering the phobia of judicial activism. 
Furthermore as in the case of the WTO Preamble, the object and purpose from Articles 7 and 
8 of TRIPS could never alone form the basis of a WTO dispute. They can only bolster the 
argument where a Member is accused of failing to implement correctly other provisions of 
the Agreement.296 Furthermore, in the context of abus de droit, legitimate expectations or 
other corollaries of the good faith principle, Art. 7 would not give more policy space for the 
pursuit of technological development, but if anything would additionally restrain it. 
Therefore, the objectives and principles of TRIPS as set out in Articles 7 and 8 cannot act as 
a tool to rebalance the Agreement itself in terms of developing countries demanding the 
rights to either exclude fields of technology from patentability or shorten the length of 
protection when this would help their technological development. 
9. Forcing Market Access through the Goal of Development 
Ironically, however, despite the pro-liberalisation bias, much like prohibited policy space, in 
terms of market access the adjudicators cannot ‘add to or diminish rights and obligations 
provided in the WTO Agreement' either.297 Thus the DSM cannot be used to force developed 
countries into removing restrictions on market access for exports of interest to developing 
countries, regardless of the 'unfairness' of such restrictions or their incompatibility with the 
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free trade theory or any goal purported in the GATT or WTO Preambles, as long as such 
restrictions are permitted by the rules of the separate agreements. 
This became apparent already in 1961, when Uruguay famously filed a complaint against the 
entire developed country Membership for the 576 market restrictions they were imposing on 
exports of interest to Uruguay. The restrictions were not necessarily illegal in the strict sense, 
neither did Uruguay claim them to be, however they were seriously reducing Uruguay's 
exports and thus preventing the country from receiving the overall level of benefits as 
contemplated by the GATT. Uruguay relied on Art. XXIII, which makes it technically 
possible for complaints to be raised based on an overall imbalance of benefits and 
obligations. However the Panel made it clear that it would only examine individual trade 
restrictions and Uruguay would have to demonstrate how each constituted a 'non-violation 
impairment' of GATT benefits. The broader claim of 'nullification and impairment' due to an 
overall imbalance, however, was ignored. Despite Art. XXIII theoretically allowing for 
complaints on the basis of such an imbalance, Hudec described how it was actually meant for 
claiming ‘legal adjustments in the case of something like a catastrophic 1930s-type world 
depression’ so not generally.298 In his view the whole complaint was not even meant as a 
normal lawsuit but rather ‘an effort to dramatize a larger problem by framing it as a 
lawsuit,’299 which would imply that Uruguay never even expected a significant outcome in 
terms of the ruling.   
10. Perceived Inability of Panels to Adjudicate on Development 
In Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft the Panel declared that to examine a 
Member country’s development needs was ‘an inquiry of a peculiarly economic and political 
nature, and notably ill-suited to review by a panel whose function is fundamentally legal’.300 
It is the view of this author that judicial bodies at the WTO will nevertheless have to engage 
with such inquiries, not only to be able to apply already existing law which demands such 
analysis,301 but also if an enforceable RTD is ever to be successfully included in the system. 
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It is no doubt easier to just stick to the black letter law, pretending a ‘delicate balance’ of 
obligations and rights has already been established at the negotiations and to refrain from any 
judicial activism. The considerations necessary for deliberations on matters of concern to 
development are similar to any other non-legal considerations, which at times need to be 
taken into account in the context of reaching a legal judgment.  
Conclusion 
Mainly to the benefit of developing countries the world trade system has seen a significant 
strengthening of its dispute resolution mechanism with the adoption of the DSU. Furthermore 
problems faced by smaller countries in accessing the system, such as the question of 
overcoming the costs of the proceedings, lack of experience or fear of retribution, which have 
prevented their active participation in the past, are being successfully overcome. Effective 
enforcement against more powerful players is still problematic, however options exist here 
also, at least to an extent. For example retaliation under a different agreement than the one 
where the violation occurred is a more successful method of inducing the losing party into 
bringing its measures into conformity with WTO rules. However this option is not 
automatically available to developing countries and it would be desirable to reform the DSU 
in this regard. Furthermore when the violating measure in the developed country concerns an 
interest which is too politically sensitive, not even retaliation under a different agreement can 
provide incentive enough for bringing it into conformity. The participational legitimacy gap 
seems thus to be narrowing, yet a democratic legitimacy gap remains due to the unequal 
enforcement. It is clear that although struggling with its own problems, the dispute settlement 
at the WTO is continuously improving developing countries’ access to legal redress and 
giving them the tools to take on much more powerful players. This being said, the dispute 
settlement also can be and is used against developing countries in applying an essentially 
unfair law which excessively restricting developing countries’ policy space and inhibits their 
potential for industrialisation and technological catch-up. Thus it has been suggested that 
developing countries carve out this policy space through active lawyering. Galanter describes 
as examples strategies undertaken by what he calls ‘repeat players’ – countries which are 
frequently engaged in similar disputes over an extended period of time and who can rely on 
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experience, expertise and economies of scale.302 Firstly these countries seek to maximize gain 
over time, even at the risk of incurring maximum loss in some cases, strategizing about rule-
making, even if it means trading-off tangible gain in a particular case.303 They further use the 
fact that before an actual enforcement of a ruling there is plenty of time and opportunity for 
testing the boundaries of the rule, by only slightly adjusting the measures in breach of the rule 
and doing only what is strictly needed instead of overcompensating.304 A third strategic 
possibility is an ‘efficient breach’ where a party, even though it has lost a case, continues 
with the violation, because the benefits of non-compliance are greater than any sanctions 
resulting therefrom.305 In other words trying to steer interpretation in a desirable path, 
ignoring the law, postponing its implementation or manipulating the rulings of the dispute 
settlement bodies are here presented as legitimate strategies to pursue, due to the fact that the 
law itself is over restrictive. Indeed the current legal framework and dispute settlement 
practice offers little in terms of legally valid excuses for policy measures for economic 
development which discriminate beyond what has been explicitly agreed to between Member 
countries, despite possible benefits to a development strategy. 
Generally speaking the panels and the AB could show more flexibility. Arguably they have 
most leeway to do this in the context of interpreting SDT provisions. Elsewhere, however, 
WTO law and the law on treaty interpretation do not really let them ‘improvise’ to an extent 
which would significantly address the injustices of the current system. There is a general 
sense that something went wrong when decisions such as that on the Indian Solar Mission 
come about, yet it is mostly the underlying legal framework that is the problem and not the 
panels/AB which apply them. Since it is not a stand-alone right at the moment, Members try 
to bring in their economic developmental needs by reference to the ‘sustainable development’ 
mentioned in the Preamble and combining this goal with provisions such as Art. XX, 
however a closer reading of the latter article and its applications at the DSM soon show the 
impossibility of consolidating it with developmental goals. General exceptions cannot be read 
with sustainable development in mind, except for the ‘sustainable’ part. Furthermore they are 
essentially handicapped as general principles since they do not automatically apply to 
accession protocols. The objectives and principles of TRIPS similarly prove equally useless 
in claiming policy space for the pursuit technological development.  
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The above analysed case law shows that despite being somewhat reluctant to do so, 
developing countries are nevertheless testing whether arguments relating to their economic 
development, economic diversification and sovereignty could open up more policy space for 
them at the DSM, however both the law and its application have proven too rigid for this 
possibility while taking into account the needs of economic development remains but an 
empty promise. Thus while the participational legitimacy gap at the dispute settlement 
mechanism is successfully narrowing, the application of an unjust law and of the lack of 
options for creative interpretations contribute most to the legitimacy gap of the system 





‘to a shoemaker there is nothing like leather,  
to a lawyer there is nothing like a court’1 
 
Chapter VII 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
 
 
1. Conclusions of Analysis 
This thesis analyses the world trade regime from several different perspectives and finds 
support for the hypothesis that it suffers from a legitimacy gap due to its agenda being mainly 
driven by and for the benefit of certain groups in developed countries negatively impacting 
the potential for economic development of its poorer Members. This fact negatively affects 
its democratic/procedural as well as substantive legitimacy as explained in chapter II which 
are intrinsically linked as demonstrated in chapters IV and V. Despite providing developing 
countries with predictability in a rules-oriented system which to an extent tames pure power 
politics, the organisation is nevertheless overly tilted against their right to development 
(RTD) from its underlying economic theory to its particular rules and the way the rules are 
agreed to and enforced.  All the while, the WTO maintains that it works towards the ultimate 
goals of sustainable development and enhanced welfare, thus chapter III analyses the stated 
means of achieving these goals as set out by the organisation’s main mandate, i.e. mutual 
liberalisation of markets with a very limited regard for the principle of special and differential 
treatment. The analysis shows that the rhetoric of achieving development through free trade is 
in essence dishonest and that the theory of comparative advantage is incompatible with 
development, since it does not take into account the question of context and timing and 
supposes benefits for everyone regardless of their circumstances, level of development and 
how technologically primitive or advanced is the production in which they have comparative 
advantage at the moment of liberalisation. Historical analysis shows that from its inception, 
the theory served to justify relations between countries in which one party gained at the 
expense of the economic development of the other while claiming mutual benefits. Despite 
mounting empirical evidence against the infallibility of the theory and its modern 
reinterpretations, the latter is still represented as science or fact and hailed as the best insight 
                                                            
1 Oscar Schachter  
282 
 
into economics. The inevitable conclusion here is that it serves as propaganda to distract from 
the negative impacts of early liberalisation on the ability of poorer countries to develop and 
thus makes any objections on their part seem illegitimate, misplaced or unnecessary. The 
propaganda plays in this sense an important part in setting the agenda of the organisation and 
of the individual negotiations and provides it with perceived legitimacy. Most ironically, the 
theory demonises mercantilism, yet looking at GATT/WTO negotiations they function 
exactly based on mercantilist principles and despite preaching about the benefits of (even 
unilateral) opening up, developed countries refuse to do so without reciprocity and 
furthermore keep disproportionate protectionist measures on large areas of their economies.2 
The vastly superior economic power, monopoly over said propaganda, resources allowing for 
numerous WTO missions and a secretariat biased towards their agenda create an 
insurmountable imbalance between their influence on law-making and that of developing 
countries. This thesis shows the numerous tactics used throughout the various rounds with 
ever the same result in terms of developed countries and their agenda prevailing over that of 
developing countries, increasingly limiting the latter’s policy space needed for development 
while failing to liberalise and provide unhindered market access in areas of interest to them.  
Developed countries’ tactics for achieving their goals range from drafting and hiding the 
agenda until the last minute, divide et empera approaches, shaming and blackmail all the way 
to simple persuasion using soft power. All this makes the consensus rule of reaching 
agreements lose its potential role of ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the organisation. 
Furthermore regardless of the format of the discussions at the negotiations, the imbalance 
remains and is reflected in the resulting rules and agreements. The legitimate concerns and 
demands of developing countries are taken into account only to the extent necessary to create 
the illusion of special and differential treatment granted and thus avoid substantial reform. A 
closer look however reveals overwhelming limitations of the so-called special and differential 
treatment, which render most of it useless, failing the test of legitimacy of international rules 
both in terms of certainty as well as coherence.  
The thesis devotes special attention to the question of the protection of IP under the WTO due 
to the upgrade of technological capabilities being an essential component of economic 
development. A separate analysis of TRIPS is also warranted due to the misfit of intellectual 
property protection with the general free trade philosophy of the WTO which is another 
testimony  to the way developed countries cherry pick liberalisation in areas which suit them 
                                                            
2 C. Thomas, ‘The Death of Doha? Forensics of Democratic Governance, Distributive Justice, and Development 
in the WTO’, Research Paper no. 12-18, Cornell Legal Studies, (2012), p. 199. 
283 
 
and uphold protectionism where it does not. The analysis here focuses mainly on the 
implications for the possibility of successfully pursuing technological and thus economic 
development under a regime of extensive patent protection considering historical and 
empirical evidence on this matter. It reaches the conclusion that the TRIPS Agreement retains 
a substantial degree of flexibility, especially in terms of the breadth of patentability. Yet it 
nevertheless makes it more difficult for developing countries to use essential policy space 
needed in their pursuit of technological advancement, especially with the extension of the 
duration of protection and by prohibiting discrimination in patentability as to the field of 
technology, while offering basically nothing in return. The study further shows a similar 
pattern of propaganda in terms of a certain economic theory being accepted as dogma and an 
ideology elevating IP to the status of a human right, again limiting ab initio the possibilities 
of discourse and exerting soft power over countries reluctant to test the limits of the 
remaining flexibilities.  
The thesis then considers whether the imbalance in the negotiations and the resulting rules 
can be ‘corrected’ by the dispute settlement mechanism. Despite providing developing 
countries with an invaluable and relatively powerful tool against developed countries, quite 
unlike any options available to them in bilateral relations, the analysis nevertheless concludes 
that the mechanism should not be perceived as a magic wand correcting all the imbalances 
and thus addressing the legitimacy gap of the institution. Firstly, access to the dispute 
settlement mechanism is severely affected for developing countries due to their lacking legal 
strength including less resources to deal with the high costs of the proceedings, the absence of 
necessary institutions and fear of upsetting a more powerful party or even merely fear of the 
unknown due to lack of experience. Despite being substantial, however, these obstacles can 
nevertheless be surmounted by adopting several strategies such as learning by participating as 
third parties, using the help of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law et cetera. Still the problem 
of developing countries failing to discover non-obvious violations by developed countries in 
the first place remains unsolvable at the moment. Secondly, there is the question of 
enforcement which essentially remains voluntary and dependent on how powerful the 
potential retaliation can be. Here developing countries can add to the weight of their 
retaliation by enacting it under a separate agreement from the one under which the violation 
occurred, or threatening to do so. However, it has been observed that even then, when the 
affected interest in the developed country is strong enough, no retaliation or threat thereof by 
a developing country can suffice to induce compliance. Thirdly and most importantly, the 
dispute settlement mechanism unsurprisingly does not create law – and is constantly kept in 
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check not to do so – but merely applies the essentially unbalanced and in several aspects anti-
developmental law of the WTO. In this sense, developing countries themselves are frequently 
brought before the dispute settlement mechanism for using policy tools necessary for their 
economic development but which are not in line with WTO law.  
This study conducts an in-depth analysis of some of the cases in which developing countries 
tried carving out necessary policy space for their economic development at the dispute 
settlement mechanism. The analysis shows that they sought broad interpretations of general 
exceptions by relying on purported goals and purposes of WTO Agreement, on other 
international as well as domestic laws and goals, as well as using sovereignty arguments, a 
right to economic diversification etc. The study reveals how all these arguments failed to 
carve out any additional policy space beyond what is already strictly allowed under the 
substantive provisions. Despite the goal of sustainable development being sometimes 
characterised as a ‘constitutional and legislative tenet of the WTO’ this is little more than 
wishful thinking as it proves that beyond the question of sustainability, i.e. allowing for 
exceptions based on the protection of the environment, concerns for the protection of 
economic development have no basis in any of the binding agreements and connot form part 
of the interpretative process since they are many dimes directly in conflict with the 
substantive provisions. The Panels and Appellate Body have been criticised for selectively 
using flexibilities based on whose interests they are protecting, however a closer look at the 
law reveals that there is no basis given for allowing exceptions based on developmental 
concerns. Thus it is the proposal of this study that the dispute settlement mechanism is indeed 
provided with such a basis with the inclusion of the right to development as an actual 
constitutional principle of the organisation and specifically including economic 
developmental concerns in the substantive binding agreements as a legitimate value for which 
exceptions to general rules can be made. Furthermore the analysis shows that despite the 
liberalisation mandate the dispute settlement mechanism cannot be used to instruct developed 
countries to remove restrictions on market access for exports of interest to developing 
countries, regardless of the unfairness of such restrictions, their incompatibility with the free 
trade theory or any goal purported in the GATT or WTO Preambles. The proposed inclusion 
of the right to development into the WTO would give Panels the power to adjudicate based 
on an overall imbalance of benefits and obligations between Member States such as was the 




2. Call for Reform  
 
This analysis shows how impossible it is to talk about the global trade rules without 
understanding the power politics and propaganda which have brought them into existence. 
However this is typical of international law, which is so intertwined with politics that many 
times ‘one struggles to locate the boundary between the political and the legal’.3 Rules are 
created through bargaining, where every state tries to maximize its profit and once such rules 
are in place they are again used and misused based on the power of particular states and their 
agendas or they are outright ignored, if the state can afford reputational cost.4 The whole 
process is many times wrapped in propaganda which tries to present the stances and decisions 
of the actors as fuelled by some altruistic motives or a struggle for the common good of the 
whole of humanity, while the reality is usually far less rosy.5 One does not have to look far to 
identify biases echoing those found in the WTO or even worse. Perhaps the most famous is 
the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council granted solely on the basis 
of power at the time of the creation of the UN Charter and forced on everyone else under the 
threat that otherwise there would be no UN. The only alternative to the acceptance of a 
Charter with the veto was no Charter at all.6 A representative of the US even demonstrated 
this by tearing up a copy of the Charter in front of the representatives of small states and told 
them they could go home and declare that they had defeated the veto but that they would be 
at a loss for words when asked about where the Charter was.7   
The veto has since been successfully used to protect interests of the permanent members or 
their political allies at the expense of people suffering in various conflicts around the world, 
perhaps most infamously Palestine. In the area of international criminal law, the exclusive 
focus on African states by the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused outrage, while 
specific tribunals can be set up through the Security Council for the trial of individuals from 
less powerful states even against the consent of these states. On the other hand the hegemon, 
US, remains untouchable, choosing not to sign up to the Rome Statute of the ICC (despite 
having influenced heavily its drafting) and concluding bilateral treaties with states that are its 
                                                            
3 C. Reus-Smith, (ed.), The Politics of International Law, Cambridge Studies in international Relations 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), introduction, p. 2.  
4 Ibid, xiii, referring to the decision by the US to invade Iraq, its treatment of prisoners of war and the use of 
torture. 
5 For a discussion on different theories of international relations from the liberal and the ‘benevolent hegemon’ 
theories to dependency theories see M. P. Karns and K. A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics 
and Processes of Global Governance, 2nd edn., (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 49. 
6 F. O. Wilcox, ‘The Yalta Voting Formula’, 39 The American Political Science Review, pp. 943-956. 
7 Ibid.  
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members, so that they renounce their right to bring any US crimes to the ICC. Similarly to the 
situation at the WTO, where an increased influence on the rule making process by actors 
other than the richest countries has meant that the whole process has more or less come to a 
standstill, the United States are backing out of all aspects of international law where 
developing countries and non-governmental organisations are gaining a voice and where the 
agenda no longer strictly follows the US interests.8 What was once mainly a Western project, 
international law now stands without the support of the most powerful country in the world in 
important areas where it is not strictly in its interest to join, for example in the case of the 
ICC and regarding international commitments on reducing CO2 emissions, such as the Kyoto 
Protocol and now the Paris Agreement. The US furthermore already rejected membership in 
the League of Nations in 1921, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1998 and of course as described in chapter III the ITO in 
1948. It also withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.  
John Austin, considered that international law was controlled by powerful states to such an 
extent that this law is fundamentally different from national law, and thus could not even be 
jurisprudentially analysed.9 His positivism is also reflected in the famous observation that 
international law is nothing more than ‘an attorney’s mantle artfully displayed on the 
shoulders of arbitrary power’ and ‘a decorous name for a convenience of the chancelleries.’10 
In his treatise on the nature of international law, Koskenniemi finds it to lie somewhere 
between state behaviour, will or interest (the concrete aspect) and a system which binds a 
state regardless of its behaviour, will or interest (the normative aspect). In other words, he 
finds law and its justification in the behaviour, will or interests of the state, but it then the law 
(at least temporarily) binds the state regardless of its behaviour, will or interests.11 For 
Koskenniemi there is no divine or natural law or justice against which we could measure the 
norms of international law as it is a purely artificial creation, based on the concrete 
behaviour, will and interest of states.12 On the other end of the spectrum one finds thinkers 
such as Professor Allott, a self-proclaimed utopian, who calls for a revolution and a complete 
reconceptualization of the status quo. He has no trouble finding the standard against which 
                                                            
8 P. Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules, (Allen Lane, 2005), p. 324. 
9 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought W. 
E. Rumble (ed.), (Cambridge University Press, 1995); see also M. W. Janis, ‘Jeremy Bentham and the 
Fashioning of ‘International Law’’, 78 The American Journal of International Law, (1984), p. 410.  
10 J. Brierly, The Outlook for International Law, (Clarendon Press, 1944) (quoting Sir Alfred Zimmern), p. 13. 
11 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, The Structure of International Legal Argument, Reissue with new 




we could measure the norms of international law and for this purpose reaches quite simply 
for our most fundamental values and ideals. Unfortunately, due to a number of historical 
circumstances and events, an international legal system has been imagined by the holders of 
public power, which enacts and enforces a perverted, anti-social, anti-human worldview 
which treats social injustice and human suffering on a global scale as if it were beyond 
human responsibility and beyond the judgment of our most fundamental values and ideals 
while the people and the peoples of the world have simply had to acquiesce in and to live 
with the consequences of this disgraceful perversion of theory and practice.13 Allott finds the 
root cause of all evil to be the idea that international society is not a society. In this way it has 
avoided both the democratic revolution and socialisation which took place in state societies.14 
Several other commentators, including Wolff and Kant have written on the existence of a 
human family in a desire to instil a sense of common responsibility for the common 
welfare.15 In this sense Falk speaks of a ‘planetary community’ as he advocates an alternative 
model for the existing system in what he perceives to be the second Grotian moment in 
history; according to the new model ordinary men and women would take precedence over 
both great power stateism and global capitalism in a ‘global solidarity’.16  
In the discussion about stateism versus solidarity, however we must not lose sight of the fact 
that either system can be harmful or beneficial depending on its use. If it is only the stronger 
states which determine what is considered a common good, than strict sovereignty would be a 
better option. To the extent that international law has moved away from states so far, it has 
become lex mercatoria, where transnational corporations actors are the principal moving 
force in decentralised law making.17 The neo-liberal agenda enforced by the international 
financial and trade institution is displacing national legal systems, where it does not make any 
difference anymore, who is in power as they are all compelled to pursue the same economic 
policies.18 Activists for the right to development (RTD) have thus long been fighting against 
the loss of domestic autonomy and policy space brought about by what neo-liberalism has 
portrayed as the ‘common good’, i.e. opening up of markets regardless of different stages of 
                                                            
13 P. Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State, (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 
399-416. 
14 Ibid, p. 407, emphasis in original. 
15 C. W. Jenks, The World Beyond the Charter, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1969), p. 137. 
16 R. Falk, ‘A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals,’ in R. Falk, F. 
Kratochwil and S. H. Mendlovitz, (eds.), International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, (Westview Press, 
1985), pp. 657, 673; R. Jackson, Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations, From Anarchy to 
Cosmopolis, (Pelgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 130. 
17 B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: a Manifesto’, 8 International Community Law 




development.19 The implication that governments by default abuse their sovereignty at the 
expense of their peoples’ suffering and should thus see their powers diminished in a global 
society is not necessarily correct. Furthermore sometimes dictatorships can look inhumane on 
the outside but bringing them down would mean more misery and more chances for foreign 
abuse and exploitation. Human rights, and democracy, as common goods have been used as 
excuses for military interventions often times bringing more destruction and eventually less 
human rights, not to mention regression of the current of development, to the regions 
affected. However it is nevertheless important to establish a theoretical appreciation of a 
natural law in terms of justice and a common good that should be strived for with 
international law – not so much in terms of fixating methods, but merely as aims to be 
achieved. Methods then need to be defined and determined separately from state influence in 
a judicial setting and with a scientific method. It is to play such a role, that the present author 
suggests the inclusion of the RTD at the WTO. 
Due to a fundamental shift in the scope and reach of international law (see below under 
discussion on illegitimacy of international norms), Pogge places the responsibility for 
changing the rules which perpetuate poverty in developing countries on the shoulders of 
ordinary citizens of affluent countries. Since we have better resources of information as well 
as means of communication and of political organization at our disposal and are also much 
better protected through a set of civil and political rights that are enforced effectively by an 
independent judiciary, Pogge places on us even more responsibility to act to prevent global 
injustice than he would have placed on Germans during Nazi rule to act to prevent the 
regime’s atrocities.20 Similarly Allott emphasises how ordinary people around the world must 
express to their rulers their moral outrage at the present state of the human world. In his 
words:  
It is an outrage made almost unbearable by the complacency of those who operate the international 
system and the conniving of those who rationalise it, as commentators in public discussion or analysts in 
an academic context.21  
 
Arguably it is not the nature of the vast majority of peoples but their misinformation and the 
sense of hopelessness, which prevents them from expressing such outrage and exerting 
enough pressure on their governments. In this sense Sanson does not share the impression of 
Hobbes, Spinoza, Pufendorf and Locke about the selfishness and greed of the human nature 
                                                            
19 M. Salomon, ‘Legal Cosmopolitanism and the Normative Contribution of the Right to Development’, in S. 
Marks, (ed.), Implementing the Right to Development – The Role of International Law, (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
2008), p. 19. 
20 Ibid, p. 7. 
21 Allott, supra note 28, p. 398. 
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and instead believes in an evolving humanity and a desire by the people for their government 
to act in the common interests of the whole world. Indeed, we as citizens of developed 
countries bare the moral responsibility and are the only ones who can make a difference in 
the behaviour of our governments in the international arena, however one cannot disregard 
the effectiveness of extensive propaganda in place which not only prevents the majority of us 
from understanding facts about the global regime but even prevents us from using our 
democracies in our own favour, let alone the favour of developing countries. The example of 
the Iraq invasion (and several other invasions since) shows us, how with the proper 
propaganda, anything (or nearly anything) can look legal or legitimate to ordinary citizens of 
the hegemon. The scholarship on international trade rules and administration by the ‘insiders’ 
in the trade policy community or the elite has also lacked a critical approach and has been 
mostly apologetic.22 Howse speaks of how the idea of such scholarship reminded him of the 
corruption of the life and of the mind under circumstances of oppression which he witnessed 
in the Soviet Union.23 As mentioned above, counter-propaganda in the area of international 
economic law once already existed at substantially high levels. It was the establishment of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and actions by the G-77 
within the UN system which provided the first fundamental and sustained challenge to the 
dominant liberal view.24 However the momentum was lost after the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) project failed to achieve its goals on almost all grounds apart from 
the adoption of the (Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) by GATT in 1971, itself 
riddled with problems and limitations (see chapter IV). UNCTAD eventually became less 
active and its focus narrowed to capacity building25 thereby losing its revolutionary nature. 
Hegel’s observation on the transformative potential of new theories replacing entrenched 
ones, highlights how the existing model needs to be portrayed as something purely negative 
before reality can start moving towards the concretization of the idea of justice.26 It is thus 
important to highlight and condemn without apology highly problematic aspects of the 
GATT/WTO system in terms of their anti-developmental character and to unveil the selfish 
nature with which states and lobbies approach rule making, in a bid to prove the urgency of 
drastic reform.  
                                                            
22 R. Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy, (Cameron May, 2007), Preface, p. 7. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Karns, supra note 5, p. 394.  
25 Ibid. 
26 G. W. F. Hegel, ‘Freiheit und Schicksal’ in G. Lasson (ed.) Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie 
(1923), 138 et seq. in J. von Bernstorff, ‘International Law and Global Justice: On Recent Inquiries into the 
Dark Side of Economic Globalization’, 26 The European Journal of International Law, (2015), p. 292. 
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Intrinsically linked is the necessary reform of outdated limitations placed on the right to self-
determination which prevents it from assuming a meaningful role in the world of today. This 
is described below and inspiration for a new perspective is again found in the African 
Charter.  
 
3. An Application of the Right to Self-Determination and Right to Resist Economic 
Oppression for the Modern Times 
Concepts such as the right to self-determination and the right to resist should form part of the 
discussion when it comes to demanding a fairer international trading system. The concepts 
however need to be considered through evolutionary interpretations, so that they correspond 
to the challenges of today’s world. 
The right to resist, has been a part of many different philosophies, cultures and religions for 
millennia; it can be found in one form or another in Solon’s Law and the Athenian Decrees of 
Demophantus and Eucrates, the philosophies of Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch,27 the Confucian 
twin concepts of tianming (mandate of heaven) and geming (removal of the mandate),28 the 
Islamic concept of jihad (struggle against oppression), the war theories of Grotius29 and de 
Vattel,30 the social contract theory of Locke,31 or in Marxist thought as a right to struggle 
specifically against capitalism and colonialism.32 In pre-colonial Africa, popular uprisings 
and overthrows of tyrants were not uncommon. The idea can further be found in Art. 35 of 
the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen’, incorporated into the French 
Constitution of year I (24 June 1793): 
When a government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is the most sacred of rights and the 
most indispensable of duties. 
                                                            
27 J. F. McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece, (Cornell University Press, 1993) pp. 88, 185-
187; O. Jászi and J. D. Lewis, Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide (The Free Press, 
1957); S. Murphy, ‘The Right to Resist Reconsidered’ in D. Keane and Y. McDermott, The Challenge of 
Human Rights: Past, Present and Future, (Edward Elgar, 2012), p. 91. 
28 Menicus, trans. D.C. Lau, rev. edn., (Chinese University Press, 2003) for example book I part B:8, book II 
part B:14, book VII part A:31; Chung-Shu Lo, ‘Human Rights in the Chinese Tradition’, in UNESCO, Human 
Rights: Comments and Interpretations, (July 1948) UNESCO Doc. PHS/3(rev.) 25, pp. 185-6; Murphy, ibid. 
29 ‘Jus belli dari posse in principem populi liberi’ (‘the right to make war may be conceded against him who has 
the chief authority among a free people’) H. Grotius, The Law of War and Peace: Selections From De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis, trans. W.S.M. Knight, (Peace Book Co., 1939) book I chapter IV i3, vii4, viii4; book II chapter XXV 
viii2; Murphy, ibid. 
30 Subjects have a legal right to resist their sovereign ‘if by his insupportable tyranny he brings on a national 
revolt against him’ de Vattel, supra note 35, book I chapter IV 54; Murphy, ibid. 
31 See J. Locke’s ‘Doctrine of the Lawfulness of Resisting all Unlawful Exercises of Power’, J. Locke, Two 
Treatises of Government, P Haslett ed., (Cambridge University Press, 1988) especially the Second Treatise 
chapter XVIII ‘Of Tyranny’ and chapter XIX ‘Of the Dissolution of Government’; chapter XIX [226] 415; 
chapter XIX [243] 427-428; chapter XVIII [206] 402; chapter XVIII [207] 403; Murphy, ibid, p. 92. 
32 Murphy, ibid. 
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This provided the inspiration for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, where 
the preamble states:  
Whereas it is essential, if a man is not compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.  
 
Therefore there is a long tradition of recognising this right. However these concepts envision 
the oppression as coming from the state and therefore provide justification for rebellion 
against the state. If transported into a context of colonialism or the modern neo-colonialist 
international structures they would have to translate into a right of rebellion against the 
coloniser or the unfair international regime to serve the modern fight against oppression.  
The right to self-determination has been recognized in international law primarily for peoples 
‘under colonial domination’ or those ‘subjected to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation’ and has attained treaty law, customary law and ius cogens status.33 
Unfortunately this is understood to limit the right to self-determination in scope to situations, 
which have virtually disappeared from the modern world.34 For example since the end of 
apartheid in South Africa and the Namibian independence, the unfailing support of African 
states for the cause of peoples dominated by a racist minority, as reaffirmed in the Preamble 
of the African Charter, no longer corresponds to any reality.35 Yet neo-colonialism continues 
to negatively affect meaningful self-determination and the rhetoric of promoting development 
has been playing the role of disguising a colonial project in the language of helping and 
guiding the less developed since the concept of ‘tutelage’ for developing countries was 
created as far back as the Mandate System of the League of Nations.36 The British 
representative and prominent actor at the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates 
Commission, Lord Frederick Lugard, declared that the ‘races of Africa are not yet able to 
stand alone’ ant that it was  
the genius of our race to colonise, to trade, and to govern. The task in which England is engaged in the 
tropics - alike in Africa and in the East - has become part of her tradition, and she has ever given of her 
best in the cause of liberty and civilisation. There will always be those who cry aloud that the task is 
being badly done, that it does not need doing, that we can get more profit by leaving others to do it, that it 
brings evil to subject races and breeds profiteers at home. These were not the principles which prompted 
                                                            
33 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples – A Legal Reappraisal, (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 
120; see ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ (UNGA Res. 1514 
(XV) of 14 December 1960); ‘Declaration on Principles on International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’, (UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 
24 October 1970). 
34 F. Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human 
Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa, (Martinus Njihoff Publishers, 2003). 
35 Ibid, p. 263. 
36 A. Anghie, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third 
World’, 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, (1999-2000), p. 276. 
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our forefathers, and secured for us the place we hold in the world today in trust for those who shall come 
after us.37  
In the same book, ironically, Lugard talked frankly about the impossibility of satisfying the 
right to work in the ‘democracies of today… without the raw materials of the tropics on the 
one hand and their markets on the other’.38 It is this same goal of getting raw materials from 
the poor countries of the world and opening up their markets for the finished products from 
developed countries which continued to drive much of the aims of the world trade regime 
until today. 
The vision of such ‘guidance’ of the less developed was repeated with respect to the mandate 
territories. Thus Art. 22 (1) of the League of Nations Covenant, which dealt with mandate 
territories, stated: 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the 
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able 
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the 
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that 
securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.39  
 
It was soon clear to third world lawyers, that third world struggles to win political 
independence achieved only a partial victory as colonial relations were furthered through 
continuing economic control and a ‘transition took place, from a formal system of 
colonialism based on political control to a more elusive but nonetheless powerful system of 
neo-colonialism based on economic control’.40  
From then on and all through the IMF, World Bank, and the GATT/WTO imperial powers 
continued to shape and reshape the 'science of development' in a way that allows a re-
articulation of the imperial project that followed the demise of colonialism.41 International 
law is now the principal language in which domination is coming to be expressed in the era 
of globalisation.42 The postwar development thinking established the idea that 'development 
was a necessary, as well as an inevitable, historic process to be facilitated by the 'expertise' of 
those countries regarded as 'developed'.43 On the other hand, dependency theory and its main 
proponents from 1950s Latin America saw international organizations as the agents of 
                                                            
37 F. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (William Blackwood, 1929), p. 619. 
38 F. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (1922) (Archon Books, 1965), p. 61, quoted in 
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Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy available at: 
 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22, (last accessed, 22.8.2016). 
40 Anghie, supra note 36, p. 277. 
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penetration and the creators and enablers of dependency relations.44 In this aspect they concur 
with Marxist theories in perceiving international organisations as tools of capitalist classes 
and states.45 The conviction that the adoption of liberal economic strategies by developing 
countries would translate into their eternal dependency was expressed by the UN’s Economic 
Commission for Latin America in 1950s which became the basis for the creation of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO).46 With the failure of the NIEO project however, dependency theories lost 
popularity.47 This failure has been ascribed to many reasons. Hipold for example attributed it 
to the radical language chosen by its proponents, which ‘left next to no margin for 
compromise’.48 In the words of Bertrand, Western countries in international institutions 
became alienated by the way developing countries incessantly condemned them and by what 
was, in his words, developing countries’ accusatory, demanding, anti-liberal and ideological 
propaganda.49 More likely, those dictating the status quo simply did not like the critique, 
regardless of how it was conveyed while those criticising lacked the economic power to 
implement their ideas.50 The failure in achieving a reorientation of the GATT is not 
surprising considering that UNCTAD resolutions and declarations were non-binding and the 
fact that UNCTAD was never a part of the GATT/WTO system but functions from the 
outside and is only able to put pressure on the organisation. As for the radical talk, if 
anything, it would be desirable to keep it alive, despite it being used as an excuse to shut 
down conversation by the vexed hegemon. The pro-Western, pro free trade theory talk is no 
less radical and far more deceitful in its claim of working for the benefit of everyone, thus a 
radical response is adequate and necessary to highlight the injustice and to fight for the right 
to development. As Chimni describes,  
[d]omination can coexist with varying degrees of autonomy for dominated States. In the era of 
globalisation, the reality of dominance is best conceptualised as a more stealthy, complex and cumulative 
process. A growing assemblage of international laws, institutions and practices coalesce to erode the 
independence of third world countries in favour of transnational capital and powerful States. The ruling 
elite of the third world, on the other hand, has been unable and/or unwilling to devise, deploy and sustain 
effective political and legal strategies to protect the interests of third world peoples.51 
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Commendably, the African Charter contains a broad understanding of self-determination as a 
‘universal, unquestionable and inalienable’ right, which applies to all peoples, and not just 
those colonized.52 It further states that all people ‘shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen.’53 Within the context of the right to self-determination the right to resist is 
expressly recognized in both the African and the Arab Charter.54 The African Charter asserts 
the right to resist in that ‘[c]olonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free 
themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the 
international community’ and ‘[a]ll peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States 
Parties… in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or 
cultural.’55 The Arab Charter encourages condemnation and endeavour to eliminate foreign 
domination which constitutes an impediment to human dignity and a major barrier to the 
exercise of fundamental rights.56 The recognition of a right to resist oppression and the 
recognition of a duty to assist each-other in the struggle against foreign domination would 
imply that members of the mentioned Charter should struggle together against international 
rules which are against their economic development and thus enable foreign economic 
domination and neo-colonialism. The eradication of neo-colonialism is further stated as a 
goal of the African Charter which establishes the equality of peoples and condemns 
domination of one people over another.57 The call for ‘condemnation and endeavour to 
eliminate foreign domination’ and the idea of Members co-operating as found in the Arab 
Charter would also fit well with a joint call by developing countries for the introduction of 
the right to development into the WTO system.  
There is a need to make the story of resistance an integral part of the narration of 
international law and to study and suggest concrete changes in existing international legal 
regimes.58 The articulation of demands would assist the old and new human rights and civil 
society movements to frame their call for reform in a way that would not fall into the old 
traps and would be truly beneficial to struggle for development.59 
We must recognise that the ideological domination of Northern academic institutions, limits 
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the discourse and it is thus imperative that third world approaches to international law find 
ways and means to globalise the sources of critical knowledge.60 Ironically, in academia, 
which should provide and indeed necessitates the freedom to drastically criticise the status 
quo and suggest fundamental reforms, this freedom is severely constrained by the protocols 
of what are acceptable goals and what is deemed good academic work.61 As Chimni 
describes: 
It compels the academia to playing a self-fulfilling role as the protocols, in a manner of speaking, shame 
individual academics into imagining only certain kind of social arrangements. For those who accept the 
protocols are held up as models of clear thinking. On the other hand, a variety of social and peer 
pressures are brought to bear on dissenting academics to neutralize their critical energies. Even eminent 
personalities are unable to be bold and courageous in evaluating contemporary trends and imagining 
alternative futures... we would [therefore] urge critical third world scholars to willingly court 
'irresponsibility' if that is what it takes to boldly critique the present globalization process and project just 
alternative futures. The commitment to ushering in a just world order has of course to be translated into a 
concrete research agenda in the world of international law.62  
 
As chapter I has shown, economic development of poorer countries is a fundamental value of 
humanity. The present author thus calls for WTO Member states to include the right to 
development as a constitutional norm in the organisation and thus bring it in line also with the 
UN Charter. One of the main objectives of the present author is to bring an apolitical element 
to the highly politicised negotiations of the WTO where power always prevails and 
developmental concerns are pushed aside. In the hope that the dispute settlement mechanism 
can bring this apolitical aspect, the present author wants to provide it with the tool which 
would allow it to take developmental considerations into account beyond what is currently 
envisioned.  
  
4. Call for the Inclusion of the Right to Development into the WTO Legal System 
Professor Hart has been one of the main critics of the international system and what he saw as 
its lack of a ‘unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and providing general 
criteria for the identification of its rules.’63 He wished to see something equivalent to a 
constitution which would be the ultimate set of rules against which the validity of all other 
rules would be tested. As mentioned in chapter II, others find the UN Charter to already 
provide such a constitutional basis. The UN Independent Expert on the promotion of a 
democratic and equitable international order, de Zayas has expressed that he would like to see 
the WTO incorporated into the UN subordinated to articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter 
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which would make human rights and development part of WTO’s constitutional law.64 He 
would therefore like to see trade rules recast in a human rights friendly framework.65 He 
would like to see the WTO ‘mainstream human rights into all of its activities and issue 
directives to the dispute settlement panels so that human rights treaty violations are not 
adversely affected.’66 In his view the WTO dispute panels should interpret the exceptions in 
the GATT to support initiatives on food security, health and the environment and to facilitate 
solutions to climate change.67 Since he strongly criticised the decision in India – Solar Cells, 
this implies that he would expect the allowance for economic development consideration in 
the context of ‘facilitating solutions to climate change’ and perhaps even beyond. The 
question of whether the WTO is a 'separate regime' outside of normal concepts of 
international law has been resolved by the Appellate Body which explicitly stated  in US - 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna that the WTO is part of broader international law with most 
significant implications for treaty interpretation.68 Thus the UN Charter should arguably 
already be its ‘constitution’. The analysis of this study however, shows clearly that it does not 
de facto play this role.  The present author welcomes Mr de Zayas’ proposal, however with 
reservations on transporting the human rights generally into the WTO framework. Rather this 
author calls for the inclusion of the right to development into the WTO, first and foremost 
which would inevitably include also human rights concerns, yet would not allow for human 
right talk to be used as a weapon against developing countries (see further discussion in next 
section). 
The present author further agrees with Mr deZayas that the issues concerning the WTO and 
its impact on development and human rights are so complex and the consequences so serious, 
that they require continuous monitoring.69 The UN Independent Expert on the promotion of a 
democratic and equitable international order urges countries to test the legality of the 
agreements for compatibility with their own constitutions and human rights treaty 
obligations, including from regional human rights instruments, such as the Banjul Charter and 
its right to development.70 However, apart from suggesting referendums after human rights 
assessments of the impact of such treaties, it is unclear what the Expert thinks countries could 
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do when a contradiction with such obligations is established. The only power he sees in the 
hands of developing countries at the moment is to withhold the ratifications of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement until the Doha Development Agenda is implemented.71 The present 
author finds it thus essential to provide a mechanism inside the WTO system which would 
allow the existing agreements to be challenged at the dispute settlement mechanism, when 
problems are identified by the above mentioned continuous monitoring.  
The WTO and development are intrinsically linked. Everything the WTO does effects the 
potential of its Member states for economic development. The merger with the right to 
development is thus both logical and necessary, if the organisation is to address its legitimacy 
gap as discussed in chapter II. This would further give an important enforceability element to 
the external element of the right to development which has thus far been its most neglected 
part, especially in terms of trade. 
As Arts and Tamo note, ‘to advance the right to development structurally, a new international 
order has to be pursued which would redress the current injustices in international economic 
and trade law, and allow for more forceful action on global challenges such as climate change 
and concerning financing development. This has been the elephant in too many relevant 
rooms for too long, though, both at international and national levels.’72 While UN 
Developmental goals provide something to work with, it is worth noting that Millennium 
Development Goal 8 relating to trade has been the most neglected of all73 and furthermore 
these goals provide an overwhelmingly neoliberal perspective on trade.  
The right to development introduced into the WTO system could essentially act as the new 
Grundnorm, i.e. rule of recognition of the WTO with which all its other rules would have to 
comply, in a process of a constitutitonalization of the institution.74 Apart from that it should 
be explicitly included as a legitimate value to be protected under general exceptions of Arts. 
XX GATT and XIV GATTS. It could thus provide the means for challenging unbalanced 
agreements or an unjustifiable lack of market openings in developed countries’ markets for 
goods of export interests to developing countries; a means for challenging agreements with 
vastly negative effects for climate change; and as a tool for carving out essential policy space 
for development.  The right to development should furthermore be included in Art. 27 (2) of 
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the TRIPS Agreement to allow for exclusions from patentability based on developmental 
concerns.  
As described in chapter IV a strong push for developmental concerns at the WTO has 
resulted in ‘business’ being taken elsewhere, i.e. a recourse to bilateral and regional 
agreements instead. If the right to development is to have true value within the system, it 
therefore needs to apply to any trade agreement conducted between the Members of the WTO 
even if on a bilateral or regional basis. Based on the primacy of the WTO in this regard, any 
inclusion of the right to development among its objectives would already automatically apply 
to bilateral and regional trade agreements.75 
It is important that the right to development, when included into the WTO legal system, is 
phrased in a way that would prevent it from necessarily falling victim to the manipulation it 
has received generally in international law and international developmental projects (see 
chapters II and III) in terms of the means of achieving development, any particular targets or 
even what economic development is or who would be the bearer of such a right. In this sense 
it has to be clearly acknowledged that industrialisation and the transformation of the 
productive structure into higher technology production are inevitable components of 
development. Furthermore such a right should not be confined to trade liberalisation as a 
means of achieving it. The formulation of the right should thus not show any bias towards a 
particular economic theory or school of thought, to determine what is beneficial for 
development. As explained in this thesis, protectionism forms the basis of developmental 
economics and despite being officially vilified its benefits are clearly understood by everyone 
involved as can be inferred from the bargaining at the negotiations, from the asymmetrical 
demands of accessing Members and the reluctance to practice unilateral opening up,  from 
protectionism being essentially a ‘compensation’ when a Member wins a dispute, from 
Members using protectionism at the expense of being brought to the dispute settlement and 
from Members practicing so-called ‘effective breaches.’ Thus Member states should have the 
ability to freely present evidence in respect of any policy measures, even if protectionist, in 
terms of their benefit for the developmental plan of the country and the growth of its 
technological or other capabilities. Apart from economic development generally, reasonable 
grounds for such protectionism should include the protection of infant industry; retaining 
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employment (especially in high skilled industries and thus preventing a loss to the economy); 
diversification etc. An inclusion of the right to development among the legitimate values 
which can be protected under the general exceptions of Arts. XX GATT and XIV GATS 
would also address the currently prohibited discrimination under the chapeaux of the relevant 
provisions, since discriminations are ‘justifiable’ as long as they relate to the objective of the 
measure provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs. 
One of the main criticisms of trade barriers for the sake of protecting local industry is that 
they do not necessarily remedy the problems that caused the producers to be uncompetitive.76 
This could rather easily be addressed by specifying in the relevant provision that protectionist 
measures must be accompanied by a governmental monitoring of the industry in question and 
its plans at addressing the issues which are rendering it uncompetitive. A long term plan of 
doing so could thus be specified as a precondition for allowing the restriction on trade. This 
would encourage industries to not lay back and enjoy their protected status without any 
improvements to their production, but to use this chance in order to invest into research and 
development and a better production organisation. At the same time, the provision should not 
include a fixed date by which the country would be required to remove the restriction, rather 
it could remain as long as the country and the industry in question could logically present a 
case for the benefit of such restrictions.  
A general criticism of protectionism, which would also imply here, is that its success 
crucially depends on a correct diagnosis of which industries could become competitive over 
time and it is suggested that this is often very difficult for governments to identify.77 Yet 
history has shown, time and again, that despite numerous failures there have been also 
countless examples of success in this regard, therefore to say that it is merely ‘difficult’ 
cannot be an argument that takes away such a possibility. As Stiglitz has noted, ‘the risk of 
government failure can be managed in countries as they develop’78 and that ‘it is 
inappropriate for the world trading system to be implementing rules which circumscribe the 
ability of developing countries to use both trade and industry policies to promote 
industrialisation.'79 This being said, protectionism should not be allowed across the board. 
Rather the developing country in question would have to clearly demonstrate that its policies 
are part of a long term economic plan for the promotion of certain industries which it 
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considers would most benefit its economic development and diversification. Thus the 
possibility of carving out policy space by claiming the protection of economic development 
would encourage governments in developing countries to devise well thought out economic 
plans. 
It should furthermore be made clear that conservation policy is compatible with industrial 
policy, especially in instances where developing countries are trying to transform their 
economies into a reliance on green energy in accordance with their commitments to reducing 
climate change and incurring significant costs doing so.  This kind of understanding is more 
in line with the general notion of sustainable development than the current WTO approach at 
the dispute settlements where any industrial policy is seen as proof of an absence of 
conservation policy.  
In terms of sustainable development, the importance of economic growth is mainly only 
recognised for developing countries, in order to enable them to meet the basic needs of their 
population.80 The right to development here proposed would also be essentially asymmetrical 
in that it could only be claimed by developing countries against those more developed. This 
bias however can be easily justified in light of decades of the system working mostly in 
favour of developed countries, in light of past injustices and essentially in light of economic 
development of poorer countries being a core value and thus a core responsibility of 
humanity.  
In chapter IV we have described the current subsidy rules which absolutely fail to take into 
account the commitment to sustainable development as they encourage fossil fuel 
consumption and discourage a move into green energy production by prohibiting developing 
countries to discriminate in favour of local firms when they subsidise such programmes. 
Stiglitz once suggested that countries impose tariffs and bans on imports from the US, for not 
paying the cost of damage to the environment, which he considers to be the same as not 
paying workers’ full cost or in other words, a subsidy to local firms.81 He based this statement 
on the fact that the US failed to ratify the Kyoto Agreement. Since it just pulled out of the 
Paris Agreement as well, at the very least, domestic content requirements for developing 
countries’ green energy programmes should not be allowed to be challenged by the US at the 
dispute settlement. Yet technically neither of these options is possible in the current 
framework. As described in chapter IV, bringing into the equation the right to development, 
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the current system of allowable and prohibited subsidies could be successfully challenged at 
the dispute settlement. The level of development attained by most developed countries is to a 
large extent thanks to a vast degradation of the environment globally, not just in said 
countries. On the other hand, all the models of climate change suggest that developing 
countries in the equatorial regions of the world will be hit the hardest by its devastating 
effects, greatly affecting not just their possibilities for development, but their bare 
livelihoods. Incorporating a constitutional right to development at the WTO would allow for 
evaluating current rules while taking all these issues into the equation. As Uvin says, 
currently in the development debate ‘Northern over-consumption, a history of colonialism, 
lopsided environmental degradation, protectionism, the dumping of arms in the Third World, 
the history of shoring up past dictators, the wisdom of structural adjustment, and 
globalization – all are off the discussion table.’82  A constitutional right to development at the 
WTO would bring back the relevance of these facts and provide a tool to condemn the current 
subsidy rules, requiring Members to renegotiate them. In this context it could function 
similarly to the standard of ex aequo et bono and consider issues from a broader perspective 
and not in a narrow minded manner as is the current practice at the dispute settlement.83  
Furthermore in the context of TRIPS, the right to development could permit the exclusion of 
foreign green technologies from patentability in developing countries in light of the severity 
of the climate change threat and in light of their economic development aspirations in this 
field.  
The inclusion of the RTD would also be helpful for the interpretation of special and 
differential treatment (SDT) provisions. The WTO system formally recognises the need for 
such treatment however as demonstrated in chapter IV it is implemented wholly inadequately 
most of the time. The inclusion of the RTD could play an important role in making said 
provisions more operational and binding, especially when they are written in hortatory 
language. Even in the existing framework these provisions could be read as such if they were 
considered in light of an overall objective of the agreements and if dispute settlement bodies 
would follow the example of evolutions in treaty interpretation in the field of human rights 
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and environmental law.84 However the fact that the above mentioned bodies have been 
reluctant to do so, suggests that a more clear expansion of their mandate to include the 
enforcement of the right to development could improve the status quo and force them into a 
less timid and bolder approach. The same goes for above mentioned general exceptions.  
Relevant to our proposed reform is the crucial question posed by von Bernstorff who asks 
whether ‘international lawyers as scholars can productively engage at all with moral, social 
and economic issues, such as extreme poverty, structural exploitation and the effects of 
climate change.’85 If the answer to his question is no, because we lack the necessary 
expertise, we essentially declare ourselves incompetent in the struggle for global justice, 
equality and progressive enjoyment of human rights. This is an unacceptable status quo as we 
limit ourselves to knowledge about the application of the law, but not about its merits. 
However we do find ourselves in a more than usually uncomfortable situation when it comes 
to international economic law, since any legal analysis must essentially rely on a field of 
expertise which is not scientific and its experts are many times merely the propagandists for 
their nation’s interests or are biased towards a theory which brings them more academic 
acclaim. Trachtman criticizes those condemning the global economic order if they seem to 
fail to consult economists, however in the same breath he recognizes that economists fail to 
reach a consensus on essential issues such as for example the implications of the TRIPS 
Agreement.86 Von Bernstorff is quite spot on when he asks whether it is ‘necessary to defend 
the influence of economists on the global economic order after the experience of 25 years of 
the reign of a particular and now increasingly contested economic theory in international 
economic institutions?’87 On the other hand he encapsulates the limitations of lawyers in that 
‘having expressed the moral argument through the medium of existing legal structures, 
morality will lose its revolutionary potential. The conservative function of the law demands 
its tribute even in the most progressive interpretation.’88  
The reform we are proposing would provide a system of evaluating existing rules against the 
backdrop of the right to development, where each party to the dispute can present its evidence 
backed with statistics and the research of economic experts, including those with unorthodox 
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views, thus bringing an element of objectivity into a system highly and unjustifiably tilted 
towards one economic theory. 
5. Why the Right to Economic Development and not all Human Rights 
Being concerned with the weak enforcement of human rights instruments, activists and 
academics have been looking towards WTO to ‘lend’ its enforcement mechanism in this 
regard. In other words, there have been ideas of merging the two systems together. This can 
be highly problematic however, if human rights concerns and arguments are not used to 
provide a shield against neoliberal policies that perpetuate poverty and underdevelopment, 
but are instead used to push for exactly said policies. The present author therefore cautions 
against a simplistic merger of human rights and the WTO and advocates rather for only the 
inclusion of the right to development in the latter system.   
There are ways in which the regulation of trade can be used to prevent human rights abuses. 
The two fields came into touch long before the existence of modern international economic 
law or international human rights law.89 This was the case with the outlawing of piracy,90 and 
of the trade of women, children91 and slaves.92 Outlawing piracy was an attempt to fight an 
insidious threat to human life on the High Seas as well as to protect the safety of international 
trade on what was then the main international channel of transfer for goods. The trade 
element was essential as slavery continued to be legal in many countries and there was no 
mechanism for so-called humanitarian intervention.93 
For such grave violations against humanity one would wish to retain the option of using trade 
agreements to prevent them. However this does not mean that the WTO should become the 
main platform for the fight for human rights. Mainly because human rights talk can be used, 
and has been used for less than noble reasons before. A claim for particular human rights can 
be used as a weapon against those that cannot provide for them because of their low level of 
development instead of helping such countries reach that necessary level. Without 
downplaying the importance of individual human rights, it is this author’s belief that the 
WTO needs to provide for the ‘enabling condition’ i.e. development, whereas existing human 
rights bodies can continue their work on individual rights in parallel. Of course the weakness 
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of these bodies and their enforcement mechanism is an issue on its own, however bringing 
human rights into the WTO is not the solution, especially since the weight of its enforcement 
is largely tilted against weaker states as has been demonstrated in this study. The language of 
human rights is not always innocent and has become a principal means of legitimizing less 
than noble political and social agendas. Thus scholars need to avoid blindly following the 
linear progressivism underlying contemporary human rights scholarship and begin 
questioning the use of human rights language for legitimizing, opposing and negotiating 
power.94  
Human rights have been used as a tool for putting pressure on developing countries not to 
stand together and thus remain easier to manipulate into accepting more anti-development 
deals. An example is the announcement made by the US on 23 March 2004 that it would 
sponsor a UN resolution criticizing China’s human rights record. It had not done so a year 
before but in the aftermath of China standing together with the G21 at Cancun, the US lost no 
time. It took revenge with as many trade related attacks as possible but went also beyond the 
trade arena into the realm of human rights protection to achieve its goal.95 
One should furthermore keep in mind the neoliberal circumstances of human rights which 
have permanently defined their trajectory. A rather important aspect of the contexts of the 
birth of the movement for human rights is the rise in that period of the neo-liberal version of 
‘private’ capitalism, with its now familiar policy prescription of privatisation, deregulation, 
free markets and state retreat from social provision; in other words the history of human 
rights cannot be told in isolation from developments in the history of capitalism.96 
The mainstream international human rights lawyers generally envision a large zone of 
compatibility between their norms and standard market arrangements and use human rights 
separately to keep globalization in check if and when it goes wrong and offer legal and other 
standards to guide, tame and ‘civilize’ an era of transnational market liberalization that in 
their view has in general improved the human condition.97 While the effects of capitalism and 
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the world trading regime on the enjoyment of basic human rights have been highly mixed, its 
biggest victim has been equality both of resources and opportunities in the national as well as 
global context.98 The human rights doctrine was never set out to protect said equality and by 
focusing only on a minimum floor of human rights protection it is thus wholly inadequate for 
addressing neoliberalism’s obliteration of the ceiling on inequality.99 Moyn thus suggests that 
human rights ‘stick to their minimalist tasks outside the socioeconomic domain.’100 The same 
criticism does not apply to the right to development, at least not in how it was initially 
envisioned and how its external component calling for a more equitable international 
economic order. The right to development is further unconventional concerning the classical 
individualistic paradigm of human rights, since was originally meant primarily as a collective 
people’s right of an erga omnes nature.101 It is thus not surprising that developed countries 
have been trying to sabotage the right to development while supporting at least in principle, 
the idea of other human rights. Its nature does not fit well with the neoliberal agenda and as 
described in chapter II and III there has already been an effort at diluting its meaning to fit 
better the general human rights narrative and forsake its revolutionary potential. It is 
important when seeking reform, not to slip into the ideological frameworks of general human 
rights and neoliberal theories where the freedoms of individuals matter more than collectivist 
efforts at raising the well-being of the population generally.102 Furthermore by focusing on a 
minimum floor of human protection, human rights norms prove inadequate in facing the 
reality that neoliberalism has damaged equality locally and globally much more than it has 
basic human rights outcomes (which, in some cases, it may indeed have advanced).103 
In the words of Teubner 'human rights could be seen as one of the most globalized political 
values of our time.'104 However, in their name, states are pushed to take on obligations in the 
fields of investment, trade, technology, currency, environment etc.105 It is this paradox that 
sees human rights actually being used against their own promise of long term betterment of 
the human condition, liberty and democracy for all peoples. This needs to be resolved for a 
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genuine pursuit of the raising of the standards of living of peoples around the world and the 
progressive realisation of their human rights. Human rights need to be reclaimed from the 
political tool they have become in the forcing of neo-liberal policies, especially when that is 
done with the help of the crime of aggression and regime change, and become the ideal that 
many people perceive it to be, that is, the ideal of human dignity, equality and opportunity for 
development of everyone. The post-colonial era has witnessed the massive violation of 
human rights of ordinary peoples in the name of development, which has contributed to some 
viewing development as a trojan horse.106 However it is 'development' thorough structural 
adjustment programs or neo-liberal policies that needs to be indicted, rather than the 
aspirations of the people to be able to exercise greater choices and a higher standard of life.107 
The language of human rights needs to be effectively used to defend the interests of the poor 
and marginal groups, which includes exposing the hypocrisy of the developed world with 
respect to the observance of international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law.108 In this sense, it is not the UN itself, which is plagued by power politics and recently 
also by the influence of corporate actors financing it, reducing the possibility of the 
organisation being at the centre of collective action by developing countries,109 but rather 
individual independent UN experts and special rapporteurs which have been most 
commendable. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mr de Schutter, has strongly 
challenged the WTO beyond the neoliberal narrative on the right to food (see chapter IV) and 
more recently Mr Alfred de Zayas, the UN Independent Expert on the promotion of a 
democratic and equitable international order has voiced his strong critique of the WTO, its 
latest negotiations and dispute settlement decisions calling for the stop of their vilification of 
industrial policy. Together with Special Rapporteur Mr Idriss Jazairy,110 Mr de Zayas called 
for international action on social justice as they spoke of the lack of a broad-based 
international awareness of the impact on human rights of the actions of foreign entities, be it 
states, international organizations or transnational corporations, which can have a severely 
negative impact on human rights in many countries, particularly in developing economies 
condemned by poverty.111 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has 
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already documented many of these problems in numerous reports, but international action to 
advance social justice has been lacking.112 The experts noted that ‘[w]hile regional human 
rights courts can consider injustices that arise as a result of ill-advised national legislation, 
there is no similar monitoring or corrective procedure with universal jurisdiction to consider 
issues created by the actions of external actors.’113 This speaks pointedly to the arguments 
raised by the present study regarding the inability of regional human rights instruments to 
provide protection of the right to development in its external dimension and gives support to 
the call for incorporating the right to development within the WTO system to address this 
deficiency. It is within the right to development that other human rights concerns should then 
be raised. For example labour rights may be important when a Member state argues that its 
protectionist measures aimed at a particular industry would prevent unemployment or 
underemployment which in turn would prevent the loss of investment into this factor of 
production, i.e. a loss to the economy. The protection of the right to health may join concerns 
for economic development in the context of exceptions from the general rules of TRIPS or in 
the context of limiting exports of materials the mining of which is necessary for domestic 
production but harmful to human health. The right to food has already been playing a major 
role in arguments for the need to protect local farming and allow stockpiling. In other words, 
what is crucial is that human rights would not be used against developmental needs of 
developing countries but could form part of their arguments. 
Human rights language has also been abused in the case of intellectual property. How 
intellectual property rights are labelled has a bearing on how the public views them. In the 
nineteenth-century, when the opposition movement against privilege and monopoly and for 
free international trade was very strong, the fact that patent protectionism was linked with 
tariff protectionism and patent monopoly was linked with monopoly privileges in general 
tended to boost the support for their opposition.114 On the other hand the IP lobby ‘in 
deliberate insincerity’ construed the artificial theory of the property rights of the inventor ‘as 
part of the rights of man’ to fit the spirit of the time which was so much for liberty and 
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equality, substituting the unpleasant ring of ‘privilege’ with a respectable connotation, 
‘property’.115 As Susan Sell describes:  
The language of rights weighs in favour of the person claiming the right. The language of privilege 
weighs in favour of the person granting the privilege. By wrapping themselves in the mantle of ‘property 
rights,’ they suggested that the rights they were claiming were somehow natural, unassailable and 
automatically deserved. They were able to deploy ‘rights talk’ effectively because they were operating in 
a context in which property rights are revered. In that regard ‘rights talk’ resonated with broader 
American culture… Advocates of highly protectionist IP norms expressed indignation at those violating 
these ‘rights’ and claimed that so-called violators were ‘pirates.’116  
 
This is also the position taken by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights which 
considers IPRs as ‘instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges on 
individuals or institutions solely for the purposes of contributing to the greater public good. 
The privilege is therefore a means to an end, not an end in itself.’117 The Commission further 
suggests that IPR should be looked at as taxation – ‘taxation might be desirable if it delivers 
public services that society values more than the direct and indirect cost of taxation. But less 
can also be beneficial, for instance if excessive taxation is harming economic growth.’118  
The way IPRs are considered today has been harshly criticized for preventing us from seeing 
our acts of creation in terms of the relational world that they occupy, and instead creating a 
false idea about them as being abstract from social relations.119 In this sense they have even 
been compared to a neurological condition which completely alters our abilities to see and to 
relate to the phenomenological world. 120 These rights are presented as universal truths even 
though they are in reality based on very particularized ideas of property and personhood, 
stemming from the classical liberal political theory in which every individual is the proprietor 
of one’s own person according the philosophy of John Lock who linked the theories of 
identity and property in his Two treaties of Government and An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. The patent protection legislations of Great Britain, France and America 
found their philosophical justification in this theory which declared everything one could 
form with one’s hands or mind to be the property of the one who formed it.121 Critics suggest 
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that thinking instead of our relation to the world of knowledge and culture via the trope of 
proximity ‘enables us to rethink our relations to our work, to ourselves and to each other, not 
as distinct sets of legal relations bound together by the idea of rights, but as a continuum that 
blurs the boundaries between rights, obligations and relationalities.’122 
Furthermore in the words of John Lewis Ricardo ‘nearly all useful inventions depend less on 
any individual than on the progress of society.’123 Or as another commentator puts it: 
‘individual achievements [are] not as much important as societal achievements and in 
particular the general framework conditions: without politico-economic and legal parameters 
invention would hardly be possible’ rendering individual privately owned property rights a 
contradictio in adiecto, as ‘[e]ach inventor is standing on the shoulders of his predecessors, 
profiting from the overall institutional framework.’124 Furthermore most inventors today do 
not own the patents for their inventions. Rather these are owned by their employers, who 
provided the investment, which basically means that inventors indeed only get only a certain 
reward for their inventions, sometimes merely for a ‘pittance’.125 Even more ironically, the 
owner of the patent can also simply be a buyer, who has nothing to do with the initial 
investment, but merely perceives the purchase of the patent as an opportunity for profit by 
raising its price.  
Considering the vast discrepancies between the research and development funding in 
developed and developing countries as well at their existing industrial and educational 
structures it is therefore essential to recognise the inherent inequality of opportunity for 
competitive innovation to take place in the former compared to the latter. Accordingly the 
human rights theory needs to recognise the inappropriateness of intellectual property 'rights' 
as human rights as well as the unfairness of the 'piracy' label when it comes to copying or 
reverse engineering of technologies originating from developed countries by those in 
developing countries. Similarly to free trade, it is only when countries achieve a comparable 
level of technological development that it could be legitimately asked of all countries to 
protect intellectual property 'rights' of foreigners to the degree demanded by TRIPS or TRIPS 
plus. Until then, the investment into research by companies from developed countries (when 
                                                            
122 Liang, supra note 119, p. 282. 
123 J. L. Ricardo, author of History and Anatomy of Navigation Laws, nephew of David Ricardo, president of a 
London bank and an MP. According to Macfie, he was the ‘principal advocate of reform or abolition of the 
patent system’ in the House of Commons, Machlup, supra note 114, p. 18, fn 65. 
124 M. Wӧrsdӧrfer, ‘Walter Eucken on Patent Laws: Are Patents Just ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’, 1 Economic 
Thought, (2012), p. 37. 
125 Machlup, supra note 114, p. 24. 
310 
 
this indeed happens and it is not merely a public subsidy) should be considered to be 
sufficiently compensated by their advantage of being first on the market. 
 
6. Why Revolutionary Pro-development Interpretations are Unlikely in the 
Current System 
As mentioned previously, some believe the necessary flexibilities are already there and that 
the dispute settlement Panels and Appellate Body could simply interpret rules in a more pro-
development manner. However, states did their best to try to prevent any judicial creativity 
by stating not once, but twice in the Agreement that recommendations and ruling of the DSB 
‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.’126 
It is true that judicial lawmaking nevertheless occurs to an extent,127 yet when it does, 
concerns are quickly raised about the ‘overstepping’ of the boundaries assigned by the law. 
The AB has already been accused of ‘making law’, instead of merely interpreting it and the 
possibility of ‘checks and balances’ operating within the WTO, has been proposed, so that 
when the AB makes a ‘mistake’ in its interpretations, the General Council or the Ministerial 
Conference could overturn its decision by adopting an interpretation of a WTO Agreement by 
two-thirds or a simple majority of the Membership.128 This would imply that developing 
countries, which hold the majority, could have the last say and perhaps strike down future 
decisions such as US-Shrimp. Yet it is not the decision in US-Shrimp which is the real 
problem but rather a lack of flexibility provided by the law in giving weight to arguments 
based on a concern for economic development, as discussed at length in chapter VI. This is 
not to say that judicial creativity is not possible beyond what is envisioned in the law. One 
need only to look at the example of the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia which 
disregarded the war nexus required by the Statute in the context of crimes against humanity 
making an important and necessary step forward beyond what politics had laid out.129 Panels 
at the WTO could show courage by adopting more ‘daring’ reports yet they are to expect 
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harsh criticism as already proposals such as a creation of a ‘peer-review’ group at the WTO 
have been suggested with the task of publishing criticisms of ‘problematic reports’.130 Apart 
from further intimidating the Panels from thinking outside the box this is rather redundant as 
academic peer review always exists anyway, without a need for a special group at the WTO.  
Significant tensions can also be observed between the DSM and the negotiation forum at the 
WTO in terms of treaty interpretation when this goes beyond US interests. For example, the 
practice of ‘zeroing’ has been consistently found to be WTO-inconsistent at the dispute 
settlement mechanism, yet the 2007 ‘Consolidated Texts on Anti-dumping and Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures circulated by the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules’ allows 
the utilization of zeroing under certain circumstances.131 This was in line with the US 
criticism of the Panels and the AB’s interpretative approach in zeroing cases and their 
insistence that zeroing is ‘allowable under current global trade rules, penned in the 1994 
Uruguay Round Accord’, and thus any agreement emerging from talks must recognize its 
validity.132 This clearly shows how the negotiating forum, or in other words its most powerful 
players, keeps the judicial branch in check when it interprets law against their wishes. The 
proposal of this thesis wishes to avoid such scenarios by clearly giving a mandate to the 
Panels and Appellate Body to adjudicate based on a consistency with the right to 
development as a constitutional right and not something which can be easily adjusted at the 
negotiations according to US wishes.  
 
7. How Realistic is the Inclusion of a Right to Development in the WTO System 
This however brings us to the unfortunate fact that, speaking realistically, there is also almost 
zero likelihood that the US or any other developed country would be enthusiastic about 
accepting the right to development into the system in the first place. Still, with a consistent 
push from developing Member states and civil society, this goal is not impossible. 
Development is already purportedly the goal of the organisation as well as of the international 
community generally, therefore it would be hard to mount a principled resistance to the 
inclusion of such a right as long as its formulation would not go into detail about how it 
should be protected or enforced. Perhaps this should be the strategy of pushing for such 
reform, i.e. presenting it as a limited concept at the start with little contentious issues. The 
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Declaration on the Right to Development itself is quite abstract and vague.133 Unlike the ideal 
formulation described and proposed by the present author in the sections above, a more 
modestly defined concept of a right to development can more easily overcome initial hurdles 
for its acceptance which would be posed by those who do not wish to see any concrete 
implementation obligations or even by developing countries themselves due to the different 
interests between them. For example not specifying that it may work against the free trade 
mantra, can make it easier to pass through the negotiations. It would then be for the Panels 
and Appellate Body to fill in the gaps and interpret it in a way that would bring out its full 
potential. As many other concepts in national as well as international law, which evolve 
through time, a vaguely defined right to development at the WTO would provide a humble 
seed with the potential to grow into the enforceability tool necessary for re-shaping the 
international trade law into a more just system, as envisioned by the conceptual architects of 
the right to development. Judicial lawmaking has proved essential in the past when politics 
erect a wall in front of progress. The situation could become similar to that found in the 
context of terrorism, where political considerations have long been preventing a workable 
international definition of the crime from being created. Thus Judge Baragwanath from the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon has called for a judicial decision to fill the vacuum, preferably 
by the International Court of Justice or failing that, by domestic or international courts seized 
of a relevant issue in exercise of their responsibility to contribute to the creation of 
international law.134 He maintains that the creation and development of international law is 
the responsibility of every court, both domestic and international and that judges need to 
furthermore be able to demonstrate they and the rule of law serve the whole of community.135  
Of course any kind of drastic reform, such as the one proposed is unlikely to happen without 
peoples’ struggles to engage in collective action.136 Adequate collective action, however, 
needs to take place not only in developing countries but more importantly in developed 
countries, which ultimately hold the power to change the status quo. In this regard, 
countering the neo-liberal propaganda and spreading genuine knowledge is essential. It was 
thus part of the methodology of this research to present as exhaustively and systematically the 
issues we should be focusing on in terms of reforming the WTO into a more developmentally 
friendly model. By proposing the inclusion of a right to development into the WTO, the 
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thesis furthermore provides a goal which the civil society could comfortably rally behind, 
without necessarily understanding the intricate details and economics behind the WTO 
agreements or proposing concrete changes to them. This would then happen at a later stage, 
once such a right would become a legal tool for developing countries to use at the dispute 
panels as mentioned. Peoples’ struggles have engaged before in collective action behind the 
right to development. Furthermore we are currently witnessing a growing awareness of the 
American public about the impacts of their foreign policies. If the trend continues, which 
seems to be the case, we can expect the American public to demand of their politicians a 
higher level of sensitivity towards developing countries, something almost entirely lacking in 
their current political discourse surrounding elections. It is also encouraging to know that 
alternative news outlets, which reach a considerable amount of people on social media, have 
reported on the WTO dispute settlement decisions in the India - Solar Cells case thus 
bringing to the general public an idea of what the problems are. De Zayas has called for a 
greater engagement of the general public in the form of holding referendums based on impact 
assessments of trade agreements.137 The Expert's idea may not be ideal in terms of such 
referendums potentially going for all or nothing, however it does stress the importance of the 
public in participating. A better solution would be the kind of involvement which could 
provide tools for a constant improvement and re-evaluation of existing agreements such as 
this thesis proposes. It has to be said however that ultimately, how realistic the inclusion of 
the right to development into the WTO system is, cannot be a measure of the merit of this call 
and it should not discourage us from trying to push for it. At the moment saving our 
ecosystem from imminent destruction seems equally as unrealistic. Yet hopefully this should 
not stop us from trying to prevent it.  
One could undoubtedly also raise the point that even with a formal recognition of the right to 
development within the WTO, developed countries would never respect or implement rulings 
which would substantially depart from the rules as they stand at the moment. A disregard for 
such rulings could have a negative effect on the reputation of said states, however it is 
questionable whether they really need to take this into account in order to protect their 
interests. As much as reputation for complying with international law may be beneficial to 
some states, it may be quite unnecessary for others. States which are strong enough can 
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achieve their objectives through a reputation for toughness,138 rather than a reputation for 
being ‘good’ obedient partners, which is what weaker states must uphold to avoid costs such 
as the ‘exclusion from future opportunities to cooperate or tougher terms of cooperation’.139 
However it is the proposition of this author that such rulings, even if not respected, could 
nevertheless play an important role, that is, in being an authoritative and respectable source of 
law that could counter the current propaganda machine, diminish the soft power and bring 
change in the long run. Furthermore even the US has started showing signs of a concern for 
its failing propaganda. The election of Trump has brought to the surface all kinds of dodgy 
politics pursued by the US around the globe and the people are slowly but surely waking up 
and demanding more accountability from the hegemon.  
 
8. Negative Effect on Predictability 
Regardless of the fairness or unfairness of the international trade law system, one of its 
undisputed merits is the predictability it offers to Member states. Predictability is furthermore 
important for development as it is an essential element of any economic planning. Art. 3(2) 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding emphasises how the ‘dispute settlement of the WTO 
is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system.’ Introducing the right to development in the system which might disturb the status 
quo and thus at least temporarily disturb the predictability, may thus be seen as problematic. 
However, in the long run, one cannot just keep a system unjust, because of short term 
predictability concerns. Eventually as mentioned above the desire to avoid challengeable 
rules may incentivise states to come up with fair and pro-development rules and conditions 
already at the negotiations thus avoiding uncertainty in the future. In a sense, the DSM 
already positively influences negotiations in this regard. For example in March 2005, the 
Appellate Body upheld Panel findings against the US on various cotton subsidies in response 
to a complaint brought by Brazil.140 It was thanks to this complaint being brought to the 
dispute settlement mechanism that the Cotton four managed to achieve their goals at the 
Hong Kong Ministerial, even though only two of these countries joined the dispute as third 
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parties.141 In short, short term negative effects on predictability may be overcome in the long 
run. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
The power politics which shape rules at the WTO are shaping international law and policies 
generally. This is not surprising considering how the international society and lawmaking had 
been set out from the beginning and considering the persistent lack of a sense that we live in a 
world community which just as any other community should uphold constitutional values for 
the benefit of everyone, beyond the outcomes of bargaining.  
Cass finds that what one considers to be legitimate, depends on what one is interested in 
achieving; thus those interested in welfare enhancement consider a system legitimate if more 
countries achieve greater growth, whereas those promoting the so-called Washington 
consensus consider a system legitimate if it encourages states to adjust their policies to the 
demands of said consensus.142 However legitimacy cannot be relative to such an extent, 
unless it is to become meaningless. The WTO and the Washington consensus claim that their 
ultimate goal is achieving welfare enhancement therefore it is not implied anywhere that 
liberalisation is the alpha and omega of legitimacy, a goal in itself. It may be so in reality, 
however the reluctance to admit this fact attests to the recognition that true legitimacy lies 
elsewhere. The development of poorer countries is undisputedly one of the core values of the 
general public as we have discussed in chapter II and it is furthermore a fundamental goal of 
the international community, found also in the UN Charter.143 It is the proposition of this 
author that a move away from pure power politics at WTO negotiations into a more objective 
mechanism that would ensure the respect of the right to development in the organisation 
through judicial means would thus address its legitimacy gap. In the past couple of decades, 
international litigation has grown substantially in size and importance and it now occupies a 
prominent place in international relations. In the words of HE Judge Sir Christopher 
Greenwood, ‘there is no doubt that the effective and impartial adjudication of international 
disputes makes the world a safer place and one in which justice plays a greater role.’144 
Impartial adjudication on the rules themselves against constitutional norms of the 
international community whether this be based on the UN Charter or the common values of 
                                                            
141 Rolland, supra note 84, p. 98. 
142 D. Z. Cass, The Constitutionalisation of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy and 
Community in the International Trading System, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 47. 
143 S. Cho, ‘A Quest for WTO’s Legitimacy’, 4 World Trade Review, (2005),  
144 C. Greenwood, ‘Some Challenges of International Litigation, 1 Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, p. 9. 
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humanity is no less important and mechanisms need to be set up to provide for such a 
possibility. Domestically, constitutional courts play the role of evaluating regulations against 
the higher norms embodied in the constitution of a state. Parallel mechanisms need to exist 
internationally and it is this what the present author is proposing with the inclusion of the 
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